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Foreword
This report represents the outcome of a joint and shared effort between 
our two organizations: the National Academy of Public Administration 
(NAPA) and the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). In their respective 
spheres, these two institutions play important roles by bringing to bear ex-
pert advice on some of the most significant challenges facing our nation.
At the request of and with the support of the John D. and Catherine 
T. MacArthur Foundation and using procedures of the National Research 
Council, NAS and NAPA jointly undertook a 2-year study of the long-
term fiscal challenge facing the United States. The work was performed by 
a stellar committee representing a diversity of disciplines and practices, a 
wealth of experience with the federal budget and various public policies, 
and a wide range of political and policy views. The committee has worked 
in harmony and forged a strong consensus under the leadership of its co-
chairs, John Palmer and Rudy Penner. We thank them for their leadership 
and the entire committee for their extraordinary efforts.
No one reading this report can avoid being struck by the magnitude 
of the long-term budget challenge facing the federal government. Other 
studies have called attention to this challenge in similar terms. Uniquely, 
however, this study provides a framework that leaders and others can use 
to systematically consider a range of choices to put the federal budget on 
a sustainable course.
This report neither presumes nor recommends a particular path to a 
stable fiscal future. In a democracy, it is not the role of experts from outside 
the government to decide important policy questions, especially questions 
of this magnitude. That is the task of political leaders. And voters have the 
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responsibility to engage in the issues, elect officials who understand the 
challenges, and then hold them accountable for acting responsibly.
As a group of experts, the committee is providing the basis for making 
policy decisions and their professional judgment about the key issues for 
our fiscal future. It acknowledges the differences in values and perspec-
tives that must be reconciled in order to reach agreement. It illustrates the 
range, as well as the difficulty, of the policy choices that have to be faced. 
It also offers a set of analytical tools for weighing those choices, including 
practical tests that can be applied to budget proposals to determine their 
fiscal prudence.
Much is at stake. If we as a nation do not grapple promptly and wisely 
with the changes needed to put the federal budget on a sustainable course, 
all of us will find that the public goals we most value are at risk. This re-
port will have served its purpose if its insights and analytical framework 
are widely used to support serious discussion of this most urgent question. 
We hope that it will receive the widest possible attention.
Ralph J. Cicerone Jennifer L. Dorn
President President and Chief Executie Officer
National Academy of Sciences National Academy of 
Chair  Public Administration
National Research Council
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Summary
The federal government is currently spending far more than it col-
lects in revenues, and if current policies are continued, will do so for the 
foreseeable future. Over the long term, three major programs—Medicare, 
Medicaid, and Social Security—account for the projected faster growth in 
federal spending relative to revenues. No reasonably foreseeable rate of 
economic growth would overcome this structural deficit. Thus, any efforts 
to rein in future deficits must entail either large increases in taxes to support 
these programs or major restraints on their growth—or some combination 
of the two. The good news is that the nation now has many options to 
change course and put the federal budget on a different path. Taking steps 
soon to stabilize the nation’s fiscal future will be less costly and difficult 
than acting later.
The Committee on the Fiscal Future of the United States was estab-
lished under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the 
National Academy of Public Administration, supported by the John D. and 
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, to carry out a comprehensive study 
leading to a set of plausible scenarios for the federal budget, to put it on 
a path toward a stable fiscal future. Members of the committee have quite 
varied backgrounds and perspectives on the budget. We disagree on many 
policy matters; but we are unanimous that forceful, even painful, action 
must be taken soon to alter the nation’s fiscal course.
Without such action, the long-term mismatch between expected rev-
enues and the estimated costs of government policies and programs will 
continue to require the government to borrow heavily. If remedial action 
is postponed for even a few years, a large and increasing federal debt 
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will inevitably limit the nation’s future wealth by reducing the growth of 
capital stock and of the economy. It will also increase the nation’s liabili-
ties to investors abroad, who currently hold about one-half of the federal 
government’s debt. If policies do not change, a large and increasing debt 
will expand the portion of the budget required to pay interest on the debt, 
especially if interest rates rise, and thereby reduce the resources available 
for all other government activities. Increasing debt also may contribute 
to a loss of international and domestic investor confidence in the nation’s 
economy, which would, in turn, lead to even higher interest rates, lower 
domestic investment, and a falling dollar.
As shown in Figure S-1, the current trajectory of the federal budget 
cannot be sustained. Without a course change, the nation faces the risk of a 
disruptive fiscal crisis, a risk that increases each year that action to address 
the growing structural deficit is delayed. With delay, the available options 
become more extreme and therefore more difficult, and even more pain is 
shifted to future generations.
In the next year or two, large deficits and more borrowing are unavoid-
able given the severity of the economic downturn. However, action ought 
to begin soon thereafter—the committee believes that fiscal 2012 (which 
begins October 1, 2011) is a reasonable time to start—to first slow the rapid 
increase of the federal debt relative to the economy and then, over several 
years, reduce it to a more desirable level.
A first step toward dealing with the country’s fiscal challenge is to 
specify a concrete test that can help to assess whether any budget is moving 
toward sustainability in a prudent manner. There are a variety of ways to 
measure fiscal prudence and numerous targets and time paths that could 
be connected to various measures. In order to design plausible scenarios to 
FIGURE S-1 The long-run budget outlook.
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illustrate the implications of future policy choices, the committee selected a 
widely used metric as a reasonable (albeit not the only possible) indicator 
of fiscal prudence: the size of the government’s debt as a percentage of the 
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). The key concern undergirding the 
committee’s analysis is that under a continuation of current policies this 
ratio would continue to rise in the years ahead, with potentially harmful 
effects on current and future generations.
There is no magic number for the ratio of government debt to GDP; a 
smaller debt is always more manageable and gives a nation more ability to 
absorb unexpected shocks. A higher debt limits its choices and flexibility. 
The committee believes that the debt that will result if the United States 
continues with current tax and spending policies will be at a level that 
poses too great a risk to the economic welfare of the current generation and 
would impose an unfair and crushing burden on future generations. (The 
debt, which was about 40 percent of GDP just 2 years ago, is now above 
50 percent and rising rapidly.) This is a judgment based on the committee’s 
deliberations over the best available data, literature, understanding of eco-
nomic policy and history, and analysis of possible scenarios. Given the ad-
ditional risk of carrying a higher debt burden, the committee believes that 
the growth in this ratio must soon be limited, as shown in Figure S-2.
More specifically, the committee believes that some combination of 
revenue increases and spending restraints should be implemented soon 
to constrain the growth of federal debt as a percentage of GDP within a 
decade to a level that provides an appropriate balance between the risks as-
FIGURE S-2 Debt savings from stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio in 12 years.
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sociated with a higher ratio and the additional difficulties of implementing 
policies that would be consistent with a lower ratio. The committee judged 
that a debt of 60 percent of GDP reflects an appropriate balance and is an 
achievable target within a decade—and is therefore useful to guide policy 
choices that will ultimately be made by elected leaders. This is a different 
ratio than the committee would have likely proposed under different cir-
cumstances. Indeed, it will surely be seen by some as too high and by others 
as too low. But the committee believes it is the lowest ratio that is practical 
given the fiscal outlook. A higher debt burden would leave the nation less 
able to cope with unforeseeable but inevitable shocks—such as interna-
tional crises or natural disasters—requiring a vigorous federal response. It 
would put the nation closer to a point from which no politically credible 
path to sustainability could be constructed. Moreover, stabilizing the debt 
at a higher ratio implies a higher deficit, a greater draw on the nation’s 
saving or more foreign borrowing, which will have a negative impact on 
future living standards. On the other side, a lower ratio would imply even 
more painful changes in tax and spending policies.
The rapid growth of federal spending for health care is the largest 
contributor to the nation’s long-term fiscal challenge. Any reasonable path 
to fiscal sustainability will have to include reforms to reduce the growth 
rates of Medicare and Medicaid. The challenge posed by Social Security is 
far less problematic, but still substantial. Options for putting it on a sound 
fiscal footing range from sizable reductions in currently projected benefit 
growth to sizable increases in payroll taxes, with many possible intermedi-
ate combinations. Spending growth in many other areas of federal activity 
can be moderated, in part by curtailing or reforming less effective programs. 
Options that raise taxes substantially include significant reforms to make 
the tax system fairer and more efficient and include the introduction of new 
taxes on consumption.
These and other policy changes can be combined to produce a wide 
range of budget paths or scenarios that would bring revenues and spending 
into close alignment over the long term and to stabilize the nation’s debt 
burden. The committee’s different scenarios are intended as an illustrative, 
but by no means definitive or exhaustive, set of trajectories toward a sus-
tainable fiscal future. The committee offers four representative scenarios 
that illustrate a wide range of available policy choices. Any of these paths 
would yield growing debt savings relative to current policies and stabilize 
the debt at 60 percent of GDP. To achieve this, the budget does not have 
to be balanced or in surplus. In fact, once the target debt ratio is reached, 
average deficits could be as high as 2 to 3 percent of GDP without debt 
growing faster than GDP.
The four illustrative paths show that many policy choices are available 
if action is taken soon. However, none of them is easy. If the choice is to 
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continue all government programs at a level consistent with current poli-
cies, both spending and revenues would have to rise dramatically to prevent 
an ever-rising debt in relation to GDP. Given the inefficiency of the present 
tax structure, it would almost certainly also be necessary to change how 
revenue is collected. If, instead, the choice is to keep the federal govern-
ment’s share of the economy close to the level of the past several decades, 
the government would have to scale back what it does, and extremely dif-
ficult choices would have to be made about what social goals to pursue less 
vigorously and what programs to end.
Figure S-3 compares the committee’s four illustrative paths.
1. Low	spending	and	revenue: revenues are held near their recent av-
erage level of 18 to 19 percent of GDP, and spending is 2 to 3 per-
centage points higher than revenues. This path would require sharp 
reductions in projected growth rates for health and retirement 
programs, as well as reductions in the proportion of the economy’s 
resources available for all other federal responsibilities.
2. High	spending	and	revenue: spending and revenues are increased 
substantially, with spending eventually reaching one-third of GDP. 
Because this spending level is still less than under a continuation of 
current policies, it would require an eventual reduction in the rate 
of growth of health spending. It would, however, accommodate the 
spending needed to maintain currently scheduled Social Security 
benefits. And it would allow spending on all other federal programs 
to be higher than the level implied by current policies.
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FIGURE S-3 Projected federal spending under the committee’s four scenarios.
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3. Intermediate	path	1: spending and revenues rise gradually to about 
one-fourth of GDP and spending on the elderly population would 
be constrained to support only modest expansion of other federal 
spending. The growth rates for Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid would be slower than under current policies. This path 
reflects the view that the federal government should make selective 
new public investments to promote economic growth, preserve the 
environment, and build for the future.
4. Intermediate	path	2: spending and revenues would eventually rise 
to a little more than one-fourth of GDP. Spending growth for 
health and retirement benefits for the elderly population would 
be slowed but less constrained than in the intermediate-1 path. 
Spending for other federal responsibilities would be reduced. This 
path reflects the view that the government’s implicit promises for 
the elderly are a higher priority than other spending.
The scenarios demonstrate that it is indeed possible to reduce the 
risk of financial disruption and put the budget on a sustainable course 
using the illustrative debt target of 60 percent of GDP and timeline to 
reach it. The choice of the starting date and timeline, as with the level 
of the target, will ultimately be a decision of elected leaders, taking into 
account the best information available to them when they must make 
budget choices.
The committee recognizes that this task is extremely difficult: the 
pain, whether cutting the growth of spending, increasing taxes, or both, 
must begin very soon, while the gain of avoiding a fiscal train wreck and 
its consequences is in the future and of uncertain magnitude. Although 
it may be natural to want to delay action, the committee has concluded 
that doing so would be costly and possibly perilous. With delay, revenues 
would have to be raised even higher or spending reduced even more to 
bring the debt to a prudent level while also incurring higher interest 
payments. With delay, also, the risk grows that the nation’s creditors—
especially, those abroad—will conclude that the United States has no plan 
to restore fiscal stability and will therefore demand higher interest rates or 
make other tough economic demands. The margin for error then would 
be smaller, and the options for corrective action even more painful than 
they are today.
The committee recognizes that fiscal sustainability cannot be achieved 
without major near-term policy changes, particularly forceful actions to 
slow the growth of spending in Medicare and Medicaid. Because of the 
difficulty of such changes, the committee proposes that elected leaders 
annually assess the country’s progress and develop concrete proposals to 
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place the budget on a sustainable path. To do so, the committee offers a 
framework that everyone can use to evaluate any proposed federal budget. 
Our framework of six tests can be used to hold leaders accountable for 
their proposed budgets:
1. Does the proposed budget include policy actions that start to 
reduce the deficit in the near future in order to reduce short-term 
borrowing and long-term interest costs?
2. Does the proposed budget put the government on a path to re-
duce the federal debt within a decade to a sustainable percentage 
of GDP? Given the fiscal outlook and the committee’s analysis of 
the many factors that affect economic outcomes, the committee 
believes that the lowest ratio that is economically manageable 
within a decade, as well as practically and politically feasible, is 60 
percent.
3. Does the proposed budget align revenues and spending closely over 
the long term?
4. Does the proposed budget restrain health care cost growth and 
introduce changes now in the major entitlement programs and in 
other spending and tax policies that will have cumulative beneficial 
fiscal effects over time?
5. Does the budget include spending and revenue policies that are 
cost-effective and promote more efficient use of resources in both 
the public and private sectors?
6. Does the federal budget reflect a realistic assessment of the fiscal 
problems facing state and local governments?
The President and Congress share accountability for putting and keep-
ing the federal budget on a sustainable path. The Office of Management 
and Budget and the Congressional Budget Office—as well as private organi-
zations—can make major contributions to the needed reassessment of the 
nation’s fiscal course by regularly publishing projections of the long-term 
effects of the President’s budget and of major alternatives. Those projec-
tions can be used to assess the extent to which proposals are sustainable 
by the tests above.
The current federal budget process does not favor forward-looking 
assessment and management of the nation’s fiscal position. The committee 
finds that the present process gives too much weight to the interests of the 
current generation and too little weight to the interests of future genera-
tions. If the process is an obstacle to prompt correct action, then the first 
step in dealing with the fiscal challenge is to reform it.
The committee favors reforming the budget process to make it more far 
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sighted and to establish a new regime of responsible budget stewardship. 
Under this new regime, leaders will be better prepared to take the political 
actions necessary to fairly represent the interests of the nation’s children 
and grandchildren and to avoid the potentially serious consequences of 
continuing on the present path.
If action is taken soon, the country has a wide choice of options to 
help achieve fiscal sustainability. All are difficult; but if action is postponed, 
the options will be fewer and the choices will be even more difficult. With 
delay, the risk of a disruptive fiscal crisis will grow, and the standard of 
living experienced by everyone’s grandchildren is likely to be lower than it 
is for people today.
The challenges are formidable, but not impossible. If the nation accepts 
sacrifices in the short run, it will be much stronger, safer, and more prosper-
ous in the long run.
1The Long-Term Challenge
It is simple arithmetic. The federal government’s spending for current 
programs—already far in excess of current revenues—is projected to grow 
much faster than its revenues in the coming decades.
The cumulative effect of the fundamental mismatch between expected 
revenues and the spending implied by the federal government’s policies and 
commitments will be a very large and rapid increase in the amounts that 
the United States must borrow to finance current spending. This spending 
will include growing interest payments to the individuals, institutions, and 
countries that provide the financing through the purchase of U.S. Treasury 
debt. In addition to this fundamental imbalance, there has been a surge 
of spending and a drop in revenues because of the 2008-2009 economic 
downturn, which added more than $1.5 trillion of debt in just 1 year, about 
$4,500 of additional borrowing for each U.S. resident. This temporary bor-
rowing surge is of concern, of course; however, it is the much larger longer-
term mismatch between projected spending and projected revenues implied 
by current policies that is the greater concern and the focus of this report.
Three major programs that primarily serve the elderly and many people 
of modest means—Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security—are largely 
responsible for the projected growth of spending. Medicare and Medicaid 
have been growing faster than either revenues or the economy for some 
time, driven by enhanced benefits, rapid growth of health care costs, and, 
more recently, by aging of the U.S. population. Social Security spending will 
grow faster than the economy in the near future as baby boomers retire. 
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Those three programs already account for nearly one-half of all spending 
(excluding interest on the debt). The challenge posed by this growth of 
spending will be compounded by the projected slowing growth of the labor 
force that is a direct result of the aging of the U.S. population. The number 
of people who receive retirement and health benefits will increase just as the 
growth of revenues from income and payroll taxes slows down.
If changes are not made, the nation’s debt is projected to surpass the 
immediate post-World War II record in less than 20 years, and it would be 
about seven times the size of the economy in 75 years. That, of course, is 
impossible. Long before the federal debt reached such a level, the United 
States would experience a financial crisis that would dwarf what the coun-
try has recently experienced, and with more lasting consequences.
The budgetary arithmetic may be simple, but making the necessary 
adjustments will not be. If policy changes are made, spending and revenues 
can gradually be brought into alignment, over several years. The required 
policy changes will entail some painful decisions, and action would have 
to begin soon. If such changes are delayed too long, it will not be possible 
to put the federal budget on a sustainable course before a fiscal disaster 
becomes inevitable.
In the face of the looming fiscal crisis, the John D. and Catherine T. 
MacArthur Foundation asked the National Academy of Sciences and the 
National Academy of Public Administration to undertake a comprehensive 
study to identify how to put the federal budget on a sustainable path; see 
Box 1-1 for the full charge to the committee. In response to that charge, 
the two organizations appointed our committee. (See Appendix H for 
biographical sketches of the committee members and staff.) The rest of 
this chapter discusses the size and nature of the budget challenge, how it 
arose, and its implications. Subsequent chapters discuss in detail how to 
approach solutions, what some major policy options look like, and how 
people of differing views might combine these options to put the budget on 
a sustainable long-term path. Chapter 2 provides a framework for thinking 
about how to address the fiscal challenge. Chapter 3 provides practical tests 
of fiscal prudence that can be applied to the federal budget or alternatives. 
Chapters 4 through 9 lay out major building blocks of possible corrective 
action—in three major areas of spending and in revenues—and then illus-
trate how such policy options can be combined in order to put the federal 
budget on a sustainable path. The results demonstrate that there are a 
wide range of possible ways to bring revenues and spending into alignment 
over the far horizon. Chapter 10 describes possible reforms of the budget 
process to make it easier to address the long-term fiscal challenge. Chapter 
11 describes how citizens and leaders can use the results of this study as a 
basis for constructive analysis and discussion of alternatives.
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THE BUDGET OUTLOOK
Largely because of the severe downturn in the economy that began in 
2008, the federal government borrowed $1.4 trillion in fiscal 2009 to pay 
for current spending, and it is expected to run an annual deficit in excess of 
$1 trillion for at least 1 more year. After the unprecedented deficits of 2009 
and 2010, the economy’s recovery will reduce the annual deficit, although 
BOX 1-1 
Committee Charge
	 An	ad	hoc	committee	will	conduct	the	following	tasks	and	prepare	a	report.
	 1.	 	Produce	 several	 baseline	 projections	 of	 the	 federal	 budget,	 deficit,	 and	
debt,	based	on	existing	information	and	on	an	analysis	of	the	nature	and	
extent	of	the	nation’s	fiscal	and	economic	conditions.	The	projections	will	
be	based	in	part,	on	data	from	sources	such	as	the	Social	Security	Actuar-
ies,	the	Congressional	Budget	Office,	and	the	U.S.	Office	of	Management	
and	Budget.
	 2.	 	Produce	a	fiscal	framework	and	set	of	guiding	principles	for	the	develop-
ment	of	policy	scenarios	and	estimates	of	 the	effects	of	selected	budget	
options.	The	framework	could	include	the	target	date	by	which	the	federal	
budget	would	achieve	balance	and	the	desired	path	to	close	the	fiscal	gap,	
which	 is	 the	amount	of	 spending	 reductions	or	 tax	 increases	needed	 to	
keep	debt	as	a	share	of	gross	domestic	product	at	or	below	today’s	ratio.
	 3.	 	Identify	values,	preferences,	and	concerns	that	prior	research	has	shown	
are	shared	by	segments	of	the	American	public	and	use	this	 information	
to	assist	in	the	development	of	several	budget	scenarios	that	are	designed	
to	 reduce	 federal	deficits	or	 federal	debt.	The	prior	 research	should	also	
take	account	of	alternative	views	of	the	roles	of	individuals	and	employers	
in	restoring	the	country’s	long-term	fiscal	health.
	 4.	 	Develop	 several	 budget	 scenarios	 that	will	 demonstrate	 various	ways	 to	
address	 the	 fiscal	 challenge	 facing	 the	 national	 economy	 over	 the	 next	
several	decades.	The	scenarios	will	deal	with	both	the	income	and	expen-
diture	sides	of	the	federal	budget.	The	scenarios	will	be	crafted	to	take	into	
account	information	on	values,	preferences,	and	concerns	of	the	American	
public	and	differing	views	of	the	roles	of	individuals	and	employers.
	 5.	 	Identify	and	evaluate	options	to	improve	fiscal	transparency	and	discipline	
in	the	federal	budget	development	process.
	 6.	 	Develop	a	report	that	will	summarize	the	methodology	and	evidentiary	base	
for	the	projections	and	provide	an	explanation	of	how	different	values	and	
attitudes	have	been	 reflected	 in	 the	policy	scenarios.	The	 report	will	 not	
recommend	a	single	solution	to	 the	structural	deficit	problem.	 Its	conclu-
sions	 will	 be	 limited	 largely	 to	 providing	 a	 framework	 for	 understanding	
the	deficit	issue	and	a	rigorous	methodology	for	analyzing	different	policy	
scenarios.
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it is likely to remain near historically high levels. But the debt, which was 
just over 40 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 
2008 and approaching 55 percent just 1 year later, will continue to grow; 
see Box 1-2 on the debt and the deficit.
Using information as of June 2009 (Congressional Budget Office, 
2009e) and projecting the likely effects of current policies, the long-term 
budget outlook if policies are not changed is bleak:
• By 2020, current policies would raise the federal debt to nearly 80 
percent of GDP; see Figure 1-1, which also shows trends in spend-
ing and revenue from 1965 to the present.
• In about 30 years, if new revenues are not raised, and the three big 
retirement and health programs are not modified, those programs 
alone will consume all available federal revenues. Even sooner, 
their growth will intensify pressure to cut the portion of federal 
spending that is subject to annual appropriations, an array of pro-
grams that includes most of the core functions of government and 
many services and investments generally considered vital.
BOX 1-2 
The Deficit and the Debt
	 The	“headline”	federal	budget	deficit	(or,	in	some	years,	surplus),	is	the	differ-
ence	in	a	given	year	between	what	the	government	spends	and	what	it	takes	in	
(revenues).	The	deficit	is	mostly	a	measure	of	the	net	cash	flows	to	and	from	the	
U.S.	Department	of	 the	Treasury.	The	deficit	 is	 financed	by	borrowing	 from	 the	
public	(individuals,	governments,	and	investors	here	and	in	other	countries).	The	
deficit	was	$459	billion	for	fiscal	2008	(the	year	ending	September	30,	2008)	and	
$1.4	trillion	in	fiscal	2009.
	 The	debt	is	the	cumulative	amount	the	U.S.	government	owes.	In	most	years,	
the	annual	deficit	is	a	rough	measure	of	the	change	that	year	in	the	federal	debt.	
However,	 in	 fiscal	 2008	 and	 2009	 the	 federal	 government	 also	 borrowed	 to	 fi-
nance	transactions	related	to	the	failure	of	major	financial	institutions.	The	publicly	
held	portion	of	 federal	debt	 is	 that	held	by	persons	or	organizations	(foreign	or	
domestic)	 outside	 the	 federal	 government.	 It	 excludes	 federal	 debt	 held	 inside	
the	government,	much	of	it	in	balances	of	the	Social	Security	and	Medicare	trust	
funds	dedicated	to	payment	of	future	benefits.	(The	combined	total	of	debt	held	by	
the	public	and	held	in	government	accounts	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	the	gross	
federal	debt.)	Debt	held	by	the	public	reached	$5.8	trillion	in	fiscal	2008	and	rose	
to	about	$7.5	trillion	a	year	later,	about	$25,000	per	person.	A	substantial	fraction	
of	the	outstanding	public	debt	matures	each	year	and	must	be	replaced	by	new	
borrowings	at	then-current	interest	rates.
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• Through about 2035, Social Security spending as a share of GDP 
will grow significantly, reflecting the broad demographic trend of 
an aging population. It will grow more slowly thereafter.
• Medicare and Medicaid will consume an increasing share of GDP 
as per-capita health spending continues to grow at a faster rate 
than the economy. Federal health spending also will grow because 
the number of recipients will increase, even without legislation ex-
panding program coverage, driven by the same aging demographic 
trend that affects Social Security.
• As noted above, if no action is taken to constrain or offset the 
growth of Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, if the tax rates 
stay near their current levels, and if other programs are held at 
their current share of GDP, the federal debt, deficits, and interest 
costs will explode over the long term. If all this were to occur, the 
federal debt would be more than seven times the nation’s GDP in 
75 years; see Figure 1-2.
These projections, which largely rely on the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) for estimates (although making a few different assumptions, see Box 
1-3), are similar to those that others have made using similar techniques. 
They estimate the budget effects of current policies if they are continued 
over a long period—what is commonly referred to as a budget baseline; see 
Box 1-3. CBO’s June 2009 long-term outlook reached the same basic con-
clusion as its previous updates, that “under current law, the federal budget 
is on an unsustainable path” (Congressional Budget Office, 2009e:1). The 
latest long-term projections from the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), using somewhat different assumptions, also confirm that “the long-
term fiscal outlook is unsustainable” (Government Accountability Office, 
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FIGURE 1-1 The long-term budget outlook.
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2009:1). The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), in its annual 
long-run budget outlook published in April 2009, also says that “increasing 
health costs and the aging of the population will place the budget on an 
unsustainable course without changes in policy to address these challenges” 
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009a:191). In sum, our conclu-
sion that a change of course is needed is not at all controversial among the 
government’s experts, and private analysts agree (Auerbach and Gale, 2009; 
Cox et al., 2009; Moore, 2009). What is controversial is just how urgent 
is corrective action, an issue we address later in the report. Similarly, there 
will be controversy, even among those who believe that action is needed 
very soon, on what mix of spending and revenue policies should be pursued 
to close the fiscal gap.
BOX 1-3 
Constructing a Budget Baseline
	 A	baseline	is	useful	for	understanding	the	implications	of	current	policies	as	
they	could	play	out	over	time	and	as	a	benchmark	against	which	to	measure	the	
effects	of	proposed	policy	changes.	A	baseline	is	not	a	prediction—of	course,	no	
one	can	predict	the	fiscal	future	with	much	accuracy	over	even	a	few	years.	Nor	
is	it	a	“realistic”	projection	in	the	sense	that	it	unrealistically	assumes	no	changes	
in	policy.	The	study	committee	developed	 its	baseline	by	making	several	modi-
fications	 to	baseline	projections	published	by	 the	Congressional	Budget	Office.	
In	most	cases,	these	modifications	were	to	take	account	of	 likely	congressional	
actions.	 Specifically,	 the	 committee’s	 baseline	 assumes	 that	 Congress	 acts	 to	
extend	expiring	tax	breaks	that	have	bipartisan	support,	continues	providing	relief	
from	the	alternative	minimum	tax,	adjusts	for	expected	costs	of	operations	in	Iraq	
and	Afghanistan,	assumes	modest	 increases	 (instead	of	sharp	cuts	 that	are	 in	
the	law	but	Congress	annually	overrides)	in	fees	paid	to	physicians	by	Medicare,	
and	adds	an	expected	cost	for	federal	disaster	payments.
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FIGURE 1-2 The long-term outlook for the debt.
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If no major policy changes are made, debt service (the amount the U.S. 
government must spend each year for interest on the debt), which was more 
than $800 per person in 2008, would roughly double in those terms by 2020 
at current interest rates. But average interest rates on government debt now 
are extraordinarily low, because of worldwide economic conditions: CBO 
and others project that, as the recovery proceeds, the government’s borrow-
ing rates will return to more historically normal levels, roughly doubling 
over the 10-year period. With debt nearly doubling and the government’s 
average borrowing rate rising, spending for debt service in 2020 could ap-
proach $1,700 per person. And beyond 2020, the projected growth of the 
debt accelerates. Of course, uncertainties surround any budget forecast, 
especially over a long horizon; see Box 1-4. Each update changes the picture 
slightly, without changing the basic conclusion; for example, CBO’s August 
2009 update of its 10-year baseline increased the projection of cumulative 
deficits over 10 years by about $1.5 trillion relative to its March estimate 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2009a, 2009g).1 However, this update does 
not change the committee’s conclusion that if action is not taken soon the 
necessary and nearly certain result will be a larger discrepancy between rev-
enues and spending and heavier burden of debt that eventually will require 
very sharp cuts in spending or very sharp increases in taxes. These, in turn, 
could have disruptive effects on many people and inflict severe damage on 
the economy or raise the risk of a severe financial crisis.
BOX 1-4 
Uncertainties
	 The	fiscal	outlook	could	be	worse	than	projected	if:
	 •	 	the	 economic	 recovery	 is	 weaker	 or	 slower	 than	 forecast,	 automatically	
increasing	spending	and	depressing	revenues;
	 •	 	health	spending	growth	is	faster	than	projected;
	 •	 	new	or	expanded	spending	programs	are	not	fully	offset	by	new	revenues	
or	cuts	in	other	programs;
	 •	 	annually	appropriated	spending	(that	is,	other	than	for	entitlements)	grows	
with	 GDP	 rather	 than	 only	 with	 inflation,	 as	 assumed	 for	 the	 next	 10	
years;
	 •	 	new	 crises—pandemics,	 wars,	 major	 natural	 disasters;	 major	 bankrupt-
cies—demand	emergency	spending;	or
	 •	 	interest	rates	rise	more	than	projected.
	 The	fiscal	outlook	could	be	better	than	projected	if	economic	growth	is	stronger	
than	 forecast,	 if	health	spending	growth	slows,	or	 if	 interest	 rates	 remain	 lower	
than	predicted.
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A crisis could begin when, absent a credible plan to correct the fiscal 
mismatch, the nation’s creditors—the people and institutions that hold the 
nation’s debt—demand additional interest (or sell their dollar-denominated 
assets) to compensate for increased risk that the United States could default 
on its debts. Such a result seems unthinkable today, but so too, just 2 years 
ago, did the bankruptcy of General Motors and huge financial institutions. 
Although the “too late to turn back” date is unclear, it is clear that the 
clock is ticking. Certainly, the consequences of failing to address the fiscal 
challenge in time would be far more painful than those of acting to put the 
budget on a sustainable path. Fortunately, the nation still has reasonable 
options.
THE FISCAL CHALLENGE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
At the end of World War II, the size of the federal debt was a record 
109 percent of GDP. So, in one sense, the United States has been here be-
fore. But in the immediate post-World War II period, the U.S. economy was 
growing rapidly. Rapid growth of the labor force after the war, combined 
with inflation that eroded the value of the debt principal, made the task 
of balancing the budget easier. The debt was reduced to about 25 percent 
of GDP by the 1970s. It rose again, to about 50 percent in the very early 
1990s, but then reached another low—33 percent of GDP—in 2001. At the 
end of fiscal 2008, the federal debt was equal to about 41 percent of GDP, 
about where it had been in the 1960s and, again, as recently as 1999.
Yet there is a major difference in the post-World War II situation and 
the current situation. For one thing, labor force growth now is slowing 
(with the retirement of baby boomers) rather than accelerating. Further-
more, the debt incurred during World War II was owed almost entirely 
to average Americans; in contrast, today’s debt is largely held by govern-
ments and foreign investors. Governments and other investors held less 
than 5 percent of outstanding Treasury debt in the 1960s, but they held 
nearly 50 percent at the end of 2008. Realistically, a large proportion of 
the trillions of dollars of additional debt that the federal government will 
accumulate in coming years will have to be funded from foreign institutions 
and investors.
If people are willing to lend to the U.S. government, as they have been, 
then the current debt burden is sustainable. However, looking farther 
ahead, it is clear that the budget is on an unsustainable course, as noted 
above: Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid have been growing and 
will continue to grow rapidly. Arithmetically, these three programs alone 
largely account for the long-term problem. In 2008, Social Security paid 
about $612 billion to beneficiaries of its old-age, survivors, and disability 
insurance programs. Although Medicare health benefit payments of $460 
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billion were partly offset by premiums paid by the program’s (mostly el-
derly) beneficiaries, net outlays were still almost $390 billion. The spending 
for Medicaid, the health program targeted for poor people, totaled just over 
$200 billion. Together, these three big programs in 2008 accounted for 
nearly 45 percent of federal spending (excluding interest on the debt).
Rapidly rising health care costs are at the core of the federal govern-
ment’s fiscal challenge. Although part of that rise results from predictable 
growth in the number of aged beneficiaries, more of it is attributable to 
the extent to which costs per beneficiary are expected to continue to grow 
faster than per capita GDP (even after adjusting for changes in the age-sex 
mix of the beneficiary population), as they have in the past. If such “excess 
cost growth”—as it is called—continues as CBO and others project, the 
federal spending on health care alone will exceed the total amount col-
lected in federal revenues within 50 years. There is little evidence to date 
to suggest that the growth of health costs will slow any time soon without 
major changes in health policy, and some changes, such as expanded health 
insurance coverage, could exacerbate the budget problem unless they are 
offset or paid for by savings in health care or elsewhere, or by new revenues 
(see Chapter 5).
The United States—like many other affluent countries—faces a steep 
demographic transition. There are several factors in the transition. People 
65 and older, who currently make up 13 percent of the population, are 
expected to account for 20 percent by 2035. Over the same time, the ex-
pected patterns of retirement, immigration, longevity, and birth rates will 
result in a decline in the percentage of the population of working age. Over 
the next 20 to 30 years, aging of the population will be as important, or 
more important than, the projected growth in health care costs in driving 
up spending for the three major entitlement programs (Biggs, 2008; U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, 2009c). Over a longer term, a 70-year 
horizon, aging and cost increases are expected by most analysts to play 
roughly equal parts in driving up spending for Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid; see Figure 1-3.
The slowdown in workforce growth not only means a rise in the 
proportion of the population who are recipients of federal retirement 
and health benefits, but also a long-term slowing of economic growth. A 
smaller proportion of the population working also means that, absent other 
changes, federal income and payroll tax revenues will grow more slowly 
than they have in the past.
The long-term problem existed before the economic downturn that be-
gan in 2008, but the downturn has made it worse. The downturn has thus 
far affected the fiscal outlook in four main ways (not all negative). It has 
(1) temporarily reduced individual and corporate incomes and therefore tax 
collections related to personal income and corporate profits; (2) temporar-
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ily increased spending for economically vulnerable or newly unemployed 
people, their communities, and some sectors of the economy; (3) led to the 
“stimulus” legislation, including new temporary tax provisions and spend-
ing, and to a variety of new federal authority to provide financial support 
for or to rescue private financial institutions and provide relief for home-
owners facing default; and (4) temporarily reduced inflation and interest 
rates.2 The jump in deficits and borrowing resulting from the downturn 
may be only temporary, but the extra trillions of debt that will have ac-
cumulated in that period will be a lasting burden. This extra burden also 
makes the challenge of facing the much larger long-term deficits implied by 
current policies greater and more urgent.
The United States is not alone in facing growing gross government 
debt. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has projected that the aver-
age public debt-to-GDP ratio in 2014 for 19 major industrialized countries 
would exceed their weighted average at the end of 2007, which was then 
78 percent of GDP, by 36 percentage points of GDP; and that debt ratios 
for these countries would continue to grow over the longer term because 
of demographic forces (International Monetary Fund, 2009a:26). (These 
international comparisons include debt for all levels of government, not just 
the central or federal level, and internal as well as publicly held debt.)
CHANGING PATTERNS OF SPENDING AND REVENUES
Over the past 50 years, the federal government’s budget has usually 
been somewhat out of balance—that is, revenues were less than spending 
Fig1-3.eps
In the Absence of
Population Aging and
Excess Health Care
Cost Growth
Effect of Aging
Effect of Excess
Cost Growth
0
5
10
15
20
25
2009 2019 2029 2039 2049 2059 2069 2079Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
o
f G
ro
s
s 
D
o
m
e
s
tic
 
Pr
o
du
c
t
FIGURE 1-3 Factors in projected Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid spend-
ing, 2009-2079, as a percentage of GDP.
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (2009e:12).
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(outlays). In fiscal 2008, the budget deficit equaled 3.2 percent of GDP. 
However, in fiscal 2009, the combination of falling revenues and higher 
spending because of the downturn have caused the deficit to swell to about 
10 percent of GDP (4 percentage points higher than the largest previous 
deficit since World War II), rapidly adding to the amounts the federal gov-
ernment must borrow to finance its current spending. For perspective, in 
the 1970s the federal debt had fallen to about 25 percent of GDP; the 2009 
deficit alone increased the debt by more than 10 percent of GDP.
Federal government outlays in 2008 equaled just under 21 percent of 
the size of the U.S. economy, almost the same proportion as in 1979 (U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, 2009c). In fiscal 2008, the federal gov-
ernment spent nearly $3 trillion, about $9,600 for every U.S. resident; see 
Figure 1-4.
In 2009, federal spending spiked to 25 percent of GDP, higher than the 
previous post-World War II maximum of 23.5 percent, in 1983. Revenues 
dipped to 15 percent of GDP in 2009, a low not seen since the 1950s. In 
2009, the deficit approached 10 percent of GDP, far above the previous 
postwar high of 6 percent in 1983, another recession year.
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid (as well as some smaller but 
similarly designed programs) are sometimes referred to as “entitlements” 
because their spending is determined by provisions of law establishing 
who is eligible and for what payments. These are part of a broader class 
of federal programs (commonly referred to as “mandatory spending pro-
grams”) for which the level of spending is not determined through annual 
congressional appropriations; instead, absent a change in policies, spending 
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is largely determined by changes over time in demographic and cost factors. 
From 1962 to 2008, spending for the three large entitlement programs in-
creased from 2.5 percent to 8.5 percent of GDP; see Figure 1-5A. As noted 
above, their costs are projected to continue growing faster than federal 
revenues and the economy in the decades ahead.
Over the same period, other noninterest spending declined from 15 
percent to less than 11 percent of GDP; see Figures 1-5B and 1-5C. This 
diverse category of spending topped $1.4 trillion in 2008: about $610 
billion for defense spending and $520 billion for nondefense spending. 
The category includes a wide range of programs (commonly referred to as 
“discretionary”) for which spending levels are set annually by congressio-
nal appropriations. These include foreign aid, science and space programs, 
environmental protection, transportation, biomedical research, grants to 
states for education and social services, veterans’ medical care, and the 
administration of justice. Although most of the programs are discretion-
ary, the category also includes smaller entitlements (totaling about $400 
billion)—food stamps, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, 
the refundable Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), federal military and civil 
service retirement, unemployment compensation, payments to disabled 
veterans, and farm price supports.
Defense and international spending, one of the largest components of 
this part of the budget, accounted for more than 10 percent of GDP 50 
years ago and again at the height of the Vietnam War before falling to less 
than 5 percent 30 years ago and as low as 3 percent at the end of the 1990s 
(see Figure 1-5B). In 2008, as the United States was fighting wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, it had risen to just over 4 percent of GDP.
Because spending for federal programs other than the three large en-
titlements grew less rapidly than the U.S. economy from the early 1960s 
to 2008, the federal government was able to keep taxes stable and hold its 
debt in a sustainable range as a proportion of GDP. In other words, the high 
growth rate of the large entitlement programs for retirement and health 
over a long interval was offset by slower growth of spending for defense 
and some other programs. From 2008 on, however, it is hard to imagine 
how the anticipated continued growth of the large entitlements could be 
offset by further relative reductions in other spending. The large entitle-
ments have grown even larger, and the smaller programs are now so small 
as a group that even eliminating them would not yield sufficient savings to 
offset future growth of the larger ones.
The government paid a net $253 billion in interest in fiscal 2008—the 
cost of servicing its debt less some interest earnings. This interest is paid 
to investors in U.S. Treasury bonds and other U.S. Treasury securities. The 
outstanding volume of the nation’s publicly held debt was $5.8 trillion at 
the end of 2008 and reached $7.6 trillion a year later. The interest total 
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excludes interest income from debt held by federal trust funds, like Social 
Security; see Figure 1-5D.
In 2008, the government collected just over $2.5 trillion in revenues—
equal to 17.7 percent of GDP, or about $8,100 per person. For almost three 
decades, two sources have accounted for about 80 percent of the money 
the federal government takes in: the individual income tax, which brought 
in more than $1.1 trillion in fiscal 2008, and social insurance (payroll) 
taxes, which brought in $900 billion in that year. Social insurance taxes are 
dominated by the 15.3 percent payroll tax that workers and their employers 
pay for Social Security and the Medicare Hospital Insurance programs. For 
most workers, in fact, social insurance taxes are higher than income taxes 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2007a). Corporate income taxes accounted 
for about $300 billion of the government’s revenues in fiscal 2008. The re-
maining $170 billion came from excise taxes on gasoline, alcohol, tobacco, 
airline tickets, and other products and services; estate and gift taxes; cus-
toms duties; and miscellaneous receipts (chiefly the earnings of the Federal 
Reserve System); see Figure 1-6.
Because federal revenues fell far short of the $3 trillion in federal out-
lays in fiscal 2008, the government covered the gap by borrowing3—the 
“exploded” wedge in Figure 1-6. The deficit of $459 billion in that year 
amounted to 15 percent of total outlays and slightly more than 3 percent of 
GDP. On a per-person basis, it came to about $1,500 for each U.S. resident 
in 2008. However, the following year, as spending surged and revenues fell 
during the economic downturn, both borrowing and the debt increased 
significantly.
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FIGURE 1-6 Federal revenues and borrowing in fiscal 2008.
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Revenues, as a percentage of the economy, have stayed relatively con-
stant since 1978. In fact, revenues have been remarkably stable in these 
terms over the past 40 years, never falling below 17 percent of GDP and 
only once (in 2000) exceeding 20 percent of GDP, despite many changes in 
tax policy and economic ups and downs. Missing from most discussion and 
representations of revenues is “tax expenditures,” revenues not received; 
see Box 1-5.
The downturn that began in 2008 has at least temporarily caused major 
changes in both spending and revenues, especially for fiscal 2009. Spending 
rose sharply as the federal government stepped in to stabilize the financial 
sector and stimulate the economy. As incomes and business profits fell, so 
did revenues. The resulting very large increase in the deficit was financed 
with additional borrowing.
Few economic experts would forgo strictly temporary increases in fed-
eral spending, deficits, and debt in an economic downturn as severe as this 
one. Such deficits are countercyclical—they help moderate the societal ef-
fects of a recession that might otherwise be far harsher, and they may speed 
BOX 1-5 
Tax Expenditures
	 An	invisible	component	of	charts	like	Figure	1-6—because	no	one	has	figured	
out	 how	 to	 depict	 negative	 slices	of	 pie—is	 tax	expenditures.	Also	dubbed	 tax	
breaks,	 preferences,	 or	 loopholes,	 “tax	 expenditures”	 refer	 to	 departures	 from	
normal	tax	law	that	favor	certain	types	of	income	or	economic	activity.	Tax	expen-
ditures	reduce	the	amount	of	money	that	the	government	collects	from	specified	
sources.	Analysts	debate	how	best	 to	measure	 tax	expenditures,	but	one	com-
monly	used	measure	is	the	annual	loss	of	revenue	resulting	from	each	provision	
(assuming	other	parts	of	the	current	tax	code	are	unchanged).
	 The	 Joint	Committee	on	Taxation	 (2008a)	 lists	more	 than	200	 tax	expendi-
tures,	 led	 by	 preferential	 rates	 on	 dividends	 and	 capital	 gains	 ($150	 billion	 in	
2008),	favorable	treatment	of	pensions	and	other	retirement	plans	($120	billion),	
the	 exclusion	 of	 employer	 contributions	 to	 health	 insurance	 and	 similar	 plans	
($117	billion),	 the	deductibility	of	mortgage	interest	on	owner-occupied	housing	
($67	billion),	and	the	deductibility	of	state	and	local	income,	sales,	and	property	
taxes	($48	billion).	This	list	of	the	top	five	tax	expenditures	omits	the	tax	rebates	
paid	as	part	of	the	economic	stimulus	effort,	which	the	Joint	Committee	estimated	
at	$95	billion	in	2008,	because	those	rebates	are	not	a	permanent	feature	of	the	
tax	 code.	 Although	 tax	 expenditures	 reduce	 federal	 revenues	 and	 thus	 make	
government’s	 role	 appear	 smaller	 by	 that	measure,	 they	 have	 the	 same	effect	
on	the	deficit	as	would	equivalent	spending	for	the	same	activities.	If	 they	were	
classified	as	federal	spending	instead	of	tax	benefits,	federal	expenditures	would	
have	been	about	30	percent	higher	in	2006	than	OMB	reported—slightly	over	26	
percent	of	GDP	instead	of	20.3	percent	(Burman,	Toder,	and	Geissler,	2008).
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recovery. The long-term problem with such widely accepted temporary defi-
cits during a short-term downturn is that they add to the accumulated debt. 
As two prominent economists have noted: “[E]ven if the recovery occurs as 
projected and the stimulus package is allowed to expire, the country will 
face the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsus-
tainable and urgent fiscal problem” (Auerbach and Gale, 2009:13).
Interest rates on U.S. Treasury bonds fell dramatically during the down-
turn. This may indicate that buyers of federal debt do not as yet perceive 
a significant risk of a future explicit default or an implicit default through 
inflation. As many analysts have noted, the confidence that investors have 
in the strength of the U.S. economy and its ability to manage its fiscal af-
fairs enables it to borrow in its own currency, and at lower rates than other 
countries in comparable circumstances. However, investors’ confidence 
could falter as the government’s fiscal outlook worsens. The mere fact that 
a larger share of the budget must be dedicated to debt service increases the 
risk that, at any time, if investors demanded sharply higher interest returns, 
interest spending could become a substantially larger (and obligatory) share 
of federal spending. Larger interest payments to investors both in the United 
States and abroad would quickly increase the deficit. To offset such an 
outcome would require either painful cuts in other spending or increases 
in revenue.
How the Nation Got Here
How did the United States get into this situation? Some critics blame 
policy choices made during the George W. Bush administration, especially 
the tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 and the expansion of Medicare to cover 
prescription drugs. Those tax cuts significantly increased deficits, and their 
indefinite extension for people with incomes below $250,000—as proposed 
by President Obama and assumed in the committee’s study baseline—would 
increase annual deficits beyond what they would otherwise be over the next 
decade by an average of 1.3 percent of GDP.4 Although those policy choices 
made the long-run fiscal outlook worse, the roots of the problem go deeper 
and carry no particular political brand.
The three large entitlements whose projected growth is largely respon-
sible for the budget’s unsustainable course are part of a major expansion 
of the federal government’s commitments to provide income support and 
health insurance to the old and the disabled. This expansion has roughly 
paralleled similar social program growth in other affluent countries. These 
and other federal programs help limit income inequality and prevent severe 
hardship for millions; for those with more personal resources, they supple-
ment those resources, reducing uncertainty and the risk of personal financial 
catastrophe.5 They represent open-ended promises to future generations.
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For both Social Security and Medicare, the primary sources of revenue 
for these programs grow with the economy, but the benefits grow with the 
size of the eligible population and other factors. Although the intention 
was—and is—to finance both programs in part from dedicated sources, 
the structure of both Social Security and Medicare creates the opportunity 
for benefits to outrun revenues (for details of the program structure and 
operations, see Chapters 5 and 6; see also Oberlander, 2003). As discussed 
above, the changing age structure of the population means that for at least 
the next two decades a smaller workforce will be supporting a growing 
retired population.
The growth of health care costs at a faster rate than the growth of the 
economy for a long period is another factor causing federal spending for 
Medicare, as well as other federal health care spending, to outpace dedi-
cated revenue sources, including payroll taxes and premiums. As discussed 
in Chapter 5, the upward growth of Medicare costs has been driven largely 
by a broad dynamic that has caused all health care costs to rise faster than 
GDP over most of the last three decades—not primarily because more 
people were receiving care but mainly because on average the intensity and 
quality of care have increased. The same is true of spending for Medicaid, 
but this program does not have a dedicated revenue source.
Looking forward, it is difficult to quantify how much of the mismatch 
between projected spending and dedicated revenues for Social Security and 
Medicare is attributable to initial design, how much to subsequent expan-
sion and other program changes, and how much to changing demographic 
and economic forecasts. In any case, their costs now far exceed early esti-
mates. Medicare and Medicaid costs have grown at a rate similar to that 
of all health spending, which has been substantially faster than that of the 
economy. For example, when Medicare was enacted in 1965, it was then 
estimated to cost $3 billion a year (about $20 billion in 2008 dollars). In 
2008, net outlays for a much-expanded Medicare program approached 
$400 billion. Tax expenditures for employer-provided health benefits have 
fueled the growth and generosity of private insurance plans, adding to the 
rising total of federal subsidies for health while reducing revenues.6 And 
medical science has advanced to provide far better, but also far more costly, 
treatments and services. Given that Social Security and Medicare were 
known to be structured in a way that allowed their costs to grow faster than 
tax revenues, the difficult question is why policy makers have been so slow 
to address their lack of sustainability. Initially, unintentional underestimates 
of what Social Security and Medicare would cost may have set the stage for 
later underfunding of those long-term commitments. Yet continuing warn-
ings of underfunding or shortfalls have been discounted or ignored.
Even in 2000, when the budget was in surplus and many were actu-
ally concerned about the rate at which the federal debt was being reduced, 
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budget analysts warned of pitfalls ahead; the budget was already on an 
unsustainable path, with health and Social Security costs rising steeply 
outside the 10-year window conventionally used to assess the budget effects 
of policies (Congressional Budget Office, 2000; U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget, 2000). Since then, a succession of reports not only repeated 
the warning, but also outlined possible solutions to the looming problem 
(see, e.g., Rivlin and Sawhill, 2004). While the Social Security and Medicare 
program actuaries have projected and warned about shortfalls for a long 
time, such exercises for the whole budget were rarely done until about 20 
years ago. The National Economic Commission, formed by the President 
and Congress in 1987 and reporting in 1989, was perhaps the first in a 
series of high-level independent bodies to call attention to the seriousness 
of the long-term budget challenge. Its findings were largely ignored. It was 
followed in 1994 by the Kerry-Danforth Commission, which also foresaw 
a long-term budget crisis. Kerry-Danforth, for example, concluded that, 
absent reforms, spending on five programs alone—Social Security, Medi-
care, Medicaid, and federal civilian and military pensions—would exceed 
federal revenues by 2030. However, its members could not agree on “any 
proposal to reform a system that it had in its own report concluded was 
‘unsustainable’” (Peterson, 2004:124).
CBO made its first long-term projections of the federal budget in 1996. 
Looking out to 2050, CBO noted that the expected increase in the number 
of beneficiaries of federal programs for the elderly and a slowing in the 
rate of growth of the labor force—combined with the anticipated growth 
in the per-person cost of Medicare—would put enormous pressure on the 
budget. Its report (Congressional Budget Office, 1996:xxii) said that if 
those pressures were not dealt with by reducing spending or increasing 
taxes, mounting deficits could seriously erode future economic growth. 
At about the same time, OMB published its first long-term projections. 
The fiscal 1998 budget (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 1997:21) 
noted: “Despite the improvement in the outlook after the passage of OBRA 
[President Clinton’s economic plan in 1993], serious long-run problems re-
main. Beginning around the year 2010 and continuing throughout the next 
several decades, the deficit would rise [under current policies], eventually 
reaching unsustainable levels.”
A fundamental obstacle to dealing with the nation’s long-term fis-
cal problem is that all solutions are painful. Thus, leaders who advocate 
them may well be voted out of office, especially if the voters are not well 
informed about the problem. Poorly informed voters are vulnerable to 
demagoguery, such as: (1) there is no long-run problem that cannot be 
solved by economic growth or immigration; (2) solving it through growth 
is possible only if you avoid any tax increases; and (3) any cut in promised 
benefits or increase in taxes will cause unacceptable suffering. These claims 
ignore the facts that one can get a long way to a solution by reducing the 
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rate of growth of benefits, rather than cutting them outright, by raising 
taxes, or with a judicious mix of benefit reductions and revenue increases. 
That is, as detailed in Chapters 4-9, there are several possible ways to solve 
the nation’s long-term fiscal problem that are less drastic than sometimes 
suggested, although it is important to emphasize that none is pain free.
It is generally assumed that electorates always prefer a combination of 
higher spending and lower taxes. Survey results and other evidence suggest 
a more complicated pattern of thinking (Modigliani and Modigliani, 1987; 
Schultze, 1992). Most Americans say that their taxes are too high (52 per-
cent in a 2009 Gallup survey), although this proportion is lower than two 
or three decades ago. In a 2008 Pew survey, cutting middle-class income 
taxes was ranked 15th in importance in a list of 20 issues, although this 
survey was conducted prior to the current major recession. Another 2008 
survey (by CBS and the New York Times) found that the public appears 
evenly split (43 percent to 43 percent) between those who favor a larger 
government that offers more services and those who favor a smaller gov-
ernment that offers fewer services. Other research shows that Americans 
object more to how their federal tax dollars are spent than to how much 
they pay (Bowman, 2009). Perhaps public opinion constrains leaders from 
acting unless or until the wolf is at the door, push comes to shove, or Scylla 
meets Charybdis (Weaver, 1986). Some observers have likened the lack of 
forceful action to address the long-term fiscal imbalance to a similar lack 
of forceful action in other major policy areas, such as climate change. Both 
the fiscal and climate problems exemplify a class of challenges that have 
enormous long-term cost—but pose no immediate pain—for the nation’s 
welfare and people’s way of living.
In addition to the dynamics of politics in a democracy, particular ele-
ments of the federal government’s policy-making process seemingly work 
against a focus on solving the long-term problem. The reasons for this are 
several, including natural limits on rational behavior and the normal in-
centives facing decision makers, especially elected officials. In principle, a 
better-informed and integrated decision-making process can help overcome 
these natural limits. But, expert observers have not found that a substantial 
increase in information and analysis available to policy makers has had a 
demonstrable effect to date on the quality of budget decisions (Joyce, 2008). 
Reforming the budget process may help focus attention on long-term con-
sequences of today’s actions, thereby improving incentives for early action. 
Such options are discussed in Chapter 10.
Consequences of Inaction
One reason it has been relatively easy for most policy makers and the 
public to ignore the nation’s fiscal problem is that, to date, the United States 
has had no difficulty borrowing to finance current spending. And borrow-
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ing is not necessarily a bad thing, any more than when a family takes out a 
mortgage in order to purchase a home. However, more resources spent to 
pay interest on debt means fewer resources available for other uses. And, 
borrowing when there will not be sufficient income in the future to repay 
debt is a serious problem. If higher federal debt and debt service squeeze 
other spending, then the federal government will be able to deliver less for 
a given level of taxation, perhaps leading more people to conclude that they 
are getting too little benefit for their taxes.
Political incentives for additional borrowing could change quickly if 
financial markets began to penalize the United States for failing to put 
its fiscal house in order. And because the recent economic downturn has 
been worldwide, all interest rates have trended down, while investors have 
favored U.S. Treasury securities as a perceived safer haven for their money 
than other countries’ debt. This situation has reduced the government’s 
debt service cost. Moreover, because the United States borrows in its own 
currency, it need not worry, as other nations do, that it may be punished 
by having to repay in a currency that has become stronger relative to its 
own.
However, if investors become less certain of full repayment or believe 
that the country is pursuing an inflationary course that would allow it to 
repay the debt with devalued dollars, they could begin to charge a “risk 
premium” on U.S. Treasury securities. That could happen suddenly in a 
confidence crisis and ensuing financial shock. The United States would be 
acutely vulnerable to such a crisis because it has to continually refinance 
its current debt. (The United States rolls over more than one-third of its 
marketable debt every year before raising a new dollar of borrowing; see 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2009; also see Table F-5 in Appendix F.)
There is precedent for a financial disruption first contributing to large, 
chronic deficits and then in some cases contributing to the loss of investor 
confidence and even to a default on a nation’s debt (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). The unique position of the United States—because of its economic 
dominance and the dominant role of the dollar internationally—make it 
difficult to extrapolate from the experience of other nations in estimating 
the risk or timing of a financial crisis arising from failure to address the 
projected U.S. fiscal imbalance. However, as many analysts have observed, 
there is a risk that the nation’s status as a world “reserve currency” could 
be damaged by deterioration of its economic performance arising from a 
chronic fiscal imbalance (Auerbach and Gale, 2009; Friedman, 1988).
Given the lack of precedent for such a trajectory for a country like the 
United States, one might get better information on possible effects if Japan 
or a major European country had a crisis first, but waiting for that to hap-
pen is neither reasonable nor practical. A provocative paper even before 
the current downturn asked whether the country was bankrupt (Kotlikoff, 
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2006). The paper’s answer was “yes” because all governments must satisfy 
a long-run budget constraint and the United States has made promises that 
it cannot keep. Its “creditors” (defined broadly as those who work and 
pay taxes, not just bondholders), will eventually balk—by refusing to lend 
money, refusing to work, or even emigrating. At that point, the government 
would have either to cut back from its promises, raise taxes, or renege on 
its debt. It could do this outright or by stealth, that is, through inflation 
that reduces the real value of debt principal.
It is impossible to determine or forecast, based on history or the specif-
ics of the fiscal challenge, at what level of debt financial markets will decide 
that there is an increased risk that debt will not be fully repaid (or repaid 
in greatly inflated dollars) and react by demanding higher interest rates. 
Although the credit crisis that began in August 2007 and became a world-
wide downturn in 2008 has not yet increased interest rates on U.S. Trea-
sury securities, it serves as a sobering reminder that confidence is a fragile 
thing (Rubin et al., 2004). Auerbach and Gale (2009) note that a bleaker 
fiscal outlook already is affecting market assessments of U.S. government 
debt. By one measure, the implied probability of default rose from under 
1 percent before September 2008 to almost 8 percent in early 2009 before 
declining again. Such a fluctuation illustrates how quickly financial markets 
could react in the future, triggering a possible spiral of rising federal interest 
spending and pressures to either reduce noninterest spending or increase 
revenues, possibly at a time when economic conditions would make these 
choices even more difficult than under “ordinary” circumstances.
Increased debt decreases U.S. wealth both by depressing the growth of 
the nation’s capital stock and increasing its liability to foreigners. Although 
the ability of the U.S. government to draw on foreign saving reduces any 
immediate negative effects of deficits on GDP growth, it also means that 
more of the income generated by that growth must be transferred abroad 
in the form of interest and dividends. Bergsten (2009b) notes the contribu-
tion that larger budget deficits are making to a projected rise in the broader 
measure of debt (both public and private borrowings) that the United States 
owes to investors abroad. He cites as credible a projection that by 2030 
the United States would be “transferring a full seven percent ($2.5 trillion) 
of its entire economic output to foreigners every year in order to service its 
external debt” (Cline, 2009). Bergsten (2009b) also projects that large bud-
get deficits by 2030 will drive long-term interest rates up by 2.5 percentage 
points. Even if investors at home and abroad remain confident about buying 
and holding U.S. Treasury debt, large deficits and debt can have a corrosive 
effect. And even without a crisis of confidence in the ability of the United 
States to manage its fiscal problem, chronic large deficits erode the growth 
of future living standards by reducing national savings, thereby slowing the 
accumulation of wealth (see Congressional Budget Office, 2005b).
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Because economic models are bounded by historical experience, they 
struggle to illustrate the consequences of deficits and debts that are “off the 
charts.” However, one such exercise vividly demonstrates what the nation 
is facing. In response to a special request, the Congressional Budget Office 
(2008g) attempted to gauge what might happen to the economy if federal 
debt continued to climb. Answering the question meant departing from 
CBO’s (and other organizations’) standard practice of using mainstream, 
“sustainable” economic assumptions in order to analyze inherently unsus-
tainable policies. The CBO analysis concluded that debt would drain funds 
from the nation’s pool of savings, reduce investment in the domestic capital 
stock and in foreign assets, and cause real interest rates to rise. CBO gauged 
effects on the economy using gross national product (GNP) per person, 
which averaged about $45,000 in 2007.7 The results suggested that rising 
deficits would cause real GNP per person to stop growing in the late 2040s, 
sinking from a peak of nearly $70,000 (in 2007 dollars) to about $55,000 
in 2060. That is, the United States would begin to become a markedly less 
wealthy country. The CBO projections ended after 2060 because the model 
simply could not continue to compute such deterioration. Of course, a 
financial crisis might come well before that date. CBO noted that simply 
hiking income tax rates to cover projected spending would not forestall 
this deterioration because extremely high income tax rates would seriously 
distort work incentives and hobble economic growth.8
Can the country grow its way out of the problem? Some people have 
suggested that future increases in wealth will allow the United States to 
meet growing public needs and still have enough left for increased private 
consumption. A sober analysis of recent fiscal history offers little basis for 
that view. One reason is that labor force growth, a major driver of GDP, has 
slowed and will continue to slow. The annual rate of growth in the labor 
force decreased from an average of about 2.1 percent during the 1970s and 
1980s to about 1.1 percent from 1990 to 2008. The 2009 report of the 
Social Security Trustees (Social Security Administration, 2009d:98) projects 
further slowing of labor force growth, resulting from slower growth in the 
working-age population as the baby-boom generation reaches retirement 
and the succeeding smaller cohorts reach working age. Under the Trustees’ 
intermediate assumptions, the U.S. labor force is projected to increase by 
about 0.7 percent per year, on average, through 2018. Thereafter, it is pro-
jected to increase still more slowly, at an average of 0.5 percent a year, from 
2018 to 2050, and 0.4 percent over the remainder of the 75-year projection 
period. Wages subject to Social Security taxes are projected to fall from 
38.5 percent of GDP in 2008 to 33.1 percent in 2083, in part because of a 
projected increase of nontaxable employer-provided benefits as a share of 
total compensation (Congressional Budget Office, 2009e; Lavery, 2009). 
With a smaller part of the population working and paying taxes, even if 
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productivity were to increase at roughly the same rate it has in the past 40 
years, real GDP growth—which averaged 3 percent annually from 1967 
to 2007—would slow. Under the Trustees’ intermediate assumptions, real 
GDP is projected to grow 2.4 percent annually through 2018, and more 
slowly thereafter, reflecting slower labor force growth (Social Security Ad-
ministration, 2009d:100). Personal income and federal revenue growth also 
would slow as a direct result.
Some people have argued that an increase in immigration can be a 
solution. Because labor force growth is a major driver of GDP, one way to 
increase both is to admit more of those seeking to live and work here. U.S. 
immigration—roughly 1 million a year—has been high in comparison with 
most European countries and Japan. This immigration has helped keep the 
U.S. working-age population proportionately higher than in those coun-
tries, where high proportions of elderly people must count on a declining 
fraction of the population of working age to pay for services. In the future, 
larger numbers of immigrants—especially skilled workers—could boost the 
working portion of the U.S. population, helping to pay for benefits to the 
elderly. However, immigrants grow old, too, so it would be a temporary 
“solution.” In fact, to offset slowing labor force growth, immigration rates 
would have to rise substantially. In the past, immigration has been found to 
have a small net positive impact on U.S. economic activity, but the effect is 
so modest that even if immigration doubled or tripled from the current rate, 
it would make only a small long-term contribution to incomes and therefore 
to federal revenues (see Congressional Budget Office, 2005a:3; Council of 
Economic Advisers, 2007; National Research Council, 1997).9
Not only is there no easy way out of the nation’s fiscal problems, but 
the challenge now facing the United States is arguably worse than standard 
analyses suggest. Even as questions are raised about the sustainability of 
federal retirement and medical insurance programs, many people are con-
cerned about the adequacy of those commitments. The 2009 debate over 
health reform legislation has highlighted the number of people who risk fi-
nancial disaster because they lack adequate health insurance. The downturn 
has highlighted the exposure of many households to financial risk. Many 
baby boomers have not provided adequately for their own retirement, and 
recent drops in home and stock values have wiped out part of what they 
had saved (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Private savings, which equaled 
10.4 percent of national income in 1984, had become negative by 2006, 
even before the downturn (Conley, 2009): The decline in U.S. private sav-
ings has been partly offset by foreign purchases of U.S. debt.
A decline in private savings means that many households have a smaller 
savings cushion against loss of income or unexpected expenses, and there-
fore are potentially more dependent on government or private charities for 
financial help in these circumstances. Thus, even as questions are raised 
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about the sustainability of federal retirement and medical insurance pro-
grams, many are pressing to supplement or expand those commitments.
There is no escape from the arithmetic of the long-term fiscal chal-
lenge. No one can estimate with any accuracy the risk of any crisis in the 
financing of the federal government, nor when any such crisis might occur. 
The committee considers it unlikely the federal government would default 
outright on its debt. Nor does it believe it likely that the United States 
would pursue a policy of deliberately inflating its currency to reduce the 
real cost of repaying debt. Such a policy, in any case, would not be sufficient 
by itself to escape the debt obligation, partly because much of the debt is 
short term or indexed for inflation and partly because benefits of the three 
biggest entitlement programs rise in tandem with inflation. The greater risk 
of a sudden government fiscal crisis caused by rising interest rates is that the 
nation would be forced to respond precipitously. A rushed, ill-considered 
budget response to the threat of a debt crisis might deprive people of needed 
public services or hobble the economy for many years. The damage to the 
country’s residents would be immediate, but the damage to the nation’s 
credibility and ability to manage its finances could be profound and long 
lasting. Even if the United States is able to avoid a full-blown financial cri-
sis, it would increasingly find its options narrowed as it juggled competing 
demands. Policy makers would lose flexibility to cope with such events as 
recession, natural disaster, war, or terrorist attack.
THE OPPORTUNITy TO ACT
Setting aside other priorities to address a seemingly distant, abstract 
fiscal challenge is asking a great deal of both leaders and the public. Both 
groups already must deal with many urgent matters. Yet the costs of inac-
tion are potentially enormous. In a sense, all of the other goals that people 
value and pursue through government already are hostage to finding a 
politically feasible way to address the looming fiscal challenge.
The committee believes that this report will be helpful to both the 
public and the nation’s leaders in addressing the fiscal challenge through a 
distinctive approach:
• We present a range of possible paths rather than a single so-
lution. Because current policies cannot be sustained, Americans 
and their leaders must find a way to construct a sustainable bud-
get. People hold many views on critical policy issues that reflect 
sharp differences in values and interests: These must be considered 
and balanced before the nation can find such a sustainable way. 
The committee’s paths can be a starting point for dialogue and 
compromise.
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• We present a clear set of standards that anyone can apply to as-
sess how close any gien set of budget proposals comes to achie-
ing sustainability. All of the paths to sustainability involve tough 
choices—most likely requiring new limits on what the government 
will pay for and possibly requiring new ways to pay for programs 
that stay in the budget. By presenting some of the major building 
blocks of a sustainable budget and estimates of their budget effects, 
the report provides a starting point for practical choices.
• We recognize that deeply held (and at times, conflicting) alues are 
the lenses through which different people will study and choose 
among the alternaties. Because it is so difficult to achieve and 
maintain a sustainable budget, the committee believes that any ef-
fort that hopes to succeed must be rooted in the values of fairness, 
economic opportunity, and personal and family security that people 
hold dear.
• The committee recognizes that prospects for addressing the U.S. fis-
cal challenge are intertwined with those of other nations around the 
globe. The many economic and financial ties between the United 
States and the rest of the world are now reinforced by increased de-
pendence on foreign investors to fund the nation’s growing national 
debt. The same demographic trends and environmental challenges 
that contribute to budget pressures in the United States are affect-
ing many other countries and may require cooperative solutions.
The economic downturn has complicated the fiscal challenge. Right 
now the nation faces an extraordinary clash between demands for ex-
panded government and the inconvenient reality that commitments already 
made are expected to consume all the available revenues and then some. 
Reconciling those demands for more with the need to deliver less will re-
quire political creativity and compromise. However, the committee believes 
that reasonable options are still available if action is taken forcefully and 
soon.
It would be wise to take painful steps now to avoid more painful ones 
later on. These steps should distribute the required sacrifices fairly and give 
people affected by benefit changes ample notice so they can adjust their 
financial plans accordingly. The remainder of this report attempts to spell 
out some ways that this can be done.
NOTES
1. The cumulative effect of the larger near-term deficits implied by CBO’s August revision 
to its 10-year baseline would be to increase the estimate of debt-to-GDP ratio in 2019 
by about 7 percentage points relative to that resulting from the baseline estimates used 
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in the study. Throughout the report—unless otherwise noted—dollars are nominal rather 
than adjusted for inflation, budget amounts expressed as percentages of GDP are relative 
to estimates of GDP in the year referenced, and years refer to federal fiscal years (ending 
September 30 of the calendar year).
2. Because of its effect relative to tax provisions, lower inflation reduces tax collections 
in real terms. This effect is partially offset, however, because lower inflation reduces 
automatic cost-of-living adjustments in some federal spending programs, such as Social 
Security.
3. The federal government’s annual borrowing needs do not exactly match the deficit or 
surplus in the same year. In fiscal 2008, for example, the government borrowed $768 
billion in 2008 although the deficit was just $455 billion. Of the seeming discrepancy of 
$313 billion, $300 billion went to a special “Supplementary Asset Program” designed to 
soak up excess liquidity at the Federal Reserve System in extraordinary circumstances. 
Most of the rest went to the financing accounts established to extend direct loans, chiefly 
student loans. For details, see U.S. Department of the Treasury (2008:Table 6). The 
special interventions associated with the downturn, including assistance to Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac in conservatorship and some transactions of the Treasury Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) in 2009 and beyond, including cash repayments that reduce borrow-
ing needs, will create even larger temporary differences between net borrowing and the 
deficits recorded in the same years.
4. The effect on revenues of extending the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts (along with indexation 
after 2009 of the Alternative Minimum Tax and the extension of other, much smaller 
expiring provisions) beyond their current legal expiration has been calculated by the Con-
gressional Budget Office (2009e:6; Table 2-1) by comparing revenue estimates for 2020 
and other selected years to 2080. In 2020, CBO estimates, revenues would be reduced 
from $20.3 trillion to $18.6 trillion.
5. Over the past century or so, industrial societies have dedicated a growing share of their 
growing wealth to social protection of vulnerable populations. Affluent governments 
now spend more on social programs than at any time in history (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, 2008a). Public commitments to provide minimum 
financial support and services to the most vulnerable people in a country, sometimes 
termed the “social safety net,” supplement or in some cases replace traditional family and 
community responsibilities, which have been weakened with changes in family structure 
related to economic modernization and other social changes. Some conservatives argue 
that, by substituting for personal responsibility, programs aimed at helping the poorest 
families have sometimes weakened family structure.
6. The exclusion of employer contributions to health premiums and care for their employees 
is now the single largest tax expenditure, as measured by the revenue that would be col-
lected if this provision were ignored in calculating employer taxes. It is estimated to have 
reduced federal income tax revenue in 2008 by at least $117 billion (Joint Committee on 
Taxation, 2008a).
7. For these analyses, GNP is more useful than GDP, because GNP measures net income of 
residents in the United States after deducting payments to foreigners.
8. For details of the CBO analysis, including estimates of what would happen by offsetting 
this spending growth entirely through cuts in other programs, see Congressional Budget 
Office (2008g).
9. Similarly, a sensitivity analysis for the Social Security Trustees shows that if immigra-
tion were one-third higher in the future than in their standard projection, the projected 
negative balance of the trust fund after 75 years would be reduced from –2.00 to –1.81 
percent of taxable payroll (Social Security Administration, 2009d).
2Framing the Choices
Having recognized the magnitude of the long-term fiscal challenge, 
how can one sort through alternatives for constructing a sustainable federal 
budget? A sustainable budget, as noted in Chapter 1, must align revenues 
and spending over a long time horizon. To guide one’s thinking about how 
to put today’s federal budget on a sustainable path, this chapter presents a 
framework for the inevitable hard choices. The right framework—although 
it cannot by itself resolve fundamental differences—can be a basis for in-
formed deliberation and decision making.
CONNECTING BUDGETS AND VALUES
A budget is a plan to use part of the nation’s current and future eco-
nomic resources to produce public benefits. Among other things, govern-
ment spending produces goods and services whose benefits are widely shared 
and not easily divided—what economists call “public goods” or “collective 
goods” (Samuelson, 1954). National defense spending is a good example. 
Its benefits are shared by all and not divisible. Budgets also use taxation and 
spending to transfer resources from some groups to others. Examples are the 
use of revenues to support low-income families or to compensate wounded 
veterans. In political terms, the federal budget represents decisions about 
the use of national resources for public benefits and social objectives and 
decisions on how to collect the revenues to finance the planned spending. 
Even more broadly, a budget reflects how the proposed use of resources 
is expected to yield certain desirable outcomes—improvements in society 
and in people’s lives. The essence—and difficulty—of budgeting is to trade 
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off many desirable social goals against each other when resources are not 
unlimited. A “good” budget shows clearly whether there is a match between 
plans to spend and plans to pay for spending and whether the spending 
implied by current and proposed policies is sustainable.
In this report we insist that it is critical in assessing a budget to take 
the long view—to be concerned about future generations’ opportunities and 
well-being. Because current policies as projected are not sustainable, either 
spending must be reduced or revenues must increase. Budgets quantify the 
priority given to every public objective, from the oldest and most basic, 
such as national security, to newer ones, such as environmental protection. 
Federal government responsibilities have expanded gradually over many 
years. The oldest federal functions included building interstate transpor-
tation networks and securing the nation’s borders. For example, George 
Washington’s administration built the lighthouse at Montauk Point in New 
York. The newest functions include protecting endangered species, reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, and expanding broadband access.
Public priorities change over time. Although federal spending as a pro-
portion of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) was relatively stable 
from 1962 to 2008—increasing from about 19 percent to 20.5 percent—the 
distribution of spending by function changed dramatically. Social Security 
and health benefits, mainly to the poor and elderly, roughly tripled as a 
proportion of total spending, while the share going to defense and veterans 
fell from about one-half of the total to about one-fourth; see Figure 2-1.
Budget debates reflect fundamental differences: in people’s values, 
interests, and beliefs; about questions of budget priorities or tradeoffs 
concerning the best allocation of resources among public goals; and on 
practical questions about the best way to use resources to advance agreed-
on priorities.
People hold sharply differing views of what they want or need from 
government, what they believe government can deliver, and what role they 
believe government should have in the economy and other aspects of life. 
In general, people favor policies that they believe will benefit themselves, 
their families, others like themselves, and the society as a whole—whether 
“benefit” is seen largely in material or in other terms.
Logically and appropriately, differences in values, interests, and beliefs 
about government’s role will lead people to widely different positions about 
what the budget should support and how. Differences in values, interests, 
and beliefs need to be recognized and at least partly reconciled in order to 
make long-range budget decisions. Fortunately, people who differ in their 
values and beliefs can and do often find common ground when it comes to 
practical solutions. In the next section we discuss the values that are most 
often reflected in budget debates. In the last section we consider practical 
concerns about how value preferences relate to budget choices.
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VALUES AND BUDGET DECISIONS
The list of values that are applicable to assessing budgets is poten-
tially long (see, e.g., Yankelovich, 1994). We consider five that have been 
most prominent in recent budget debates: (1) equity or fairness, (2) eco-
nomic growth, (3) efficiency, (4) physical security, and (5) the size of 
government.
Fairness
For many people, the distribution of public burdens and benefits is a 
principal measure of social justice (see, e.g., Penner, 2004; Rawls, 2001). 
Of course, people disagree sharply on what is fair and, looking at the same 
budget, will disagree in their assessments of its fairness.
Budgets affect the distribution of private income and wealth. At various 
times in the nation’s history and again in the past decade, many people have 
expressed concern about increases in U.S. income inequality and a lack of 
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progress in reducing poverty (see, e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2004; Sherman 
et al., 2009; Smeeding, 2005). Budgets can affect the distribution of income 
in two ways: directly, by specifying how revenues will be collected from one 
income group and distributed to another; and indirectly, by incorporating 
policies that affect economic opportunities. Over time, for example, budgets 
that provide education and other basic services to economically disadvan-
taged people can increase their chances for solid jobs and productive lives 
and thereby reduce income inequality.
People do not agree on the extent to which governments should aid or 
tax different groups differently or act to increase opportunities for particu-
lar groups. Most people argue that, as a matter of fairness, the government 
should support people who are unable to support themselves, including the 
indigent elderly and children of poor families; however, people differ on 
what degree or scope of support is appropriate.
In their attitudes toward social spending—including programs such as 
Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid—Americans have tried to reconcile 
conflicting concepts of fairness: one based on what people need and another 
based on what people deserve.1 In trying to reconcile these two concepts, 
many people embrace a principle of “reciprocity,” which says that people 
should not get something for nothing, but should get something if they 
“play by the rules” (Yankelovich, 1994).
Another dimension of fairness concerns the distribution of public bur-
dens and benefits across generations. It is difficult to measure how budgets 
redistribute costs and benefits from one generation to another. Many have 
argued, however, that the current federal budget—by failing to pay for 
current and expected obligations from current revenues—unfairly burdens 
future generations.2
Economic Growth
A budget should sustain and assist in expanding the nation’s economy, 
the ultimate base of resources that are available both for personal consump-
tion and investment and to fund public goods and services. Yet there is no 
consensus—among either economists or policy makers—about the best pol-
icies to advance this goal under any given set of economic circumstances.
Budget choices can have large influence on future economic growth. In 
principle, well-targeted public investments that accelerate development and 
the application of new technologies or that increase education levels lead to 
economic growth and higher incomes on average (Romer, 1986). However, 
governments may have difficulty determining in advance which investments 
will stimulate growth and which will not. On the revenue side, many people 
favor tax reductions as a policy to stimulate private investment and growth; 
others argue for a tax structure that encourages savings and rewards pro-
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ductive private investments; and still others would use higher revenues to 
reduce government deficits and increase national savings. In practice, the 
growth effects of different tax policies, like those of public investments, are 
uncertain and often in dispute.
The task of determining the differing implications for future growth 
of alternative revenue and spending policies raises a theoretical problem 
implicit in many budget debates. Some level of savings and investment 
(both public and private) is needed to ensure that the next generation is at 
least as well off as the present one. But the optimal balance of consumption 
and savings is unknown. A common view is that the United States needs a 
higher rate of savings and investment, both by governments and by private 
businesses and households, than has been the case in recent years.
Given how hard it is to estimate the effects of any given policy on 
economic growth, and therefore on the future income base for government 
revenues, most analysts recommend against simple or mechanical estima-
tion (see, e.g., Kobes and Rohaly, 2002). The committee has followed this 
advice in its study. That is, we have neither adjusted our projections of 
future economic growth nor estimated future budget effects of changes in 
growth on the basis of changes in the mix of spending or the structure of 
revenues over time, even though modeling such relationships would be part 
of the ideal development of budget policy.
Efficiency
Although governments do not have a monopoly on inefficiency, many 
people believe that a good part of what government spends yields too little 
benefit to justify taking private resources for public purposes.3 Government 
leaders and managers are always looking for ways to identify and eliminate 
waste and to replace ineffective programs with more effective ones; how-
ever, there is no line in the federal budget for “waste, fraud, and abuse.” 
Instead, the task of improving government’s effectiveness requires collecting 
information about alternative uses of funds and the results they yield, and 
shifting efforts to the most effective uses.
Although evidence on the relative efficacy of alternative policies and 
programs can help reduce some budget disagreements, such evidence is of-
ten lacking or, at best, limited. When even experts are uncertain about the 
relative effectiveness of different policies or programs, the best approach to 
budgeting and making other policy choices is to be flexible, to continually 
test policies against experience, and to remain open to new information 
about their efficacy. Rigorously evaluating what works can contribute to 
more efficient use of the public’s dollars if the findings are applied to future 
budget choices and program reforms.
The federal government has historically used only a small fraction of 
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its budget to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs, although in recent 
years agencies have invested more effort in finding better ways to measure 
their performance. Thus, information about program effectiveness is slowly 
improving. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) 
provided federal agencies with the legal framework for this strategic ap-
proach, the Obama Administration’s 2010 budget calls for “establishing a 
comprehensive program and performance measurement system that shows 
how Federal programs link to agency and Government-wide goals” (U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, 2009a:9).
In principle, this approach can lead to improved results. In practice, 
the goal of a performance-driven budget process remains elusive. The in-
tense budget pressures of the looming deficits and debt are likely to put a 
premium on more efficient use of the public’s resources. Possible reforms 
to reinforce a performance-driven budgeting approach are discussed in 
Chapter 10.
Security and Risk
Ensuring physical safety, including security from external attacks and 
internal disorder, is perhaps the oldest and most fundamental objective of 
national governments. People must be safe before they can pursue other val-
ues. The value of security often focuses attention on government’s efforts to 
provide for national security and fight crime; but, viewed broadly, security 
can be a product of many policy choices, including those to provide the ba-
sic means of survival to people who cannot provide them for themselves. In 
the modern era, the most common view of government’s responsibility for 
security has expanded to include responsibility to provide a minimum level 
of economic security to all. Even as the budget constraints have increased, 
many people and policy makers seek to expand health insurance coverage 
or other federal programs that protect households against financial shocks 
or economic losses—policy changes that would increase spending but pro-
vide greater income security to many people.
Size of Government
Debates about the size of government reflect both a basic value ques-
tion and a practical one. They have been shorthand for disagreements about 
whether or not government can be a positive instrument to promote values 
of equality, freedom, and security (Madrick, 2009). However, government 
actions can either expand or limit freedom and choice, and the relationship 
between government’s size and these values is quite complicated. Debates 
about the proper size or scope of government have also been shorthand for 
disagreements about government power and intrusiveness. On a practical 
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level, size is also a question of how much spending the society is able or 
willing to pay for through current taxes or by borrowing.
The government’s size is commonly measured by comparing the levels 
of federal government spending and taxes with the size of the economy, that 
is, as a percentage of GDP. By this measure, government (including state 
and local governments) is smaller in the United States than other affluent 
countries; see Figure 2-2. However, as discussed below, this is only a crude 
measure of government’s reach and influence on society and the economy. 
For one thing, the U.S. federal government makes more use than many 
other countries of special provisions in the tax code (tax expenditures) that 
reduce revenues and do not add to spending but do enlarge the role of gov-
ernment, increase deficits, and may distort private choices (Minarik, 2010); 
this aspect of the budget is discussed more fully in Chapter 8.
As detailed in Chapter 1, the federal government is currently spending 
much more than it has in the past: even if substantial and difficult reduc-
tions are made in the rate of spending growth, spending will rise. A bigger 
federal government will have major implications for individuals, businesses, 
and state and local levels of government. This development will renew 
and intensify old debates about the proper size and reach of the federal 
government.
The government can also affect individual and business behavior out-
side of the budget in many ways—for example, through policies that protect 
personal privacy or regulate the operations of financial institutions. Such 
laws and mandates have the effect of increasing the role of the federal 
government, but without increasing federal revenues and spending. Health 
policy illustrates how similar objectives can be pursued either through or 
Fig2-2.eps
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FIGURE 2-2 General government total tax and nontax receipts as a percentage of 
nominal GDP in 2008.
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outside the budget: the two approaches may yield similar public benefits 
but with widely different effects on spending and revenues; see Box 2-1. 
Disagreements about which approach to take are not differences about the 
value of health or about providing access to better care, but about the best 
way to do so.
People who believe that equity or fairness gives people first claim on 
the money they earn (or inherit) often favor smaller government: they 
therefore require that a strong case be made before the government takes 
money, usually through taxes, for public goods and purposes. Although 
they may believe it is appropriate for government to help people who have 
no or limited capacity to take care of themselves, they may demand a high 
level of proof of need. People with a strong view of individual claims also 
often see social benefit in asking people to exercise more personal respon-
sibility. This view leads them to argue for relatively less spending on many 
social programs. They also are likely to believe that high marginal tax rates 
discourage private investment and work effort. They stress the inefficiency 
BOX 2-1 
Health: An Example of Values and Choices
	 For	some	people,	health	policy	is	about	basic	value	choices:	the	extent	of	gov-
ernment’s	responsibility	for	 individuals’	physical	well-being	and	what	constitutes	
fairness	in	treating	people	of	different	means	who	face	similar	health	problems.	
However,	most	 health	 policy	 debates	 focus	 on	more	 practical	 questions,	 such	
as:
	 •	 	How	should	 the	costs	of	health	care	be	divided	among	 individuals,	 their	
employers,	and	the	government?
	 •	 	How	should	essential	treatment	or	care	be	defined	and	paid	for?
	 •	 	How	should	health	care	delivery	be	organized	to	reduce	medical	errors	and	
save	money?
	 Knowing	how	a	person	values	health	does	not	necessarily	indicate	that	per-
son’s	stand	on	specific	policy	questions,	such	as	whether	the	government	should	
spend	more	or	less	on	health	care	relative	to	other	goals,	or	how	to	pay	for	it.
	 If	the	choice	is	to	increase	spending	for	health,	it	can	be	done	in	various	ways.	
Larger	subsidies	for	health	can	be	added	to	the	budget	and	paid	for	by	increased	
revenues	or	increased	borrowing.	Or	tax	subsidies	can	be	provided	to	employees	
by	allowing	their	employers	to	exclude	health	insurance	coverage	for	them	from	
their	business’s	income,	thus	lowering	their	tax	obligations.	This	is	the	equivalent	
of	adding	subsidies	on	the	spending	side	of	 the	budget,	but	 it	has	the	effect	of	
reducing	income	tax	revenues	instead.	Or	the	government	may	simply	mandate	
that	employers	pay	 for	 their	employees’	health	care,	without	offering	a	subsidy.	
All	these	options	may	have	the	same	effect	on	health	care	access	and	health,	but	
only	the	first	would	increase	the	government’s	direct	spending	on	health.
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and ineffectiveness of many spending programs. Moreover, they often argue 
that government programs impose a burden on the economy by increasing 
the cost of private investment and perhaps diverting resources to uses that 
do not contribute to growth. Therefore, in evaluating government spending 
proposals, they look for evidence that those programs produce benefits that 
at least exceed their direct costs (see Trenchard and Gordon, 1995).
On the other side are people who believe the government has a basic re-
sponsibility both to help individuals with limited capacities or opportunities 
and to foster a variety of public benefits, including building a society where 
more people can achieve their dreams. From this perspective, they tend 
to support government interventions to expand opportunity for personal 
economic and social achievement, as well as to shield people from events 
that can negate their efforts. This leads them, often, to support a larger and 
more robust government than those with different views. In defining a role 
for government social spending and regulation of private economic activ-
ity, they are more likely to emphasize flaws in the way markets function, 
leading perhaps to highly unequal incomes or to underproduction of public 
goods, such as training and basic research, needed for optimal growth. They 
view taxes as a worthwhile price to pay for increased collective benefits, 
including the opportunity to live in a just society (see Rawls, 2001).4
With regard to many federal responsibilities, people with relatively 
little confidence in the government’s ability to spend or invest wisely favor 
reducing the government’s role, as far as possible, to the basics—chiefly, 
defense and homeland security and environmental and public health pro-
tection when clearly justified. In contrast, people with more confidence in 
government’s capacity to use resources wisely often argue that there are 
economic justifications and unfulfilled demands for public programs that 
cannot be met either privately or at a community level. They often believe 
that government is underinvesting in certain areas—notably education, 
basic research, and infrastructure—that they expect to have large future 
payoffs that will benefit both society broadly and many individuals.
Views of the proper size of government also affect views on revenue 
policy. People who believe taxes are a drag on the economy’s efficiency or 
on individual and business incentives to work and invest generally favor 
low marginal tax rates and lower overall levels of taxation. Economists 
have tried to assess this contention. A recent analysis of many empirical 
studies finds no clear relationship and offers a variety of possible explana-
tions; see Box 2-2. In contrast, people who put more emphasis on the tax 
system as a means to overcome some of the inequalities of wealth and 
unequal opportunity favor a progressive tax structure, that is, one with 
high marginal rates for upper-bracket incomes. They also tend to support a 
relatively higher overall level of taxes to finance the government programs 
they believe are appropriate.
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In most cases, the larger size of other Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) country governments (as a percentage 
of GDP) reflects more comprehensive systems of publicly financed pension 
and health insurance programs. The apparently smaller public sector in 
the United States than in almost all other affluent countries, as measured 
BOX 2-2 
Government Size and Economic Growth
	 The	government’s	share	of	 the	economy	varies	widely,	even	among	affluent	
nations.	 It	has	been	widely	assumed	that	 if	 taxes	are	high	and	used	to	finance	
increased	social	spending,	economic	growth	will	slow.	Economic	theory	generally	
posits	 that	 taxes	 impose	a	“dead	weight”	 loss	on	 the	economy	by	discouraging	
productive	 effort	 and	 that	 the	 transfer	 of	 resources	 to	 poor	 and	elderly	 people	
prevents	their	use	for	more	productive	purposes.	The	countervailing	view	is	that	
government	investments	in	education,	infrastructure,	and	research	and	develop-
ment	will	contribute	to	future	economic	growth.
	 Because	 levels	of	 taxation	and	social	spending	vary	widely	 from	country	 to	
country,	it	is	possible	to	empirically	test	the	two	views.	In	such	a	study,	controlling	
statistically	for	other	factors—such	as	the	proportion	of	the	population	of	working	
age—that	might	 explain	 international	 variations	 in	 growth	 rates,	 Lindert	 (2003)	
found	no	clear	relationship.	In	recent	years,	GDP	grew	as	fast	 in	countries	with	
high	tax-based	social	spending	as	in	others.
	 Lindert	also	tried	to	determine	why	countries	that	tax	and	transfer	one-third	of	
national	GDP	have	grown	no	more	slowly	 than	countries	 that	devote	only	one-
seventh	 of	GDP	 to	 social	 transfers.	He	 concluded	 that	 the	 keys	 to	 this	 puzzle	
include	the	following:
	 •	 	High-budget	welfare	states	choose	a	mix	of	taxes	that	are	more	pro-growth	
than	the	mix	chosen	in	the	United	States	and	other	relatively	private-market	
countries	of	the	Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development	
(OECD).
	 •	 	Universalist	welfare	states	have	adopted	several	policies	that	create	strong	
incentives	for	young	adults	to	work	and	obtain	training.
	 •	 	Government	 subsidies	 to	 early	 retirement	 bring	 only	 a	 tiny	 reduction	 in	
GDP,	 partly	 because	 the	 more	 expensive	 early	 retirement	 systems	 are	
designed	to	encourage	the	least	productive	employees	to	retire.
	 •	 	Similarly,	 larger	 unemployment	 compensation	programs	have	 little	 effect	
on	GDP	because	although	they	lower	employment	they	also	may	get	the	
least	productive	workers	out	of	their	jobs.
	 •	 	Social	spending,	including	education	spending,	often	has	a	positive	effect	
on	GDP,	even	after	weighing	the	effects	of	the	taxes	used	to	finance	it.
	 Whatever	the	explanation,	it	appears	that	merely	increasing	the	size	of	govern-
ment	 through	higher	 taxes	and	 increased	social	spending	does	not	necessarily	
reduce	economic	growth.	Much	depends	on	specific	policy	choices,	such	as	the	
structure	of	the	tax	system	and	how	social	programs	are	designed.
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by revenues, is consistent with its strong traditional preference for limited 
government. However, it also reflects a U.S. decision to support many pub-
lic purposes by means of tax expenditures, which reduce revenues while 
extending government’s reach.
VALUES AND PRACTICAL CHOICES
The intellectual journey from values, interests, and beliefs to budget 
choices can be winding and complicated. For example, some policies, if 
used effectively, can advance multiple goals: examples are education, health 
care, and the development of new technologies. Education programs have 
contributed to economic growth while also increasing opportunities for 
individual advancement. Near-universal public education has added signifi-
cantly to U.S. economic growth, boosted incomes, and lowered inequality 
(Goldin and Katz, 2008). Increased access to good health care and public 
health programs that lead to communitywide improvements in health can 
have similarly broad effects (Bloom et al., 2001). Public investment that ac-
celerates the development of new technologies that provide a high economic 
return can boost growth while advancing other important public goals. For 
example, investments in environmental technologies that seed new indus-
tries can provide future job growth while improving energy efficiency and 
reducing carbon emissions, two other policy objectives. But imprudent or 
wasteful public investments divert resources from more productive uses; 
and, quite often, it is uncertain in advance whether a particular investment 
will be productive or wasteful.
Revenue policies can similarly be analyzed for their likely effects on 
growth, equity and opportunity, and other values. Such analyses need to 
consider both the total tax burden for each income group and the extent to 
which tax provisions favor certain uses of income over others. Many people 
believe the federal government raises revenues in ways that unnecessarily 
burden the economy. For example, tax provisions that favor investments in 
some activities over others may distort private decisions from that which 
would be financially optimal. If the tax code favors more spending on hous-
ing, some people will buy more housing than they would without the tax 
incentive, perhaps diverting capital from more productive uses. Or if the 
income directed to savings is taxed at the same or a higher rate than income 
that is consumed, savings and investment will be lower than otherwise, 
leading to slower growth (see Chapter 8).
The number of goals people would like to see the government pur-
sue, or pursue more vigorously, is long and seems always to be growing: 
helping end poverty; improving the justice system; providing more people 
with better education; fostering new technologies; exploring the universe; 
expanding access to high-quality health care; strengthening financial regula-
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tion; preparing for and responding to natural and human-caused disasters; 
fostering development abroad; and many more.
In many societies over recent decades, priorities have shifted from an 
emphasis on economic and physical security to subjective well-being, self-
expression, and the quality of life. The wealth accumulated by advanced 
societies allows an unprecedented share of the population to grow up tak-
ing survival for granted. Using public opinion data, Yankelovich (1994) 
describes how affluence has changed people’s priorities, a complicated evo-
lution as Americans have tried to take advantage of the expanded choices 
that affluence brought them and find a balance with their continuing need 
for enduring commitments, such as family and community.
People who share common values may disagree on what role govern-
ment should play in advancing those values. Conversely, because broad 
values do not dictate specific policy choices, people who have fundamental 
differences may sometimes agree on specific policies or programs. Still other 
differences—whether framed as value choices or not—may be driven by 
financial or other self-interest.
Many people are not comfortable with framing much of the policy 
debate about budgets as a choice between big and small government. 
The public’s view tends to be pragmatic: Intervention in the economy is 
warranted when it works, otherwise not (Yankelovich, 1994). Notably, 
President Obama, in his inaugural address (2009), expressed this more 
pragmatic view: “The question we ask today is not whether our government 
is too big or too small, but whether it works—whether it helps families find 
jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified.” 
Many people look at questions of the size of government and government 
programs in this practical way.
The committee proposes, in the same spirit, that people now give pri-
ority to finding practical ways to put the budget on a sustainable course. 
This does not mean that deeply held values and beliefs need be set aside, 
only that everyone recognize that agreement on prompt, prudent corrective 
action is needed soon to avoid an outcome that could harm everyone.
NOTES
1. Debates about social insurance programs are also about such practical questions as 
whether government or individuals are better managers of financial risk. Such questions 
illustrate the blending of value and practical questions in budget and policy debates.
2. One attempt to measure intergenerational fairness, known as generational budget ac-
counting, is especially relevant to any long-term analysis of the federal budget, but it 
is methodologically and conceptually challenging. A seminal work by Auerbach et al. 
(1991) presented this approach to analyzing budgets (see also Gokhale and Smetters, 
2003). The Congressional Budget Office (1995) has cautioned that generational account-
ing requires many debatable assumptions. One central technical challenge of generational 
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accounting is the rate that is assumed for discounting future costs and benefits (see 
Nordhaus, 2009:Ch. 9): the higher the assumed discount rate, the less important are the 
effects of today’s spending and borrowing for future generations.
3. Government policies also can have a major influence on the efficiency with which private 
resources are used. A major example is discussed in Chapter 5: one goal of health care 
reform is to improve the use of resources in the broader health care system. However, 
this aspect of efficiency is not a major focus here.
4. Opinions on whether government’s role should be bigger or smaller often vary with per-
sonal circumstances. For example, a 2009 survey measuring attitudes about risk found 
that those who had experienced a financial shock or had relatively few assets not only 
expressed more financial insecurity but were much more likely to believe that their finan-
cial well-being depended on events mostly out of their control rather than on their own 
actions. Not surprisingly, they also were more disposed toward collective, government-
sponsored interventions to provide financial security (Allstate/National Journal Heart-
land Monitor, reported in Brownstein, 2009).

3Fiscal Prudence
Whatever people’s values and choices about government and the bud-
get, in the long run many widely shared policy goals that require federal 
spending will be unattainable if the budget is not on a sustainable path. It 
will be difficult to simply continue the programs that people have come to 
expect, let alone allow sufficient flexibility for future generations to develop 
new policies for a changing world. In this chapter we offer a first step to-
ward dealing with the country’s fiscal challenge by specifying concrete and 
usable tests that any proposed budget must meet to move toward sustain-
ability in a prudent manner.
The committee’s members embody a range of disciplinary perspectives 
and practical experience in dealing with the federal budget. We hold quite 
varied views of the nation’s priorities and how best to achieve them, includ-
ing the proper size and role of government. We do not necessarily agree, 
for example, about the extent to which the federal budget ought to aim at 
expanding individual responsibility and choice or at promoting economic 
security; whether the nation should limit the use of carbon fuels or eschew 
such limits to facilitate economic growth; or how much to emphasize na-
tional security concerns versus expanding education and other programs 
that may promote equality of economic and social opportunity. What the 
committee members do agree on is the need for a set of straightforward 
criteria that anyone can use to assess the fiscal responsibility of any budget 
proposal for the overall federal budget from a long-term perspective.
In its work, the committee sought to apply these criteria to the develop-
ment of an illustrative set of policy and budget scenarios that demonstrate 
several possible paths to sustainability. These scenarios are detailed in 
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Chapter 9. The criteria also can be applied to the President’s budget or any 
alternative set of budget proposals, as discussed in Chapter 11.
LIMITING THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL DEBT
In consequence of our concerns about the current trajectory of the 
federal budget, the committee believes the overriding goal of long-term 
budget policy should be to slow the rate of future accumulation of the 
federal public debt—through some combination of revenue increases and 
spending restraints—so that such debt first ceases to grow faster than the 
economy and then subsequently returns to a prudent proportion of gross 
domestic product (GDP) within a reasonable period of time. The choice of 
a particular path for deficit reduction will ultimately be made by elected 
leaders, in light of the information available to them when they make bud-
get decisions. But the committee believes that the projected level of federal 
government debt relative to GDP is an appropriate benchmark for assessing 
the prudence of long-term budget policy, and that aiming for a level of 60 
percent within a decade of initiating policy actions that could begin as soon 
as fiscal year 2012 is prudent under current circumstances.
The remainder of this section explains our rationale for these views. 
The trajectory of a nation’s level of debt relative to its GDP has been widely 
used by U.S. government agencies, international organizations, and other 
countries as a benchmark for assessing a nation’s fiscal condition (see 
Peterson-Pew Commission on Budget Reform, 2009; also see Appendix G). 
The three major federal agencies that regularly make long-term projections 
each highlight the debt as a percentage of GDP as a principal measure of 
the budget outlook: (1) the Congressional Budget Office (2009c), (2) the 
General Accountability Office (2009), and (3) the U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (2009a:Ch. 13).
The most recent assessment of the state of public finances in advanced 
economies and emerging markets by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) (2009b) uses the ratio of total public debt to GDP as the basis for 
international comparisons (International Monetary Fund, 2009b). The IMF 
also used simulations to project the evolution of public debt as a percent-
age of GDP as a way of judging which countries are most vulnerable to an 
adverse debt dynamic following the current downturn. Those simulations 
noted, for example, that “[projected] increases are particularly large in 
absolute terms for the United Kingdom and the United States, where debt 
levels rise sharply” (International Monetary Fund, 2009b:18). Similarly, the 
Center for Budget and Policy Priorities has estimated that “driven primarily 
by health care costs, rapidly growing deficits will push the debt held by the 
public up to roughly 300 percent of gross domestic product by 2050, or 
nearly three times as large as the record level reached at the end of World 
War II” (Cox et al., 2009:1).
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The Congressional Budget Office (2009e) and others (e.g., Auerbach, 
1994) have calculated another measure that is useful in assessing the long-
term fiscal outlook, termed the “fiscal gap.” It is the amount that spending 
has to be reduced or revenues increased as a percentage of GDP so that 
the debt is the same at the end of a specified projection period as today, 
expressed as a percentage of today’s GDP. It is similar to our measure in 
that the debt is eventually stabilized relative to GDP, but it is more stringent 
in that it depends on stabilizing the debt ratio at today’s level. Because the 
stimulus plan, financial bailouts, and the lingering effects of the recession 
have the debt ratio on a strong upward course, the committee believes 
that the total elimination of the fiscal gap would require an overly painful 
change in tax and spending policies.1
Yet another alternative fiscal yardstick would be the size of the annual 
budget deficit. A different target and an even more stringent goal than 
ours for budget policy in the long term would be a return to the easily 
grasped idea that budgets should be balanced—either year-by-year or on 
average—and as expeditiously as possible. Because the government’s debt 
in dollar terms would be constant if budgets were balanced, the economy’s 
growth would gradually reduce the federal debt as a percentage of GDP. 
A balanced budget, although not consistently achieved, was the norm over 
most of U.S. history (Schick, 2007). Adopting this more stringent approach 
would, over time, provide a widening margin for error in case projections 
are overly optimistic or adverse developments ensue. However, the commit-
tee concluded that such a goal is unnecessarily restrictive: It would both 
be extraordinarily difficult to achieve in the foreseeable future—and goes 
well beyond what prudent fiscal policy requires for sustainability over a 
long period. Moreover, many would argue that running modest deficits to 
finance wise public investments that will benefit future generations is ap-
propriate (see also the discussion in Box 3-1 of the relationship between 
deficits and GDP growth).
Having selected the ratio of debt to GDP as a reasonable (albeit not the 
only possible) indicator of fiscal prudence, the committee then considered 
possible targets for it and on what time line the target should be reached. 
Within certain bounds, the choice of a target for debt is a matter of judg-
ment, but that does not mean that it is arbitrary.2 The federal government 
could eventually stabilize its debt at a substantially higher percentage of 
GDP than our chosen level of 60 and could run larger deficits in the mean-
time (which would in part accommodate the resulting additional debt 
service). Or, it could stabilize debt at a smaller percentage of GDP, requir-
ing larger policy adjustments to reach the goal in a given period of time.3 
Box 3-1 provides illustrations of the relationship among interest rates, the 
primary budget balance, growth in incomes and GDP, and the debt-to-GDP 
ratio.
There is no magic number either for the debt target as a percentage of 
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BOX 3-1 
The Arithmetic of the Debt
	 Suppose	 borrowing	 were	 used	 only	 to	 finance	 the	 interest	 portion	 of	 spending,	
that	 is,	 revenues	 were	 always	 sufficient	 to	 cover	 noninterest	 (“primary”)	 spending.	
And	suppose	that	the	interest	rate	on	the	debt	equals	the	growth	rate	of	incomes	(or	
GDP,	given	that	incomes	and	GDP	grow	at	nearly	the	same	rate).	Under	those	condi-
tions,	the	debt	will	grow	at	the	same	rate	as	incomes,	and	the	debt-to-GDP	ratio	will	
remain	constant.	For	example,	if	the	interest	rate	on	the	debt	is	5	percent	and	the	U.S.	
Treasury	borrows	just	enough	to	cover	it,	the	debt	will	grow	5	percent	annually.	If	GDP	
also	were	 to	grow	at	5	percent,	 the	debt-to-GDP	ratio	would	 remain	constant.	At	60	
percent	of	GDP,	which	is	the	target	ratio	the	committee	proposes,	debt	service	at	an	
interest	rate	of	5	percent	would	be	3	percent	of	GDP	(0.6	×	5).	If	all	spending	totaled	
about	20	percent	of	GDP,	 interest	on	 the	debt	would	be	15	percent	of	all	 spending.	
With	revenues	at	17	percent	of	GDP,	the	budget	would	be	balanced	except	for	interest	
on	the	debt.	The	annual	budget	deficit—equal	to	the	additional	borrowing	or	growth	of	
debt—would	be	3	percent	of	GDP	and	the	debt	would	grow	by	that	amount	or	at	a	rate	
of	5	percent	(3/60).	If	GDP	grew	4	percent	in	one	year,	then	debt	at	the	end	of	the	year	
would	be	60.6	percent	of	GDP.a	If	budgeters	wanted	to	prevent	the	debt	from	growing,	
they	could	either	raise	revenues	or	reduce	primary	spending	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	
This	“solution”	might	not	be	practical	for	long,	however,	given	that	the	study’s	baseline	
projects	primary	spending	to	grow	faster	than	GDP	if	no	changes	in	policy	are	made.	In	
that	case,	it	would	become	increasingly	difficult	to	either	limit	or	offset	spending	growth	
in	order	to	keep	debt	stable.
	 The	simple	relationship	between	growth	rate	of	the	economy	and	the	federal	debt	
is	summarized	by	the	following	equation	(adapted	from	von	Furstenberg,	1991):
Rt = Pt + (r – n)Dt–.5 – [Dt – Dt–1],
where	R	is	revenues,	P	is	noninterest	spending,	and	Dt–.5	is	the	average	publicly	held	
federal	debt	during	the	year,	all	expressed	as	percents	of	GDP.	The	average	interest	
rate	on	debt	is	represented	by	r,	n	is	the	growth	rate	of	GDP,	and	t	is	the	fiscal	year.	
When	r – n	is	zero,	revenues	can	equal	primary	spending	plus	the	change	in	the	debt	
resulting	 from	borrowing	 the	 amount	 needed	 that	 year	 for	 interest	 on	 the	 debt	 paid	
that	year.	If	r – n	 is	negative,	either	revenues	can	be	lowered	or	spending	increased	
without	increasing	the	debt.	Conversely,	in	a	year	when	r – n	is	positive,	the	debt	will	
grow	unless	revenues	are	increased	or	spending	reduced	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	As	
the	debt	grows,	so	does	the	burden	of	interest	on	that	debt.
	 Even	if	r – n	were	always	zero,	if	P	is	on	a	rising	path,	as	this	study’s	baseline	proj-
ects,	then	to	keep	the	debt	from	increasing	relative	to	GDP,	R	must	rise	by	the	same	
amount.	Or,	to	keep	R	constant	as	P	rises,	D	must	fall	instead.	However,	r – n	can	be	
(and	often	has	been)	positive,	as	in	the	example	above.	Although	n	can	be	(and	often	
has	been)	greater	than	r,	it	is	precisely	when	the	opposite	is	true	that	the	nation	can	
least	afford	to	run	primary	surpluses,	so	these	circumstances	deserve	special	attention	
(Bohn,	1995).	The	most	recent	downturn	serves	as	an	example.	In	2008	and	2009,	n	
turned	negative	while	r	fell	slowly,	P	rose	as	a	result	of	additional	spending	demands	
and	efforts	to	stimulate	recovery,	and	R	fell	with	the	drop	in	employment,	incomes,	and	
profits:	the	result	was	a	rapid	rise	in	federal	debt,	D.
	 The	following	example	illustrates	how	quickly	D	can	rise	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	in	
and	following	a	less	severe	downturn	than	the	one	we	have	experienced.	Assume	that	
at	the	recession’s	onset	Dt	=	.60	and	r	=	n.	The	primary	deficit,	Pt+1	– Rt+1,	suddenly	
equals	.08,	and	n	falls	to	–.05	while	r	=	.05.	Rearranging	the	budget	constraint,
Dt+1 = Pt+1 – Rt+1 + (r – n)Dt + Dt
	 Then,	substituting	the	assumed	numbers,	we	have
Dt+1 = .08 + (.055 × .6) + .6 = .713
	 The	recession	has	raised	D	by	11.3	percentage	points.	Now	assume	a	partial	re-
covery	next	year.	The	primary	deficit	improves	to	.02,	n	=	.02,	and	r	remains	at	.05.
Dt+2 = .02 + (.03 × .713) + .713 = .754
	 The	debt	has	risen	by	over	15	percent	of	GDP	in	only	2	years.	This	exercise	illus-
trates	how	fast	D	can	rise	in	a	recession	and	its	aftermath.
	 Suppose	 that	 interest	 rates	on	 the	debt	doubled	 in	 the	 future	while	annual	GDP	
growth	 continued	 to	average	4	percent.	 In	 that	 case,	 debt	 service	would	more	 than	
double	 in	a	 few	years	as	 the	debt	grew	relative	 to	GDP	and	as	maturing	debt	rolled	
over	and	was	replaced	by	new	debt	carrying	higher	rates.	If	annual	interest	payments	
on	the	debt	doubled	from	3	to	6	percent	of	GDP,	for	example,	then	one	of	three	things	
would	have	to	happen:	the	additional	interest	spending	would	be	covered	by	borrowing	
and	the	debt	would	grow	by	that	amount;	noninterest	spending	would	be	reduced	by	
about	18	percent	(equal	to	3	percent	of	GDP,	assuming	total	spending	is	20	percent	of	
GDP);	or	revenues	would	be	increased	by	3	percent	of	GDP.	The	first	option	would	put	
the	budget	on	an	unsustainable	path.	The	other	two	options	would	be	very	painful	but	
perhaps	barely	manageable.	If	the	debt	reaches	much	more	than	60	percent	of	GDP,	
an	interest	rate	doubling	might	be	too	difficult	to	manage.
	 Suppose	instead	that	the	debt	is	stabilized	at	80	percent	rather	than	60	percent	of	
GDP.	With	the	 interest	rate	at	5	percent,	 the	 interest	bill	would	be	4	percent	of	GDP	
(0.8	×	5),	that	is,	interest	spending	would	be	one-third	higher	than	at	a	60	percent	debt	
ratio.	Even	 if	GDP	growth	matches	 interest	 rates,	absent	a	decision	 to	 increase	rev-
enues	by	1	percent	or	to	reduce	noninterest	spending	by	1	percent,	the	deficit	would	
increase	from	3	to	4	percent	of	GDP	because	of	the	additional	interest	spending.	Not	
only	would	annual	interest	payments	be	higher	on	this	larger	debt,	but	the	margin	for	
future	spending	and	revenue	increases	would	be	reduced.
	 In	 the	 budget	 baseline	 used	 for	 this	 study,	 the	 publicly	 held	 debt	 is	 projected	 to	
increase	 by	more	 than	 40	 percentage	 points	 of	 GDP	 from	 2008	 to	 2021.	 Suppose	
that	after	some	years	 the	United	States	 faced	one	or	a	series	of	economic	or	other	
emergencies	of	magnitude	comparable	to	the	2008-2009	financial	crisis	and	downturn,	
contributing	to	a	comparable	increase	in	borrowing,	which	would	put	the	debt	at	120	
percent	of	GDP.	At	that	level,	even	with	no	increase	in	borrowing	rates,	annual	interest	
payments	would	be	6	percent	of	GDP,	requiring	a	decision	about	whether	to	borrow,	
raise	revenues,	or	 lower	spending	to	cover	the	higher	 interest	payments.	 If	revenues	
are	not	increased	or	noninterest	spending	reduced	in	this	case,	the	debt	would	begin	
to	grow	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	If	interest	rates	doubled,	debt	service	would	consume	
12	percent	of	GDP;	if	other	spending	were	maintained	at	17	percent	of	GDP,	spending	
would	equal	29	percent	of	GDP,	and	interest	would	be	41	percent	of	total	spending.
FISCAL PRUDENCE 
BOX 3-1 
The Arithmetic of the Debt
	 Suppose	 borrowing	 were	 used	 only	 to	 finance	 the	 interest	 portion	 of	 spending,	
that	 is,	 revenues	 were	 always	 sufficient	 to	 cover	 noninterest	 (“primary”)	 spending.	
And	suppose	that	the	interest	rate	on	the	debt	equals	the	growth	rate	of	incomes	(or	
GDP,	given	that	incomes	and	GDP	grow	at	nearly	the	same	rate).	Under	those	condi-
tions,	the	debt	will	grow	at	the	same	rate	as	incomes,	and	the	debt-to-GDP	ratio	will	
remain	constant.	For	example,	if	the	interest	rate	on	the	debt	is	5	percent	and	the	U.S.	
Treasury	borrows	just	enough	to	cover	it,	the	debt	will	grow	5	percent	annually.	If	GDP	
also	were	 to	grow	at	5	percent,	 the	debt-to-GDP	ratio	would	 remain	constant.	At	60	
percent	of	GDP,	which	is	the	target	ratio	the	committee	proposes,	debt	service	at	an	
interest	rate	of	5	percent	would	be	3	percent	of	GDP	(0.6	×	5).	If	all	spending	totaled	
about	20	percent	of	GDP,	 interest	on	 the	debt	would	be	15	percent	of	all	 spending.	
With	revenues	at	17	percent	of	GDP,	the	budget	would	be	balanced	except	for	interest	
on	the	debt.	The	annual	budget	deficit—equal	to	the	additional	borrowing	or	growth	of	
debt—would	be	3	percent	of	GDP	and	the	debt	would	grow	by	that	amount	or	at	a	rate	
of	5	percent	(3/60).	If	GDP	grew	4	percent	in	one	year,	then	debt	at	the	end	of	the	year	
would	be	60.6	percent	of	GDP.a	If	budgeters	wanted	to	prevent	the	debt	from	growing,	
they	could	either	raise	revenues	or	reduce	primary	spending	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	
This	“solution”	might	not	be	practical	for	long,	however,	given	that	the	study’s	baseline	
projects	primary	spending	to	grow	faster	than	GDP	if	no	changes	in	policy	are	made.	In	
that	case,	it	would	become	increasingly	difficult	to	either	limit	or	offset	spending	growth	
in	order	to	keep	debt	stable.
	 The	simple	relationship	between	growth	rate	of	the	economy	and	the	federal	debt	
is	summarized	by	the	following	equation	(adapted	from	von	Furstenberg,	1991):
Rt = Pt + (r – n)Dt–.5 – [Dt – Dt–1],
where	R	is	revenues,	P	is	noninterest	spending,	and	Dt–.5	is	the	average	publicly	held	
federal	debt	during	the	year,	all	expressed	as	percents	of	GDP.	The	average	interest	
rate	on	debt	is	represented	by	r,	n	is	the	growth	rate	of	GDP,	and	t	is	the	fiscal	year.	
When	r – n	is	zero,	revenues	can	equal	primary	spending	plus	the	change	in	the	debt	
resulting	 from	borrowing	 the	 amount	 needed	 that	 year	 for	 interest	 on	 the	 debt	 paid	
that	year.	If	r – n	 is	negative,	either	revenues	can	be	lowered	or	spending	increased	
without	increasing	the	debt.	Conversely,	in	a	year	when	r – n	is	positive,	the	debt	will	
grow	unless	revenues	are	increased	or	spending	reduced	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	As	
the	debt	grows,	so	does	the	burden	of	interest	on	that	debt.
	 Even	if	r – n	were	always	zero,	if	P	is	on	a	rising	path,	as	this	study’s	baseline	proj-
ects,	then	to	keep	the	debt	from	increasing	relative	to	GDP,	R	must	rise	by	the	same	
amount.	Or,	to	keep	R	constant	as	P	rises,	D	must	fall	instead.	However,	r – n	can	be	
(and	often	has	been)	positive,	as	in	the	example	above.	Although	n	can	be	(and	often	
has	been)	greater	than	r,	it	is	precisely	when	the	opposite	is	true	that	the	nation	can	
least	afford	to	run	primary	surpluses,	so	these	circumstances	deserve	special	attention	
(Bohn,	1995).	The	most	recent	downturn	serves	as	an	example.	In	2008	and	2009,	n	
turned	negative	while	r	fell	slowly,	P	rose	as	a	result	of	additional	spending	demands	
and	efforts	to	stimulate	recovery,	and	R	fell	with	the	drop	in	employment,	incomes,	and	
profits:	the	result	was	a	rapid	rise	in	federal	debt,	D.
	 The	following	example	illustrates	how	quickly	D	can	rise	as	a	percentage	of	GDP	in	
and	following	a	less	severe	downturn	than	the	one	we	have	experienced.	Assume	that	
at	the	recession’s	onset	Dt	=	.60	and	r	=	n.	The	primary	deficit,	Pt+1	– Rt+1,	suddenly	
equals	.08,	and	n	falls	to	–.05	while	r	=	.05.	Rearranging	the	budget	constraint,
Dt+1 = Pt+1 – Rt+1 + (r – n)Dt + Dt
	 Then,	substituting	the	assumed	numbers,	we	have
Dt+1 = .08 + (.055 × .6) + .6 = .713
	 The	recession	has	raised	D	by	11.3	percentage	points.	Now	assume	a	partial	re-
covery	next	year.	The	primary	deficit	improves	to	.02,	n	=	.02,	and	r	remains	at	.05.
Dt+2 = .02 + (.03 × .713) + .713 = .754
	 The	debt	has	risen	by	over	15	percent	of	GDP	in	only	2	years.	This	exercise	illus-
trates	how	fast	D	can	rise	in	a	recession	and	its	aftermath.
	 Suppose	 that	 interest	 rates	on	 the	debt	doubled	 in	 the	 future	while	annual	GDP	
growth	 continued	 to	average	4	percent.	 In	 that	 case,	 debt	 service	would	more	 than	
double	 in	a	 few	years	as	 the	debt	grew	relative	 to	GDP	and	as	maturing	debt	rolled	
over	and	was	replaced	by	new	debt	carrying	higher	rates.	If	annual	interest	payments	
on	the	debt	doubled	from	3	to	6	percent	of	GDP,	for	example,	then	one	of	three	things	
would	have	to	happen:	the	additional	interest	spending	would	be	covered	by	borrowing	
and	the	debt	would	grow	by	that	amount;	noninterest	spending	would	be	reduced	by	
about	18	percent	(equal	to	3	percent	of	GDP,	assuming	total	spending	is	20	percent	of	
GDP);	or	revenues	would	be	increased	by	3	percent	of	GDP.	The	first	option	would	put	
the	budget	on	an	unsustainable	path.	The	other	two	options	would	be	very	painful	but	
perhaps	barely	manageable.	If	the	debt	reaches	much	more	than	60	percent	of	GDP,	
an	interest	rate	doubling	might	be	too	difficult	to	manage.
	 Suppose	instead	that	the	debt	is	stabilized	at	80	percent	rather	than	60	percent	of	
GDP.	With	the	 interest	rate	at	5	percent,	 the	 interest	bill	would	be	4	percent	of	GDP	
(0.8	×	5),	that	is,	interest	spending	would	be	one-third	higher	than	at	a	60	percent	debt	
ratio.	Even	 if	GDP	growth	matches	 interest	 rates,	absent	a	decision	 to	 increase	rev-
enues	by	1	percent	or	to	reduce	noninterest	spending	by	1	percent,	the	deficit	would	
increase	from	3	to	4	percent	of	GDP	because	of	the	additional	interest	spending.	Not	
only	would	annual	interest	payments	be	higher	on	this	larger	debt,	but	the	margin	for	
future	spending	and	revenue	increases	would	be	reduced.
	 In	 the	 budget	 baseline	 used	 for	 this	 study,	 the	 publicly	 held	 debt	 is	 projected	 to	
increase	 by	more	 than	 40	 percentage	 points	 of	 GDP	 from	 2008	 to	 2021.	 Suppose	
that	after	some	years	 the	United	States	 faced	one	or	a	series	of	economic	or	other	
emergencies	of	magnitude	comparable	to	the	2008-2009	financial	crisis	and	downturn,	
contributing	to	a	comparable	increase	in	borrowing,	which	would	put	the	debt	at	120	
percent	of	GDP.	At	that	level,	even	with	no	increase	in	borrowing	rates,	annual	interest	
payments	would	be	6	percent	of	GDP,	requiring	a	decision	about	whether	to	borrow,	
raise	revenues,	or	 lower	spending	to	cover	the	higher	 interest	payments.	 If	revenues	
are	not	increased	or	noninterest	spending	reduced	in	this	case,	the	debt	would	begin	
to	grow	as	a	percentage	of	GDP.	If	interest	rates	doubled,	debt	service	would	consume	
12	percent	of	GDP;	if	other	spending	were	maintained	at	17	percent	of	GDP,	spending	
would	equal	29	percent	of	GDP,	and	interest	would	be	41	percent	of	total	spending.
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the GDP or for the number of years until the target is reached. These choices 
must follow from the underlying purpose of adopting such a standard. The 
federal budget will be sustainable if investors around the world (including 
the United States) are willing to lend to the Treasury at affordable interest 
rates. Maintaining that willingness to lend now and in the future requires, 
in our view, a credible public commitment to responsible fiscal behavior.
The choice of the target and the time line are important. A target or 
a schedule that is too stringent risks failure because it imposes such pain-
ful policy choices. A failure to achieve a publicized goal could shake the 
confidence of domestic and international financial markets. An excessively 
rigorous standard might require either what would be viewed as exces-
sive taxation or forgoing government services that most people believe are 
essential.
The higher the level of debt, the closer the nation would be at any time 
to a major problem as the result of any adverse events—such as an eco-
nomic downturn or a national security crisis—that can drive revenues down 
and increase spending needs. In fact, the IMF (2009b:21) found that the 
size of the fiscal stimulus during 2008-2010 was inversely related in large 
	 These	calculations	assume	that	the	debt	level	or	changes	in	the	debt	level	do	
not	have	their	own	effect	on	future	interest	rates.	However,	if	investors	in	federal	
debt	demand	higher	interest	rates	when	debt	is	high	or	rising	because	they	per-
ceive	an	 increase	 in	risk,	 then	 interest	costs	will	 rise,	 increasing	 the	probability	
that	r	 in	a	given	year	would	exceed	n.	There	 is	no	scientifically	established	nor	
expert	consensus	on	the	relationship	between	debt	levels	and	interest	rates;	one	
estimate	 is	 that	an	 increase	 in	D	of	1	percentage	point	of	GDP	would	 increase	
the	 long-term	 real	 interest	 rate	by	 .03	percentage	points	 (Engen	and	Hubbard,	
2004;	Foster,	2008).	Another	estimate	is	that	long-term	rates	rise	by	.05	percent-
age	points	for	each	1	percentage	point	increase	in	government	debt	(International	
Monetary	Fund,	2009b).	Using	the	smaller	of	these	estimates,	a	decision	to	sta-
bilize	the	debt	at	80	percent	rather	than	60	percent	of	GDP	would	increase	r	by	a	
further	0.6	percent	over	a	long	period.	If	this	relationship	between	debt	level	and	
interest	rates	held,	stabilizing	the	debt	at	120	percent	of	GDP	would	increase	r	
by	1.8	percentage	points	relative	to	the	proposed	target.	An	equal	increase	in	R	
or	equal	decrease	in	P	would	be	required	each	year	to	keep	D	constant.
aCBO’s	 latest	 forecast	 is	 for	 GDP	 growth	 averaging	 just	 over	 4	 percent	 following	 the	
economic	 recovery,	 i.e.,	 from	2014	 through	2019,	and	 for	 the	Treasury’s	borrowing	 rate	 to	
average	around	5	percent.	The	intermediate	assumptions	of	the	Social	Security	Administra-
tion	(2009d)	have	GDP	growing	in	the	long	run	at	an	annual	rate	of	about	4.5	percent.	The	
Trustees’	 intermediate	assumption	 is	 that	nominal	 interest	 rates	over	 the	projection	period	
after	2010	(on	the	fund’s	holdings	of	special	Treasury	securities)	will	 range	between	5	and	
6	percent.
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countries to the initial level of public debt. Presumably, those with higher 
debt burdens were more constrained either politically or economically 
than others. Furthermore, the larger the debt and the government’s interest 
obligations, the more the budget would be vulnerable to any upward spike 
in interest rates.
Both theory and evidence suggest that higher debt itself will tend 
to increase the long-term interest rate on government debt (Engen and 
Hubbard, 2004; International Monetary Fund, 2009b). The observed ef-
fects are even larger “for countries that start from high debt ratios or deficit 
levels, or that confront faster population aging” (International Monetary 
Fund, 2009b:21-22). With interest payments as a larger share of spending, 
the task of maintaining debt at a given percentage of GDP in the face of 
an interest rate rise becomes harder. There is a danger of a debt spiral. The 
tax increases or spending cuts necessary to finance a growing interest bill 
become more difficult politically as they become larger. Legislators may 
lag in enacting them. The deficit grows, and interest pressures become 
more severe. Faced with such pressures, many countries throughout history 
have simply given up and decided to finance deficits by creating money 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). The hyperinflation that follows destroys per-
sonal wealth and government programs. It is often said that cannot happen 
here, but the prospect is so terrible that we must be extremely vigilant in 
avoiding even the smallest probability of such an outcome.
It can also be argued that an “easy” standard would result in a gov-
ernment that many people would believe is too large. The larger the debt, 
all else equal, the more the government must spend on interest payments 
before it can spend to meet any of the nation’s needs. Larger government 
borrowing competes with other uses of capital, including productive busi-
ness investment, and can increase interest costs for other borrowers. To the 
extent that productive investment is crowded out or the United States must 
rely on borrowing from abroad, either wage growth is slowed or a higher 
portion of our income must be devoted to paying interest and dividends 
to foreigners.
The committee believes that some combination of revenue increases 
and spending restraints should be implemented soon to constrain the 
growth of federal debt as a percentage of GDP within a decade to a level 
that provides an appropriate balance between the risks associated with a 
higher ratio and the additional difficulties of implementing policies that 
would be consistent with a lower ratio. The committee judged that a debt 
of 60 percent of GDP reflects an appropriate balance and is an achievable 
target within a decade—and is therefore useful to guide policy choices that 
will ultimately be made by elected leaders. This is a different ratio than 
the committee would have likely proposed under different circumstances. 
Indeed, it will surely be seen by some as too high and by others as too low. 
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But the committee believes it is the lowest ratio that is practical given the 
fiscal outlook and reflects the best balancing of practicality and risk, taking 
into account a range of concerns.
In establishing a debt target, the nation needs a standard that balances 
risk—maintaining credibility, but not excessively constraining public ser-
vices or raising taxes—through either too low a constraint on debt or too 
high a level of debt service. Maintaining credibility will require a debt target 
that is within a reasonable range, based on the nation’s economic history. 
Although the U.S. economy survived a debt in excess of its GDP in the years 
immediately following World War II, those were extraordinary—probably 
unique—times. There was enormous pent-up demand for domestic goods 
and services as a result of war-time rationing, the labor force grew enor-
mously with the return of the troops, and the federal government had not 
yet made sizeable commitments for retirement and health care that would 
later cause spending to automatically rise much faster than revenues. As 
a result, the debt-to-GDP ratio fell rapidly as the GDP grew quickly, and 
the budget remained close to balance from 1947 through 1960. Today, this 
favorable situation is almost completely reversed, as the post-World War II 
baby boom generation is just beginning to retire, both slowing the potential 
growth of the labor force and the economy and (along with rising health 
care costs) putting severe pressures on the budget.
Our target of stabilizing the ratio of debt to GDP at 60 percent still 
would leave the public debt relative to the size of its economy at its high-
est point since 1952. Assuming as a rough rule of thumb that the average 
interest rate on the debt is 5 percent, that would leave the government’s 
net interest cost at 3 percent of GDP—which would be higher than in any 
years other than the period of high deficits and elevated interest rates of 
1985 through 1997.4
With the future spending and higher debt relative to GDP implicit in 
the nation’s promises to the elderly both larger than at any time in the 
past, the credibility of a target debt level of 60 percent of GDP is not a 
foregone conclusion. However, a 60 percent target would have institutional 
confirmation in the financial world. The European Monetary Union (EMU) 
set as its standard for membership the achievement and maintenance of 
a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent.5 Of course, just as the U.S. debt has 
increased in the current economic and financial crisis, so have the debts of 
EMU members. However, should the United States articulate and pursue a 
target for the public debt of 60 percent of GDP, there is a strong probability 
that the financial credibility of the nation in world financial markets will 
be maintained.
In considering feasibility, we concluded on the basis of the analysis in 
this report that a debt target of 60 percent of GDP could be reached con-
sistent with appropriate levels of spending and taxation. In fact, there are 
many plausible policy combinations that would produce this result if action 
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is taken in our proposed time frame. We note again that the members of 
the committee would choose different levels of taxation and of spending in 
different categories of the budget. Those decisions ultimately must be made 
by the citizens of the nation, through their elected representatives. Our find-
ings demonstrate that many reasonable choices are available to meet the 
standard that we have chosen.
Apart from the numerical target for the debt as a percentage of GDP, 
there are further specific questions about how quickly it should be reached. 
We selected fiscal 2012 (which begins October 1, 2011) as a reasonable time 
to start—to first slow the rapid increase of the debt relative to the economy 
and then, over several years, to reduce it to a more prudent level. We ex-
pect the economy to find its feet by that date. The longer the time taken 
to change course, the longer the debt will continue to rise relative to GDP 
and the higher the level before it begins to be stabilized or reduced, raising 
all of the concerns about excessive debt. However, given the situation as 
the committee writes its report—and with an economy that is still fragile 
and in a slow recovery—sharply and quickly raising revenues or reducing 
spending quickly could be a mistake, even with a debt-to-GDP ratio above 
50 percent and rising rapidly as it currently is in the United States. With-
drawing purchasing power from the economy while the recovery is fragile 
could return the economy to a recession. The committee is aware both of 
the many spending demands that the federal government must meet in the 
immediate future and the dangers of quickly raising revenues or reducing 
spending relative to their current paths. We believe that articulating an ex-
tended adjustment path from the outset would help to cushion the impact 
on the economy, reducing the risk of extending the recent slowdown. We 
note that once a 60 percent debt-to-GDP ratio is reached, the government 
can run annual deficits (after 2022) that average between 2 and 3 percent 
of GDP at the projected rate of interest on the debt without causing the 
debt to grow in proportion to the economy.6
A target or schedule that is delayed too long could itself lose the nation’s 
credibility with investors by failing to assure that the nation’s debt-servicing 
obligations will be met. In fact, we believe that the reassurance of financial 
markets that would come from the national determination to meet a clear 
fiscal standard would help keep interest rates lower than they otherwise 
would be, facilitating the economic recovery and ultimate expansion. We 
then believe that 10 years would prove to be a sufficient time horizon to 
achieve the necessary savings in a nondisruptive manner.
The choice of the starting date and time line, as with the level of the tar-
get will ultimately be a decision of elected leaders, taking into account the 
best information available to them when they must make budget choices. 
However, we judge that waiting longer to begin changing course or enacting 
a less stringent target (thereby allowing the debt to GDP ratio to rise even 
further before its rise is arrested and reduced to the proposed target) will 
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only add to the ultimate budgetary cost—and the economic risk. This, in 
turn, will add to the political difficulty and pain of reaching the 60 percent 
target. The budget costs of such delays are highlighted by an analysis, pre-
sented in Chapter 9, showing the budget effects of waiting 5 or 10 years 
longer before beginning to introduce similar policy changes.
As the discussion of illustrative policy options in the following chapters 
makes clear, achieving the committee’s proposed stabilization of the debt-
to-GDP ratio by 2022 would require the adoption of painful policies. The 
fact that the goal is so politically challenging to reach is an indication of 
the depth of the nation’s fiscal hole. The committee would prefer a more 
ambitious goal for the very long run, but believes that it is unrealistic to aim 
for a significantly lower debt ratio within the next 20 to 25 years. Thus, 
we selected a 60 percent debt-to-GDP target as reasonable and reachable 
within this time frame—particularly since a higher target or longer glide 
path would leave the nation at too much risk of being unable to cope with 
unforeseeable shocks that require a vigorous federal response. Chapters 4 
through 9 present first an overview of, and then describe, specific sets of, 
policy options and possible combinations that would put the U.S. budget 
on a path to achieve this target federal debt-to-GDP ratio by 2022. The 
committee’s different scenarios are intended as an illustrative, but by no 
means, definitive or exhaustive, set of trajectories toward a sustainable 
fiscal future.
Reasonable people may differ with our views about what target and 
time path to choose, and there should be a full and rich debate about those 
decisions. However, the committee urges those who differ significantly on 
these choices—especially those who would choose a less ambitious target or 
a slower time path—to consider seriously the benefits in terms of credibility 
from formally setting some target and some schedule to reach it. We believe 
that such a public commitment would be beneficial even if the target and 
schedule chosen were different from ours.
TESTS FOR FISCAL PRUDENCE
Having set a long-term target for sustainability, the committee sug-
gests that people apply to any comprehensive set of budget proposals three 
primary fiscal prudence tests, on the debt target and on the long-term re-
lationship between revenues and spending. We also offer secondary fiscal 
prudence tests on the deficit, age-related programs, cost-effectiveness and 
growth, and effects on states.
Primary Tests for Fiscal Prudence
A budget must be judged primarily by the extent to which it moves 
from the current unsustainable path to one that is sustainable for the 
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foreseeable future. The committee proposes three primary tests to assess 
whether it puts the country on a path of economic sustainability.
1. Does the proposed federal budget include policy actions that start 
to reduce the deficit in the near future in order to reduce short-term 
borrowing and long-term interest costs?
The budget should include proposals that begin to close the gap be-
tween revenues and spending, first slowing the growth of the debt and then 
gradually reversing its growth. This cannot be done overnight, but it can 
be done gradually and steadily over a decade or more. It is important to 
minimize near-term annual deficits that add to the future size of the fed-
eral debt and the costs of servicing that debt, in part because many policy 
changes to entitlement programs will take a long time to yield substantial 
budget savings, even if enacted soon.
2. Does the proposed budget put the government on a path to reduce 
the federal debt within a decade to a sustainable percentage of 
GDP?
Given the fiscal outlook and the committee’s analysis of the many fac-
tors that affect economic outcomes, the committee believes that the lowest 
ratio of debt to GDP that is economically manageable within a decade, 
as well as practical and politically feasible, is 60 percent. If the budget is 
put on a path beginning in 2012 to reach that target, savings from interest 
payments that are avoided by reducing borrowing requirements would ac-
cumulate slowly at first, but would equal nearly $800 billion in the first 10 
years (2012 through 2021), exceeding $5.7 trillion by 2031 and multiply-
ing quickly thereafter: see Figure 3-1. These estimates are derived from the 
scenarios developed and analyzed in Chapters 4 through 9.
In addition to contributing directly to deficit reduction, less borrowing 
in this period would contribute to creditors’ confidence in the United States’ 
ability to manage its affairs and thereby reduce the risks of a disruptive 
financial crisis that could harm the economy, as well as greatly illustrative 
complicate efforts to achieve budget sustainability.
3. Does the proposed budget align revenues and spending closely over 
the long term?
Projections of the long-term path (75 years or beyond) implied by a 
proposed or enacted budget should show revenues and spending that are 
roughly aligned and parallel and appear likely to remain so beyond the 
end of the projection period. The size and timing of changes that affect the 
budget’s path matter a great deal. It may be too much politically to ask 
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leaders to provide specific policies in a single year’s budget sufficient to ac-
complish the entire, large task of aligning spending and revenues. However, 
each year’s budget should demonstrate a credible commitment to policy 
changes that substantially move toward sustainability, with an explicit 
commitment to the longer-term goal of aligning revenues and spending 
over the long term.
Secondary Tests for Fiscal Prudence
The standards of fiscal prudence proposed above address the overall 
long-term balance between revenues and spending. The additional criteria 
discussed in this section can help people assess whether budgets are moving 
in the right direction. Most analysts are likely to agree on these in principle, 
although they may disagree on how to apply them in practice. The three 
secondary criteria offered below are applicable to any budget, but they are 
particularly important given the current path of the U.S. budget.
4. Does the proposed budget restrain health care cost growth and 
introduce changes now in the major entitlement programs and in 
other spending and tax policies that will have cumulative beneficial 
fiscal effects over time?
For entitlement programs, peoples’ reasonable expectations about cur-
rent benefits will be honored. Changes will be easier to manage if spending 
restraints or revenue increases are introduced soon, but applied in a way 
FIGURE 3-1 Debt savings from stabilizing debt-to-GDP ratio in 12 years.
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that minimizes their effects on current beneficiaries. This means that even 
budget savings from changes introduced immediately would take effect 
slowly—so the sooner the effort is started the better.
If programs can be designed that truly yield productivity gains by 
restructuring major sectors of the economy or the budget (or both), invest-
ments in these may increase spending in the short run but yield permanent 
gains from more productive use of resources. Proposed investments in in-
formation technology for health and investments in new forms of energy, if 
they yield hoped-for gains in productive capacity and other social benefits, 
fall into this category.
For both sets of policies, it may take many years after major policy 
changes are made before they achieve results of the magnitude required to 
help bring revenues and spending into stable alignment. For this reason, 
if policy changes are deemed necessary to yield large long-term changes in 
levels of spending or revenues relative to the baseline, they should be intro-
duced as soon as possible. The costs of waiting—in forgone budget savings 
and accumulated additional borrowing to finance deficits—are high.
5. Does the budget include spending and revenue policies that are 
cost-effective and promote more efficient use of resources in both 
the public and private sectors?
A budget should include those investments—perhaps in education, pre-
ventive health, infrastructure, and scientific research—that can be shown to 
yield high returns. A budget should raise revenues in ways that do not cre-
ate undue distortions and inefficiency in private-sector decisions about the 
best use of resources, which slow growth. And a budget should eliminate 
or curtail programs that have proven ineffective or inefficient and use in-
formation about performance to redirect public resources to more effective 
programs addressing the most important national objectives.
6. Does the federal budget reflect a realistic assessment of the fiscal 
problems facing state and local governments?
It would be easy for the federal government to improve its books by 
simply dumping its burdens onto state and local governments. Because 
cutting federal transfers to states and localities adds to their fiscal burdens, 
applying this test requires consideration of the fiscal stresses that are facing 
state and local governments. In the medium and longer term, states will 
face daunting fiscal pressures from some of the same sources as the federal 
government, including commitments for health and retirement. Their free-
dom of action is more limited than that of the federal government because 
in most cases they have, at most, limited borrowing capacity to finance 
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these commitments. Shifts of responsibilities to state and local govern-
ments should be predicated on evidence that these will improve overall 
government efficiency and responsibility to local circumstances. However, 
arguments for devolving to states some functions traditionally performed 
at a national level—if these changes are made thoughtfully—are stronger 
now than in the past. States’ governing capacities have increased and be-
come more uniform over time, and state governments are often leaders in 
both policy innovation and service administration. States can be expected 
to do more than some years ago partly because of convergence among 
states in their economies and policies. In particular, many southern states 
whose economies were so weak they could not easily provide basic services 
to their residents or have had a history of racial discrimination are today 
closer to economic parity with other states. However, the principal test for 
deciding whether to devolve some federal responsibilities to state and local 
government is whether those government can better take account of local 
conditions and be more responsive to people’s varied demands than the 
federal government.
In a broad sense, these secondary tests help to ensure that the federal 
government makes the most efficient possible use of its share of the nation’s 
resources, allowing other governments and private actors to allocate the 
rest.
APPLyING THE FRAMEWORK
The framework presented in this and the preceding chapter is intended 
to have immediate practical application. A proper understanding of how 
values and beliefs shape budget choices provides a starting point for under-
standing how to approach the difficult choices that face the country. A set 
of practical tests of fiscal prudence will enable every person to judge how 
far a proposed or enacted budget goes to meet the looming fiscal challenge 
and put the budget on a sustainable course. The committee believes that 
these tests ought to be applied by everyone to all proposed budgets, starting 
with the budget that the President will present for the next fiscal year.
The tests outlined above do not, of course, help policy makers and 
others decide what combination of reductions to spending, increases in rev-
enues, or both to choose. If policy makers agree that the nation must reduce 
the debt and bring spending and revenues into long-term alignment, then 
some combination of the following must occur soon: some objectives must 
be abandoned or pursued by means other than federal spending, govern-
ment spending must yield much more for each dollar, or government spend-
ing will take a larger share of the economy’s resources and must be financed 
by higher revenues. If the majority decision is to continue to pursue the 
federal government’s long and growing list of responsibilities with the same 
vigor, and perhaps to take on new challenges, either such efficiencies must 
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be achieved or more revenue will have to be raised. If the majority decision 
is to avoid or minimize tax increases, then the rate of spending growth must 
be slowed even more, and, eventually, quite dramatically.
Several aspects of the relationship between value choices and budget 
choices are becoming increasingly clear. First, to bring spending and rev-
enues into alignment over the next two decades and then keep them there 
will require not merely tactical changes but rethinking the way government 
is used to achieve the goals Americans consider most important. Explicit 
and deep debate over these questions is needed to inform choices. If politi-
cal leaders are to act responsibly without being punished at the polls, the 
culture and character of the nation’s politics—typically dominated by orga-
nized clienteles lobbying to protect or expand narrow benefits—may need 
to change to represent better the more diffuse public benefits and the lower 
but perhaps more concentrated costs of a prudent fiscal policy.
Second, unless revenues are raised to a level consistent with spending 
over the long term, some federal responsibilities on which people place 
great value eventually will have to be sacrificed or significantly reduced. 
This change can be achieved in part by shifting resource decisions to state 
and local governments or to the private sector or by mandating specific use 
of private resources through federal regulation.
Third, if the nation fails to bring spending and revenues into closer 
alignment over the long term, then all of the values that are now reflected 
in federal programs and fiscal policy will be threatened by a financial melt-
down. If the nation fails, eeryone’s ox may be gored.
Fortunately, perhaps, values do not translate directly or consistently 
into positions on particular policies, as discussed above. People with simi-
lar values may arrive at different positions on questions of policy. And 
conversely, those with sharply different values may be able to agree or 
compromise on a particular policy. A proper framing of the problem can 
help. The hard fiscal choices facing everyone in the country put a premium 
on rational discussion. There is no magic formula for resolving value and 
other differences and reaching the consensus and accommodation that are 
necessary. In Chapter 10 we suggest some process changes that can help. 
In a democratic society, different values and interests, and differing views 
of how to pursue them, are eventually compromised or reconciled through 
healthy argument and bargaining. Ultimately, the nation will have to rely 
on democratic politics, shaped by responsible leaders, to set a new course.
NOTES
1.  The fiscal gap represents the government’s long-term projected flows of revenues and 
spending by a single number, which is the present value of future payments to and from 
the Treasury, discounted for the time value of money to make them comparable with 
payments today; see Appendix A. The fiscal gap would be zero if it was expected that 
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over a long period the debt would remain the same proportion of GDP. Although the 
committee might have constructed such a measure and set a target on this basis, the debt 
target is more easily understood and communicated.
2.  In December 1991 the Maastricht Treaty of the European Union (EU) set future targets 
for deficits and debt that were to be used as conditions for membership in the European 
Monetary Union. The debt criterion was that publicly held debt may not exceed 60 per-
cent of GDP. However, several EU member nations currently do not meet this standard. 
An official of the International Monetary Fund noted in a conference call in July 2009 
that there is no “magic number” for debt-to-GDP (International Monetary Fund, 2009c). 
Buiter (2006) has written about the nature of the 1991 EU debt and deficit targets and the 
subsequent failure to enforce them, either as originally defined or with modifications.
3. Stabilizing the ratio of debt to GDP implies and is equivalent to stabilizing deficits at a 
constant percentage of GDP (or deficits minus debt service, the so-called primary defi-
cit, as a percentage of GDP). The target could as easily be expressed in these terms. As 
discussed below, stabilizing the budget at a higher debt-to-GDP ratio would permit the 
government to run larger annual deficits.
4. With a 1-year respite in 1994, when debt service was 2.9 percent of GDP.
5. The IMF has used a target of 60 percent by 2030 as the basis for measuring “the aggregate 
adjustment required to restore advanced economy ratios to safer levels” (2009b:23).
6. The projections assume that inflation is generally well behaved during the projection 
period. A higher inflation rate allows a higher deficit, because the real value of past debt 
is being eroded. But the effect is limited in the United States because so much of its debt 
is short term and the average interest rate on the debt will adjust upward quickly.
4Choices for a Sustainable Budget
Given the fiscal arithmetic, changing the nation’s economic course will 
almost certainly require an early dramatic adjustment in the level and mix 
of government spending and/or higher revenues. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
if people want to continue all the federal government programs at levels 
consistent with current policies, given the growing elderly population and 
rising health care costs, spending will have to greatly increase as a percent-
age of gross domestic product (GDP). This higher spending will require 
commensurately higher revenues. Also, as is discussed in Chapter 8, given 
the inefficiency of the present tax structure, it will almost certainly also be 
necessary to change how revenue is collected. If, instead, people prefer to 
keep government’s share of the economy’s resources about what it has been 
in recent years, the government will have to do much less in the future than 
implied by current policies, and choices will have to be made about what 
social goals to pursue less vigorously or what programs to give up. And it 
is important to stress that there are many possible paths between these two 
that would both reduce spending growth and raise revenue levels.
Chapters 5-8 present major policy options for three major categories 
of spending and for revenues. Options for the three major entitlement 
programs are treated first: Medicare and Medicaid in Chapter 5 and Social 
Security in Chapter 6. Spending options for defense and domestic programs 
other than the three big entitlements are treated in Chapter 7. Each combi-
nation of options to create a future spending path implies a roughly parallel 
revenue path needed to ensure fiscal sustainability. Chapter 8 describes al-
ternative approaches to raising the necessary revenues, including structural 
changes to the tax system that would be required for the higher revenue 
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levels. Chapter 9 then puts the spending and revenue pieces together to il-
lustrate different ways to reach fiscal sustainability.
This chapter serves as the broad introduction to the detailed analyses 
in Chapters 5-9. It also outlines how the options can be assembled to pro-
duce an illustrative set of budget “paths” (or “scenarios). The purpose of 
presenting a set of options and paths is not to argue for a particular set of 
policies, but to highlight the range and magnitude of the choices that the 
nation has to confront in seeking a sustainable course for the budget. All 
of the options to adjust spending and revenues are changes relative to the 
study baseline, which is the path of the budget projected by the continua-
tion of current policies; see Box 1-3 in Chapter 1.
SPENDING OPTIONS
Options for Medicare and Medicaid
The health care policy problem is extraordinarily difficult. From a 
budget standpoint, one of the greatest difficulties is the inability to estimate 
with any confidence how most of the widely discussed reform options, or 
combinations of them, will affect the future trajectory of health spending.
Although spending increases for federal health programs are driven in 
part by the same demographic forces as Social Security (i.e., the aging of 
the U.S. population), for other reasons health spending has grown and is 
likely to continue growing at a faster rate than the economy.
Any plan to change the health care system is likely to be highly com-
plex. There is little agreement on an overall approach or even on incremen-
tal steps to limit spending. The budget savings from any single option or a 
combination of options are highly uncertain. In addition, if savings can be 
realized, there will be strong pressures to use the savings for improvements 
in health and to extend federal support to people who would not otherwise 
have adequate insurance or care.
Given the uncertainties about savings and recognizing the pressures for 
spending, the committee’s approach is to present an array of options that 
could, collectively, reduce cost growth; but we do not attribute savings to 
any particular option or strategy for Medicare and Medicaid. The resulting 
paths for health spending are essentially a range of guesses as to the poten-
tial effectiveness of any change. As described in Chapter 5, at least in the 
short run, achieving any significant savings in Medicare and Medicaid with 
some measure of certainty will most likely require strong measures that 
directly control their costs in order to slow their rate of spending growth. 
Such measures could take several forms. The high cost of health care in 
the United States compared with other industrialized countries certainly 
suggests that the nation can provide care more efficiently than it currently 
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does. However, imposing direct limits on Medicare and Medicaid spend-
ing runs the risk of reducing either access to care or the quality of care, 
with potentially negative consequences for some people’s health. For the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs, there is a limit to how much cost con-
tainment can be achieved, without doing harm, and without reorganizing 
the nation’s overall health care system. In the medium term, major reforms 
that change incentives for providers and consumers, provide better informa-
tion to both about costs and benefits, and reorganize health care delivery 
can both improve care and yield budget savings. Such reforms will ease the 
pain imposed by—and eventually perhaps obviate the need for—an overall 
budget limit for health spending.
Options for Social Security
The committee’s options for Social Security are among many that have 
received wide discussion. Unlike the options for health, it is possible to es-
timate their budgetary effects with a good deal of confidence. Absent policy 
changes, future spending for Social Security benefits and future payroll tax 
revenues are relatively predictable from data on population aging, work 
and retirement patterns, immigration, and trends in wages.
The range of options for Social Security is wide, and a set of frequently 
discussed and relatively incremental reforms can put the program on a 
financially self-sustaining trajectory. Moreover, there is precedent from the 
early 1980s for agreement on significant changes, although the adjustments 
required now to bring Social Security revenues and benefits into alignment 
over the long run would be larger than those adopted earlier.
The options the committee presents would eliminate the now-projected 
Social Security shortfall in different ways, showing how it is possible to 
preserve benefits scheduled under current law by increasing payroll taxes 
or what adjustments to the rate of the growth of benefits would be needed 
to avoid payroll tax increases. The committee’s options illustrate the broad 
range of choices available to keep Social Security solvent without chang-
ing the fundamental nature of the program. Restoring Social Security to 
solvency is not a prerequisite for putting the entire budget on a sustainable 
path, but it is desirable in itself and can make an important contribution 
to the broader goal of budget sustainability.
Options for Defense and Other Domestic Spending
In 2008, 56 percent of all spending (excluding interest on the national 
debt) was for programs other than Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Secu-
rity.1 The hundreds of programs in this broad category address a wide range 
of goals pursued by the federal government: for national and homeland 
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security, veterans, education, the environment, transportation, and many 
other functions. This diverse category of domestic and defense spending 
rose sharply in 2009, if temporarily, as the government addressed the major 
economic downturn and its consequences.
People have widely differing views of the value of some of the programs 
in this category, and some arguably are sustained more by the power of 
their political constituencies than by evidence of their effectiveness. The 
options for limiting this range of spending are similarly numerous. For this 
category, the committee broadly illustrates in Chapter 7 how priorities for 
spending cuts might be set and what the likely implications are of different 
levels and mixes of spending.
Four options are presented for defense. All assume that costs for the 
wars and Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced over time, as in the study base-
line. On the high end of the committee’s options, defense spending would 
remain nearly at its current level as a percentage of GDP, although lower 
than in the Cold War period. At the low end of the committee’s options, 
defense spending would be a smaller share of GDP than in any recent pe-
riod, though it would be higher than the combined amount spent by U.S. 
allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Four options are presented for other domestic spending. At the lowest 
spending level, this broad category of programs would be reduced by 2019 
to a level 15 percent below the study baseline. At somewhat higher spend-
ing levels, two broad strategies for other domestic spending are illustrated. 
One intermediate option would allow other domestic programs to grow 
to a level 10 percent higher than the baseline. This growth would allow 
for substantial new investments intended to enhance the economy’s future 
growth, as well as benefiting people directly. These kinds of investments 
might be viewed as favoring younger age cohorts, because they will have 
more years to enjoy the future returns. The other intermediate option would 
reduce other domestic spending to a level 6 percent below the baseline, 
leaving no room for new investments unless offset by other program cuts. 
A fourth option for other domestic spending suggests what could be done 
if spending were to grow to a level 14 percent above the study baseline.
REVENUE OPTIONS
Options for federal revenues depend in part on whether the nation 
pursues a path to sustainability that keeps spending and revenues close to 
their recent historical levels, as a percentage of the economy, or pursues a 
path with higher spending, which would require higher revenues. If rev-
enues need to increase substantially, then there are severe limits on how 
much can be collected efficiently by simply raising rates within the current 
income and payroll tax structure. Reform of the tax structure would be 
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needed, probably including (in the higher-spending scenarios) new forms 
of taxation. An alternative to the present tax structure that is simpler and 
treats various sources of income more uniformly is described in Chapter 8, 
as is the possibility of a value-added tax (VAT) similar to that used in other 
industrialized countries. The analysis in that chapter of options for collect-
ing additional taxes illustrates the different levels and mixes of taxes and 
other revenues that could be used to move the budget to a stable relation-
ship between revenues and spending.
BUDGET SCENARIOS
The policy options presented in Chapters 5 through 8 can be combined 
to produce long-term federal budget scenarios (or paths) that first close the 
gap between spending and revenues to reduce the debt to no more than 60 
percent of GDP and then align spending closely with revenues, to put the 
budget on a sustainable trajectory. In Chapter 9, four such scenarios are 
presented, each of which leads to long-term budget sustainability. The four 
scenarios differ significantly in their composition and in the resulting level 
of spending and revenues. As a set, they are hardly exhaustive (but, rather, 
are illustrative) of the wide range of plausible—not necessarily politically 
feasible—potential policy paths to long-term fiscal stability.
The rest of this section provides an overview of the committee’s four 
scenarios:
1. low spending and revenues
2. intermediate-1 spending and revenues
3. intermediate-2 spending and revenues
4. high spending and revenues
The low path strives to maintain revenues at about their historical 
share of GDP and tightly limits federal spending to align with that level. 
In contrast, the high path envisions substantially more robust spending 
for the federal government (although less robust than under current poli-
cies), with correspondingly much higher revenues. The intermediate-1 and 
intermediate-2 paths lie in between, with the latter committing more re-
sources to elderly oriented entitlement programs and the former more 
to investments that confer greater benefits on the young and on future 
generations.
These scenarios—all of which meet the primary tests of fiscal prudence 
presented in Chapter 3—have differing implications for the values and 
beliefs that shape budget debates, as discussed in Chapter 2. The lowest 
spending and revenue path would limit what government can do to pro-
vide health care, pensions, and a range of other benefits. Certainly, in that 
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scenario, many people who rely on the federal government for income, 
health care, or other benefits will suffer, even if some spending reductions 
are offset by more efficiency in government programs. Much slower spend-
ing growth would almost certainly also slow the rate of public investment 
in future growth—in people, infrastructure, and technology—which would 
probably limit the opportunities for future generations.
Choosing a path of lower spending and revenues also means that more 
decisions about spending and savings would be made by private house-
holds and businesses, or by state and local governments, rather than by the 
federal government. People who doubt the national government’s ability 
to make wise spending decisions or fear that too large a government will 
have too much power are likely to prefer leaving more choices in private 
or local government hands.
Under scenarios for higher levels of spending, the federal government 
would be able to do more, although not all, of what it has been doing to aid 
people and invest in public goods that contribute to future growth. If the 
government can increase its effectiveness by shifting resources to programs 
that provide greater return on the public dollar, it can do still more. But a 
sustainable budget scenario at a higher spending level requires much higher 
revenues: In at least one scenario the government’s claim on the economy’s 
resources would increase to levels unprecedented in U.S. history.
Clearly, it is possible to construct many other scenarios. The commit-
tee’s four should be viewed as illustrative. Policy makers, analysts, and 
others can use them as the starting point for constructing other paths that 
achieve the same long-term sustainability and are more consistent with their 
personal values and beliefs.
Low Path
The committee’s low path will appeal to people who seek to minimize 
future revenue increases. Even if they would prefer a somewhat different 
mix of spending options, they can use it to estimate the extent to which 
spending in each of the three major areas must be constrained. In consider-
ing the options for Medicare and Medicaid (see Chapter 5), for example, 
one can assess the realism of enacting and maintaining policies that would 
hold the growth of per capita health spending to no more than the growth 
rate of incomes over a long period. And one can consider which combi-
nation of options discussed for Medicare and Medicaid are sufficient to 
achieve this result.
The low path also helps one assess whether it is both feasible and 
desirable to constrain the growth of Social Security benefits in the future 
to what can be financed with payroll taxes under current law and perhaps 
ask whether the options proposed or some other set are the best available 
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to do so. For defense and other domestic spending, people can decide 
whether the program cuts suggested to reduce spending by 20 percent from 
the study baseline are the best available and whether such reductions are 
feasible and consistent with their values and view of the role of the federal 
government. Apart from changes to existing spending programs, it is also 
important to consider easy-to-imagine but hard-to-specify future demands 
for federal spending that could be difficult to accommodate within such a 
constrained budget.
Intermediate Paths
People who believe that the reductions from the baseline rate of spend-
ing required to hold revenues near current levels are either infeasible or 
unacceptable will find other scenarios more appealing. However, these 
scenarios will all require substantially higher federal revenues in the future 
than have been historically acceptable in the United States. By some time 
in the next decade, on these intermediate paths, government’s share of the 
economy would need to be 4 or 5 percentage points higher than in the three 
decades prior to the recent downturn (when spending temporarily soared 
and revenues sagged as a proportion of the economy) and would continue 
to grow faster than the economy for many years thereafter. Although such 
proportions are within the experience of most wealthy countries, they 
would represent a change in government’s share of the nation’s resources 
that some people may find unacceptable. The two intermediate scenarios 
also illustrate the broad choice between spending that makes more room for 
the growth of benefits to an aging population and spending that represents 
investments in future growth, including education. And within the context 
of that broad tradeoff, there are many possible variations in the specific 
mix of policies that put spending and revenues on a higher long-term path 
consistent with a sustainable budget.
Government can do more with more revenues, but it is important to 
recognize that both of the intermediate scenarios (and the high revenue and 
spending scenario discussed below) represent reductions in the baseline rate 
of growth in spending implied by current policies. As noted above, collect-
ing more revenue efficiently probably would require broadening the base of 
the income tax and perhaps adding a new form of taxation.
High Path
People who are most concerned about the effects of reductions in the 
rate of projected spending growth may prefer the committee’s high path. 
The current tax structure cannot be used to achieve the high levels of rev-
enue, so a more efficient structure with new sources of revenue would be re-
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quired. This scenario would permit health spending to grow faster than the 
economy for a few more decades, although eventually at a rate slower than 
in the baseline. Under this scenario, Social Security benefits and retirement 
ages would continue as they are scheduled under current law. And spend-
ing for all other programs would grow at the same rate as the economy. 
Budget savings from any reductions due to efficiencies or changing needs 
in this category could be used to pay for new initiatives or to respond to 
emergencies and other unanticipated events or needs.
The result would be a federal government that spends and taxes at 
rates far higher than in the past—possibly one-third higher as a percent of 
GDP within two decades and even higher thereafter. The implications of a 
much larger government for the economy’s performance and for individu-
als are important considerations in constructing a sustainable budget. It is 
also important to reiterate that even this scenario would represent a major 
reduction in spending for health relative to the baseline projection of cur-
rent policies.
CONCLUSION
Although some people will see raising revenues—especially other peo-
ple’s taxes—as the best way to address anticipated higher spending, other 
people will argue just as strongly against this path. Given the pressures 
for higher spending for an aging population and rising health care costs, 
holding revenues near recent historical levels would force large changes to 
limit spending growth. Such a limitation would probably require drastic re-
structuring of the nation’s entire health care system, and it would certainly 
require caps on health spending, reductions in rate of growth of benefits 
for future Social Security recipients, and abandonment or curtailment of 
federal support for many other purposes. But if revenues are increased to 
permit faster spending growth, the federal government’s claim on national 
resources will be far larger than ever in the nation’s history, necessarily 
reducing the resources available for private purposes.
Taken together, the various policy options discussed in the following 
four chapters and the four scenarios that are presented in more detail in 
Chapter 9 illustrate the very wide range of available policy choices and 
plausible fiscal strategies that can be pursued to achieve a sustainable bud-
get. They are the building blocks of a prudent fiscal policy consistent with 
the principles proposed in Chapter 3.
As noted above, the committee is not recommending any one of these 
paths to sustainability. Our task was to identify how to put the federal 
budget on a sustainable path, and in this report we present many ways to 
do so. The decisions that will be made will reflect the diversity of values 
and preferences of the nation’s population. The best choices consistent with 
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a sustainable budget are matters for the public and the nation’s leaders to 
debate and decide. We stress, however, that finding compromises around 
some set of options that leads to a sustainable budget is a must. Doing 
nothing is not a viable option.
NOTE
1. Because this category of domestic and defense spending rose sharply, if temporarily, as 
the government addressed the downturn and its consequences, 2008 may be a better 
benchmark for many historical and future comparisons.

5Options for Medicare and Medicaid
Rising health care costs are projected to increasingly dominate the 
federal budget, as noted in Chapter 1, and they threaten to squeeze out 
other public needs and priorities. This chapter presents illustrative options 
for limiting growth in the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs—the 
largest of the government’s health programs.1
THE CURRENT CONTEXT
As the committee was completing this report, the nation was debating 
systemwide health care reform: see Box 5-1. The proposed legislation, if 
enacted in a form similar to one of its most recent versions, would cover 
a majority of people who now lack health insurance, and it would raise 
revenues and increase spending without increasing the deficit over the next 
10 years (Congressional Budget Office, 2009f). Although the proposed leg-
islation includes provisions that have the potential to reduce the long-term 
growth of both federal and private-sector health spending, most of the pro-
visions are to be implemented as demonstrations or experiments rather than 
systemwide:2 their effects are uncertain and, at best, will be modest.3 Thus, 
even with health reform as currently considered, the major fiscal challenge 
of rising health care costs has yet to be faced head-on.
The growth rate of federal health spending has been higher than the 
growth rate of the economy for more than three decades. At the same time, 
health care costs are projected to rise in the private sector, burdening house-
holds and businesses. Because the charge of this committee is the future of 
the federal budget, the options presented in this chapter focus on the pub-
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BOX 5-1 
2009 Health Care Reform Legislation
	 As	 this	 report	went	 to	press,	 the	House	of	Representatives	had	passed	 the	
Affordable	Health	Care	for	America	Act,	and	the	Senate	had	passed	the	Patient	
Protection	and	Affordable	Care	Act.	(For	details	on	the	House	bill,	see	Committee	
for	 a	Responsible	Federal	Budget,	 2009;	Congressional	Budget	Office,	 2009d,	
2009f.	 For	 details	 on	 the	Senate	 bill,	 see	Congressional	 Budget	Office,	 2009i,	
2009j.)	
	 In	order	to	expand	access	to	health	care,	the	proposed	health	care	bills	would,	
among	other	things:		
	 •	 	establish	an	individual	mandate	for	the	purchase	of	health	insurance;	
	 •	 	create	 “insurance	 exchanges”	 through	 which	 individuals	 would	 be	 able,	
within	a	subsidized	and	regulated	framework,	to	choose	among	plans	of-
fering	differing	levels	of	coverage;	
	 •	 	impose	coverage	requirements	on	larger	employers;	
	 •	 	provide	tax	credits	to	certain	small	employers	who	offer	health	insurance;	
and	
	 •	 expand	eligibility	for	Medicaid.	
Under	the	two	bills,	94-96	percent	of	the	nonelderly	U.S.	population	(who	are	legal	
residents)	would	have	insurance	coverage	by	2019—an	increase	in	the	number	of	
insured	people	of	31-36	million	(Congressional	Budget	Office,	2009d,	2009j).	
	 The	Congressional	Budget	Office	(2009d,	2009i)	projects	 that	 the	proposed	
expansions	in	insurance	coverage	would	increase	net	costs	by	$614-$891	billion	
over	 the	 next	 10	 years.	That	 increase	 would	 be	 offset	 by	 increases	 in	 federal	
revenues	of	$264-$574	billion	and	a	combination	of	spending	changes	that	would	
save	$427-$483	billion:	the	result	would	be	a	net	reduction	in	federal	deficits	of	
$109-$132	billion.	The	largest	savings	would	come	from	changes	in	the	Medicare	
Advantage	payment	rates	($118-$170	billion)	and	reductions	in	annual	updates	to	
Medicare	payment	rates	for	most	services	in	the	fee-for-service	sector	other	than	
physicians’	services	($186-$228	billion).
	 One	or	both	bills	 include	a	number	of	other	measures	designed	to	slow	the	
growth	of	systemwide	health	care	costs:	payment	reforms	to	discourage	unnec-
essary	 hospital	 readmissions;	 pilot	 programs	 to	 help	 hospitals	 and	 physicians	
better	manage	and	coordinate	 care	 (through	“accountable	 care	organizations”)	
and	deliver	more	cost-efficient	care	(through	payment	“bundling”);	increased	pay-
ments	to	primary	care	providers	and	the	promotion	of	medical	homes	designed	
to	coordinate	care;	 funding	of	new	comparative	effectiveness	 research	and	 the	
development	 of	 new	 quality	 measures;	 measures	 to	 encourage	 greater	 price	
transparency;	and	measures	 to	promote	preventive	services	and	wellness	pro-
grams	(Committee	 for	a	Responsible	Federal	Budget,	2009:5).	According	 to	an	
analysis	 that	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	 Congressional	 Budget	 Office,	 the	 10-year	
savings	associated	with	these	measures	in	the	House	bill	are	quite	modest—in	
the	 neighborhood	 of	 $5	 billion	 (Committee	 for	 a	 Responsible	 Federal	 Budget,	
2009:5).		
	 In	the	second	decade,	the	Congressional	Budget	Office	(2009f,	2009i)	expects	
the	 spending	and	 revenue	provisions	of	 the	House	and	Senate	bills	 to	 slightly	
reduce	federal	budget	deficits	(relative	to	those	projected	under	current	law),	by	
between	 zero	 and	 0.5	 percent	 of	GDP.	The	 effects	 of	 the	 spending	 provisions	
alone	would	be	even	more	modest.	
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lic programs (and tax expenditures) that have direct effects on the federal 
budget. However, public-sector health care costs cannot be considered in 
isolation from private-sector costs. The services paid for by Medicare and 
Medicaid (and other federal health programs) are similar to those delivered 
in the private health care system by the same providers (doctors, hospitals, 
imaging facilities, nursing homes, etc.). Some analysts have pointed out that 
changes in government programs can have considerable influence and lever-
age over the health system as a whole (see, e.g., Finkelstein, 2007; White, 
2007:160). Medicare policy, in particular, can have such effects because 
virtually every health care provider is affected; and private insurers often 
adopt Medicare payment schedules and coverage policies, with adjustments 
reflecting their own market conditions. Other analysts (see, e.g., Aaron, 
2007) are skeptical about the possibility of practices spreading from Medi-
care to the private health care sector: they argue that it is more likely that 
providers will try to recover from private payers whatever income they lose 
from Medicare. Instead, they emphasize that the health care cost growth 
curve must be bent downward for the entire system in order to avoid major 
cost shifts from the federal budget to all other payers.
The nation’s health care system is complex and multifaceted, and it in-
cludes many expensive and long-lived investments in structures, equipment, 
and skills. Accordingly, many reforms that promise to limit cost growth 
through efficiencies, better practices, and organizational changes cannot be 
counted on to produce significant savings in the near term. Indeed, some 
ideas for cost savings may even require some up-front increases in spending. 
Furthermore, the ultimate effects of changes in such a complex system are 
inevitably difficult to quantify.
Given the history and structure of the broader health care system and 
the uncertainties just noted, the committee believes that achieving any sig-
nificant near-term savings in Medicare and Medicaid spending (relative to 
the baseline) with some measure of certainty will most likely require tak-
ing strong measures that directly impact their costs. Such limits could take 
several forms, which could be adopted singly or in various combinations. 
For example, provider reimbursement rates could be cut, Medicare benefi-
ciary cost-sharing could be increased, or federal cost-sharing for Medicaid 
could be reduced. In a more far-reaching step, Medicare coverage could be 
converted to a defined contribution that could be used to purchase private 
insurance. Essentially, each of these steps could provide estimable amounts 
of budget savings to keep the total budget within prescribed limits.
However, such near-term reductions in Medicare and Medicaid spend-
ing growth would not obviate the need for systemwide changes to the 
nation’s health care market to relieve the underlying pressures that spur 
spending growth. At best, they might help generate longer-term system-
wide improvements by providing incentives for administrators and payers 
to search for major increased efficiencies, but most likely they will contain 
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the cost pressure rather than prevent it. The committee does not support 
terminating the entitlement status of Medicare and Medicaid. Rather, the 
savings from such reductions are intended to be a “bridge” to savings from 
fundamental and systemic reform.
FOUR TRAJECTORIES
Given the uncertainty about the long-term budgetary savings that could 
accrue from the many possible combinations of health reforms described 
later in this chapter, the committee has sketched four health care spending 
trajectories that vary in their assumptions about the stringency of direct 
spending reductions in the near term, while leaving open the possibility 
that slower-acting redirection of incentives and improvements in informa-
tion (among other things) may eventually achieve savings that will reduce 
or eliminate the need for direct reductions. Figure 5-1 shows the baseline 
and the committee’s four trajectories (see Appendix F for details). The lower 
the spending trajectory, the tighter the necessary limits (at least in the near 
term). We also discuss a range of illustrative reform approaches and options 
below, but uncertainties as to the effects of some of the options make it 
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impossible to map specific combinations of reforms onto particular long-
term spending trajectories.
The lowest trajectory assumes that there will be zero percent “excess 
cost growth” starting in 2012, a sharp decrease from recent historical 
averages (see below). Zero percent excess cost growth means that per 
capita federal spending on health care will grow no faster than the gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita.4 This low-spending trajectory makes 
the extremely ambitious assumption that a major slowdown occurs almost 
immediately and can be sustained through the entire projection period.
Spending for Medicare and Medicaid, which equaled 4.1 percent of 
GDP in 2008, would still increase to 6.8 percent by 2035 (3.1 percentage 
points below the baseline level of 9.9 percent) because of projected changes 
in both the number and average age of beneficiaries. By 2083, it would be 
at 7.5 percent of GDP, 10.9 percentage points below the study baseline. 
This steep, sustained slowdown of spending growth is possible only under 
a regime of tough cost controls in at least the near and medium term. Many 
analysts would consider this trajectory to be politically unrealistic. It also 
may be regarded as implausible to the extent that competing policy objec-
tives of expanding access to care and improving quality are taken seriously. 
Nevertheless, this is the only one of the four trajectories for Medicare and 
Medicaid that would not require significant increases in federal revenues 
(as a share of GDP) above their recent historical level even when combined 
with stringent policy changes in other areas of federal spending.
The high health spending trajectory does far less to slow the growth 
of health costs.5 In fact, on this trajectory, spending is assumed to track 
the study baseline until 2030. However, even this trajectory assumes that 
the rate of excess cost growth will gradually fall to zero by 2083, leaving 
program spending at 15.4 percent of GDP by 2083 (3 percentage points 
below the baseline).
The two intermediate trajectories have federal Medicare and Med-
icaid spending increasing from 4.1 percent of GDP in 2008 to 7.8 per-
cent (intermediate-1) and 8.8 percent (intermediate-2) in 2035 (2.1 and 
1.1 percentage points below the baseline, respectively) and 10.2 percent 
(intermediate-1) and 12.8 percent (intermediate-2) in 2083 (8.1 and 5.5 
percentage points below the baseline, respectively). The intermediate-1 
health spending trajectory is set at the midpoint between the low and 
intermediate-2 trajectories, and the intermediate-2 trajectory is set at the 
midpoint between the intermediate-1 and high trajectories. Both intermedi-
ate trajectories are considerably more restrictive than the study baseline and 
would likely have to rely, to different degrees, on direct spending reductions 
for quite a few years. We assume that the intermediate-1, intermediate-2, 
and high spending trajectories would raise the Medicare payroll tax, now 
at 2.9 percent, to 3.6 percent in 2012 and 5.8 percent by 2025.
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HEALTH SPENDING
As noted throughout this report, the health care sector of the economy 
is large and growing rapidly. Total health spending is projected to reach 
almost $2.8 trillion, or 17.9 percent of GDP, in 2011 (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services, 2009b). This amount represents more than a dou-
bling of spending as a percentage of GDP over the past three decades, from 
8.1 percent in 1975.6 The Congressional Budget Office (2009c) projects 
that if current price trends continue and with known demographic develop-
ments, these expenditures will grow to 46 percent of GDP by 2080.
Federal outlays for Medicare and Medicaid have gone from about 1.5 
percent of GDP to 4 percent over the past three decades (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2008b:20). Medicare and Medicaid costs per beneficiary 
have historically risen at about the same rate as that for private insurance 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2009c:Table 13; Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2007c:8). Figure 5-2 displays the historical averages 
for excess cost growth in Medicare and Medicaid. The rate of excess cost 
growth was slower in the 1990-2005 period than in the 1975-1990 one. 
It is difficult to determine whether this difference reflects one-time changes 
(such as the spread of managed care) or if the underlying trend has changed 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2009e:27).7
In 2008, Medicare and Medicaid accounted for about 20 percent of 
all federal spending (Congressional Budget Office, 2009c). According to 
the same analysis, nominal spending for Medicare and Medicaid will grow 
at an average rate of around 6 percent a year in the decade after 2009, 
significantly faster than the economy (which is expected to grow at an 
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average annual nominal rate closer to 4 percent over the same period). 
Given the size and projected growth of Medicare and Medicaid, achieving 
slower spending growth for this part of the federal budget is likely to be 
central to any strategy to make the budget sustainable over the long term. 
The rapid growth of health spending has also put increasing pressure on 
the budgets of consumers, employers, and state and local governments: for 
example, premiums for health insurance offered through employers have 
doubled since 1999, as has the cost paid directly by workers (Kaiser Family 
Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust, 2008). Choosing 
between health care and other priorities will become increasingly difficult 
even in good economic times unless the nation takes steps to improve the 
health system’s performance and to slow spending growth.
Reasons for Increasing Spending
The causes of the rapid growth of public and private health care spend-
ing in the United States are multifaceted and complex. Improvements in 
medical technology, broadly defined, are clearly important (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2008h). New ways of diagnosing and treating disease typi-
cally depend on expensive new equipment and devices, drugs, and the skills 
of increasingly specialized physicians with advanced training. Even when 
a medical advance reduces the cost of treating an individual patient, the 
benefits of the advance (such as clinical response, reduced discomfort, and 
shorter time for recuperation) often lead more patients to seek the new 
treatment, which can result in higher total health spending. Looking to the 
future, technological change may increasingly raise difficult decisions.
Yet it is difficult to separate the effects of technology from other con-
tributing developments. The way the nation and its residents pay for health 
care has interacted with technology to fuel the growth of spending.8 Indeed, 
some analysts argue that the lack of cost consciousness on the part of pro-
viders and consumers is a key cause of rising health spending in both the 
public and private sectors (see, e.g., Committee for Economic Development, 
2007). In one respect, demand is fed by health insurance, which reduces the 
costs paid directly by patients and thus removes a possible constraint on 
the use of services; health insurers generally support volume-driven high-
cost medicine so long as they can cover the costs through higher premiums. 
There has been a significant increase in insurance coverage in the past four 
decades: more than 50 percent of the cost of health care in 1965, but only 
about 13.5 percent in 2008, was paid for directly by patients (Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2009a). The drop in direct, out-of-pocket 
payments occurred partly because employer contributions to health insur-
ance premiums are exempt from taxes; this encourages more generous 
and expensive coverage, including coverage of relatively small, predictable 
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health costs. Demand for services has also grown because as incomes rise, 
people consume more health care services (Hall and Jones, 2007).
Another factor promoting the use of health care is the dominance of 
fee-for-service medicine, under which health care providers are compen-
sated for the services they deliver. Fee-for-service medicine encourages the 
delivery of more services and dulls market incentives to adopt cost-saving 
technologies and conservative practice styles (Congressional Budget Of-
fice 2008f; Eddy, 1997). The result is an inefficient delivery system that 
promotes the use of medical services, discourages economizing behavior, 
and encourages the use of increasingly expensive and complex technology. 
Thus, spending in the health care system rises faster than incomes in the 
economy at large, and neither consumers nor providers have incentives to 
stop the spiral.
The ability to treat disease has expanded greatly over the past few de-
cades, but so has the need for health care as the older population has grown 
rapidly. In 2000, one of six adults was age 65 or older; by 2030, the number 
will be one of four adults (Census Bureau, 2002; Council of Economic Ad-
visers, 2009). An aging population uses more care, and a high proportion 
of that spending is financed through Medicare and Medicaid. The Con-
gressional Budget Office (CBO) has calculated that aging by itself accounts 
for 37 percent of the projected growth in federal Medicare and Medicaid 
spending through 2035 and 21 percent through 2080 (Congressional Bud-
get Office, 2009c). The prevalence of chronic diseases is also rising, based in 
part on the spread of obesity; excessive weight is associated with diabetes, 
heart disease, and other serious illnesses. About 34 percent of adults were 
obese in 2004, an increase from 23 percent in 1988 (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2008f). The treatment of the rising prevalence of chronic diseases 
also contributes to increasing health spending: the fee-for-service medical 
system is more likely to pay for expensive treatment of symptoms than for 
the maintenance of health through control of the underlying condition.
Health Spending and the Federal Budget
The federal budget is directly affected by the rising cost of health care 
in two major ways: Medicare and Medicaid outlays increase as the popu-
lation ages and as the standard of medical practice expands to encompass 
the use of more, and more-advanced, interventions; and tax subsidies for 
health care increase as the cost of employer-sponsored insurance rises. In 
2008, Medicare and federal Medicaid spending totaled approximately $671 
billion (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009c); see Box 5-2 for 
program details.
Medicare and Medicaid are entitlements, essentially guaranteeing a 
level of health benefits that is not bound by any spending limit (which are 
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imposed on most other programs by the appropriations process). As noted 
in Chapter 1, if current policies remain unchanged and health spending 
grows as projected, outlays for Medicare and Medicaid as a share of GDP 
would more than double over the next quarter century, rising from 4.1 
percent of GDP in 2008 to 9.9 percent in 2035, and they would continue 
BOX 5-2 
Medicare and Medicaid
	 In	2008,	Medicare	spent	about	$468	billion	and	helped	pay	for	hospital	care,	
doctor	visits,	and	outpatient	care,	and	prescription	drugs	for	37	million	elderly	over	
the	age	of	65,	as	well	as	7	million	disabled	beneficiaries	under	age	65	(Boards	of	
Trustees,	2009).	The	Medicare	program	has	four	components:
	 1.	 	“Part	A”	 helps	pay	 for	 hospital,	 home	health,	 skilled	nursing	 facility,	 and	
hospice	care.	Funded	primarily	by	a	2.9	percent	payroll	tax,	it	represented	
about	half	of	total	Medicare	expenditures	in	2008.
	 2.	 	“Part	B”	helps	pay	for	doctor	visits	and	outpatient	care	(as	well	as	home	
health	services)	and	represented	about	40	percent	of	 total	Medicare	ex-
penditures	in	2008.	Part	B	services	are	funded	by	a	combination	of	general	
revenues	and	beneficiary	premiums	(set	by	law	to	cover	25	percent	of	total	
spending	under	Part	B).
	 3.	 	“Part	 C,”	 or	 “Medicare	 Advantage”	 (MA),	 is	 an	 alternative	 to	 traditional	
Medicare	services	offered	under	Parts	A	and	B.	It	allows	beneficiaries	to	re-
ceive	care	from	private	health	insurance	plans	that	contract	with	Medicare.	
Federal	payments	to	MA	plans	are	drawn	from	the	trust	fund	accounts	for	
Parts	A	and	B.
	 4.	 	“Part	D”	covers	outpatient	prescription	drugs	through	privately	administered	
insurance	plans	and	is	funded	by	a	combination	of	premiums	and	general	
revenues	(set	by	law	to	cover	25	percent	of	total	spending	under	Part	D).	
It	constituted	about	10	percent	of	total	Medicare	spending	in	2008.
About	22	percent	of	Medicare	beneficiaries	were	enrolled	in	Medicare	Advantage	
plans	in	2008,	and	the	rest	were	enrolled	in	traditional	Medicare.	In	addition,	about	
70	percent	of	Medicare	enrollees	had	prescription	drug	coverage	under	Part	D	
(Boards	of	Trustees,	2009).
	 Medicaid	covers	the	cost	of	acute	and	 long-term	care	services	for	about	50	
million	low-income	individuals,	including	children	and	parents	in	working	families,	
children	and	adults	with	severe	disabilities,	and	low-income	Medicare	beneficia-
ries.	Although	the	elderly	and	disabled	comprise	only	about	one-third	of	Medicaid	
beneficiaries,	they	account	for	two-thirds	of	the	program’s	expenses	(Council	of	
Economic	Advisers,	2009).9	The	Medicaid	program	is	financed	jointly	by	federal	
and	 state	 governments,	 with	 the	 federal	 share	 varying	 according	 to	 state	 per	
capita	 income.	On	average,	 the	 federal	government	has	paid	about	57	percent	
of	program	costs	(Congressional	Budget	Office,	2009h).	The	federal	government	
spent	about	$201	billion	on	Medicaid	 in	2008	 (U.S.	Office	of	Management	and	
Budget,	2009b).
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to increase at a somewhat slower pace thereafter (consuming about 12.6 
percent of GDP by 2050).
Separate from Medicare and Medicaid, the federal government subsi-
dizes health care through tax expenditures—large subsidies that are pro-
vided through tax provisions that support the purchase of health care in 
general and private health insurance in particular. The largest subsidy is the 
exclusion of employer contributions to health insurance premiums from 
employees’ taxable income, which reduced income tax collections by at 
least $117 billion in 2008 (Joint Committee on Taxation, 2008a).10 And 
as noted above, this tax subsidy, which undergirds the employment-based 
system of private health insurance, encourages the use of high-cost care and 
drives up systemwide costs (Burman, 2006; Steuerle, 2006).
The committee estimates that financing the projected growth of Medi-
care and Medicaid spending alone would require an increase in total federal 
revenues (from the recent historical average of about 18.5 percent of GDP) 
of about 25 percent by 2030 and about 45 percent by 2050. Without such 
tax increases or an explosion in borrowing, rising federal health outlays 
would reduce the funds available for spending on virtually all other na-
tional priorities, such as education, housing, energy, and transportation.
REFORM ISSUES
Competing Reform Objectives
Slowing the growth of federal health spending seems essential to any 
strategy to put the federal budget on a sustainable path, but that fiscal goal 
must be balanced against other health policy objectives. Indeed, one of the 
reasons that ever-higher levels of health spending are problematic is that the 
nation does not appear to be getting its money’s worth for the additional 
dollars being spent “at the margin.” For example, between 44,000 and 
98,000 preventable deaths annually are associated with hospital care (Insti-
tute of Medicine, 2000). Conversely, by one estimate only about 55 percent 
of the care called for under generally accepted standards of medical practice 
is actually delivered (McGlynn et al., 2003). The substantial variation in 
per-capita health care spending across the country—with no evidence that 
regions with higher spending experience better health outcomes—is also 
often regarded as an indicator of inefficiency in the U.S. health care system 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2008d; Fisher et al., 2009a, 2009b).
Although federal budget savings are the primary focus of this report, 
health reform should also aim to improve the value that people receive for 
health spending. Given the evidence of waste and poor-quality care in the 
system, there is wide agreement that the nation needs comprehensive health 
reform—that is, fundamental changes in system organization and service 
delivery. In addition to slowing the growth of total health spending, truly 
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successful reform would increase the efficiency of the health system, expand 
access to health insurance, widen the availability of essential health services, 
allow choice and control by individuals over their own health insurance 
plans and care, encourage medical innovation, and, ultimately and perhaps 
most importantly, produce better health outcomes. Inevitably, those policy 
goals are partly in conflict, which forces policy makers to consider tradeoffs 
and priorities. Policies intended to reduce federal health outlays could re-
duce insurance coverage and the quality of care, disproportionately affect-
ing the poorest and sickest people in the country. Measures that discourage 
the provision of services believed to be of limited value to a patient’s health 
may also squeeze out services beneficial to some patients. The challenge for 
reformers is to balance cost containment with other policy objectives.
Reforms of Medicare and Medicaid that shift costs to individuals (e.g., 
increasing the eligibility age for Medicare) or states (e.g., converting federal 
subsidies for Medicaid to block grants) should be distinguished from those 
that improve efficiency and might be emulated by private insurance compa-
nies (e.g., devising incentives that reduce hospital readmissions or improv-
ing the way Medicare pays for services). Other policies—such as a mandate 
on employers to pay for health coverage for their employees—may not 
increase federal outlays even though they require additional health spend-
ing by the private sector. Shifting responsibility for policy goals through 
regulation would not create an entry in the federal budget even if the effects 
would be equivalent to imposing a tax and expanding a federal subsidy or 
program. Such policies might improve the federal government’s narrowly 
construed fiscal position and yet worsen the health spending burden on the 
rest of the economy.
Uncertainty About What Works
In contrast to the policy options for Social Security (discussed in the 
next chapter), there is little certainty about the magnitude of budget sav-
ings that could be realized from the many possible reforms in Medicare and 
Medicaid. Social Security makes cash payments to a known population of 
beneficiaries, but health programs pay for the use of medical services for 
which the total cost depends on many factors—such as how many people 
are diagnosed with particular illnesses, the severity of those illnesses, and 
how those illnesses are treated according to prevailing and emerging medi-
cal practices in different parts of the country.
The savings that can be expected from Medicare and Medicaid options 
that make adjustments to existing payment levels or otherwise work within 
current institutional settings are somewhat predictable, at least over a short 
time span. However, the budget effects of policies that depart from current 
practices or that rely on significant changes in the practice of medicine or 
the business of health care are much more difficult to predict, particularly 
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over a long period of time. Options such as expanding the use of health 
information technology or expanded funding for research comparing the 
effectiveness of alternative treatments may have the potential to achieve 
significant reductions in health system costs, particularly over a horizon 
of several decades. However, existing evidence on the performance of such 
major changes in the delivery of health care also suggests that near-term 
savings would be quite modest and longer-term savings highly uncertain.
Poor incentives, inadequate information, and structural impediments 
to more cost-effective practice have defeated many efforts to limit costs 
throughout the health care system. Successful reform will require many 
building blocks, including changes that would transform private insur-
ance, public programs, individual behavior, and the culture and practice 
of medicine. It will be an ongoing learning process, not a one-time event. 
Thus, the extent to which any proposal can achieve that goal is an open 
question. There is a great deal that is not known about the potential effects 
of specific policies, and policies will have to be adjusted to take advantage 
of successes and to learn from failures.
BROAD REFORM APPROACHES
The debate over the best general strategy for reform raises fundamen-
tal questions about the system and people’s values. Should the system rely 
on the competitive market and consumer choice to establish appropriate 
incentives for greater efficiency? Or should it rely on strong government 
regulation to manage health delivery, control costs directly, and protect 
individuals from financial risks that they should not have to bear? Without 
attempting to answer these questions definitively, this section presents some 
of the very broadest classes of alternative health care cost-control strate-
gies. Some of these broad alternatives would change the entire health care 
system and could encompass Medicare and Medicaid as part of a major 
reform. Still others would bend the cost curve in the non-federal market 
and thereby help Medicare and Medicaid to achieve similar savings. Each 
alternative has a set of enthusiastic advocates and a set of strong-voiced op-
ponents. The discussion begins with those options that entail the strongest 
government intervention in the health care system and end with the most 
market-driven policies.
A Single-Payer Health Insurance System
The most interventionist broad policy option would probably be a 
government-run single-payer health insurance system. Under this approach, 
the federal government would establish an insurance entity to offer health 
insurance and would prohibit private health insurance, except perhaps as a 
supplement to the publicly provided insurance. The government insurance 
OPTIONS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
entity could operate in different ways. For example, it could run the entire 
health care system, as is the case in the United Kingdom. Alternatively, like 
Medicare, it could set payment rates and contract its operations to private 
companies (which is handled differently under traditional Medicare, as 
one model, and Medicare Advantage, as another). There are many other 
possible options.
Government would dictate the terms of coverage, and it could also 
become much more closely involved in deciding how medicine is practiced. 
Advocates (see, e.g., Krugman, 2005; Krugman and Wells, 2006) argue that 
government as insurer would end the worst practices ascribed to private in-
surers, notably including denying coverage because of individuals’ medical 
conditions. Because it would set prices, government could slow the growth 
of costs by fiat. With only one insurer, administrative costs (now driven in 
part by multiple paperwork requirements of different insurers) would de-
cline. The government insurer would be free to innovate, perhaps along the 
lines of the arguably successful Veterans Health Administration (Longman, 
2007). Furthermore, such a system would relieve businesses of the burden 
of managing health insurance for their employees.
Opponents (see, e.g., Committee for Economic Development, 2007; 
Goodman, 2005) reply that any monopoly in health care would slow or 
end innovation and that a government monopoly would be the worst of 
all. Government price setting, they say, inevitably would lead to significant 
misallocation of resources. The Medicare program has failed to overcome 
political constraints to drive innovation in the practice of medicine, and it 
remains largely stuck in fee-for-service medicine with only a costly flawed 
and partial attempt at managed care (now known as Medicare Advantage) 
as an alternative. In this view, a single-payer system would fail to achieve 
innovation for the same reason. Opponents also argue that Medicare’s ad-
ministrative costs are low only because the program is underadministered, 
as evidenced by what they say are frequent revelations of provider fraud. 
Simpler paperwork systems could be created with far less intrusion. Gov-
ernment price setting in Medicare has not been successful in limiting total 
cost growth, at least in part because providers have found ways to bill for 
more and more expensive diagnoses and treatments to recover some of the 
income they lost when government cut the prices of individual services.
In answer to some of these arguments, it should be noted that single-
payer systems can vary greatly in generosity and costs by, for example, 
varying deductibles and copayments. They can be operated with a budget 
cap, as in Canada, or as an open-ended system.
A “Robust Public Option”
Short of a single-payer system, a so-called “robust public option” 
would set up a government insurance company to compete with private 
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insurers. The public insurer would have authority to compel doctors, hos-
pitals, and other providers to work for it at rates dictated by government, 
usually specified as Medicare rates (which are estimated to be below pro-
vider cost for at least some services and institutions). Advocates (see, e.g., 
Hacker, 2009) claim that such a public insurer would use its pricing power 
to lower the prices of private insurers by competition and would raise the 
standards of the insurance industry by its example, such as by offering 
coverage to individuals regardless of their medical condition.
Opponents (see, e.g., Cannon, 2009a; Minarik, 2009a, 2009b) counter 
that a government insurer’s power to dictate prices, its absence of a need 
to earn a profit, its lower cost of capital, and the implicit guarantee of a 
bailout would be sufficient to drive private firms out of the market or out 
of business, even if they were more efficient. With private insurers gone, 
the robust public option would quickly become a single-payer system, with 
all the problems that entails. And until private insurers were driven out of 
business, they would be squeezed by providers’ attempts to recover their 
losses in the public plan with higher charges in the private sector.
A “Non-Robust Public Option”
For want of a better term, a “non-robust public option” would create 
a government insurance company that competes on the proverbial “level 
playing field”—without the power to compel providers to work with be-
low-cost compensation, without access to Treasury Department financing, 
and without a government guarantee. Advocates (see, e.g., Committee on 
Ways and Means et al., 2009) believe that such a public insurer would at-
tract customers through ethical practices, including covering individuals 
without reference to health conditions. It would inject competition into the 
marketplace, especially in markets, such as those in less populous or rural 
areas, that are now dominated by a single private insurer.
Opponents (see, e.g., Cannon, 2009a; Minarik, 2009a, 2009b) reply 
that there already are many private insurance companies and that one more 
company competing on a truly level playing field would not change the 
competitive nature of the marketplace. Rural markets are uncompetitive 
in large part because of the small number of insured consumers (because 
of sparse populations and also because of the large percentages of unin-
sured individuals in those areas) and limited health care purchasing power; 
with a reform that extended coverage to all, those problems would solve 
themselves to the extent feasible. Opponents also question whether a truly 
level playing field is attainable: the implicit guarantee that any government 
enterprise would enjoy, even with a legal disclaimer (noting the recent 
experience of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for example) would inhibit 
private competitors and thereby reduce the degree of competition in the 
marketplace. It is also possible that sicker consumers would be drawn to 
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a public plan and would thereby make its risk pool less viable. These fac-
tors would not exactly or completely counterbalance the possible market 
advantages of such a public plan, but they would make the management of 
the plan even more difficult and its effects more problematic.
Price Controls
At another level of intervention, government could impose price con-
trols in health care (see, e.g., Oberlander and White, 2009; White, 2009a, 
2009b). At a stroke, advocates say, this would end the unsustainable 
growth of health care costs and the alleged unconscionable profits and 
incomes in the health care industry. Evidence that health spending varies 
substantially across the country suggests that there are excesses that could 
be eliminated without effects on health care.
Opponents (see, e.g., Butler, 1998; Coulam et al., 2009) respond that 
the controlled prices across thousands of different health products and 
services would inevitably be wrong and would lead to massive resource 
misallocations. They point to examples of price reductions in Medicare: 
one result was that providers partly offset reduced prices for individual 
services by making more aggressive diagnoses and ordering more and dif-
ferent services. The variation in spending across the country arises more 
because of differences in the volume of services delivered than on variation 
in price, suggesting that price controls are not a simple way to cut spending. 
Finally, opponents doubt that either political and administrative processes 
or economic science would allow cutting only those prices that are exces-
sive, in only the geographic areas where they are excessive, by precisely (or 
even nearly) the amount of the excess. Rather, the political process would 
gravitate toward equal across-the-board cuts, which would reduce reim-
bursements of both efficient and inefficient treatments and providers.
Individual, Cost-Conscious Choice of Insurance Plans
A less interventionist and more market-oriented approach would be to 
have individuals use a fixed-dollar contribution to choose from the available 
private insurance plans (see, e.g., Committee for Economic Development, 
2007). A fixed-dollar contribution means that an individual saves money 
by choosing a less expensive plan. A similar system, known as the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Plan, is available to members of Congress and 
all federal employees. Under it, the central market-maker (the U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management) sets rules for insurers and acts as a broker or 
“exchange” for individuals. This system prohibits consideration of preex-
isting conditions for enrollment (or re-enrollment). Advocates argue that 
such a system, if extended nationwide, would subject all private insurers to 
competition and give providers a reason to try to deliver quality care at the 
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lowest possible price. As under the regulated Federal Employees plan, insur-
ers would not be able to select their customers and so could not profit from 
selecting lower-risk individuals. Instead, they would direct their energies 
toward attracting and satisfying customers. In sum, market forces would 
drive both providers and insurers to pursue efficiency and innovation.
Opponents (see, e.g., Berenson, 2005) argue that private insurers be-
have badly under the current system and will not change their ways, or that 
penny-pinching competition is not the health care that the country needs. 
They also doubt that competition would in fact help to reduce costs in 
health care, given that the “market” that now exists has not done so. Large 
employers and labor unions oppose this approach because they believe that 
the current system delivers quality health care today, and because they are 
advantaged by their ability to provide better health care than smaller em-
ployers with small risk pools that are unattractive to insurers.
Eliminating Group Health Insurance
An even more market-oriented approach than one like the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Plan would eliminate group health insurance so 
that there would be only an individual insurance market (see, e.g., Cannon, 
2009b). It would establish a large—perhaps income-related—tax credit for 
all individuals to buy health insurance and replace the current tax exclusion 
for employers who provide group insurance. This approach could reduce 
existing regulation, so that people could choose health insurance plans that 
do not meet current state regulations or could allow people to purchase 
insurance across state lines. Advocates claim that individuals would shop 
for cheaper health insurance and drive market prices down. Under that 
pressure, and especially if empowered by loosening of state regulation, 
insurers would offer relatively inexpensive plans stripped of mandated 
coverages (such as mental health) that are required by many current regula-
tors and that increase costs. Plans would be expected to move toward high 
deductibles with medical savings accounts, and individuals would respond 
by forgoing unnecessary care.
Opponents (see, e.g., Barry et al., 2008; McDevitt et al., 2010) counter 
that insurers in an individual insurance market will always have an incen-
tive to avoid bad risks and that a stronger market organizer in a competitive 
large-group system (like the Federal Employees plan) is essential. They also 
characterize the supposed competition among less regulated insurers as a 
“race to the bottom,” in which insurers drop coverages that are necessary 
for people with expensive medical conditions, thereby beginning a zero-sum 
competition on the basis of risk selection. Furthermore, opponents argue, 
the omission of such coverages may be accepted by people while they are 
healthy and enjoy lower premiums, but, ultimately, the absence of those 
coverages will cause medical expense crises when people are older or con-
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tract serious illnesses. Opponents also believe that high-deductible plans do 
not focus on the real health cost problem, because most money is spent on 
expensive cases whose costs are far more than feasible deductibles; thus, 
individual patients have little incentive to forgo unnecessary care. In addi-
tion, opponents argue, individuals lack the technical knowledge to make 
complex medical decisions.
Summary of Broad Reform Approaches
Advocates of these various broad reform approaches believe that they 
would induce the health care industry to find ways to deliver quality care 
more efficiently and that those improved methods would be applied in 
serving Medicare and Medicaid patients as well. In some options (includ-
ing use of the individual market or of individual choice as in the Federal 
Employees plan), individuals could have the option of keeping the cost-
efficient plans that they choose over their working lives, thereby “growing 
into” an alternative to the Medicare program gradually over time. Through 
those mechanisms, the federal government would share in the savings from 
systemwide reform.
SPECIFIC REFORM OPTIONS
The rest of this chapter presents some of the most widely discussed 
specific reform options that depend (in various combinations) on market 
incentives and on government regulation to slow spending and improve 
health outcomes and the quality of care. This list of options is meant to be 
representative rather than exhaustive; it would be impossible to describe 
all of the major proposals for reforming health care and limiting federal 
health spending.
Although a number of these ideas have the potential to slow the growth 
of spending, their success is not assured. Some options require extensive 
further development and experimentation before they can be implemented 
widely, and it would likely take a long time for them to yield systemwide 
savings. At least in the near term (for three out of the four health spending 
trajectories laid out by the committee), the “strong medicine” of mandated 
limits on Medicare and Medicaid spending may be the only reasonably 
certain way (politics aside) to slow federal health spending as much and 
as soon as necessary. Such restrictions are hardly without problems, not 
the least of which is that they can be blunt instruments that could limit 
access or deny some necessary or beneficial care. In addition, experience 
with various limits to date shows that they may fail to be enforced even if 
they are legislated.11 Nevertheless, if political barriers can be surmounted, 
direct controls (imposed gradually) offer the most certain short-term route 
to slowing the growth of federal health spending until longer-term improve-
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ments can take effect. And although it cannot be predicted, such spending 
constraints may spur stakeholders to seek out system improvements and 
efficiencies in ways that they would not otherwise. However, spending 
caps should not be confused with true reform. This section discusses two 
variants of caps on federal health spending: absolute limits on government 
payments to providers and capped-amount vouchers in place of open-ended 
entitlement. (A separate cap on the largest tax expenditure for health is also 
discussed below and presented as an element of a simplified tax option in 
Chapter 8.)
Other system reforms and improvements fall into two categories: those 
with relatively direct implications for slowing spending growth and those 
whose effects are less direct. Examples of system reforms that are fo-
cused on reducing federal spending include capping the tax exclusion 
for employer-sponsored coverage, reforming Medicare payment systems 
(through the use of bundled payments, accountable care organizations, 
pay-for-performance measures, improved fee-for-service pricing, and lower 
payments to private Medicare Advantage plans), restricting Medicare eligi-
bility, restructuring Medicare premiums and cost-sharing requirements, and 
limiting malpractice awards. Examples of system reforms that are primar-
ily concerned with care quality and health outcomes rather than cost, but 
which may also have indirect implications for slowing spending growth, 
include comparative effectiveness research, health information technology, 
disease management, and health promotion. These options merely illustrate 
some of the plausible approaches and are by no means a comprehensive list 
of possible reforms.
The estimated savings from most individual reform options are small 
in comparison with the total savings that will be needed to slow Medicare 
and Medicaid spending growth to a rate closer to that of GDP growth. The 
savings that could be achieved through a combination of options may be 
more or less than the sum of the savings estimates for individual options, 
depending on whether they reinforce or reduce each other’s effectiveness 
and the degree to which they overlap in achieving particular savings. It also 
should be kept in mind that these cost estimates were generated within the 
context of a financing and delivery system that is frequently characterized 
as fragmented and misaligned (see, e.g., Cebul et al., 2008); many of these 
options may very well produce different results under a reformed, better 
organized payment and delivery system.
Imposing Caps on Federal Health Spending
As noted above, because savings from restructuring the large and com-
plex health care industry take time to achieve and are very difficult to esti-
mate, achieving overall federal fiscal stability may require near-term savings 
through more direct and potentially more painful methods, as unattractive 
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as that course would be (although the pain of such caps would be mitigated 
to the extent that they lead to improvement in the efficacy and efficiency 
of the health system). It will be a challenge to set payment limits in ways 
that fully account for the health needs of the beneficiary population, mini-
mize the financial hardships for low-income people, and take account of 
the difficulties that the elderly and low-income populations might have in 
navigating complex health coverage choices on their own. Congress also 
would have to adhere to any budget limits it sets for itself, and experiences 
to date have been disappointing. (See Chapter 10 for a discussion of ways 
to encourage greater congressional budget discipline.)
One way to impose a spending cap on Medicare is to set an absolute 
limit on federal payments to providers, placing pressure on them to manage 
their patient loads and trim nonessential services. However, establishing 
such caps in a fashion that would minimize dislocations would be quite 
difficult, and patients would ultimately bear the effects of the limitations. 
Alternatively, public insurance programs could be converted from defined 
benefits with open-ended subsidies to fixed-value vouchers, whose aggre-
gate cost to the government could be controlled. This approach would be 
more transparent in transferring the risk of high-care spending from the 
government to patients, who would use vouchers to shop for private insur-
ance. However, given the limited and expensive nature of coverage in the 
individual insurance market, reforms that make competitive group rates 
available to uninsured individuals would be necessary. For either approach 
to be successful, the traditional Medicare program would have to become 
fully and irrevocably accountable for its spending. (The law currently pro-
vides that shortfalls in Parts B and D of Medicare are automatically covered 
by general revenues, which means Medicare does not now face a binding 
budget constraint.) After-the-fact bailouts would have to be prevented.
For Medicaid, vouchers also could be used to help individuals pay the 
cost of private health insurance instead of paying directly for health services 
for the low-income population.12 However, the potential for significant 
savings would be limited because Medicaid already costs less than private 
insurance for comparable beneficiaries (Hadley and Holahan, 2003; Ku 
and Broaddus, 2008). Another way to cap Medicaid spending would be 
to convert federal matching payments into a block grant, eliminating the 
open-ended payments to states for services delivered under the program 
and making states fully responsible for the fiscal consequences of program 
management and fluctuations in caseloads. States already have experience 
with managing such hard budget constraints, given the annual struggles of 
many states to comply with balanced budget requirements—which often 
centrally involve Medicaid costs. Yet given the importance of Medicaid 
costs as a component of state budgets, it likely would be very difficult to 
meet still tighter targets.
In the study baseline, nominal spending for Medicare and Medicaid is 
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projected to grow at an annual average rate of 7.5 percent in the decade 
after 2012 (with nominal GDP growing at an annual average rate of 4.1 
percent over that period).13 If federal spending caps were to do all the work 
of slowing the rate of federal health spending growth during that decade, 
they would have to reduce the growth rate (as a share of GDP) by an aver-
age of 1.1 percentage points per year for the most constrained spending 
trajectory (see Figure 5-1, above), and they would have to do so by an 
average of 0.8 and 0.4 percentage points per year for the two intermediate 
trajectories. (The high spending trajectory, as has been noted, follows the 
study baseline until 2030.)
It is difficult to predict how the health care industry would respond to a 
federal spending cap (and also how the health industry would react to state 
government responses to a federal cap) and what the ultimate consequences 
would be. The outcomes will depend in part on the extent of institutional 
bottlenecks to achieving efficiency (administrators who can only imperfectly 
control the behavior of physicians, a shortage of nurses, etc.) and whether 
or not the “shock” of imposing dollar constraints would be sufficient to 
force changes in long-standing arrangements. Similarly, wage reductions 
and service cuts may or may not have an effect on quality, depending on 
whether (for example) health professionals behave as monopolistic actors 
who obtain extra income through their market power and whether the ser-
vices that are cut are really necessary or not. Geographic factors will also be 
relevant: genuine savings may be easier to achieve (all else equal) in regions 
of the country that are now less efficient, but fewer gains may be possible in 
the regions that are already relatively more efficient. Savings in Medicaid, 
if not achieved through efficiencies, would burden the states through their 
share of the cost of the program. Reductions in Medicare growth could be 
passed on to patients and employers in the private sector.
System Reforms with Direct Implications for 
Slowing Federal Health Spending Growth
Cap the Tax Exclusion for Employer-Sponsored Coverage
Health-related tax expenditures are open ended and have been growing 
at a rate not much slower than that of Medicare and Medicaid spending 
(and health costs in general). The current tax code excludes from workers’ 
taxable incomes the contributions made by employers to health insurance 
premiums, without any limit. That exclusion has fueled the growth of 
employer-sponsored coverage, but it has also contributed to the escalation 
of health care spending in ways that are inefficient and inequitable. As 
noted above, there is substantial evidence that the tax preference increases 
the volume and price of health care, although there is also considerable 
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uncertainty regarding the true size of this effect (Newhouse, 1996, as cited 
in Joint Committee on Taxation, 2008b). The value of the tax exclusion 
also increases with income, so that people with more income receive larger 
tax savings.14
Capping the value of the exclusion would increase awareness of the 
costs of health care by beneficiaries and is likely to promote the offering and 
purchase of lower-premium health coverage with more efficient networks of 
providers, possibly with higher deductibles and copayments. Such a cap also 
would increase revenues and is one element of the simplified income tax 
structure option described in Chapter 8. A cap could be designed in many 
ways, with estimated savings varying accordingly. The Commonwealth 
Fund, for example, estimates that a cap on the deductibility of premiums set 
at 110 percent of the value of the median employer-sponsored plan could 
generate an additional $130 billion in tax revenues over the next decade 
(Schoen et al., 2007). The Urban Institute has estimated that policy options 
capping the exclusion at the 75th percentile of premiums would generate 
$62 billion in tax revenues over the next 10 years if indexed by the rate of 
growth of medical expenses, and it would generate $224 billion if indexed 
by the rate of growth of GDP (Clemans-Cope et al., 2009).
Reform Medicare Payment Systems
Medicare outlays could be reduced by improving the program’s effi-
ciency through at least five different payment system reforms (which imper-
fectly approximate the incentives from capitated prepayment as practiced 
in the private sector).
First, Medicare could restructure payments to cover more of a patient’s 
episode of care, such as including certain preadmission and post-discharge 
services in the same “bundled payment.” Providers, who would be at risk 
for costs in excess of the bundle amount, would have an incentive to avoid 
unnecessary care and might be motivated to reduce the chance of having 
an avoidable complication or preventable readmission. However, there is 
reason to be concerned that providers might be penalized for unanticipated 
spending that is outside of their control and that inaccurate payment rates 
could distort incentives to provide needed care. Evidence regarding cost 
savings is also mixed.15
Second, Medicare could promote “accountable care organizations” in 
conjunction with a cap on reimbursements. The members of such organi-
zations, which would include hospitals, primary care and specialist physi-
cians, and other providers, would agree to be held accountable for their 
performance in terms of cost and quality of care. The organization would 
not function as a traditional managed care plan; rather, it would be paid 
on a fee-for-service basis. Any savings from more efficient delivery of care 
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would be shared between the organization and the federal government (see 
Fisher et al., 2009c). Although accountable care organizations have the 
laudable goal of promoting more efficient and integrated care, the extent 
to which participating providers would actually change their behaviors is 
unknown.
Third, rather than continuing to pay for services without regard to their 
effects on patients, Medicare could incorporate measures of performance 
in fee-for-service payment formulas. Program expenditures would fall if the 
average payment rate was lowered as performance-based pricing was in-
troduced. Implementing a pay-for-performance approach is not necessarily 
simple or straightforward, however, and system errors may adversely affect 
health care quality and access (Cannon, 2006).
Fourth, the accuracy of fee-for-service prices could be improved. Some 
analysts have argued that formula-based pricing for health services is 
likely to overpay some services relative to the market and underpay others 
(Ginsburg and Grossman, 2005; Hayes et al., 2007). These inaccuracies 
distort the provision of care, leading providers to oversupply care when 
reimbursement levels exceed actual costs, and undersupply care when 
reimbursement is lower than actual costs. Market-based reforms, such 
as competitive bidding methods, might improve payment accuracy and 
reduce program spending. Competitive bidding has been proposed to set 
payments for durable medical equipment and clinical laboratory services. 
However, there is a risk that prices might go up and services to beneficiaries 
might be reduced as smaller suppliers go out of business (Antos and Rivlin, 
2007b).
Fifth, the payment differential between Medicare Advantage private 
plans and traditional Medicare could be reduced. In 2008, payment “bench-
marks” for the Medicare Advantage program were, on average, 17 percent 
higher than projected per capita spending in traditional Medicare (Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2008b:106). Much of this benefit accrues to private 
plan participants in the form of supplemental benefits or lower premiums 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2007d:7). The Congressional Budget Office 
(2008b) estimates that setting the benchmark for Medicare Advantage 
private plans at the same level as local per capita spending in traditional 
Medicare would yield approximately $157 billion in savings over the next 
10 years.
Restrict Medicare Eligibility
The federal government could gradually increase the Medicare eligibil-
ity age from 65 to 67, as was done for the age of retirement with full ben-
efits in the Social Security program. That would reduce program spending 
and increase revenue from payroll taxes somewhat as at least some people 
OPTIONS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 
delayed their retirement. The resulting Medicare savings would be modest, 
because the youngest elderly as a group are healthier and use less expensive 
medical services than those who are still older. The Congressional Budget 
Office (2008b) estimates that raising the Medicare eligibility age by 2 
months annually starting in 2014 until the eligibility age reached 67 in 2025 
would reduce Medicare spending by $85.6 billion over the next decade. It 
is also estimated that an additional $6.8 billion would be saved in Social 
Security payments in that period because some people would delay their 
retirement to retain employer-sponsored health benefits.
Although increasing the eligibility age might keep older workers on the 
job longer and raise their retirement income, it would also expose employ-
ers to higher payroll and benefit costs. Moreover, Davidoff and Johnson 
(2003) estimate that increasing the Medicare eligibility age to 67 would 
cause 9 percent of 65- and 66-year-olds (amounting to approximately 
356,000 people) to become uninsured.
Restructure Medicare Cost-Sharing Requirements
Fee-for-service Medicare has a complex benefit structure, largely be-
cause of historical and political factors (Oberlander, 2003; Patashnik, 
2000). There are separate deductibles for hospital and outpatient care, and 
copayments vary among covered services. This structure is confusing to 
beneficiaries and fails to provide consistent and effective financial incentives 
for prudent use of services. The program could be restructured with a single 
deductible and copayment requirement for all services, with the levels set to 
reduce federal outlays. The Congressional Budget Office (2008b) estimates 
that Medicare could save $26.4 billion over the next decade through one 
such restructuring.
Several changes to Medicare premiums also could generate savings. 
For example, raising the Medicare premium for physicians’ and other out-
patient services (Part B) from the current 25 percent to 35 percent of the 
program’s costs would generate $217 billion in savings over the next 10 
years. For the prescription drug part of the program (Part D), the Congres-
sional Budget Office (2008b) estimates that changing it to conform to the 
current Part B premiums (25 percent of the program’s cost for beneficiaries 
with annual incomes of up to $85,000, gradually increasing to 80 percent 
of costs for couples with annual incomes of more than $426,000 in 2009) 
would increase program savings by $7.8 billion over the next decade.
An alternative to higher premiums would be to raise the payroll tax 
rate for Medicare. Premiums are essentially user fees that force those who 
directly benefit from the program to pay part of the cost, unlike payroll 
taxes, which shift the cost of current beneficiaries to younger generations.16 
A 1 percentage point increase in the tax rate would generate $592 billion 
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over 10 years. If the Medicare tax rate was increased only on earnings 
above $150,000, the revenue gain would be $77 billion (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2008b).
Limit Malpractice Awards
It has been argued that legal liability fears cause providers to engage in 
the practice of “defensive medicine,” administering treatments that do not 
have worthwhile medical benefits (Kessler and McClellan, 1996). However, 
the effect of defensive medicine on health spending is unclear (Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2006b), and the budgetary effects of limiting awards 
from medical malpractice torts may be relatively modest. The Congres-
sional Budget Office (2008b) estimates that limiting awards from medical 
malpractice torts would lower federal health spending by $4.4 billion and 
increase federal revenue by $1.3 billion over the next 10 years. These fig-
ures may understate the potential savings if litigation fears have suppressed 
(in ways overlooked by conventional cost estimates) physicians’ efforts to 
pursue cost and quality improvements in medical care settings. Opponents 
of limits on tort awards argue that such limits might cause health care 
providers to exercise less caution and make it more difficult for victims to 
obtain appropriate compensation for their injuries (Congressional Budget 
Office, 2008b:22).
System Reforms with Indirect Implications for 
Slowing Federal Health Spending Growth
Systematic, comprehensive reform must also concern itself with care 
quality and health outcomes. A number of health reform options speak to 
these issues: comparative effectiveness research, health information technol-
ogy, disease management, health promotion, and better primary care.
Comparative Effectiveness Research
Comparative effectiveness research assesses how well a health care 
technology or treatment for a specific disease works in comparison with 
other options. Such research can, ideally, provide a scientific basis for us-
ing treatments that provide the highest-quality care at the lowest possible 
price. A government role in financing and promoting the research will be 
unavoidable, since there are few incentives for private-sector entities to 
invest in comparative effectiveness research.
Randomized clinical trials can cost tens of millions of dollars (National 
Institutes of Health, 2007) and take years to complete. Analyzing data on 
medical claims or synthesizing existing studies would be less expensive than 
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clinical trials, but might yield less definitive results. Even when the research 
is completed, there is no mechanism for ensuring that providers use the in-
formation in their practices. Historically, disseminating practice guidelines 
has seldom had significant effects on providers’ actions, although practices 
might change if the health industry became more market oriented.17 A more 
effective but controversial approach, given the limitations and complexities 
of comparative effectiveness research (Gottlieb, 2009), would require Medi-
care to base its coverage decisions on such research. Alternatively, Medicare 
might increase payments to providers who adhere to guidelines derived 
from such research. State Medicaid programs might adopt similar policies. 
Currently, neither the federal nor state programs use cost-effectiveness 
information to make coverage and reimbursement decisions (Gold et al., 
2007). The Congressional Budget Office (2008b) estimates that an increase 
of $1.1 billion over the next decade in federal funding for comparative ef-
fectiveness research would modestly reduce health spending, resulting in 
an increase in net federal spending of about $860 million. The American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 appropriated $1.1 billion for such 
research.
Health Information Technology
Health information technology refers to a variety of electronic tools 
used to manage health care information. It has the potential to save money 
and improve quality by reducing the need to maintain paper files, eliminat-
ing duplicative tests, encouraging more-accurate and efficient drug prescrip-
tion, improving hospital patient flow, and reducing demands on hospital 
nursing staff. Like comparative effectiveness research, health information 
technology is generally recognized as a form of public good in which the 
private sector will underinvest. To date, information on the cost and quality 
effects of such technology is limited to a relatively small number of stud-
ies. It is not clear whether these findings can be broadly generalized (see 
Shekelle et al., 2006). The Congressional Budget Office (2008b) predicts 
that, by requiring all Medicare providers to adopt health information tech-
nology by 2015, the federal government could save $34 billion during the 
next decade.18 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 pro-
vided approximately $19 billion in payment incentives to encourage Medi-
care and Medicaid providers to adopt health information technology.
Disease Management
Disease management programs are designed to reduce avoidable com-
plications associated with chronic disease by assisting patients in managing 
their conditions. Programs vary, but components include patient outreach 
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to encourage adherence to medication regimens, fastidious monitoring of 
weight or other key features, behavior modification programs, and an em-
phasis on preventive care. Studies have shown that disease management is 
associated with improved adherence to evidence-based guidelines and bet-
ter disease control (Mattke et al., 2007), but the evidence on cost savings 
is inconclusive. Early results from a disease management trial in Medicare 
suggest the program is unlikely to achieve savings and may actually increase 
spending (McCall et al., 2007). Some people have argued that the savings 
potential of the Medicare demonstration project was hindered by imple-
mentation challenges (Wilson, 2007), but previous trials in Medicare also 
failed to produce significant savings (Bott et al., 2009).
Health Promotion
Unhealthful behaviors—including poor diet, lack of exercise, smok-
ing, and excessive alcohol consumption—contribute both to poor health 
outcomes and increased health spending. Public policies aimed at smoking 
cessation, including cigarette taxes and workplace smoking bans, have 
been shown to reduce smoking rates (Carpenter, 2007; Carpenter and 
Cook, 2008; DeCicca and McCleod, 2008; DeCicca et al., 2008; Evans 
et al., 1999). Similarly, studies have shown that alcohol consumption falls 
in response to higher taxes and other policies, such as Sunday sales bans 
(Baltagi and Goel, 1990; Baltagi and Griffin, 1995; Cook and Tauchen, 
1982; Dhaval and Saffer, 2007; Stehr, 2007). The effects of policies to re-
duce obesity are less certain.19 Small school- and community-based obesity 
programs have been effective at reducing body mass indices (Economos and 
Irish-Hauser, 2007; Gortmaker et al., 1999), and some workplace inter-
ventions have been associated with modest health improvements (Goetzel 
et al., 2009; Haines et al., 2007; Proper et al., 2003). If an effective clinical 
method of preventing obesity could be found, it would probably result in 
lower lifetime medical spending (Goldman et al., 2009). However, evi-
dence is lacking as to whether such programs are cost-effective in practice 
(Cawley, 2007).
Better Primary Care
Better primary care could improve health-care quality and contribute to 
lower health-care costs by keeping people out of emergency rooms, doing 
a better job managing chronic diseases, and reducing reliance on medi-
cal specialists. One proposal, sometimes referred to as a patient-centered 
medical home, would reimburse primary-care providers at a higher rate for 
improvements such as facilitating better disease management, extending 
office hours, or adopting health information technology. A medical home 
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demonstration project in the North Carolina Medicaid program reported 
savings of 11 percent per member per month (Mercer Human Resources 
Consulting, 2007), and preliminary findings from a trial in the Geisinger 
Health System indicate that medical homes led to a 7 percent savings (Pau-
lus et al., 2008). However, it is uncertain whether similar savings could be 
achieved if medical homes were widely adopted by public programs, such 
as Medicare. Medical homes also do not address the larger issue of the 
growing deficiency in the number of primary-care physicians.
Caveats Regarding Savings from Reform
A major objective of health system reform is the more efficient use of 
resources—but efficient use might not yield federal budget savings. Policies 
that increase the efficiency of health care delivery might promote the wider 
use of more effective but more expensive treatments, improving health out-
comes without reducing spending. For example, the identification of better 
treatments through comparative effectiveness research might result in an 
increase in the number of patients treated—and, therefore, in higher costs.20 
Any savings that result from comparative effectiveness research, moreover, 
would occur well after the research was funded because of the long lead 
time required to produce treatment recommendations and for the medical 
community to put those recommendations into practice.
In a similar vein, better health information technology may increase 
health spending by identifying people who need treatment but are not 
currently receiving it. Substantial savings through various applications of 
technology are possible only if medical practice becomes dramatically more 
efficient. Health information technology might promote such a change (al-
beit with attendant adjustment costs for providers), but by itself would not 
necessarily create such savings.
Preventive medical care (which includes things such as immunizations 
and screening tests) also may not be the most promising place to look for 
significant systemwide cost savings. Most preventive medical care improves 
health outcomes but increases costs (Cohen et al., 2008; Russell, 2007, 
2009). Typically, preventive care must be offered to a relatively large group 
of people of whom only a small fraction will directly benefit through an 
averted illness (Cohen et al., 2008).
CONCLUSION
The difficulty of establishing a fiscally sustainable long-term growth 
curve for federal health spending can hardly be overstated. The reform 
challenge is complicated by the need to balance cost containment with other 
important objectives. Virtually any plan to expand access will require ad-
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ditional federal spending. Similarly, reforms aimed at improving health care 
quality are likely to increase spending, at least in the near term. Delivery 
system changes—such as the expansion of health information technology 
and better primary care—may require considerable up-front investment, 
with cost savings not being realized until well in the future. Other popular 
ideas, including prevention and wellness initiatives, may add value to the 
health system but are unlikely to reduce spending.
Better payment approaches also cannot, by themselves, ensure that the 
resulting trends in federal health spending will be sustainable, and there 
is considerable uncertainty about the total budgetary savings that would 
accrue over the long term from the many possible combinations of health 
system reforms. At least in the near term, some form of health spending 
cap is more likely to reduce federal spending than any particular reform 
or combination of reforms. Although a cap would have the undesirable ef-
fect of shifting costs to nongovernment payers, it also has the potential to 
contribute to longer-term system improvements as fiscal constraints spur 
administrators and payers to seek efficiencies; given the complexities and 
uncertainties at issue, the response cannot be predicted. At any rate, the 
committee does not intend to imply that spending caps could be a long-term 
substitute for fundamental and systemic reform.
Health spending on its current trend is unsustainable, yet the nation has 
structured its health system and policy-making process as if there were few 
resource constraints. An essential prerequisite for change is full acceptance 
by the public that difficult steps need to be taken. We do not minimize the 
nature of the challenges that lie ahead. Reorganizing and rationalizing the 
ways in which health benefits and services are delivered are essential to 
ensure the fiscal sustainability that is vital to the nation’s future.
The four Medicare and Medicaid spending trajectories described above 
illustrate a range of potential reductions in the rate of growth for health 
spending, without specifying which combination of reform options would 
achieve those reductions. These illustrative options reflect an appropriate 
modesty about what will lower costs, especially in the near term. They also 
highlight the very difficult decisions of how much stringency to apply to this 
sector of the federal budget and national economy. The amount of federal 
health spending growth reduction achieved over the next several decades 
will determine the range of choices in other areas of the budget, on both the 
spending and revenue side, for putting the federal government on a fiscally 
sustainable course.
NOTES
1. The federal government also finances several smaller programs, including the Children’s 
Health Insurance Program, the military’s TRICARE program, health care for veterans, 
and the Indian Health Service.
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2. Pilot projects are more likely than demonstrations to yield large-scale improvements 
because pilot projects, if they prove successful, can be implemented nationwide without 
congressional action.
3. Moreover, CBO’s scoring of the Affordable Health Care for America Act (see Box 5-1) 
assumes that major spending provisions (such as constraints on Medicare payment rates) 
“are enacted and remain unchanged throughout the next two decades, which is often not 
the case for major legislation” (Congressional Budget Office 2009f:13).
4. For this purpose, health care spending has to be adjusted for changes in the age and 
gender composition of the population. Thus, for example, even with effective discipline 
on costs, spending will grow faster as the population becomes older on average.
5. See Burman (2008) for a discussion of using the value-added tax as a financing source for 
health care. (See Chapter 8 for a discussion of the value-added tax as a general revenue 
source.)
6. The rate of growth of health spending in the United States is nearly the same as that of 
European countries. Between 1997 and 2003, for example, the 15 original members of 
the European Union (EU) experienced a 4.2 percent increase in health spending, com-
pared with an average GDP growth of 2.4 percent. Over the same period, U.S. health 
spending grew 4.3 percent, while GDP grew 1.9 percent (Antos and Rivlin, 2007a).
7. The Congressional Budget Office (2009c:27) also notes that Medicare began paying 
hospitals a predetermined rate for each admission under a “prospective payment system” 
in 1983.
8. For example, see Smith et al. (2009) for a discussion of the interrelationship between 
technology and health insurance and the possibility that insurance coverage may not 
continue to stimulate technological change to the extent that it has in the past.
9. Medicaid pays for cost sharing, premiums, and some treatments and services that Medi-
care does not cover, but it is a secondary insurer for this group.
10. An alternative approach to calculating the cost of this tax expenditure (Joint Committee 
on Taxation, 2009) goes beyond conventional estimates by looking at the impact of the 
employer-sponsored health care exclusion on payroll taxes and assuming certain behav-
ioral responses by taxpayers. This analysis puts income and payroll tax revenue losses in 
2008 at $133 billion and $94 billion, respectively.
11. The sustainable growth rate formula stands as an example of a budget cap that has not 
worked. Created by Congress to limit the growth of Medicare payments for physician 
services, the formula ties physician payments to economic growth. Since Medicare physi-
cian spending has been growing significantly faster than the economy, the formula con-
sistently calls for cuts in physicians’ fees. The magnitude of these reductions has proven 
to be politically untenable, however, and Congress has repeatedly used its authority to 
override the sustainable growth rate formula.
12. With vouchers, private plans would have a relatively fixed budget and have to manage 
care as efficiently as possible. The financial risk is borne by the plans: if there are insuf-
ficient funds available, beneficiaries might get less care or poorer quality care.
13. This discussion refers to rates of growth of aggregate spending, rather than the excess 
cost growth measure used at the beginning of this chapter.
14. For example, people in the lower tax brackets receive cash savings from the exclusion 
valued at between $600 and $3,000 per year, while people with annual incomes of more 
than $100,000 obtain average cash savings of between $4,000 and $5,000 (Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation, 2008b:5).
15. The Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center demonstration project found that 
bundled payment was associated with a 10 percent reduction in spending among Medi-
care bypass patients (Cromwell et al., 1998). However, another bundled payment trial 
implemented in the Medicare system found no effect on costs for patients undergoing 
cataract surgery (Abt Associates, 1997).
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16. Using payroll taxes is also somewhat progressive, because although health expenses can 
be expected to be roughly equal for each person, people with higher incomes from work 
pay higher payroll taxes.
17. For an example, see Mathews (2005), who describes how Kaiser Permanente reviews 
clinical trials and provides guidance to its practitioners.
18. A study by RAND predicted that, if implemented effectively, fully operational health 
information technology systems could reduce U.S. health spending by as much as $77 
billion annually (Hillestad et al., 2005). However, the RAND study came under criti-
cism by the Congressional Budget Office (2008c) and others for using overly optimistic 
assumptions.
19. Food taxes are less straightforward to implement than cigarette and alcohol taxes because 
food is a necessity, there are few externalities associated with overeating (compared to, 
for example, drunk driving), and even healthy people at low risk for obesity-related 
problems consume junk food on occasion. A federal excise tax of 3 cents per 12 ounces 
of “sugar sweetened” beverages (which include a variety of carbonated and noncarbon-
ated drinks) would generate $50.4 billion in additional revenue over the next decade 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2008b).
20. A comparative effectiveness research center in the United Kingdom has not produced 
significant savings, and some have argued it has increased spending by giving a “stamp of 
approval” to expensive but cost-effective treatments (Pearson and Littlejohns, 2007).
6Options for Social Security
Social Security is today the largest and perhaps best-known federal gov-
ernment program. As of the end of 2008, the program had paid $9 trillion 
in retirement benefits for elderly and disabled people and their dependents 
and survivors since its inception. About 52 million people, one of every 6 
Americans, currently receive monthly Social Security benefit checks: 33 mil-
lion retired workers, 2.4 million spouses, 6.4 million survivors of deceased 
workers, and 9.5 million disabled workers and their dependents (Social 
Security Administration, 2009a).
Although Social Security is currently running annual surpluses, it is 
projected to be in substantial deficit over the long run. In the near term, 
Social Security’s benefit payments will rise rapidly as the baby boomers 
retire, while its revenues will grow more slowly. In less than three decades 
the program’s reserves will be depleted; from that time forward its sources 
of revenues will be sufficient to pay only about three-quarters of currently 
scheduled benefits. However, the program’s financial course is correctable, 
and corrective action would contribute to making the entire federal budget 
sustainable.1
The Social Security part of the federal government’s overall fiscal chal-
lenge is less complex than that posed by Medicare and Medicaid, the range 
of potential changes to the program available to address it are much better 
defined, and their consequences are easier to quantify. In the last section of 
this chapter we present four possible sets of program changes to make So-
cial Security fiscally sustainable, drawn from a much larger set of potential 
changes that have been proposed and extensively analyzed elsewhere. (See 
below, “Options to Restore Solvency.”) Each set—or reform option—varies 
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in the extent to which it will reduce the future growth of benefits or increase 
revenues or both, and each achieves the goal of restoring Social Security 
to long-term solvency without altering the program’s familiar and widely 
popular basic design.
The committee’s options are illustrative: many other packages of pro-
gram changes (some of them frequently advanced) are obviously possible—
with similar fiscal effects but differing distributional consequences. Options 
that would augment or alter the program’s basic structure are also possible 
and have been considered by others; however, the premise of the commit-
tee is that these options for structural change are neither necessary nor as 
politically feasible as the options we offer.
PROGRAM OVERVIEW
Since its enactment in 1935, Social Security has helped protect people 
against economic insecurity in old age. The basic program structure since 
its inception has been to assess payroll taxes on current workers and use 
those revenues to pay benefits to retirees.2 Virtually all workers—more than 
160 million people—pay Social Security taxes. The program’s total income 
in 2008 was $805 billion.
In July 2009, the average monthly benefit paid to retired workers was 
$1,159 (about $14,000 annually), that for widows and widowers aged 60 
and older was $1,118, and that for disabled workers $1,062 (Social Secu-
rity Administration, 2009a).3 In the 2008 calendar year (the last year for 
which complete data are available), the total amount paid in benefits was 
$615 billion (Social Security Administration, 2009a).
Revenues are credited to the program’s trust fund, and benefit payments 
are made from it. The program was initially designed with the intent that 
dedicated, payroll tax revenues plus the interest earned on the trust fund re-
serves would generally cover the payments to current retirees. The balance 
of revenues not used immediately to pay benefits is retained in the fund,4 
where it is held in the form of special Treasury bonds. Interest earned on 
those reserves—which are currently in excess of $2 trillion—is also retained 
until used to pay benefits.
Now, and in the near future, the annual flow of dedicated tax revenues 
is projected to be sufficient to fully cover the annual cost of currently sched-
uled benefits. But starting in 2016, Social Security revenue will fall short of 
benefit spending by a growing amount: when that occurs, first the interest 
on the reserves and then the reserves themselves will have to be drawn 
upon. Once the latter are exhausted—now projected to be in 2037—annual 
Social Security tax income will be sufficient to cover only about 75 percent 
of the annual benefits currently “scheduled.” If nothing is done to remedy 
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the situation in the meanwhile, benefits would have to be reduced for all 
beneficiaries; those reductions would be about 25 percent from their cur-
rently scheduled levels.5
The financial outlook for Social Security has also been problematic in 
the past. Two circumstances have contributed to the need for periodic fiscal 
adjustments to maintain the program’s solvency. First, legislation has ex-
panded Social Security coverage and increased the level of benefits. Second, 
the evolution of work, longer average life spans, and other demographic 
and economic changes have resulted in the need to reestimate how many 
retirees will be supported in the future by those still working.
When enacted in 1935, Social Security provided only retirement ben-
efits: that is, the program did not cover widows or widowers, children, or 
disabled workers whose own work experience did not qualify them for 
retirement benefits. And it was only for workers in commerce and industry, 
about 60 percent of the workforce.6 The program (today formally known 
as Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance or OASDI) was expanded 
periodically to cover additional categories of people. Benefits for surviving 
spouses and dependents were added early in the program’s history. Later, in 
the 1950s, coverage was extended to those unable to work due to total and 
permanent disability (and for their dependents). This part of the program, 
although it has grown rapidly, is much smaller than the OAS part. The 
overall OASDI expansion greatly increased the scale of the future commit-
ments to retirees and their dependents and survivors as well as to disabled 
persons and their families. And these commitments also grew after benefits 
were indexed for inflation. (Monthly retirement benefits were increased 
by legislation 10 times before automatic cost-of-living adjustments were 
enacted in 1972 and then periodically modified.)7
By the late 1970s, Social Security had all of the basic features it has 
today. Thereafter, legislative changes focused primarily on shoring up the 
program’s long-run financial stability. These changes included increases in 
the payroll tax rate and the maximum earnings subject to the tax, future 
increases in the age—previously 65—at which retiring workers would be 
eligible for full benefits, and other minor adjustments to benefits and rev-
enues (for details, see Apfel and Flowers, 2007).
The biggest changes that affected the program’s future finances were 
enacted in 1983 when it appeared that the program’s trust fund would 
soon be depleted and across-the-board benefit cuts were imminent. Payroll 
tax rates were increased. For certain higher-income beneficiaries, benefits 
became subject to the income tax, with those proceeds dedicated to the 
trust fund. Beginning that year, the annual cost-of-living adjustment was 
delayed from June to December. And the 1983 reforms provided for gradual 
increases in the age at which a person could retire with what are called full 
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benefits—from 65 to 67.8 The increased age for full benefits affected only 
people who were 45 or younger at the time, which allowed workers to plan 
for the change by increasing savings before retirement or by working longer 
(Achenbaum, 1986; Light, 1995).
The Social Security program has both a social and an insurance as-
pect.9 Its “social” aspect refers to its helping alleviate fear (particularly 
for low-income workers) of an impoverished retirement, to its compulsory 
character, and to its progressive benefit structure. Social Security has always 
replaced more of the former earnings of low-wage workers than of those 
at upper earning levels.
Figure 6-1 shows how, for illustrative workers with different lifetime 
earnings paths, lower earnings lead to lower cash benefits (left axis; line 
with diamonds) but higher replacement rates for those earnings (right 
axis, line with squares).10 Elderly retirees with the lowest income from all 
sources—including pensions, savings, and earnings—are most dependent on 
Social Security benefits; see Figure 6-2. On the basis of a 2006 survey of 
families and individuals 65 and older, for the lowest income quintile (with 
annual income of less than $11,519), Social Security benefits average 93 
percent of all income. Even for the fourth quintile (total income between 
$28,911 and $50,064), program benefits are 50 percent of all income. Only 
for the top quintile (total income of at least $50,064 annually) are Social 
Security benefits a small (26 percent) share of all income.11
Social Security aims to alleviate economic insecurity in old age and 
among disabled people. As part of its “social” aspect, Social Security 
replaces a large proportion of preretirement wages for retirees with rel-
atively low life-time earnings. This replacement is especially important 
FIGURE 6-1 Annual Social Security benefits and earnings replacement rates, for 
workers who retire at age 65, scheduled for 2010.
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and provides a safely net for those who cannot (or are not expected to) 
obtain retirement income on their own through individual savings, pen-
sions, or postretirement earnings.12 The program also provides benefits to 
dependents without reducing the primary earner’s benefit. For all but the 
highest-earning 20 percent of older Americans, Social Security is the largest 
single source of income (Reno and Lavery, 2009). The program, moreover, 
provides continuing benefits for surviving spouses and dependent children 
if a worker dies before retirement.
Social Security helps people reduce the risk of having inadequate re-
sources later in life by requiring them to contribute a portion of their earn-
ings in exchange for earned benefits they will receive when not working. 
Also, in retirement a spouse receives either one-half of the other spouse’s 
monthly benefits (if a nonworker and married to a worker) or her or his 
own Social Security benefits, whichever is larger.
It is important to keep in mind that currently scheduled benefits rise 
over time for successive cohorts of new retirees, even though replacement 
rates for those retiring at the full benefit age remain relatively constant.13 
In order for future cohorts of retirees to have the same percentage of their 
covered earnings replaced by Social Security as current retirees, initial 
benefit levels have to rise over time with real wage growth. Wage growth 
is expected to continue to exceed inflation by about 1 percent a year on 
average because increases in per capita productivity result in increases in 
total compensation (i.e., earnings plus benefits). Accordingly, adjusted for 
inflation, Social Security benefit payments for workers who retire at age 
65 would nearly double over the next 75 years (see Table C-3 in Appendix 
C) if no changes are made to the current benefit formula and if program 
revenues are adequate.
FIGURE 6-2 Social Security benefits as a percentage of total income, for families 
and individuals aged 65+, by quintile of total income, 2006.
NOTE: Couples are included if at least one is aged 65 or older; see also note 11.
SOURCE: Data from the Current Population Survey (Social Security Administra-
tion, 2009b:301).
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FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS
It is more than a generation since the major program and financing re-
forms of 1983, and many of those who were age 45 then are now retired or 
planning to retire. Americans are now living longer in retirement. A gener-
ally declining birthrate and changing work patterns have changed the actual 
and projected ratios of numbers working and paying into the program’s 
trust fund to those retired and collecting benefits. Within a generation, as 
the baby boomers retire, the number of people over the age of 65 will rise 
from about 13 percent of the population (in 2007) to about 20 percent (in 
2040) (Census Bureau, 2009). On average, people will spend many more 
years in retirement—and drawing Social Security benefits—than previous 
generations.14 Consequently, the ratio of workers covered by Social Security 
to program beneficiaries is projected to decrease from its current level of 
3.2 to 2.1 in 2035. Thereafter, this ratio is projected to continue to decline, 
but much more slowly, reaching 1.9 in 2085 (Social Security Administra-
tion, 2009d).
Social Security benefits now total 4.8 percent of GDP and they are pro-
jected to reach 6.2 percent by 2035. Over the same period, under current 
law (i.e., without any changes), Social Security revenues will decline from 
their present level of 5.8 percent to about 4.8 percent of GDP, resulting in 
a gap of 1.4 percent of GDP. On the basis of such straightforward projec-
tions by the Social Security actuaries and others, it is widely agreed that 
financial reforms are required soon to ensure that the program’s implicit 
promise is kept for the current generation of workers, as well as with future 
generations.
What will soon become a growing discrepancy between Social Securi-
ty’s benefits and revenues will exhaust the trust fund and so threaten the 
program’s solvency as well as the payment of currently scheduled benefits; 
see Figures 6-3 and 6-4.15 Box 6-1 sketches how the projected depletion of 
the Social Security trust fund relates to other indicators of the program’s 
long-term financial prospects (see Social Security Administration 2009d; 
see also Appendix C). The program’s financial outlook presents a loom-
ing problem not just for Social Security, however; given the program’s size 
and pending cash flow deficits that must be somehow financed by the U.S. 
Treasury, it is a problem for the U.S. budget as a whole.
OPTIONS TO RESTORE SOLVENCy
Overview
The fiscal future of the Social Security program could be assured in 
various ways, but virtually all experts agree that reform likely will require 
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either a substantial increase in currently scheduled payroll tax revenues, 
a substantial reduction in currently scheduled lifetime benefits for future 
retirees, or some combination of the two. Commonly discussed changes to 
reduce the future growth of benefits include: raising the full-benefit retire-
ment age and the earliest retirement age; reducing the additional benefit 
percentage for spouses; reducing the postretirement cost-of-living adjust-
ment; increasing the number of years used to compute average earnings; 
and changing the way initial benefit levels (i.e., at retirement) are calculated 
so that they grow more slowly than wages for higher earners. Examples 
of commonly discussed revenue changes include raising additional payroll 
tax revenue by covering newly hired state and local government workers; 
increasing the maximum amount of wages subject to payroll taxes; raising 
the payroll tax rate; and taxing Social Security benefits similarly to private 
pension income. The options presented are just a few combinations of the 
many proposed changes within the current program framework that have 
been made to address the program’s projected shortfalls. For detailed de-
scriptions and analysis, see, for example, American Academy of Actuaries 
(2007), Congressional Budget Office (2009b), Reno and Lavery (2009), 
Shelton (2008), and Social Security Advisory Board (2005); the list of the 
Social Security actuary is particularly comprehensive (Social Security Ad-
ministration, 2009c).
Some observers also note that an increased share of general federal rev-
BOX 6-1 
Sustaining the Social Security Trust Fund
	 The	expected	date	of	 the	depletion	of	 the	Social	Security	 trust	 fund	 is	only	
one	 indicator	 of	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 program’s	 problem	 (see	 Appendix	 C).	
Another	important	indicator	of	the	program’s	financial	soundness	is	its	actuarial	
balance,	based	on	the	discounted	streams	of	revenues	and	spending	projected	
over	a	75-year	period.	This	indicator	does	not	show	the	size	of	the	trust	fund	at	
the	end	of	the	75	years.	A	major	Social	Security	reform—like	that	in	1983—might	
achieve	actuarial	balance	during	75	years	but	still	 lead	 to	 insolvency	after	 that	
time.	However,	a	low	or	falling	trust	fund	level	(relative	to	benefits)	at	the	end	of	
the	75-year	projection	period	can	signal	looming	insolvency.
	 Each	reform	option	discussed	in	this	chapter	has	been	tested	against	multiple	
indicators.	The	estimates	show	that,	under	 the	Social	Security	 trustees’	current	
economic	and	demographic	assumptions,	each	of	our	illustrative	reform	options	
finances	the	program’s	costs	through	the	75-year	projection	period	and	results	in	
a	positive	or	near-positive	cash	flow	into	and	out	of	the	trust	fund	at	the	end	of	
the	75-year	period.
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enues could be designated for the Social Security trust fund, or new revenue 
sources could be dedicated specifically to Social Security. However, since the 
use of such revenue sources for the program would simply make the already 
difficult task of achieving appropriate fiscal balance in the remainder of the 
federal budget even more difficult, we did not include this approach among 
our illustrative reform options.16
The four illustrative options discussed below entail different combina-
tions of the broader array of possible changes outlined above—thus sus-
taining the program’s finances in the current, long-established framework 
in which payroll taxes paid by current workers support benefits for current 
retirees.
• Option 1 would achieve fiscal balance for the program without any 
revenue increases, relying instead solely on program changes that 
would generally reduce the rate of growth of currently scheduled 
benefits for future retirees.17
• In contrast, Option 4 would maintain currently scheduled benefits 
for all future beneficiaries by relying solely on increases in the pay-
roll tax.
Between these two, the other two options combine tax increases and benefit 
growth reductions in different mixes:
• Option 2 would rely two-thirds on slower growth in benefits for 
future retirees and one-third on future increases in payroll tax 
revenues.
• Option 3 is the opposite mix: it would rely two-thirds on future 
increases in payroll tax revenues and one-third on slower growth 
in benefits for future retirees.
All four options are designed to have roughly the same overall long-
term fiscal impact and to sustain the program’s solvency for the next 75 
years and beyond (see Box 6-1, above). All four also would phase in benefit 
and tax changes over many decades, and none would introduce a major 
change in benefits for people who are close to retirement.
In the rest of this section we describe each option and its “ground-level” 
consequences for benefits and payroll taxes. Table 6-1 provides a summary 
comparison of the program changes in the four options (see Appendix C 
for more detail). Two questions guided our analysis of the options: (1) How 
does each option affect future benefit levels and the proportion of individual 
workers’ past earnings that benefits replace? and (2) How does each option 
tend to affect the progressivity of Social Security benefits and taxation?
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Option 1: Benefit Changes Only
In comparison with the current program formulas, this option changes 
benefits for future retirees. Recognizing that longevity is increasing, Op-
tion 1 accelerates the currently scheduled increase in the age for retirement 
with full benefits, to 67 in 2012, instead of remaining at 66 for several more 
years. More specifically, the age to retire with full benefits would increase by 
a projected 1 month every 2 years. The age for the earliest retirement with 
Social Security retirement benefits would increase the same way.18
In addition to changes in retirement age, the other two provisions that 
affect monthly benefits under Option 1 are “progressive indexing” of the 
preretirement benefit-entitlement formula and a change in the cost-of-living 
adjustment during retirement.21 First, under the benefit formula in current 
law, improvements in average wages before a worker’s retirement generally 
increase future benefits for that worker (and all others). Under this illustra-
tive reform option, the current indexing to average wage levels would be 
reduced by “progressive indexing.” For workers with the lowest 30 percent 
of earnings, the growth rate of benefits would be maintained. For most 
others, initial benefits would grow more slowly—although, on average, at 
least as fast as prices. Benefits would grow slowest—keeping pace only with 
consumer prices—only for workers with steady earnings at the current-law 
taxable maximum.
Second, the annual cost-of-living adjustment for retirees receiving 
monthly benefits would be computed from a newer price index that is 
generally considered more accurate, which usually provides smaller ben-
efit increases.20 Upward cost-of-living adjustment would continue and so 
benefit checks would continue to be protected from price inflation during 
retirement.21
Benefit Effects
Figure 6-5 compares monthly benefit levels—adjusted for projected 
inflation—for new retirees in 2050 under Option 1 with those scheduled 
under current law for new retirees in 2010 or 2050. (Discussed below, 
Figure 6-6 presents another aspect of this option.) Benefits are compared 
for new retirees at age 65, that is, for those taking early Social Security 
retirement in 2010 and 2050. Because Option 1 accelerates the increase 
in retirement age, its age-65 benefit as illustrated in Figure 6-5 reflects 
benefits reduced by what is effectively even earlier retirement. Since Op-
tion 1’s age for full retirement benefits is later than current law’s—68 years 
and 4 months in 2050—retiring at 65 under Option 1 (in 2050) leads to a 
bigger reduction in monthly benefits for early retirement than retiring (in 
2050) under current law, assuming payment of scheduled benefits.22 (With 
a different format and more detail, Tables C-3 through C-5 in Appendix C 
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FIGURE 6-6 Social Security benefits as a percentage of past earnings for new retir-
ees at age 65 under current law and under Option 1.
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FIGURE 6-5 Monthly Social Security benefits for workers who retire at age 65 
under current law and under Option 1 (in 2009 dollars).
show the option’s effects on monthly benefits, the replacement of individual 
earnings by benefits, and on payroll taxes paid.)
Although it leads to more years of benefits, early retirement makes 
a big reduction in monthly benefits, under both current law and this op-
tion. For example, under current law, retiring in 2050 at 65 rather than at 
that year’s age for full benefits of 67 means 15.4 percent less in scheduled 
monthly benefits. As a result, Option 1’s increase of the retirement age 
for full benefits markedly contributes to lower monthly benefits. The first 
triplet of bars in Figure 6-5 represents monthly benefits of illustrative “low 
earners,” people with average lifetime earnings of $18,919 per year, in 
2009 dollars.23 The three bars show that under current law, new retirees 
categorized as low earners are projected to receive $834 per month in 2010, 
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rising (by 39 percent) to $1,161 per month for the cohort of low earners 
who retire in 2050.
Under Option 1, benefits in 2050 for low earners would be 25 percent 
above the 2010 level. Real monthly benefits would grow over time for low 
earners, but they would grow slower than under current law. In contrast, 
for the “maximum earners,” people who earn at the current taxable maxi-
mum of $106,800 per year (in 2009 dollars), real benefits would decline 
over time. Under existing law, maximum earners are projected to receive 
$2,156 a month in 2010 and $3,094 in 2050; under Option 1 they would 
receive only about 60 percent of that amount.
Because Option 1 achieves long-term solvency of Social Security by 
changing only the benefit formula—with no tax increase—the benefit 
changes are bigger than with the other options. Through benefit changes, 
all future retirees would contribute to the program’s solvency, with higher 
earners contributing much more than other workers. Yet there would con-
tinue to be growth in real, monthly benefits—though at a reduced rate—for 
all but about the highest-earning third of workers.
Figure 6-6 illustrates the benefit effects of Option 1 another way, by 
showing not monthly benefit dollars, but to what extent a worker’s Social 
Security retirement benefits replace her or his preretirement earnings. For 
all earnings levels, these “earnings replacement rates” for individual wage 
earners who retire at age 65 are set to be slightly less in 2050 than in 2010 
under current law.24 That is, the real benefits grow, but they grow more 
slowly than real wages. For example, under this option, Social Security 
benefits for medium earners in 2050 would replace 27 percent of prior earn-
ings, compared with 40 percent for 2010 under current law (see Table C-4 
in Appendix C).
Option 1 is designed so that in 2050 the benefits or the growth rate 
of benefits of all new retirees are less than those for new retirees in 2010, 
but they are reduced more for higher earners than for lower earners; see 
Figure 6-5.
Payroll Tax
Under this option there are no changes in the payroll taxes for Social Secu-
rity; for illustrations of payroll taxes under this option, see discussion below.
Option 2: Two-Thirds Benefit Growth Reductions, 
One-Third Payroll Tax Increases
The committee’s second option would achieve long-term actuarial bal-
ance with smaller cuts in benefit growth and an increase in the payroll tax. 
One of the same “building blocks” in Option 1 that reduces the growth of 
benefits—progressive indexing—is applied here, too, though in a different 
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form. A new building block for Option 2 is on the revenue side: an increase 
in the rate of Social Security payroll taxation. The current tax rate of 12.4 
percent—half levied on employees and half on employers—would be raised 
in stages to 13.9 percent in 2040. Thereafter, reflecting the reduction in 
the growth of benefits, growth in the economy, and the retirement of the 
baby boom generation, the now-sufficient tax rate would decline slightly in 
stages to 13.3 percent in 2060.
Benefit Effects
Option 2 reduces future benefits and benefit growth rates in compari-
son with those scheduled under current law, but it does so less than Option 
1; see Figure 6-7. Medium earners who retire in 2050 would receive 13 
percent more in constant dollars than they would receive in 2010 under cur-
rent law. Under the current benefit formula, they would receive 39 percent 
more in 2050 than in 2010.
As with Option 1, people with lower earnings fare better with respect 
to their benefits, in comparison with current law, than higher earners. 
Monthly benefits for low earners are the same as in current law for all 
years (see Table C-3 in Appendix C). In contrast, the benefits (in constant 
dollars) for steady maximum earners who are new retirees would decrease 
slightly in 2050 in comparison with 2010. Real benefits would continue to 
grow—but at a reduced rate—for all but about the highest-earning one-fifth 
of workers.25
Reflecting an increase in the payroll tax that would permit higher 
benefit levels than in Option 1, replacement rates for Option 2 are higher 
than for Option 1: compare Figure 6-6 with Figure 6-8, which shows re-
placement rates under Option 2 in comparison with current law. By 2050, 
the benefits for medium earners would replace 30 percent of preretirement 
earnings rather than 40 percent in 2010 as under current law. Low earners 
would receive a higher percentage: 49 percent in 2050, in comparison with 
54 percent for that group in 2010. Benefits for high earners would replace 
less of their prior earnings: 22 percent in 2050, compared with 33 percent 
in 2010.
Payroll Tax
Unlike current law and Option 1, Option 2 would raise the payroll tax, 
but would not change its other characteristics. Figure 6-9 depicts the effects 
for four groups of workers in 2010 and 2050 and for the current law for 
2050. (Because Option 1 doesn’t change the existing payroll tax for Social 
Security, there is no comparable figure for it; see, instead, the bars for the 
current law in Figure 6-9. See Appendix C for definitions of the wage levels 
of the illustrative groups.)
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FIGURE 6-9 Annual Social Security payroll tax projected for 2010 and for 2050 
under current law and under Option 2 (in 2009 dollars).
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FIGURE 6-7 Monthly Social Security benefits for workers who retire at age 65 
under current law and under Option 2 (in 2009 dollars).
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FIGURE 6-8 Social Security benefits as a percentage of past earnings for new retir-
ees at age 65 under current law and under Option 2.
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Because wages are projected, on average, to continue to grow faster 
than prices, payroll taxes paid will increase in the future, adjusted for price 
inflation. The increase of the payroll tax rate under Option 2 means that 
workers whose wages grow at the rate of price inflation (and with earnings 
below the taxable maximum) would pay 9 percent more in payroll tax in 
2050 than under current law.
Option 3: One-Third Benefit Growth Reductions, 
Two-Thirds Payroll Tax Increases
The committee’s third option restores long-term actuarial balance by 
cutting benefit-growth rates less and increasing payroll taxes more than 
under Option 2.
Benefit growth would be slowed by a milder version of progressive in-
dexing than is proposed in Options 1 and 2. Under Option 3 two provisions 
affect taxes: the current tax rate of 12.4 percent would be raised in stages 
to 14.5 percent in 2075, and a new, second tier of Social Security payroll 
taxation would be added to the existing tax. This second tier would tax 
earnings above the taxable maximum under current law, and—as with the 
existing Medicare payroll tax—there would be no cap on earnings that are 
subject to this new tax. The second-tier tax would be imposed at a rate of 
2 percent in 2012 (employer and employee combined), and rise to 3 per-
cent in 2060. Unlike the existing Social Security tax, collections under this 
added tax would not be credited toward a worker’s Social Security benefits. 
The second-tier tax would move the program’s financing in a progressive 
direction.26
Benefit Effects
Option 3 would provide higher real benefit levels than Options 1 and 
2; see Figure 6-10. In 2050, medium earners would receive an estimated 
$1,792 monthly under Option 3 (compared with $1,559 under Option 2, 
for instance). For replacement rates, the pattern under Option 3 is similar to 
but higher than that under Option 2; see Figure 6-11. They would decrease 
with earnings and would be lower in 2050 for Option 3 than under current 
law. For example, in 2050 the replacement rate for medium earners would 
be 34 percent (compared with 30 percent under Option 2).
Payroll Tax
Under Option 3, all workers would pay higher taxes than under cur-
rent law or Option 2; see Figure 6-12 (for details, see Appendix C). Because 
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FIGURE 6-10 Monthly Social Security benefits for workers who retire at age 65 
under current law and under Option 3 (in 2009 dollars).
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FIGURE 6-11 Social Security benefits as a percentage of past earnings for new 
retirees at age 65 under current law and under Option 3.
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FIGURE 6-12 Annual Social Security payroll tax projected for 2010 and for 2050 
under current law and under Option 3 (in 2009 dollars).
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Option 3 adds a second-tier tax, very high-wage workers would pay more 
than those at the first-tier taxable maximum. For very high-wage workers, 
the total payroll tax of $25,250 in 2050 under Option 3 would be almost 
twice as much as they would pay in 2010 under current law.
Option 4: Payroll Tax Increases Only
Under this option, the benefit growth rates provided under current law 
are maintained by introducing three changes to taxes. First, the current 
Social Security payroll tax would be increased by raising both that tax’s 
cap and its rate. Currently, about 84 percent of all earnings in the economy 
are subject to the payroll tax; under this option, the cap on wages subject 
to this tax would be raised to about 90 percent, where it has been in the 
past.27 Second, the current payroll tax rate would be increased—on earn-
ings up to its new maximum—rising in stages to a combined 14.7 percent 
in 2080. Third, this option would add a second-tier tax on covered earn-
ings at all levels, which would begin at 2 percent in 2012 and rise to 5.5 
percent in 2060. These changes would move Social Security taxation in a 
progressive direction.
Benefit Effects
Under this option, there would be no change to the benefit growth rates 
scheduled under current law. For the benefit levels and earnings replacement 
rates, see the bars for the current law in the figures above.
Payroll Tax
Sustaining the benefits scheduled under the current law will require 
substantially higher revenue from payroll taxes; see Figure 6-13. Adding a 
second-tier tax makes the increase much larger for those at higher earnings 
levels than at lower earnings levels. For example, for very high-wage work-
ers, annual payments in 2050 would increase 109 percent, from $19,960 
under current law to $41,608 under Option 4. These very high-wage work-
ers to date have typically paid Social Security tax on just about one-half 
of their earnings. Contributions by those at average earning levels would 
increase far less, however.
CONCLUSION
Changes to make the Social Security program financially solvent are 
an essential element of a strategy to put the federal budget on a sustain-
able path. Restoring confidence in the program’s future is especially vital 
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now, when other sources of retirement security, such as private savings and 
housing equity, have been so severely diminished. If changes are enacted 
soon, it will be possible to close the program’s financing gap with relatively 
modest, incremental tax increases or restraints on the growth of benefits (or 
both): the longer action is delayed, the larger will be the required changes 
to restore long term-solvency. Future retirees will confront increasing un-
certainty about what they can expect from Social Security in their old age; 
and low-earning workers, who rely far more than others on Social Security 
benefits for retirement income, will be particularly vulnerable to sudden or 
unexpected benefit reductions.
The four illustrative reform options outlined in this chapter would all 
retain Social Security’s familiar program structure, avoid sudden or unex-
pected increases in payroll taxes and benefit cuts, and place the program 
on a solid financial footing for both the standard 75-year projection period 
and beyond. Their differences lie primarily in the extent to which they rely 
on benefit reductions or tax increases to restore long-term solvency and in 
the particular consequences for the level of future taxes paid and benefits 
received over time by workers at different levels of lifetime earnings.
The macrolevel implications of these differences for the size of 
government—as measured by levels of spending and revenues—are straight-
forward and easy to describe. Option 4, which relies on higher taxes to 
maintain currently scheduled benefits, would eventually raise revenues by 
about 1.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP); in contrast, Option 1 
would not increase them at all; and Options 2 and 3 would have intermedi-
ate effects in proportion to their reliance on tax increases.
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In contrast, the microlevel distributional consequences are more com-
plicated and difficult to characterize. Some sense of them, in terms of taxes 
paid and for benefits received, can be seen in Figures 6-5 through 6-13, 
above, and they are detailed in more depth in Appendix C. Developing sum-
mary distributional measures that integrate the tax and benefit changes of 
each option is a complicated undertaking beyond our scope. However, we 
note that Social Security is now somewhat progressive in its overall conse-
quences (Congressional Budget Office, 2006a): that is, those with higher 
earnings pay more in taxes in relation to lifetime benefits received than 
those with lower earnings, and we judge it likely that all four of our options 
would retain or increase the program’s current degree of progressivity.28
As we note at the outset of this chapter, other packages of frequently 
advanced program changes with similar overall fiscal impacts and differ-
ing distributional consequences, can be constructed, depending on one’s 
policy preferences. Our four illustrative options are indicative of the range 
of choices available to put Social Security on a solid financial footing and 
continue its role as a foundation for economic security in retirement for 
most working Americans.29
NOTES
1. Changes to sustain Social Security finances will contribute to making the entire federal 
budget sustainable in at least two ways. First, it is now the largest federal program and 
so changes have a large effect relative to the entire budget. Although Social Security is 
designed to be self-financing, if its spending exceeds the program’s revenues, the differ-
ence adds to the federal deficit, and, conversely, if the program spends less than it takes 
in, this difference reduces the federal deficit. Second, sustaining Social Security finances 
helps rebuild public confidence that the federal government will finance the benefits it 
promises and promise only benefits that it can finance.
2. In addition to payroll taxes, which account for most Social Security revenue, small 
amounts come from the personal income taxes paid by upper-income individuals 
and families on their Social Security benefits and from interest earned on trust fund 
reserves.
3. Contrary to popular understanding, the benefits received by a retiree are only loosely 
related to the amount that retiree paid in payroll taxes because the benefit formula is 
progressive and because benefits are based on the average of the retiree’s highest-earning 
35 years.
4. The retirement and the disability programs have separate trust funds and shares of the 
payroll tax. The former is much larger than the latter. For purposes of explication, the 
two separate trust funds are usually treated in the text as one. The illustrative options 
presented below sustain both the retirement and the disability programs. However, pro-
jections of trust fund balances combine the two.
5. “Scheduled” benefits are those payable when the trust fund is adequate: in projections, 
“payable” benefits are what they would be if they had to be reduced because the trust 
fund was inadequate to cover scheduled benefits. Except as noted otherwise, all benefit 
levels mentioned are scheduled. Also, except as noted otherwise, the projections for Social 
Security in this chapter, Appendix C, and in the design of the committee’s illustrative 
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reform options all draw on the intermediate assumptions of the 2009 Social Security 
Trustees’ Report (Social Security Administration, 2009d). For the long term, the less 
detailed projections of the Congressional Budget Office (2009f) take a generally similar 
path, although its projections of the gap between spending and revenue are somewhat 
smaller and, as a result, it projects the exhaustion of the trust fund slightly later. For 
consistency with the rest of the study, the baseline for the overall budget and the analysis 
of our paths use the Congressional Budget Office projections for Social Security.
6. Only the briefest history of the program’s finances is presented here: for more detailed 
histories, see, among others, Aaron and Reischauer (1998) and Diamond and Orszag 
(2005).
7. For details on these program changes, see Aaron and Reischauer (2009) and Diamond 
and Orszag (2005).
8. Those who start receiving Social Security retirement benefits at an earlier age—62 is the 
earliest allowable—have their benefits reduced by about 8 percent a year, and those who 
delay retirement beyond the age at which they can receive full benefits gain about 8 per-
cent in benefits for each year—up to age 70—they delay retirement. These adjustments 
were intended to equalize lifetime benefits for those who retire at different ages, based 
on average life expectancies.
9. Considering the Social Security program as a whole, the program is like private insurance 
in that it insures against adverse events (such as the risk of an impoverished retirement), 
yet it is part of a social contract that includes almost all workers and their families.
10. Except for Figure 6-2, this report shows Social Security replacement rates for individual 
earnings for individual workers—not for families—and does not include other sources 
of income in retirement. These replacement rates are percentages of individuals’ earnings 
creditable to Social Security. (Illustrations of earning levels are in 2009 dollars.) This 
definition is widely used, not just currently by the Social Security Administration, but by 
others (see, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, 2001:20-21). However, it differs markedly 
from that used in retirement planning; see Appendix C.
11. Noncash income, such as Food Stamps or housing subsidies, are excluded, as are lump-
sum pension payments and income from capital gains, such as from the sale of a house or 
stock. Periodic pension payments are included in the total, however. The quintile “break 
points” in the distribution of total money income are $11,519, $18,622, $28,911, and 
$50,064 per year. Percentages graphed are the mean proportion of benefits as a share of 
all income, within each quintile. Although the total is shown, elderly individuals tend to 
be more dependent on Social Security benefits than couples.
12. Some analysts argue that the availability of Social Security and Medicare acts to reduce 
voluntary savings, however.
13. “Remain relatively constant” refers to the illustrations of workers at different positions 
in the lifetime distribution of earnings covered by Social Security. Individual workers 
who retire at a given age (such as 65) in the future will generally have somewhat lower 
earnings replacement rates. These lower replacement rates will occur because, under 
current law, the retirement age for full benefits, which once was 65, will rise in 2-month 
increments to reach 67 after 2022.
14. For example, the life expectancy for those turning 65 in 1990 was 15.8 years for men 
and 19.1 years for women; currently, it is 17.7 years for men and 20.0 years for women; 
and it is projected to be 20.9 years for men and 23.1 years for women in 2060. In other 
words, increased longevity means about one-third longer retirement for men and one-
fifth longer for women in 2060 in comparison with 1990 (Social Security Administration, 
2009d).
15. The “present values” shown in Figure 6-4 use projected interest rates to discount streams 
of future revenue and spending to a single dollar figure, in this case for January 1, 
2009.
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16. Appendix C briefly discusses the proposal to introduce individual accounts, which would 
make a fundamental change to the Social Security program, and other ideas have been 
proposed. For example, there could be more income taxation of the benefits received by 
people at higher income levels, or some or all of the proceeds from the federal estate 
tax could be devoted to Social Security. However, given the magnitude of the continuing 
funding gap, these two revenue sources could contribute only relatively small portions of 
the needed funds. From another perspective, several proposals have been made in recent 
years to enhance Social Security benefits for vulnerable populations, such as very old 
beneficiaries, workers with very low wage histories, and widows. It was beyond the scope 
of the committee’s charge to assess these or other enhanced benefit proposals. We note, 
however, that if benefits were enhanced for such vulnerable populations, corresponding 
reductions in benefits or tax increases would be needed to finance these changes.
17. However, for high earners, Option 1 would reduce the inflation-adjusted level (not just 
the growth) of currently scheduled benefits for future retirees.
18. Because a later retirement age provides more time for workers to become disabled and to 
apply for disability insurance and because it delays the age of “conversion” from disabil-
ity to retirement benefits, raising the Social Security retirement age will increase spending 
in the disability insurance program. However, the only net effect of delayed conversions 
on the program’s financial position comes from differences in indexing between retire-
ment and disability benefits for this option and two others (see Appendix C).
19. This “progressive indexing” option is not to be confused with a somewhat similar pro-
posal called “progressive price-indexing” that has been proposed and analyzed elsewhere. 
For a critical analysis of that proposal, see Appendix C and Furman (2005a).
20. The chained Consumer Price Index would replace the older fixed-Weight Consumer Price 
Index. The newer index reduces the latter’s general overstatement of price inflation by 
roughly 0.3 percentage points per year; see a study by statisticians at the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics (McCully et al., 2007:26-33) and see 
National Research Council (2002).
21. However, in comparison with currently scheduled benefits, this provision would reduce 
monthly benefits the most for long-lived beneficiaries, who are disproportionately wid-
ows. But note that low- and middle-level workers (and their spouses) generally fare best 
under progressive indexing—another benefit change under Option 1.
22. Lifetime—not just monthly—benefits are important, too, of course. For instance given 
the longer longevity projected for 2050, Option 1’s delayed retirement ages, relative to 
the unsustainable current law, produces a greater downward tendency for its lifetime 
than for its monthly benefits. This helps allow it to sustain program finances without a 
payroll-tax increase.
23. Throughout this chapter, the illustrations of benefits, earnings replacement rates, and pay-
roll tax paid use the Social Security Administration’s definitions of representative workers 
at different earnings levels. The “low,” “medium,” “high,” and “very high” illustrations 
are of lifetime earnings levels, scaled to reflect changes in the overall wage distribution 
over time. “Maximum earners” are defined differently, however, because they reflect 
steady earnings at each year’s taxable maximum, as does “worker at taxable maximum,” 
when the formula for the taxable maximum changes under some of the study’s reform op-
tions. We note, however, that the Social Security “medium” earning level has been shown 
to be higher than the actual average level (Mitchell and Phillips, 2006, 2009). However, 
because our analysis uses the various Social Security definitions of earning levels only for 
comparison with each other, this finding does not affect the comparisons.
24. We present Social Security earnings replacement rates to gauge the degree to which 
beneficiaries—especially those without pensions or savings—can rely on Social Security 
benefits.
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25. This is the only instance under Option 2 for which constant-dollar benefits decrease 
from the 2010 to the 2050 cohorts of new retirees; for details, see Appendix C. For high 
earners, the real benefits in 2035 under this option would be less in 2035 than 2010; see 
details in Appendix C.
26. Imposing a second-tier tax without a benefit credit thus tends to move the Social Security 
program away from its contributory character.
27. Estimates of the revenue from Option 4’s tax changes (as for Option 3) rely on pro-
jected income distributions. These are included in the actuarial estimates in the current 
program Trustees’ Report (Social Security Administration, 2009d). The Social Security 
Administration’s actuaries have long had to project income distribution for the program’s 
revenue estimates under current law because of the tax paid on some Social Security 
benefits by relatively upper-income payers of the current personal income tax.
28. By reducing or delaying benefits for future retirees relative to those scheduled under 
current law, Options 1, 2, and 3 would reduce the program’s contribution to income 
security in old age for all earnings groups; however, the reductions are proportionately 
larger for those with higher earnings. Option 4 would preserve the program’s currently 
scheduled benefit-growth rates by taxing wages more heavily in the future. Options 2, 3, 
and 4 would raise taxes for all earnings groups; however, the larger increases in Options 
3 and 4 would be borne more by the highest earnings groups. Because payroll taxes do 
not apply to nonwage income, such as business profits, interest, and capital gains, options 
that increase payroll tax rates disproportionately affect the people who are most reliant 
on wage income.
29. As of June 30, 2009, about 90 percent of the population aged 65 and over was receiving 
Social Security benefits, and about 94 percent of employed people and those who are self-
employed were covered under the program (Social Security Administration, 2009a).
7Options for Defense and 
Other Domestic Spending
Although much of the debate about the federal budget focuses on the 
projected growth in costs for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security, they 
are only three of a vast number of federal programs and activities. Hun-
dreds of other programs—large and small—touch the lives of almost all 
Americans and implicitly reflect views about federal roles and responsibili-
ties that are often highly contested. The total of spending on these programs 
is higher than that for Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security combined 
and under current policies is projected to remain so until 2014.
Although we group all of these spending programs under the single 
heading of “defense and other domestic spending,” that heading hardly 
captures the range and diversity of the important public missions they rep-
resent. They include enormous expenditures for the military services and 
weapons, intelligence gathering, and homeland security. They include dis-
ability payments and health care for veterans and members of the military; 
emergency aid in the wake of disasters; a panoply of programs supporting 
education, training, and income support for the unemployed; and other 
services to expand opportunity or provide care. They include a host of ef-
forts to improve transportation, the natural environment, manage national 
parks and forests, protect consumers and foster orderly markets, and aid 
particular industries and sectors. The range of tools used in this array of 
programs is similarly diverse, including grants to state and local govern-
ment, payments to individuals, and extension or guarantees of credit and 
insurance. The recent downturn has both added to the list of programs 
and augmented their scale, temporarily increasing their combined spend-
ing from less than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2007 to 
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more than 16 percent in 2009—largely because of economic stabilization 
and recovery initiatives.
SPENDING CATEGORIES AND TRENDS
The vast majority of spending for defense programs, which includes 
such related functions as intelligence, has to be appropriated on an annual 
basis—that is, it is “discretionary.” In 2008, approximately 57 percent 
of spending on “other domestic” programs (i.e., nondefense programs 
other than Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security) was discretionary. 
The remaining 43 percent was set by permanent law—that is, it was 
“mandatory.”
Most mandatory programs are so-called “entitlements” that provide 
payments or other benefits to people eligible by law to receive them. Ex-
amples include food stamps, benefits for disabled veterans, federal spending 
on unemployment compensation, cash refunds from the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, and federal civilian and military employee retirement payments. 
Examples of non-entitlement mandatory spending include Temporary As-
sistance to Needy Families and some payments to farmers and for deposit 
insurance.
The domestic discretionary category is very broad and diverse. It includes 
the federal judicial system; homeland security; commerce-related activities; 
education, training, and employment, low-income housing aid, and other 
social service programs; science research and development, space explora-
tion, and other technology programs; energy assistance; natural resource 
protection and other environmental programs; and transportation.1
Debates About Spending
In addition to being diverse, the domestic components of this category 
are often controversial. The value of domestic spending is very much in the 
eye of the beholder. Arguments about excess federal spending often center 
on items in this category that are regarded as wasteful, either because the 
program’s purposes are not valued (or are regarded as obsolete) or because 
the programs are not believed to be effective in achieving their stated ends. 
Critics may argue, for example, that programs providing support for low-
income people are excessively generous or encourage dependency, and that 
domestic spending includes unnecessary and sometimes unproductive subsi-
dies to interested business or industry groups. They would say that politics 
seldom lead to efficient allocation.
On the other side of the debate, proponents of domestic spending stress 
that it includes useful public investments (even as skeptics may take issue 
with the word “investment”) as well as essential services. Advocates con-
tend that many domestic appropriations build economic capacity through 
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infrastructure investment, new technology, education, and strengthened 
rule of law. Advocates argue that low-income support programs are not 
only appropriately compassionate but maintain health and help develop 
productive skills. When much of the federal government was shut down by 
a funding crisis in the mid-1990s, many Americans felt inconvenienced or 
even seriously hurt by the absence of routine services they previously took 
for granted—such as the processing of passports, and open and staffed 
national parks.
On the defense side, differences of opinion as to the budgetary implica-
tions of true security are often intense. We do not know when hostilities 
may emerge or what future threats will materialize. At the most aggregate 
level, defense spending is much like purchasing insurance; there is always 
uncertainty as to how much is enough (perhaps more so than in other parts 
of the budget), especially given the costs. This uncertainty is exacerbated 
because some defense spending—such as that for major new weapons 
systems—is often supported (at times against the best advice of military 
and civilian experts) because it serves a domestic constituency whose jobs 
depend on it.2
But the issues also run to a deeper level of detail. Programs that would 
provide defense against a national adversary in a conventional kind of 
conflict may or may not prove useful in an asymmetric war against terror-
ism. Specific policies, such as the war in Iraq, fuel intense arguments over 
spending priorities. Questions regarding the allocation of a given level of 
spending among new hardware, maintenance and supplies, troop levels, and 
human resources can be controversial. In this chapter, we present a wide 
range of alternative levels of defense spending, reflecting not only conflict-
ing views about the best use of defense resources, but also fundamental dif-
ferences regarding the role of the United States in preserving world peace.
Defense and other domestic spending is not projected to grow as a 
share of GDP under the study baseline. Indeed, it is projected to fall sig-
nificantly as a percentage of GDP over the next decade before stabilizing 
at a level more than 2 percentage points lower than in 2008. Nevertheless, 
it can be argued that further spending reductions (relative to the baseline) 
are appropriate. To the extent that fiscal sustainability is addressed through 
spending reductions, finding all of the needed savings in health care and 
Social Security will be difficult and, in any event, may take some consider-
able time to achieve. Savings in defense and other domestic programs may 
therefore be necessary. Putting all spending programs on the table is also 
consistent with the notion of “shared sacrifice,” which may be an important 
political element in fashioning a responsible fiscal program for the future. 
Some may also assert that the growth in the large entitlement programs 
reflects such urgent needs that cutting other areas of the budget, along with 
raising taxes, is necessary to accommodate it.
The counterargument is that cutbacks in defense and other domestic 
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programs, which are already slated in the baseline to grow slower than the 
economy and much slower than other parts of the budget, could threaten 
important national objectives. Even if ineffective or low-priority programs 
are targeted for the greatest cuts, if spending slows too rapidly it will be 
difficult for the government to accommodate needs related to population 
growth, to make new investments needed for future growth, and to deal 
with potential new international and environmental challenges. Given that 
defense and other domestic spending is not the driving factor behind the 
projected fiscal crisis, difficult choices for the actual cost drivers—Medicare, 
Medicaid, Social Security—are necessary and inevitable. Distracting atten-
tion from the large entitlement programs (as well as revenue needs) could 
be counterproductive. Tough decisions in those areas, on the other hand, 
could allow additional resources to be allocated to important defense and 
other domestic needs.
Consistent with the notion that there can be multiple paths to fiscal 
sustainability, this chapter discusses options for defense and other domes-
tic spending that run the gamut from deep cuts to significant expansions 
(all relative to the study baseline). As with other policy discussions in this 
report, these options are meant to be illustrative and not exhaustive.
Spending Trends
Both the defense and other domestic components of this category of 
spending grew in real terms from 1962 to 2008. However, as Figure 7-1 
shows, defense spending is now a much smaller share of the economy than 
in 1962, when it was over 9 percent of GDP. Over the same period, other 
domestic spending rose just slightly as a percentage of GDP.
Under the study’s baseline projections (see Chapter 1), overall defense 
and other domestic spending falls to 8.6 percent of GDP by 2019 and re-
FIGURE 7-1 Defense and other domestic spending as a percentage of GDP, 
1962-2008. Fig7-1.eps
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mains at approximately that level from 2020 on. This is approximately the 
same share of the economy it held in 1998, when it was at its lowest share 
of GDP in the post-1962 period.
Other domestic spending represented 5.9 percent of GDP in 1962 and 
6.4 percent in 2008. With the exception of a brief period in the 1970s, it 
has stayed between 5.4 and 7 percent of GDP. In 2009 it spiked to around 
12 percent of GDP because of the economic downturn of 2008-2009 and 
the policy response to it. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009 includes spending for (among other things) infrastructure, credit sup-
port for defaulting homeowners, and extended unemployment and health 
benefits. Spending also was swelled temporarily by extraordinary interven-
tions to stabilize financial markets, the government’s assumption of respon-
sibility for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and aid to floundering banks 
and auto companies.3 If the economy recovers as projected, other domestic 
spending will fall back to about 6 percent of GDP in 2010 and then drift 
down to just over 5 percent of GDP by 2019, remaining around that level 
from 2020 on. That percentage would be lower than the lowest figure for 
domestic spending in the post-1962 period, a 5.4 percent share in 1997.
Defense spending represented 4.3 percent of GDP in 2008. In the study 
baseline, declining troop levels and growth with inflation put it at 3.4 per-
cent of GDP by 2019 (which was about its share in 2002), a level at which 
it remains from 2020 on.
FOUR OPTIONS
As noted above and throughout this report, the costs that are driving 
the budget toward unsustainability are (primarily) those for health care and 
(secondarily) Social Security. The savings that can be achieved in those pro-
grams will determine whether there will be more or less room for spending 
in the rest of the budget at a given level of revenues. Similarly, a willingness 
to tax more (or less) will leave more (or less) room for all categories of 
spending. Therefore, a variety of approaches to defense and other domestic 
spending could be consistent with the goal of putting the federal budget on 
a sustainable path. The four spending paths discussed below are illustrative 
of the plausible range of possibilities, at least in terms of level and categori-
cal composition; see Figure 7-2. The rationale for allocating spending, for 
each option, across subcategories (defense, domestic discretionary, other 
mandatory) is discussed in Appendix D.
The lowest illustrative option would put spending 20 percent below the 
baseline by 2019 and hold it at approximately that level thereafter. This 
would require reductions of a depth unprecedented in modern U.S. history, 
straining the bounds of political feasibility. Such reductions would mean 
that many familiar domestic programs would be scaled back or eliminated, 
 CHOOSING THE NATION’S FISCAL FUTURE
certain federal responsibilities would be turned over to state and local 
governments, and the nation’s capacity for military intervention would be 
curtailed.
At the other end, the highest spending option would put spending 16 
percent above the baseline by 2019 and hold it at approximately that level 
thereafter, making room for major new public investments and other pro-
gram expansions (not all which of may be productive, of course), creating 
a robust capacity to deal with future military challenges, and potentially 
make it easier to respond to now-unforeseen emergencies or opportuni-
ties. Although spending would be well above the baseline in that year, it 
would still be lower as a percentage of GDP than in 2008. This option may 
nevertheless be politically challenging, given all of the other pressures and 
constraints affecting the budget.
The two options intermediate to the lowest and highest spending ones 
illustrate additional ways of apportioning resources within the defense and 
other domestic spending category. The first intermediate option (Option 2) 
cuts spending by 8 percent relative to the baseline by 2019 and holds it 
at around that level (as a share of GDP) thereafter, whereas the second 
FIGURE 7-2 Defense and other domestic spending as a share of GDP in 2019 
under four options.
NOTE: Tables D-1, D-2, and D-3 in Appendix D present further spending details 
for the defense, domestic discretionary, and other mandatory subcategories.
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intermediate option (Option 3) expands it by 5 percent and holds it at ap-
proximately that share of GDP after 2019.
Option 1: Cut Spending by 20 Percent
Option 1 makes deep cuts to defense and other domestic spending, put-
ting overall spending 20 percent below the study baseline by 2019 and, at 
6.9 percent of GDP, considerably below the 8.6 percent share of 2008. This 
represents a reduction (relative to the baseline) of approximately $361 bil-
lion in 2019—one that has no precedent in modern U.S. history. Domestic 
spending falls to 4.3 percent of GDP, well below its 5.4 percent share of 
1997 and the 5.1 percent share projected in the baseline. Defense spending 
falls to 2.6 percent of GDP, an unprecedentedly low level of spending that 
is well below the baseline projection of 3.4 percent for that year. It is also 
below the 3 percent share of 1999-2001, which was the lowest share in the 
post-1962 period.
Cutting spending on any program is always politically contentious. 
This option would impose substantial pain on virtually all defense and 
other domestic programs. Based in part on published analyses, it illustrates 
ways of reducing or eliminating spending for programs that may be re-
garded by some as ineffective, unproductive, or not essential to the purposes 
of the federal government. The option also calls for further unspecified 
cuts in order to achieve additional necessary savings. Reductions of this 
magnitude have not been feasible to date and are likely to be achieved 
only if deficit reduction—accompanied by strong skepticism about federal 
spending—becomes a national priority.
The committee’s illustrative choices to achieve such deep cuts come in 
three parts: (1) to eliminate or substantially reduce program spending in 
specified domestic areas, (2) to require additional unspecified cuts in other 
domestic areas, and (3) to redefine defense needs.
Elimination of or Substantial Reductions 
in Specified Domestic Programs
Option 1 makes substantial cuts to domestic programs through three 
broad illustrative policy changes.
The first policy change is devolution, which would combine cuts in fed-
eral grant programs with delegations of authority to state and local govern-
ments (see Appendix D for details). A number of social service, elementary 
and secondary education, and employment and training programs would 
be folded into block grants providing greater responsibility and control to 
states and localities, who (some would argue) might better manage those 
functions.4 However, their combined funding would also be reduced by 
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50 percent, which would require states and localities to come up with ad-
ditional funds and use resources more effectively in order to maintain the 
same level of activity; they may or may not be able to do this. Examples of 
affected programs include those for special education, training and employ-
ments services, and aging services.
The second policy change would be to remove commercial subsidies 
and reduce “low-value” activities. This option selectively draws on a list 
of potential budget savings identified by the Congressional Budget Office 
(2009b) to illustrate the sorts of cuts that might be made.5 This option 
would reduce the federal government’s role in subsidizing particular activi-
ties or sectors of the economy for which the private sector arguably could 
do a better job. For example, many trade promotion and foreign market 
development programs would be eliminated, along with subsidized financ-
ing vehicles such as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the 
Export-Import Bank. User fees for subsidized benefits and services would 
also be increased. Some have argued that these programs were created at 
the behest of private interest groups and use public resources largely for 
those groups’ private gain. Similarly, this option would curtail federal 
spending on activities that may be judged to have relatively low social 
returns. Payments to producers of certain agricultural commodities, funds 
for money-losing timber sales, and funding for beach replenishment come 
under this heading. The caveat, of course, is that what constitutes a low-
value activity is often in the eye of the beholder.6
The third policy change is to use a smaller inflation adjustment in in-
dexed programs. The standard consumer price index (CPI) may overstate 
the effect of inflation on households because it does not account for the 
adjustments that people make in their spending patterns to compensate for 
changes in the relative prices of different goods and services.7 The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics has calculated an alternative measure of inflation, called the 
chained CPI, which does reflect such consumer behavior.8 A chain-linked 
CPI for cost-of-living adjustments for indexed programs would reduce the 
growth of benefits for a number of the other mandatory programs, chiefly 
federal civil service and military retirement, veterans cash disability benefits, 
railroad retirement, and Supplemental Security Income. The Congressional 
Budget Office furnished the committee with an estimate of the savings that 
would result by 2019 from using a chain-linked CPI for cost-of-living ad-
justments for indexed programs.9
Additional Unspecified Cuts in Domestic Programs
The specified cuts discussed above would put domestic spending ap-
proximately 7 percent below the baseline by 2019. However, reaching the 
target for this option would require still further cuts. Accordingly, addi-
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tional unspecified cuts (which could be similar in kind to the sorts of speci-
fied cuts discussed above and described in Appendix D) would also have to 
be imposed; these would reduce domestic discretionary spending by another 
9 percent, leaving it 16 percent below the baseline by 2019.
A Redefinition of Defense Needs
In this option, defense spending would be sharply reduced from 4.3 
percent of GDP in 2008 to 2.6 percent of GDP by 2019, remaining at ap-
proximately that level from 2020 on. This would be below the lowest share 
of GDP consumed by the military between World War II and now (which 
was about 3 percent), but higher in real terms than the combined amount 
spent by U.S. allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
The military would have to reallocate funds to match real wage growth 
in the economy (keeping in mind the cyclical nature of labor markets) and 
pay for rising health care costs (8 percent of the current defense budget 
goes for health care, a proportion that is projected to rise in line with the 
growth of other health spending). Personnel compensation and support for 
those who serve (and their families) is and has been the highest priority of 
defense policy over the last five Administrations, with costs rising signifi-
cantly faster than the overall defense budget. If this priority—which now 
accounts for nearly half the cost of defense—is to be maintained under this 
low-spending option, the capacity to modernize or replace weapon systems 
will be virtually eliminated, and only minimal new investments in research 
and development and facility construction will be possible. Reductions of 
this magnitude, while preserving essential funds to adequately support the 
military forces, will eventually result in demands to recapitalize weapon sys-
tems and equipment and increase the operating costs necessary to maintain 
existing assets at any acceptable state of readiness.
With such reductions, U.S. defense forces would retain the ability to 
mount rapid deployments, although those deployments would be very small 
and of short-term duration. The funding levels implied in this option would 
not provide the capacity to engage in a mission of the size, scope, and du-
ration of the current Afghanistan campaign, and would not support more 
than one emergency response at any given time.
Option 2: Cut Spending by 8 Percent
Option 2 is less stringent than Option 1. It would cut overall defense 
and other domestic spending by 8 percent relative to the study baseline, put-
ting it at 7.9 percent of GDP in 2019 and keeping it at approximately that 
level from 2020 on. This represents a reduction (relative to the baseline) of 
approximately $144 billion in 2019.
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This option would leave defense spending at 3.1 percent of GDP a de-
cade from now (at around the 2008 level, excluding war-related spending) 
and domestic spending at 4.8 percent of GDP. As with Option 1, this option 
assumes that it is possible to target most cuts to less effective or lower prior-
ity programs, while perhaps increasing the productivity of what remains. 
Although these reductions are politically ambitious by any historical stan-
dard, they are sufficiently less onerous than those under Option 1 that there 
is no need to rely on unspecified cuts; see Appendix D for details.
Domestic Programs
The treatment of domestic programs in this option would be the same 
as in Option 1, with two exceptions:
1. Federal funding for programs block-granted under the devolution 
option (see Appendix D for details) would be cut by approximately 
one-third, rather than one-half.
2. There would be no unspecified cuts in domestic programs.
Defense Programs
In this option, defense spending would be reduced to 3.1 percent of 
GDP by 2019—lower than the baseline level of 3.4 percent, but markedly 
higher than the 2.6 percent in Option 1. Spending for defense would be 
slightly above the 3 percent share of the post-Cold War, pre-9/11 period of 
1999-2001. Sustaining the present personnel and support policy emphasis 
would likely maintain the national capacity for rapid military deployment 
but have implications for defense-related investment, research and devel-
opment, and construction projects that are similar to Option 1, albeit less 
pronounced.
Option 3: Increase Spending by 5 Percent
This “pro public investment” option expands overall category spending 
relative to the baseline. Spending would reach 9 percent of GDP by 2019 
and remain at approximately that level from 2020 on. This spending level, 
by way of comparison, falls in between the 9.2 percent share in 1996 and 
the 8.8 percent share in 2001.
In sharp contrast to Options 1 and 2, this option assumes that effective 
public-sector investments that produce long-term economic growth and 
social benefits can be identified and are worth pursuing. Domestic spending 
is expanded to 5.6 percent of GDP (at around the 1999 share), an increase 
of approximately 10 percent relative to the study baseline; this translates 
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to an increase of approximately $99 billion in 2019. Defense spending fol-
lows the study baseline, falling from 4.3 percent of GDP in 2008 to 3.4 
percent by 2019.
Domestic Programs
In a number of program areas, expanded spending might be considered 
an investment in assets that yield economic growth and produce social ben-
efits. This option considers three such areas: human capital development, 
research and development funding, and infrastructure (see details in Ap-
pendix D). These expansions are only indicative of what might be done. For 
instance, there are a variety of ways to expand early childhood education. 
Although this option refers to proposals to expand Head Start, the same 
result might be accomplished by encouraging or permitting public schools 
to offer pre-kindergarten programs or other forms of preschool programs. 
The committee’s examples merely highlight some of the possibilities.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) also 
included numerous activities designated as public-sector investments, tem-
porarily boosting spending for this category starting in 2009. Some of the 
new spending suggested by Option 3 (and Option 4) may echo the content 
of ARRA. In contrast to ARRA, however, the expansions in this option are 
intended to be permanent and focused on long-term returns rather than 
short-term stimulus.
Defense Programs
Defense spending would follow the study baseline, declining from 4.3 
percent of GDP in 2008 to 3.4 percent in 2019 (at its 2002 level) but grow-
ing with the economy thereafter. In comparison with Options 1 and 2, force 
reductions would be smaller and weapons modernization would be more 
extensive. This would make it possible to sustain present levels of personnel 
and personnel support and permit more gradual declines in defense-related 
investment, research and development, and construction.
Option 4: Increase Spending by 16 Percent
This option takes the most expansive view of the appropriate roles and 
responsibilities of the federal government. Spending would reach 10 percent 
of GDP by 2019 (close to the 9.9 percent share of 2007 and well above 
the baseline level of 8.6 percent in 2019) and remain at approximately that 
level from 2020 on.
Option 4 expands defense spending by approximately 24 percent rela-
tive to the baseline, putting it at 4.2 percent of GDP (close to its 4.3 percent 
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share in 2008), and it increases domestic spending by approximately 14 
percent relative to the baseline, putting it at 5.8 percent of GDP (slightly 
below its 5.9 percent share in 2007). This option leaves defense and other 
domestic spending close to the 9.9 percent share of GDP it held in 2007.
Domestic Programs
Domestic spending is expanded to 5.8 percent of GDP (at around the 
1996 share), an increase of approximately 14 percent relative to the study 
baseline; this translates into an increase of $141 billion in 2019. This option 
would incorporate the new spending programs of Option 3 (see Appendix 
D for details) and also allow for other expansions, potentially positioning 
the federal government to better meet unforeseeable contingencies and 
emergencies.
Defense Programs
This option expands defense spending by approximately 24 percent 
relative to the baseline, putting it at 4.2 percent of GDP in 2019 and keep-
ing it approximately at that level from 2020 on. This is slightly below the 
2008 level of 4.3 percent (which includes temporary war spending) but well 
above the baseline level of 3.4 percent. The Defense Department would be 
able to maintain current force sizes while paying for higher health care costs 
and keeping up with real wage growth. This option would help sustain the 
priority for a strong all-volunteer force adequately supported. The military 
also would have substantial funds for modernization, permitting U.S. forces 
to replace old weapons and incorporate new technology. These actions 
would, with near certainty, maintain the current technological superiority 
enjoyed by the United States. This option would permit the military to 
prepare for future peacekeeping or protection activities and maintain the 
ability to engage in large and protracted deployments or prevent another 
country from becoming a near-peer competitor.
CONCLUSION
Although all four defense and other domestic spending options reduce 
defense and other domestic spending as a share of GDP compared with its 
level in 2008, only two of the options would require reductions in spending 
relative to the baseline rate of growth.
The ability of the budget to support the more generous options will 
depend on the choices that are made with regard to the three major entitle-
ment programs (see Chapters 5 and 6) and the level of revenues (see Chap-
ter 8). Chapter 9 presents illustrative combinations—consistent with fiscal 
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sustainability—of the policy options discussed in these chapters. As will 
be seen, the higher defense and other domestic spending options discussed 
in this chapter are plausible only if they are combined with options to 
significantly reduce the growth of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security 
spending. Even then, such combinations will require federal revenues to be 
at levels much higher than the norm of recent decades.
NOTES
1. Although labeled “domestic” here for convenience, this category also includes spending 
for international programs, such as those for diplomacy and foreign assistance. However, 
in 2008, international programs accounted for just 4 percent of the spending under this 
label.
2. While Congress has put a stronger spot light on “earmarks” in an effort to curb 
such parochial, constituency-based practices, the aggregate effect on the budget in the 
most aggressive instances of earmarks has been typically less than 1 percent of total 
appropriations.
3. The timing of these outlays will depend on recording decisions by the Congressional 
Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget. It appears that the bulk of costs 
for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and capital assistance to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, among other interventions, will be recorded in the 2009 deficit.
4. Devolution might also increase disparities among state and local governments, since 
certain federal grants would play less of an equalizing role.
5. The committee adjusted for the minor overlap between the programs targeted for devolu-
tion and the programs selected from the Congressional Budget Office (2009b) report.
6. The report (Congressional Budget Office, 2009b) from which the committee identified 
illustrative budget savings contains arguments for and against each of the options.
7. For example, when the price of apples rises, the standard CPI registers that fact as an 
unalloyed loss of well-being. However, consumers can recoup some of that loss by switch-
ing their consumption to oranges or something else; the standard CPI does not capture 
that effect. See Johnson et al. (2006) and Gordon (2006) for a technical discussion of 
biases in the CPI.
8. A chained CPI uses spending data from more than one time period to account for sub-
stitution behavior on the part of consumers (see Cage et al., 2003).
9. Total savings would amount to $31.3 billion dollars by 2019. The chained CPI is also 
used in one of the committee’s illustrative Social Security options (see Chapter 6 of this 
report) and in one part of the simplified tax alternative to the current-tax structure (see 
Chapter 8).
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Revenue Options
Having considered spending options in the three preceding chapters, 
in this chapter we consider the options for revenues. Of the committee’s 
four illustrative scenarios for long-term budget sustainability, three would 
require substantial revenues in addition to the amounts projected under 
our current-policy baseline. Just how additional revenue is raised is an 
important policy question. At higher tax rates, substantial flaws in the cur-
rent tax system would be magnified. Therefore, in addition to considering 
options for higher levels of revenue, the committee has analyzed alternative 
tax regimes that promise to raise revenues more efficiently and with fewer 
adverse effects on economic growth. This analysis includes illustrative ap-
plication of a much-simplified personal income tax structure and of a pos-
sible additional revenue source, the value-added tax (VAT), to reach higher 
revenue levels.1
Taxes can be raised in different ways, which distribute the burden dif-
ferently across people with different levels and sources of income: these 
differences implicitly embody different concepts of fairness. And different 
tax regimes can have different overall effects on the economy: for example, 
most tax experts believe that the current tax code could be reformed in 
ways that would boost economic growth. The tax system also directly 
affects how the nation can respond to the increasingly competitive global 
economy.
The first part of this chapter provides an overview of federal revenues, 
currently and over time. The second part looks at flaws of the current tax 
system—its complexities, inequities, and generally negative effect on eco-
nomic performance—and ideas for reform. The chapter also considers the 
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U.S. tax system in an international context, which is important to assessing 
how the U.S. tax regime affects the economy’s global competitiveness. It 
briefly discusses the important but elusive goal of achieving fairness in taxa-
tion. In the final part of the chapter, the committee analyzes two alternatives 
to the current tax system, considering them both as ways to fix flaws in the 
current system and to raise the additional revenue that would be needed 
under three of the committee’s four scenarios.
THE CURRENT TAX STRUCTURE
Revenue Levels and Sources
For the last half century, federal revenues have fluctuated mostly be-
tween 17 and 21 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), even as tax 
legislation reduced or increased income tax rates, increased payroll tax 
rates, and made other changes. The business cycle has substantial effects 
on the federal budget; and the deep 2008-2009 recession, following major 
tax cuts early in this decade, has reduced revenues as a share of GDP below 
historical levels. However, as the economy recovers, revenues are expected 
to rise gradually back to 17 percent and then higher as the economy grows 
further. Figure 8-1 shows the recent history of federal revenues as well as 
the trend projected in the study’s baseline.
The largest amounts of federal revenue come from the individual in-
come tax, the corporate income tax, and the payroll taxes that fund Social 
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FIGURE 8-1 Federal government revenues as a share of GDP.
NOTE: Data for 2010, 2015, and 2020 are estimates.
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Security and Medicare (often referred to as social insurance taxes). These 
three taxes account for 93 percent of federal revenues. Federal payroll taxes 
rose rapidly from the 1960s to the 1980s with the expansion of Social Se-
curity and the introduction of Medicare, but as a share of GDP they have 
leveled off since then. While receipts from the payroll taxes were increas-
ing, those from the corporate income tax were declining as a percentage of 
GDP, leaving total revenues roughly flat. The payroll taxes are earmarked to 
finance rising current and future health and retirement benefits; corporate 
income taxes are not earmarked. Therefore, the ostensibly equal exchange 
of corporate income tax for payroll tax receipts—the latter linked to higher 
health and retirement spending—arguably left the federal budget worse off 
for the long term.2
Complexity of the Tax Code
The individual income tax is imposed on wages and salaries, returns 
from savings, small business profits, and other sources of income under a 
graduated rate structure.3 In 2009, statutory or explicit tax rates ranged 
from 10 to 35 percent. A substantial share of low-income workers and 
families pay no income tax because, with exemptions and the usual deduc-
tions, their modest earnings are not subject to even the lowest rate. The 
corporate income tax imposes a rate of 35 percent on corporate profits, 
with small corporations paying lower rates.
Average tax rates—which are simply taxes paid divided by total income 
—are almost always lower than the statutory rates because they include 
the effects of deductions and exemptions. Yet another important type of 
tax rate is the “marginal” rate, which is the rate a taxpayer pays on an ad-
ditional dollar of income. For example, for a person earning $60,000 who 
pays $6,000 in federal income tax, the average tax rate is 10 percent. But 
if this person is in the 25 percent federal tax bracket (and no other features 
of the tax code affect tax liability) then the rate on any additional income 
earned, the marginal rate, is 25 percent. Because marginal rates determine 
the after-tax returns from work, savings, and investment, they affect the 
willingness to undertake such activities.4
For the typical individual income taxpayer, with moderate amounts of 
wage income and modest deductions from an owner-occupied home, the 
income tax can be relatively simple. But for some taxpayers, particularly 
small business owners, the income tax is often quite complex. Federal tax 
rules spanned 70,320 pages in 2009—one measure of their complexity—
three times more than in the 1970s (CCH Canadian Limited, 2009).
In part the income tax is so intricate because “income” is difficult to 
define and measure; partly for the same reason, the current income tax base 
does not reflect a consistent definition of income. Indeed, the current income 
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tax is probably better thought of as a hybrid of a broad-based income tax 
and a consumption-based tax. Some types of savings and investment (such 
as for education) are treated more generously than they would be under a 
pure income tax, while other types (such as interest on ordinary savings) 
are fully taxed, as they would be under a pure income tax. Some (such as 
savings and investment for retirement) are treated as they would be under 
a pure consumption tax, much more generously than under an income tax. 
And the rest are treated somewhere in between. These inconsistencies in 
taxation allow taxpayers to reduce their tax burden by shuffling assets from 
fully taxed to tax-favored accounts (such as for education or retirement), 
an activity that reduces taxes collected without significantly increasing total 
saving or investment.
The complexity of the tax code has steadily worsened over time in part 
because policy makers have increasingly used it to try to achieve social goals 
and to aid particular sectors of the economy through narrow reductions in 
tax liability. For example, the deduction for the interest on home mortgages 
and other housing-related deductions seek to increase home ownership, and 
deductions for tuition and other education-related deductions seek to make 
college more affordable. Such tax provisions intended to benefit specific 
groups of taxpayers are known as “tax expenditures.” The number of these 
tax expenditures (see Chapter 1) doubled from 67 in 1974 to 146 by 2004 
(Government Accountability Office, 2005:4). A new study increases that 
count to 158, for 2008 (Minarik, 2010).
The number and range of tax expenditures lose large amounts of 
revenue. Tax expenditures for activities other than business account for 
roughly 6 percent of GDP (Burman et al., 2008a). For comparison, the 
individual income tax raises about 8 percent of GDP. These figures suggest 
that eliminating tax expenditures and broadening the tax base would allow 
tax rates to be cut nearly in half (Burman et al., 2008a:13). However, the 
elimination of tax expenditures for specific purposes might lead to demands 
for greater direct spending for those purposes.5
Most experts contend that if the tax code had fewer special provisions, 
especially those for tax expenditures and lower rates, it would be more 
conducive to growth and would consume less time and energy of taxpayers 
to comply with (or avoid).
ISSUES IN TAX REFORM
The current federal income tax is a long way from the simple and 
neutral system that almost all tax experts—and many taxpayers—favor. 
They support moving to a tax system that raises needed revenue simply, 
minimizes both paperwork and economic distortions, and provides a so-
cially desired degree of progressivity. Yet policy makers have been reluctant 
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to do the sometimes politically risky and always unglamorous work of 
“cleaning up” the code by ridding it of outdated or ineffective provisions 
and inconsistent definitions. Experience suggests that the people who would 
lose financially from elimination of the targeted provisions oppose such 
reform and are more effectively mobilized in their opposition than the 
larger numbers of people who would benefit from what would be small 
tax reductions. Often, many taxpayers see their own tax benefits as fair 
treatment for special circumstances but believe other taxpayers should lose 
their targeted benefits.
Simplification
Achieving tax simplification would yield five main benefits for individu-
als, businesses, and the economy.
First, it would reduce the high administrative and compliance costs 
of the tax code. Americans spend about 7.6 billion hours annually filling 
out tax forms, keeping records, and learning tax rules (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2008:3). The Internal Revenue Service (Internal Revenue Service, 
2008:4) estimates that the cost of complying with federal income taxes is 
roughly $200 billion annually.6
Second, tax simplification would improve the ability of individuals 
and businesses to make sound economic decisions: that is, to make deci-
sions that work best for their own finances and for the performance of the 
economy, rather than to try to benefit from special provisions in the tax 
code. For example, the large and growing number of tax rules on pensions, 
savings vehicles, and investment earnings complicate, if not confuse, family 
financial planning.
Third, simplification would reduce the frequent and often costly errors 
made by both taxpayers and businesses.
Fourth, it is widely believed that simplification would address the 
problem that tax complexity leads to noncompliance because taxpayers 
are confused about what income is taxable and what tax “breaks” exist. 
Complexity—and its twin, ambiguity—also foster “aggressive” tax plan-
ning as both taxpayers and tax advisers try to take advantage of the code. 
Because complex tax rules are subject to multiple interpretations, they spur 
taxpayers and businesses to take risks in the hope that their tax-cutting 
strategies are either legal or are not uncovered by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) (for a detailed discussion, see Edwards, 2003).
Fifth, complexity can dilute the incentives—thus, the effectiveness—of 
provisions that seek to advance particular societal goals. For example, it is 
difficult or impossible for people who invest in housing that qualifies for 
a tax credit to know for certain ahead of time the exact tax benefit it will 
yield because it depends partly on their future incomes and tax liabilities.7 
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Because it is difficult to estimate the tax consequences of the particular ac-
tions that such tax provisions are intended to reward, they act less as a spur 
to socially desirable behavior than one might expect while still resulting in 
loss of revenue.
There are many ideas for tax simplification. One that is frequently 
mentioned is to replace the income tax with a flat-rate or progressive 
consumption-based tax system. Revenue estimates have varied quite widely, 
but it appears that under revenue-neutral reform, switching to a flat 
consumption-based system might increase U.S. incomes over the long term 
by about 10 percent (Altig et al., 2001; Auerbach, 1996; Joint Committee 
on Taxation, 1997; Jorgenson and Yun, 2002; Kotlikoff, 1993). However, 
a consumption tax at a single flat rate would shift the tax burden among 
households significantly, which would create winners and losers among 
different groups of taxpayers.8
Economic Efficiency and Growth
Whatever the level of taxes in the future, GDP and incomes would be 
higher if the tax system were more efficient than it currently is. An efficient 
tax system is one that minimizes distortions that adversely affect working, 
saving, investing, spending, and other important economic decisions. A 
pure income tax would treat different forms of income in the same way, 
thus broadening the tax base. This would allow lower marginal tax rates 
without losing revenues, so that economic decisions would be less driven by 
their effect on taxes owed and be more likely to raise income throughout 
the economy.9
Neutral Treatment of Different Sources of Income
Variations in the way different categories or sources of income are 
taxed tend to distort wage, price, and profit signals in the economy, thereby 
diverting resources into lower productivity uses. This is particularly so for 
variations in taxing different sources of income of one type, such as busi-
ness profits and capital income. For example, if one industry benefits from 
a special tax provision, higher after-tax returns in that industry will draw 
resources to it from other activities that have higher economic value. Ex-
cept in the case of demonstrated market failure, only equal tax treatment 
of different economic activities will lead to the most efficient use of scarce 
resources; see Box 8-1. All of the special provisions in the current income 
tax code—including the favorable treatment of home ownership (even for 
vacation properties)—create economic costs or “deadweight losses.” These 
are the losses in “welfare” (economic well-being) that occur when tax rules 
distort economic behavior: individuals and businesses act in ways that take 
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advantage of the tax code rather than in ways that bring true benefits for 
the individual or business. That is, tax-induced distortions risk reducing 
the long-term benefits that arise when individuals use their incomes as they 
choose. They thus interfere with the wise choices of both individuals and 
businesses for income, consumption, savings, investment, and production.
Marginal Tax Rates
Marginal tax rates are the rates that individuals and businesses pay on 
an additional dollar of income, or save for any item (such as an itemized 
deduction) for which there is a tax preference. The economic distortions in 
the tax code are magnified when marginal tax rates are high or differ among 
otherwise similar economic options. The economic waste (“deadweight 
BOX 8-1 
Distortions in the Current Tax Code
	 Provisions	 in	 the	 tax	 code	 that	 favor	 one	 source	 of	 income	or	 another	 can	
distort	private	financial	decisions.
	 One	example	of	such	a	distortion	 is	 that	 there	generally	 is	a	single	 layer	of	
income	 taxation	 for	 noncorporate	 business	 profits	 but	 two	 layers	 for	 corporate	
profits:	returns	to	corporations’	investments	are	taxed	at	both	the	business	level	
and	at	 the	 individual	 level,	 in	 the	 form	of	dividend	and	capital	gains	 taxes	(see	
Gravelle,	2004).
	 The	 tax	 code	 also	 creates	 numerous	 distortions	 for	 capital	 investment.	 For	
example,	for	businesses,	the	system	of	asset	depreciation	is	distorted	by	the	ad	
hoc	rules	that	govern	the	time	period	over	which	investment	costs	are	deducted	
and	by	price	inflation,	which	lowers	the	depreciation	deduction	below	replacement	
costs	(Congressional	Budget	Office,	1997:39;	Jorgenson	and	Yun,	2002:317).
	 The	tax	code	can	distort	decisions	for	personal	savings	as	well.	The	income	
tax	 favors	 consumption	over	 saving	because	consumption	 is	not	 taxed	but	 the	
returns	 to	 saving	 are,	 encouraging	 people	 to	 spend	 their	 earnings	 rather	 than	
save	them.	Because	policy	makers	have	 long	recognized	the	favored	treatment	
of	consumption	over	savings,	they	have	enacted	many	special	provisions	for	sav-
ings.	The	tax	code	has	different	rules	for	dividends,	 interest,	 tax-exempt	bonds,	
capital	gains,	simplified	employee	pension	plans,	individual	retirement	accounts	
(IRAs),	401(k)	retirement	plans,	Keogh	Plans	(which	also	allow	individuals	to	tax-
defer	savings	from	earnings),	and	other	retirement	arrangements,	life	insurance,	
estates	and	inheritance,	and	annuities.	Although	in	some	cases	these	disparate	
rules	may	only	subsidize	the	transfer	of	existing	wealth	into	tax-favored	accounts	
rather	than	spur	new	saving,	they	do	reduce	the	anti-savings	bias	of	the	income	
tax.	Yet	they	are	so	complex	as	to	defeat	most	taxpayers’	(and	some	specialists’)	
understanding	of	them.
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loss”) to economic performance from the current tax code is directly related 
to marginal tax rates. As marginal rates rise, these efficiency losses rise more 
than proportionally, roughly as the square of marginal tax rates. Because 
of this distortion, tax reform efforts in the past, such as the bipartisan Tax 
Reform Act of 1986, focused on reducing marginal tax rates.
If marginal tax rates are cut, the tax base will expand as people re-
duce their tax avoidance and increase their productive activities (Feldstein, 
1995). One series of studies has estimated that a permanent 5 percentage 
point reduction in marginal tax rates accounts for a 10 percent increase in 
capital expenditures.10
Given the adverse effects of high marginal tax rates from a growth or 
efficiency perspective, policy makers should want the lowest possible tax 
rates that raise the amount of government revenue desired. This consider-
ation becomes particularly important for this study because the adverse ef-
fects of high rates would be magnified at the higher levels of revenue needed 
to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability under three of the committee’s four 
scenarios.11
International Context
Globalization is transforming separate but intensely competing national 
economies into a single world economy through rising cross-border trade 
and investment, migration of workers, and transfers of technology, with 
important implications for the tax system.
Most people are aware of globalization because of growing interna-
tional trade. But the growth in trade has been dwarfed recently by the 
growth in international investment. Although the value of global trade has 
tripled since 1990, the value of global investment flows has increased 10-
fold (as measured in nominal dollars between 1990 and 2006).12 These in-
vestment flows have put pressure on governments to restrain tax levels and 
reform tax systems with an eye to international competitiveness. The United 
States has a lower overall tax burden than many other advanced industrial 
countries. The total of federal, state, and local taxation in the United States 
equaled 28 percent of the economy in 2006, in comparison with an aver-
age for the countries in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) of 36 percent; see Figure 8-2. Although Japan and 
Korea have levels of taxation similar to the United States, most nations in 
Western Europe have higher tax burdens.
As OECD government budgets generally increased in size during the 
1970s and 1980s, largely to finance increased services and social benefits, 
income and payroll taxes were the major sources of additional revenues. 
But in recent decades, many countries have greatly expanded their taxes on 
general consumption, such as VATs. In Europe, the average VAT rate rose 
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over time to its current level of about 20 percent (European Commission, 
2009).
Perhaps the most striking changes in tax policies in the OECD countries 
have been the dramatic reductions in income tax rates since the 1980s. Fol-
lowing the lead of Britain and then the United States, all major industrial 
nations cut their statutory individual and corporate tax rates (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008a).13
For corporate taxes, the situation between the United States and the 
OECD countries is quite different. The United States now has the second 
highest marginal (roughly, “statutory”) corporate tax rate in the world 
(only Japan has higher rates); see Figure 8-3. The World Bank ranks the 
United States as 76th best in the world in terms of the burden of business 
taxes and business tax compliance costs (World Bank and Pricewater-
houseCoopers, 2007:47).14
Some fiscal experts argue that international tax competition is produc-
tive because it encourages governments to reform their tax systems and 
reduce low-priority spending (see, e.g., Edwards and Mitchell, 2008).15 
However, not all tax competition is so high-minded. Some very small coun-
tries with minimal public-sector needs have explicitly striven to attract cor-
porate “headquarters”—which can be nothing more than mailboxes—by 
establishing very low corporate tax rates. In effect, the corporations and 
the country split the tax savings between them.
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Whatever the underlying motivation, there is concern that unless U.S. 
taxation is competitive with the nation’s trading partners, businesses will 
shift their investment and reported profits abroad. In particular, multina-
tional corporations, which account for a majority of U.S. merchandise 
exports, can shift investments to minimize tax payments and distortions 
(Mataloni, 2007:44; data for 2005). If U.S., foreign, and multinational 
corporations reduce their activity in the United States because of relatively 
high corporate taxes (not building new factories here, for example), one 
of the likely effects would be lower wages for average American workers, 
implicitly compensating for the higher taxes paid here.16 At the same time, 
tax competition to attract capital reduces tax rates on corporate income, 
capital gains, dividends, and high incomes in general, and thereby perhaps 
unintentionally constrains tax systems to be less progressive. The conflict-
ing concerns of legitimate international tax competition and a race to the 
bottom on taxes on capital raise complex issues that will be important for 
all tax policy decisions in the coming decades.
Fairness
Every citizen and taxpayer supports tax fairness although it is quite 
possible that no two people agree on precisely what that is. And the litera-
ture on the subject is huge.17 Taken in the abstract, interpretations can be 
quite philosophical, with questions ranging from the proper ratio of the tax 
burden of the richest citizen to the poorest, to whether it is more morally 
proper to tax income or consumption.
Fig8-3.eps
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1995
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
2000 2005 2009
United States
Average of 30 OECD Countries
FIGURE 8-3 Top corporate tax rates in the United States and 30 OECD countries.
REVENUE OPTIONS 
In a practical context, the distinctions that have to be made are between 
making “fair” choices to collect the same amount of revenue as is collected 
now and making “fair” choices to distribute additional taxes (e.g., to close 
the budget gap described in this report). In raising an unchanged level of 
revenue, some people want a tax system that is more progressive, that is, 
that places greater burdens on those at higher incomes. Other people want 
less progressivity. One argument for changing the tax system but not chang-
ing its current level of progressivity is that this approach would minimize 
the number of “winners” and “losers” from the tax change. Also, taxpayers 
have made long-term commitments—borrowing money to buy homes or 
invest in their own businesses, for example—and increasing their taxes in 
the short run is unfair or, at least, painful.
When the goal is to increase the overall amount of revenue, however, 
fairness issues are more contentious. Furthermore, there is no clear and 
simple benchmark—such as maintaining the current distribution of bur-
dens—that can be used as a starting point for public debate.
In this chapter generally, the committee models either the current tax 
law or a simplified alternative with tax rates chosen to replicate the level 
and distribution of revenues of the current law and then increases revenues 
by simply increasing all tax rates proportionately. Such an approach holds 
no particular claim to superiority and in an actual legislative process surely 
would be challenged from all sides. However, we find it a straightforward 
starting place for the kind of discussion that this report seeks to begin and 
support.
There are practical choices that may conflict with some conceptions 
of fairness. One issue, noted above, is the international competition for 
investment on the basis of after-tax income from investments. If interna-
tional competition—whether arguably efficient or a shortsighted “race to 
the bottom”—forces lower taxes on incomes from capital, that would tend 
strongly toward the perhaps-unintended consequence of reducing the pro-
gressivity of the tax system.
Another issue is the current negative income tax burden on com-
paratively low-wage workers. (That is, because of “refundable” credits—
discussed below—many low earners receive checks rather than paying taxes 
through withholding or otherwise.) In the 1960s and early 1970s, some 
argued for increasing the personal exemption and standard deductions 
to cut the tax burden for families with poverty level incomes, and, at the 
same time, to reduce the administrative and compliance burden on those 
families and the IRS by eliminating the obligation to file a return. In the 
mid-1970s, however, this approach was expanded with the introduction 
of “negative income taxes,” in the form of the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC). The EITC eliminated the burden of the Social Security payroll tax 
for poor families, and provided a kind of wage supplement that did not 
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add to employers’ costs and so would not fuel inflation. However, it totally 
reversed the simplification advantage of removing low earners from the 
rolls; it actually made their tax returns much more complex than those for 
the average middle-class taxpayers. The administrative complexity grew as 
necessary safeguards were added against fraud. (And, there were concerns 
about possible under-withholding of tax for families whose wage incomes 
increase modestly during a year.) These issues have been compounded over 
the years as other tax credits have been made refundable.
If budget deficits prove to be as large as feared and significant revenue 
increases are enacted, it may be hard to raise enough revenue without some 
tax increases on the current large share of the household population that 
now does not pay income taxes—about 45 million—either because they 
receive a refund or owe no taxes, but instead actually receives negative 
income taxes.18 This would be a significant reversal of the recent policy 
trend of increasing the progressivity of the tax code.
Many other issues involving the economic efficiency, complexity, and 
ease of administration of the tax system may make it difficult to pursue 
any conception of fairness in taxation. The many objectives of tax policy, 
including fairness and revenue sufficiency, are necessarily to some degree in 
conflict, and the difficulty of resolving such conflicts is one of many reasons 
that tax reform is both technically complex and politically challenging.
ILLUSTRATIVE TAX OPTIONS
Three of the committee’s four scenarios for sustainability would re-
quire raising considerable additional revenue. In two of the scenarios the 
levels would approach or exceed the share of GDP in some other wealthy 
nations (see Chapter 1 for current international comparisons). If income 
and payroll tax rates were simply raised while retaining the current tax 
structure, the adverse effect on growth would likely be more severe than 
if a simplified tax structure were adopted; see, e.g., Congressional Budget 
Office (1997), Feldstein (2006), and Hubbard (1998). Table 8-1 provides 
an overview of the committee’s illustrative tax options, in line with the 
illustrative scenarios for a sustainable fiscal future outlined in Chapter 4 
and detailed in Chapter 9. Possible increases in payroll taxation for Social 
Security and for the hospital insurance portion of Medicare, discussed in 
previous chapters, are also shown. The discussion below considers possible 
changes to federal income taxes under the current federal structure of per-
sonal and corporate income taxation or a simplified income tax structure 
and with the possible addition of a VAT. The two alternative tax structures 
are applied to reach each of the four future revenue levels and paths re-
quired by these scenarios.
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TABLE 8-1 Federal Tax Structure and Revenue Levels Under the 
Committee’s Four Paths
Path Current Tax Structure Simplified Tax Structure
Low Spending 
and Revenue: 
Revenues remain 
at 18-20% of 
GDP through 
2050, to about 
22% by 2080.
Income taxes remain at roughly 10% of 
GDP.
Payroll taxes: Medicare remains at 2.9% 
for both employers and employees with 
no limit; Social Security tax remains at 
12.4% for employers and employees, up 
to an indexed earnings cap.
Income taxes remain at 
roughly 10% of GDP; 
personal income tax 
reformed with a broader 
base, lower rates, and two 
brackets; corporate rate cut 
to 25%.
Payroll taxes same as at left.
Intermediate-1: 
Revenues rise to 
about 23% of 
GDP by 2050; 
edge up to about 
24% by 2080.
Current income tax cuts expire and all 
tax rates rise above current law. For 
example, for 2050, the top personal rate 
of 35% rises to 37.2%, and the capital 
gains rate of 15% rises to 15.9%.
Medicare payroll tax is doubled. Social 
Security payroll tax raised in steps to 
13.3% in 2060; same cap.
Similar individual income 
tax rates as above, but 
tax-bracket thresholds and 
standard deduction adjusted 
to increase revenue. For 
example, by 2080 the two 
rates are 7.4% and 18.4%, 
and the capital gains rate 
is 11%.
Payroll taxes same as at left.
Intermediate-2: 
Revenues rise to 
about 25% of 
GDP by 2050 
and to about 
26% by 2080.
Current tax cuts expire and income 
tax rates rise (more than above). For 
example, for 2050, the top personal rate 
rises to 40.9% and to 42.5% by 2080; 
the capital gains rate rises to 17.5% 
percent and to 18.2% by 2080.
Medicare tax doubled. Current Social 
Security tax raised in steps to 14.5% 
in 2075; same cap. Second-tier Social 
Security payroll tax added for any 
earnings above cap in current law; rises 
to 3% in 2060.
Somewhat higher individual 
income tax rates than 
immediately above; tax 
brackets and the standard 
deduction are also adjusted. 
For example, by 2080 the 
two rates are 8.7% and 
21.8%, and the capital 
gains rate is 13.1%.
Payroll taxes same as at left.
High Spending 
and Revenue: 
Revenues rise 
to about 28% 
percent of GDP 
by 2050 and 
after that date to 
about 32%.
Current tax cuts expire and income tax 
rates rise higher than above. For example, 
for 2050, the top personal rate is 50% 
and the capital gains rate is 21.4%.
VAT added around 2020; rate rises to 
14.6% by 2080.
Medicare tax doubled. Current Social 
Security tax raised in steps to 14.7% 
in 2080; cap raised. Second-tier Social 
Security tax added for any earnings above 
raised cap and rises to 5.5% in 2075.
Higher individual tax rates 
than above; tax brackets 
and deductions adjusted. 
For example, by 2080 the 
two rates are 11.5% and 
28.7%, and the capital 
gains rate is 17.2%.
No VAT.
Payroll taxes same as at left.
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Current Tax Structure
One way to raise more revenue is simply to increase the statutory tax 
rates under the current tax structure, which now range from 10 to 35 per-
cent. In the “high spending and revenues” scenario that approach pushes 
income tax rates so high that the committee has concluded that current 
levels of tax avoidance and negative economic effects would reach unac-
ceptable levels. “Unacceptable” is defined differently by different experts, 
but the committee concluded that to avoid damaging effects on growth, 
the top income tax rate should not exceed 50 percent for people with the 
highest incomes.19 With the revenue required for the “high” scenario, that 
level would be reached by about 2020 under the current tax structure. At 
that time, we assume that policy makers would add to the current income 
tax a VAT similar to that in Europe. Thereafter, because we assume that 
personal and corporate income taxes cannot rise further, we assume for 
purposes of illustration that the VAT’s rate would rise to supply whatever 
additional revenues are needed.20
The economic burden imposed by a VAT could be minimized if it were 
imposed on a very broad base of all consumption. Nevertheless, in most 
countries, the VAT has a narrower base that excludes significant categories 
of consumption (such as food), for both technical and political reasons. In 
the 15 core countries of the European Union (EU), the average VAT tax 
base is about 40 percent of GDP.21 We assume that a VAT in the United 
States would have the same breadth as this European average.
Overall, the tax levels and structures in the United States and the EU 
countries are noticeably different. In 2006, the tax-to-GDP ratio in the 
United States was 28 percent, compared with 39.8 percent in the 15 core 
nations of the EU (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, 2008b:96). Taxes on “general consumption” were 7.9 percent in the 
United States and 19.2 percent in the 15 EU countries. Thus, in a rough 
sense, Europe’s higher social spending and larger governments are funded 
by higher general consumption taxes, the VAT.
One way to view the typical European approach is as using relatively 
regressive VATs, with burdens falling disproportionately on lower-income 
people, to pay for more redistributive social spending than in the United 
States, such as larger child allowances and higher unemployment benefits. 
Following this reasoning, if the United States adopted a VAT, it might be 
seen as taking only half of the European social bargain.
For simplicity, we do not assume an explicit period of transition to a 
VAT—that is, a slow phase-in of increasing tax rates—but rather propose a 
VAT rate to provide the revenue needed at any given time. The committee 
recognizes that adding a VAT would impose disparate combined tax bur-
dens on different age groups. For instance, middle-aged and elderly people 
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who have saved without the benefit of current tax subsidies, having already 
paid income tax on earnings when earned, would pay a VAT on those same 
earnings when they are spent as consumption, perhaps in retirement.22 
Although the result could be unexpected double taxation of a portion of 
the earnings of that group, some analysts believe this would be appropriate 
because these groups benefit from Medicare and Social Security. (And some 
analysts believe that this or similar problems would inevitably accompany 
any major change in the tax system and can be mitigated or avoided with 
fine adjustments in the exemptions, rates, and other parameters of the tax 
law.)
Under the low scenario we rely on both the current tax structure and 
all the details of current tax law. The greater demands of the three other 
scenarios are met by proportionately increasing tax rates for: (1) the six 
regular tax brackets; (2) capital gains and qualified dividends; and (3) the 
two brackets of the alternative minimum tax (AMT).23 In other words, for 
the three scenarios that include spending above the revenue baseline, the 
current tax structure is retained, but not its detailed tax rates. Proportion-
ately increasing tax rates is one rule-of-thumb method for an even-handed 
distribution of any additional tax burden, but it is by no means the only 
possible approach, and, like any other, it would be controversial.
Figure 8-4 displays the top statutory rates over time for the current 
tax structure under the committee’s four scenarios. (Table E-1 in Appen-
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dix E shows all the personal income tax rates, as well as the VAT rate.) 
Specifically:
• Under the low scenario, because all personal income tax rates stay 
at the 2009 level, the top rate remains 35 percent.
• The intermediate-1 scenario requires more revenue initially than 
the intermediate-2 scenario because it is oriented to the more im-
mediate spending of human capital investment programs, rather 
than to Medicare or Social Security.
• Because the intermediate-2 scenario is oriented more to the pro-
grams that serve the elderly, especially Medicare, its spending ini-
tially rises more slowly than spending under intermediate-1, but it 
rises faster than in intermediate-1 after about 2030. After about 
2040, all personal income tax rates under the intermediate-2 are 
higher than under intermediate-1.
• Under the high scenario, the top personal income tax rate rises to 
50 percent by 2020, which the committee assumes is a practical 
maximum. (The other rates also rise proportionately.) In 2020 and 
thereafter, a VAT is added to the tax structure. With the increasing 
revenue needs over time in this scenario, the single rate of the VAT 
rises from 0.9 in 2020 to 14.6 percent in 2080.24
Simplified Tax Structure
Rather than continuing to base tax law on the current structure of 
the income tax, policy makers could act to reform and simplify it (see 
Table 8-1, above). This section considers the effects of a simplified tax 
structure under each of the committee’s four illustrative scenarios. The cur-
rent tax structure discussed in the preceding section and the broader-based 
or simplified tax structure discussed here represent two “bookends,” with 
many possibilities in between.25
Assumptions
The committee’s illustrative version of a simplified tax would replace 
the current six tax brackets for individuals with two. With few deductions 
or credits, individual income tax rates could be lowered and still yield the 
same revenue because the tax base would be broader. The only deductions 
or credits would be the current EITC and child tax credit, both for low-
income, working filers, and both refundable for those with no net income 
tax liability. As currently, those “taxpayers” would receive a check for the 
net amount of the credit. To help meet international tax competition, the 
corporate tax rate would be reduced from the current generally applicable 
35 percent rate to 25 percent.
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The two-bracket simple income tax loosely echoes the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, which broadened the income tax base and reduced statutory rates. 
The committee’s simplified tax is a somewhat more “pure” tax reform than 
the 1986 act because it eliminates many more deductions, exemptions, and 
credits. Such a plan was recently analyzed by the Tax Policy Center of the 
Urban Institute and the Brookings Institution (Burman et al., 2008b).26
The committee’s simplified tax plan would be revenue neutral and 
approximately distributionally neutral in 2012. In other words, it would 
raise the same amount of money as under the current tax system, and it 
would generally retain the same relative burdens on various broad income 
groups as would occur under current tax law projected to 2012. Some 
analysts prefer more precisely mirroring the current-law distribution of the 
tax burden: for the same total revenue yield, this approach would require 
more tax brackets. In the committee’s scenarios that require additional 
revenue, the distribution of that additional revenue burden will inevitably 
be controversial.
For the low scenario, the committee’s illustrative simplified tax struc-
ture in 2012 would have these basic features:
• individual tax brackets of 10 and 25 percent (“lower” and “upper” 
or “first” and “second” brackets, respectively);
• application of the upper tax bracket to incomes above $73,100; 
and
• a standard deduction that is almost doubled from the current level, 
to $17,000 for joint filers or $8,500 for others.
For all scenarios, the simplified tax structure would have these 
features:27
• no itemized deductions;
• retention of the current 15 percent rates on capital gains and quali-
fied dividends;
• elimination of almost all deductions and credits, except pro-savings 
tax features such as IRAs, 401(k) retirement plans, and Health Sav-
ings Accounts;
• elimination of the mortgage interest deduction for own-occupied 
homes (see below); and
• retention of a simplified EITC and child tax credit for low-income 
workers and their families.28
One tax expenditure that would be dropped is the deduction for mort-
gage interest on owner-occupied homes, for those who itemize deductions. 
Although it would be appropriate to have a mortgage interest deduction 
in a system in which the economic benefit of living in an owner-occupied 
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home, that is to say, implicit rent, is taxed, it is not appropriate in our 
system.
The mortgage interest tax expenditure roughly equals in cost those 
for pensions. Unlike those for pensions, which are generally considered 
pro-savings, however, the home mortgage interest deduction is generally 
considered pro-consumption. Critics also note that it is generally regressive 
because people at higher incomes tend to itemize deductions, have more 
mortgage interest to deduct, and are in higher tax brackets, which increases 
the benefit of each dollar in interest that is deducted. These critics also 
note that mortgage interest deductibility tends to lead to overinvestment in 
houses and diverts savings away from business investment that would help 
promote an internationally competitive economy.
As an element of a possible broader reform of health care and for fair-
ness, for all scenarios, the simplified tax structure establishes a dollar cap 
on the level of insurance that employers provide as health benefits that is 
not subject to the income tax. As noted in previous chapters, the cost of this 
insurance is currently not taxable to either employers or employees, and it is 
not subject to either income or payroll taxation. As an open-ended subsidy, 
it provides an incentive for employees (especially, well-paid employees) to 
receive compensation in the form of “gold-plated” insurance coverage, 
which tends to drive up health costs. Because the value of this provision 
to the taxpayer increases with taxable income, it is highly regressive. It is 
currently the most costly tax expenditure in the system.
Capping the level of employer-paid health insurance that is excludable 
from personal income taxation would raise revenue and help limit this 
source of medical inflation. Under the committee’s simplified tax structure, 
the cap would be the average cost of such plans for 2009: an estimated 
$5,370 for single coverage and $13,226 for family coverage. The cap 
would rise with general price inflation, which has generally risen much less 
rapidly than inflation in medical prices or medical spending.29 If medical 
inflation continued at a high rate, the cap would raise increasing amounts 
of revenue over time.
The committee’s simplified tax would make no changes to the business 
tax base except repeal of the special manufacturing deduction added in 
2004.
A major tax reform of this sort could bring difficulties and uncertain-
ties, especially during the transition to it. However, if major tax reform is 
done thoughtfully, potential problems can be minimized. More importantly, 
potential problems would have to be weighed against the demonstrated 
inadequacies of the current tax system, which derive both from its structure 
and its high rates.
The committee offers this simplified tax structure—a major tax reform 
—in keeping with a basic premise of this study: that the serious and funda-
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mental long-term fiscal problem facing the United States demands funda-
mental (and bold) long-term solutions. More specifically, if revenue levels 
must rise, then the current tax code’s distortions and inefficiencies will be 
magnified by higher rates, so that consideration of tax simplification be-
comes both more urgent and more necessary.
Implementation
Under the simplified tax structure, statutory rates for the personal in-
come tax would be markedly lower, for a given revenue level, than under 
the current tax approach; see Figure 8-5 (see also Tables E-1 and E-2 in 
Appendix E). Moreover, with simplified taxation, the rates of its upper and 
lower brackets (i.e., the second and first brackets, respectively) generally 
decrease over time except under the high scenario after many years. By 
contrast, under the current tax structure, the top and other rates increase 
over time for the intermediate-2 and high scenarios.30 For the high scenario 
under the current tax structure, rates rise to their deemed maximum in 
2020, at which time a VAT is imposed and its rate rises thereafter as needed 
to generate required additional revenue.
Under the simplified tax structure, personal income tax rates generally 
decrease over time because of the broader tax base of simplified taxa-
tion and the elimination or reduction of costly tax expenditures, includ-
ing interest paid on home mortgages and, especially, employer-sponsored 
health insurance. With growth in real income, these tax expenditures would 
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FIGURE 8-5 Personal income tax rates for the first and second brackets under a 
simplified tax structure for the committee’s four scenarios.
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otherwise be increasingly costly. The general decline in rates for personal 
income taxes adds to the strength of this approach in minimizing both the 
distortion of economic decisions and the tax system’s negative effects on 
work and saving incentives.
Effects of the Options on Distribution of the Tax Burden
Figure 8-6 and Table 8-2 show the degree to which the combined fed-
eral tax burden is shouldered by each of five income quintiles (i.e., fifths), 
under the current and simplified tax structures. (The combined federal tax 
burden comprises the major federal taxes [see Appendix E], including the 
payroll taxation and VAT summarized in Table 8-1.)31 To get a clearer 
picture of how people with the highest incomes would fare under an alter-
native tax structure, data for the top quintile are supplemented by data for 
the top 10 percent and 5 percent of the income distribution. Also, reflecting 
current tax rates—not just the current structure—current law is used as a 
benchmark (see Appendix E for more detailed information). As described 
above, the combined tax burden on each group includes income taxes and 
payroll taxes for all scenarios and, in the high scenario under the current 
tax structure, the addition of a VAT.
Two indicators are used to gauge the relative burden of taxation on 
different income groups because they convey different insights. One indica-
tor is the percentage shares of combined federal taxes, which are shown in 
Figure 8-6 for 2050 for each income group. This is a relative measure of tax 
burden. As a tax system becomes more progressive, higher quintiles shoul-
der an increasingly greater share of the total tax bill. The second indicator 
is the percentage change (increase or decrease) in net, after-tax income, 
compared with the tax baseline, for 2012, 2050, and 2080, for each group, 
which is shown in Table 8-2. This is a measure of how deeply the taxes will 
“bite.” Change in after-tax income gives another view of how a new tax 
policy affects each income group, one that makes particular sense when, as 
here, the revenue requirement is being varied.
In looking at Figure 8-6 and Table 8-2, it is important to remember 
that much changes over the long time span of the projections. Although the 
committee’s revenue illustrations are designed for approximately unchanged 
tax distributions at the start (2012), the relative burdens can diverge over 
time, for at least three reasons. First, the economy is growing. Growth in 
real incomes puts taxpayers into higher personal income tax brackets—
particularly with the six brackets in the current tax structure—and also 
affects the amount of payroll tax paid.32 With only two brackets for regular 
income and no AMT, this “real bracket creep” generally raises proceeds of 
the simplified income tax far less than under the current structure.
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FIGURE 8-6 Distribution of the percentage share of combined federal taxes by 
relative income in 2050 for the committee’s four scenarios.
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Second, the needed revenue paths of the four scenarios also affect the 
distribution of taxation. The level and path of payroll taxation vary with 
the scenario, as do other details that also affect the distribution of payroll 
tax payments.33 And the VAT added in the high scenario under the current 
tax structure also has distributional effects—it is less progressive than either 
form of personal income taxation. In practice, there is no doubt that tax 
rates and other parameters of the tax system that affect tax distributions 
would be adjusted multiple times over the decades covered in these simula-
tions and projections.
The third source of change in the tax distribution over time has to do 
with how the various personal income tax rates are adjusted in the imple-
mentations of the two tax structures. For simplicity, we have assumed that 
the various rates within each personal income tax bracket are adjusted 
proportionately to each other. Notably, capital gains rates and those on 
ordinary income are not only raised and lowered together, but are raised or 
lowered by the same proportion. All of these assumed changes potentially 
TABLE 8-2 Percentage Change in After-Tax Income Under the 
Committee’s Four Scenarios in Comparison with Current Law for 
Selected Income Groups, in percent
Group
2012 2050 2080
Current 
Tax
Simplified 
Tax
Current 
Tax
Simplified 
Tax
Current 
Tax
Simplified 
Tax
Low Scenario
First Quintile NA 0.1 NA −2.0 NA −2.6
Third Quintile NA 0.7 NA −1.0 NA −1.7
Fifth Quintile NA −0.1 NA 2.1 NA 2.7
Top 5% NA 0.2 NA 3.1 NA 3.6
Intermediate- Scenario
First Quintile −0.5 −0.6 −2.2 −4.8 −1.8 −5.4
Third Quintile −1.8 −1.8 −3.5 −6.2 −3.9 −6.7
Fifth Quintile −3.7 −2.1 −3.5 −0.1 −3.1 0.5
Top 5% −4.2 −0.6 −3.0 2.0 −2.5 2.5
Intermediate- Scenario
First Quintile −0.5 −0.3 −2.3 −4.9 −2.3 −5.9
Third Quintile −1.3 −0.6 −4.6 −6.7 −6.7 −9.3
Fifth Quintile −2.3 −1.3 −6.2 −2.9 −7.8 −3.8
Top 5% −2.5 −0.3 −6.0 −1.2 −7.3 −2.0
High Scenario
First Quintile −0.6 −0.8 −4.8 −6.2 −7.0 −9.2
Third Quintile −2.2 −2.8 −9.8 −11.0 −14.4 −18.1
Fifth Quintile −4.9 −2.6 −15.0 −7.5 −18.0 −13.5
Top 5% −5.7 −0.8 −16.2 −6.0 −17.6 −11.7
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
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contribute to changes in the distribution of tax burdens. (Appendix E pro-
vides additional data for all the years projected.)34
The committee’s modeling—like most such analysis—specifies that 
higher tax rates would modestly reduce taxable incomes. However, it does 
not model the likely reductions to GDP if tax rates rise. Again, this follows 
the practice in most such analyses.
Although the distributions of our scenarios’ initial tax burdens—that is, 
in 2012—are modeled to be approximately the same as current law would 
be in that year, the distribution of tax burdens can change over time if ad-
ditional revenue is raised. Given the complexity of the tax system changes 
we analyze, it is perhaps surprising that even for many years in the future, 
the overall distribution of tax burdens changes only modestly across the 
scenarios and across tax regimes.
Looking first at the percentage share of the combined federal tax bur-
den (Figure 8-6), for the current tax structure in 2050, in all scenarios the 
relative burdens stay about the same as under current law. This is in large 
part because the current tax structure is modeled closely on current law. 
The first (i.e., bottom) quintile shoulders about the same burden as current 
law (1.2 percent of total taxes paid), at all revenue levels. The same is true 
for that middle (or third) quintile, for which shares of the combined burden 
vary between 10.4 and 10.8 percent. The top quintile generally continues 
to pay 64 to 65 percent of the total burden. However, especially under the 
intermediate-1 scenario, those in the top 5 percent pay somewhat less: 38.1 
percent, compared with 39.3 percent under current law.
With only two tax rate brackets to fine-tune the distribution in the 
simplified tax structure, combined federal taxation tends to move some-
what away from the current degree of tax progressivity and—partly since 
the implementation of simplified taxation changes only restrictedly—that 
divergence tends to increase over time. Table 8-2 shows that in 2050 
for each scenario, the simplified tax “bites” the first and third quintiles 
somewhat more, and the fifth somewhat less. That is, under the current 
tax structure, the first and third quintiles have a bigger drop in after-tax 
income than under the simplified tax structure, while the reverse is true 
for the fifth quintile. (The same relationships appear in Figure 8-6.) These 
distributional effects of the tax structures tend to increase in time, as shown 
by the columns for 2080.35
Some details and implications of how the simplified income tax struc-
ture is modeled here may help explain the distributional differences shown. 
Under the current tax structure, many single-earner families in the lower 
quintiles get a tax break by the “head of household” filing status, which is 
not included in the simplified tax structure. In the simplified tax approach, 
real income growth makes more and more filers at the low end of the dis-
tribution subject to income taxation. The simplified tax structure also elimi-
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nates itemized deductions, which currently benefit some middle-level tax 
filers who would, under simplified taxation, claim the standard deduction. 
Although the amount of the standard deduction in the simplified structure 
rises through time with the price level, incomes tend to increase faster, so 
its projected tax benefit diminishes over time, which is another cause of the 
distributional difference between the current and simplified tax structures.
Among high-income taxpayers, the effects of the tax treatment of 
income from capital gains remain significant.36 The distribution of this 
income source is extremely skewed: in recent years the top 0.1 percent of 
taxpayers has received roughly half of all capital gains. Table 8-2 shows 
that under both the current and simplified tax structures—but especially 
for the latter—the top 5 percent generally fares much better than the top 
20 percent. For the implementation of both tax structures, the capital 
gains rate is adjusted proportionately to the rates on ordinary income, but 
the resulting reduction in progressivity is greater with the simplified tax 
structure.37
Although the simplified tax structure moves the federal tax system 
somewhat away from its current progressivity, it would remain highly 
progressive. In 2050, for instance, the first quintile would pay 1.2-1.3 and 
1.5-1.7 percent of combined taxes under the current and simplified struc-
tures, respectively, for the different scenarios; for the middle quintile, taxes 
would be 10.4-10.8 and 11.2-12.2 percent, respectively; and for the top 5 
percent the share of all taxes would vary between 38.1 and 39.4 percent 
for the current tax structure and between 33.7 and 36.5 percent under the 
simplified tax structure.38 If these distributional results were judged to dif-
fer more than is desired from the current progressivity of the tax burden, 
the tax liabilities could be adjusted by using somewhat more elaborate 
procedures than the committee used to fine-tune the tax parameters, such 
as the exemptions, standard deductions, numbers of tax rate brackets and 
their tax rates.
The committee chose a simple tax structure that started by approxi-
mately replicating the current distribution of the tax burden. This choice 
does not reflect the committee’s position on any particular distribution 
of the burden. Rather, our goal was to show ways to raise the revenues 
required by the spending scenarios. If policy makers and others prefer a 
somewhat more or less progressive system, it can be achieved with relatively 
minor changes in the parameters of the committee’s version of a simplified 
system.
Whatever the tax structure or the population group, all the committee’s 
scenarios except the low one reduce the after-tax incomes of taxpayers. To 
one degree or another, all taxpayer groups would shoulder the increased tax 
burden in the three scenarios that include substantial increases in federal 
spending.
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CONCLUSIONS
This chapter’s illustrative options demonstrate some of the broad 
choices for modifying the federal tax system in order to collect the rev-
enues needed in the committee’s four paths to fiscal sustainability. For the 
scenarios requiring higher revenues, increases in payroll taxation can be 
combined with increases in personal and corporate income taxation, which 
is feasible both to raise the needed revenue and approximately retain the 
current tax burdens. Our illustrations show that there is enough flexibility 
in the current personal income tax structure so that a VAT (a new, major 
tax) would need to be added only in the high spending and revenue scenario 
under this current tax structure. Tax policy that simplifies the current cor-
porate and personal income taxes can achieve the highest required revenues 
without adding a VAT.
The illustrations show that well into the future, a simplified income 
tax structure (combined with higher payroll taxes) yields extra revenue by 
eliminating or modifying current tax expenditures. Enough extra revenue 
comes from such base broadening that a new tax like a VAT need not be 
added, even at the highest illustrated revenue level. In fact, by and large, 
under a simplified income tax structure, the marginal rates of personal 
income taxation would start low and decline over time and still provide 
the necessary revenue. In contrast, if the current tax structure (including 
tax expenditures) is retained, these rates would start higher and generally 
increase over time to meet the revenue requirements.
The debate over whether and how to raise revenues to pay for a given 
level of future spending offers an opportunity to consider alternatives to 
the current tax system that could be more efficient, simpler, and more 
conducive to economic growth. In any tax regime, high marginal tax rates 
tend to distort economic decisions, tend to lower growth, and—especially 
for personal and corporate income taxation—tend to reduce incentives 
for work and investment. But unavoidably difficult tradeoffs in values are 
implicit in the choice between the current tax structure and a simplified tax 
structure for personal income taxation.
After a transition, the committee’s illustrative policies, which use 
straightforward approaches to setting the rates, exemptions, and other 
parameters of the tax law, show somewhat less progressivity in combined 
federal tax burdens under the simplified tax structure than the current tax 
structure for each of the illustrative paths of revenue needs. And this differ-
ence in the distribution of tax burdens tends to increase over time, despite 
the similar starting points used.39
The simplified tax structure’s reduction in progressivity might be miti-
gated or avoided by adjustments or additions to its details—such as raising 
the capital gains tax rate relative to that on ordinary income, adjusting the 
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indexation of the standard deduction, and other changes that would have 
beneficial tax effects on low- and moderate-income single-earner families. 
Rather small changes to combined marginal tax rates—single percentage 
points—could change the conclusions of this distributional analysis. The 
simple illustrations here stop short of such fine tuning, which would surely 
be a part of an actual legislative process.
The current tax structure—characterized by complexity and many nar-
row tax expenditures—and current tax rates have resulted from past policy 
debates and reflect the current balance of political interests. Higher revenue 
levels, accompanied perhaps by bold changes to establish a simplified tax 
structure for the personal income tax or introduce a VAT, would require dif-
ferent tradeoffs and a new consensus. The options presented here suggest, in 
broad outlines, the kinds of changes in tax structure that may be required 
if a decision is made to achieve fiscal sustainability by raising revenue levels 
to match higher future spending, taking into account the effects of such 
changes on efficiency, growth, and the distribution of tax burdens
NOTES
1. Other new federal taxes that have been proposed by some people include a carbon tax 
and increasing federal taxation on gasoline and diesel fuel. For simplicity, we considered 
only a VAT, which many countries have implemented successfully. A national sales tax 
might be possible in the United States, but we have not estimated this possibility in our 
scenarios. We also note that taxes are one kind of government revenue: customs duties 
and a miscellany of other receipts account for the remainder.
2. Controlling health care spending—including employer-provided care—is likely to have 
an indirect effect that would raise taxable compensation, boosting both payroll and 
personal income tax revenues in the future (compared with the baseline). This effect is 
likely because employers (often facing international competition) would probably have to 
defray increased health insurance costs out of taxable pay. Controlling health care costs 
would mitigate this reduction in taxable compensation, which would then be higher than 
otherwise. We have not attempted 75-year modeling of this indirect link between control-
ling health care spending and tax revenue, just as we do not model the macroeconomic 
consequences of alternative structures of the personal income tax. On the general rela-
tionship between health cost inflation and taxable compensation, see Nyce and Schieber 
(2009).
3. Personal income taxes also are paid by Subchapter S corporations, a few of them quite 
large.
4. Average tax rates can affect other aspects of behavior, too. Average rates for the commit-
tee’s illustrative options are discussed below.
5. The arithmetic of tax expenditure dollars is complex—the figures shown are just simple 
examples. An estimate of the revenue loss of a particular tax expenditure makes sense 
only in reference to a particular tax base and rate schedule.
6. Income tax compliance costs have been variously estimated at between 10 and 20 percent 
of revenues collected. Such estimates typically apply a per hour wage rate to the estimated 
number of hours that Americans spend on tax compliance activities.
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7. We note, however, that because there is no cap on the mortgages that receive favorable 
tax treatment, there is an incentive to overinvest in housing relative to other assets.
8. Any kind of tax reform or tax simplification would be complicated. Moreover, the transi-
tion to a simplified structure is itself risky, difficult, and costly; see Congressional Budget 
Office (1997).
9. In addition to the more general (i.e., theoretical) studies cited throughout, the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation routinely applies its two macroeconomic models to estimate how 
major tax changes would effect the overall economy (see, e.g., Committee on Ways and 
Means, 2009b:531,538; Joint Committee on Taxation, 2005).
10. Martin Feldstein (2006) briefly summarizes most of this literature. For more detail, see 
also Carroll et al. (1998, 2000a, 2000b) and Gentry and Hubbard (2004). On the effect 
on the equilibrium (i.e., steady-state) level of the capital stock see Joint Committee on 
Taxation (2005). Robert H. Frank presents evidence that somewhat higher marginal tax 
rates do not alter behavior or undermine productive activities (2005). Roughly similar, 
but a very different form of analysis, an international statistical comparison of economic 
growth rates found no association with the level of taxation, controlling for other po-
tential and actual influences (Lindert, 2003).
11. The efficiency effects of tax changes are only one consideration. Below, we analyze the 
distributional consequences of illustrative tax structures.
12. Data on trade data are the average of imports and exports from the International 
Monetary Fund (2007a); data on investment are the average of inflows and outflows of 
portfolio and direct investment from the International Monetary Fund (2007a).
13. The total combines national and subnational governments. From 1995 to 2006, the 
average top individual income tax rate in the 30 OECD countries fell from 48 percent 
to 41.9 percent, and the comparable rate in the United States fell from 46.7 percent to 
41.9 percent.
14. Another study compared 80 countries. It found that the United States had the 18th high-
est marginal effective tax rates on business investment for 2008, behind such countries 
as India, Canada, Italy, and Germany (Chen and Mintz, 2008:2-3).
15. This is a controversial matter. Other fiscal experts are concerned that a “race to the 
bottom” in tax rates would go too far and result in cutting back important government 
services. Some jurisdictions, including Ireland, Hong Kong, and the Cayman Islands, have 
become tax havens and offer very low or zero income tax. Policy makers have expressed 
concern that such jurisdictions attract tax avoidance activities. However, some econo-
mists argue that tax havens have generally positive effects on the world economy. Hines 
(2006), for example, argues that by helping firms reduce their taxes on reported profits 
in high-tax countries, havens may help increase real investment in high-tax countries. He 
also argues that tax havens nearly always have good governance structures.
16. However, the contrary view (see the preceding note) deemphasizes this focus on the 
effects of high tax rates and views corporate tax competition as really an international 
“race to the bottom”—a zero-sum attempt to attract mobile capital. The result, accord-
ing to this view, is a restriction on every nation’s tax tools that makes all tax systems less 
progressive, with a lighter burden on capital and a heavier tax burden on labor, which is 
less mobile.
17. For a reasonable start, see Blum and Kalven (1953).
18. In 2006, at least 20 million returns, or about 15 percent of the total number filed, entailed 
negative tax liability. The number of tax returns with precisely zero liability was about 
25 percent larger, 25 million than the number with negative liability (Internal Revenue 
Service, 2009:Table 2)
19. Only 4 of 30 OECD countries now have top income tax rates that exceed 50 percent.
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20.	 For	simplicity	and	because	its	revenue	yield	is	dwarfed	by	that	of	the	personal	income	
tax,	we	have	not	 explored	 increasing	 the	proceeds	 from	 the	 corporate	 income	 tax	by	
broadening	 its	base—without	 raising	 the	 statutory	 rate.	Although	we	have	mentioned	
the	 corporate	 tax’s	 statutory	 and	 marginal	 tax	 rates,	 its	 average	 rate—influenced	 by	
exclusions	from	taxable	income—is	important	too,	especially	in	comparison	with	other	
countries.	 Just	as	 the	 simplified	 tax’s	broadening	of	 the	personal	 income-tax	base	 can	
increase	proceeds	while	lowering	statutory	and	average	rates,	so	can	broadening	the	base	
of	the	corporate	income	tax.
21.	 In	2006	the	typical	VAT	rate	for	the	15	countries	was	19.8	percent.	For	details	of	VAT	
rates,	 see	European	Commission	 (2009);	 for	VAT	revenues,	 see	Organisation	 for	Eco-
nomic	Co-operation	and	Development	(2008c).
22.	 However,	Social	Security	benefits	are	indexed	to	price	inflation,	so	these	benefits	would	
be	protected	from	this	aspect	of	the	transition	to	a	VAT.	Similarly,	the	actual	services	paid	
for	by	Medicare	and	Medicaid	would	not	diminish	after	a	VAT,	although	out-of-pocket	
medical	spending	would	rise.	 (A	dollar	spending	cap	for	Medicare,	Medicaid,	or	both	
[see	Chapter	5]	would	need	to	take	the	price	effect	from	a	VAT	into	account.)
23.	 The	AMT	is	indexed	to	price	inflation	but,	in	time,	real	growth	in	incomes	makes	more	
taxpayers	subject	to	it.	The	price-indexed	thresholds	of	the	tax	brackets	are	retained	in	
our	approach,	as	are	the	current	tax	expenditures.
24.	 In	fact,	it	is	not	worthwhile	to	set	up	a	VAT	structure	to	collect	at	the	low	rate	of	0.9	
percent.	For	simplicity,	these	data	reflect	the	financial	pressures	on	the	tax	system	struc-
ture,	not	short-term	administrative	responses.	At	least	in	the	later	years	of	the	scenarios,	it	
appears	that	no	practical	VAT	with	the	base	we	have	specified	could	replace	the	personal	
income	tax:	it	would	be	in	addition	to	it.	A	national	sales	tax	might	be	possible,	but	we	
have	not	estimated	this	possibility	in	our	scenarios.
25.	 The	simplified	tax	would	retain	the	current	tax’s	“worldwide”	treatment	of	cross-border	
income	flows	by	continuing	to	tax	American	companies	on	foreign	profits.
26.	 The	Tax	Policy	Center	modeled	both	the	illustrative	current	tax	and	simplified	tax	poli-
cies	for	the	committee.	For	more	information	on	the	center’s	microsimulation	model	and	
how	it	 is	applied	to	model	the	federal	tax	system,	see,	especially,	Rohaly	et	al.	 (2005)	
and	Burman	et	al.	(2008c).
	 	 Because	of	the	need	to	revise	and	extend	the	model	to	project	two	very	different	tax	ap-
proaches	almost	75	years	into	the	future,	this	aspect	of	the	committee’s	study	used	certain	
aspects	of	slightly	earlier	data,	assumptions,	and	scenarios	than	presented	in	Chapter	9.	
(The	only	exceptions	are	that	Figure	8-1	and	part	of	Table	8-1	use	the	baseline	data	in	
Chapter	9.)	Three	differences	are	noteworthy.
	 	 First,	 although	 both	 chapters	 rely	 heavily	 on	 Congressional	 Budget	 Office	 (CBO)	
projections,	the	revenue	projections	here	use	certain	long-term	assumptions,	such	as	infla-
tion	rates,	that	CBO	made	before	it	made	those	that	we	use	in	Chapter	9.	(For	example,	
for	the	years	after	2018,	this	chapter’s	long-term	inflation	rate	assumptions	were	those	
made	August	2008,	while	those	in	Chapter	9	use	CBO’s	subsequent	June	2009	assump-
tions.)	However,	the	somewhat	different	projections	used	have	little	or	no	effect	on	the	
comparison	here	of	the	study’s	illustrative	revenue	policies	because	these	are	modeled	as	
changes	from	the	study	baseline,	not	as	absolute	levels.
	 	 Second,	(except	for	Figure	8-1)	this	chapter’s	revenue	baseline	differs	somewhat	from	
the	comprehensive	baseline	applied	to	Chapter	9	and	described	in	Appendix	B.	However,	
both	baselines	do	assume	that	most	of	the	2001	and	2003	tax	cuts	are	permanent	and	
extend	the	2009	treatment	of	 the	AMT	and	the	estate	 tax,	and	both	baselines	project	
future	 revenue	 collections	 at	 18	 to	 22	 percent	 of	GDP	 during	 the	 75-year	 projection	
period.
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  The third difference of note relates to the assumed timing. Both chapters assume 
revenue changes start in 2012, and Chapter 9 assumes spending changes start then, too. 
However, the revenue needs that drive this chapter’s data were based on preliminary mod-
eling that delayed spending reforms. Especially for the earlier years, delaying the spending 
reforms tended to result in higher debt service generally and, in some instances, higher 
noninterest spending before spending reductions took place. Consequently, this chapter’s 
resulting tax policies generate slightly higher revenues than needed for the scenarios of 
Chapter 9. This “error” is on the side of prudence. But this small difference has little 
or no effect on this chapter’s comparison of the eight illustrative revenue policies—since 
they are all affected the same way by the projected revenue needs.
27. For each instance of a simplified tax structure, the second (or “upper”) tax bracket ap-
plies to incomes exceeding those for the first (“lower”) bracket Our illustrations vary 
both the personal tax rates and the thresholds for these brackets (see Appendix E).
28. The simplified tax structure is designed to start with approximately the same relative 
burdens as current law projected to 2012. That is done by adjusting its parameters then, 
specifically, the tax bracket thresholds, the standard deduction, and the child tax credit. 
Over time, other parameters are also adjusted to meet revenue needs, such as the tax 
rates for the two brackets and the rate on capital gains and qualified dividends. Although 
the simplified tax is designed for approximate distributional neutrality in 2012, its tax 
burdens might shift over time to meet revenue needs. Because of this possibility, the study 
compares the later projected burdens of the current and simplified taxes against each 
other.
29. The cap would be indexed using the chained consumer price index (CPI)—generally con-
sidered more accurate than older versions of the CPI (see Chapter 6). The chained CPI 
would also be used to index future payments in Option 1 for Social Security (discussed 
in Chapter 6).
30. In the low scenario, current tax structure rates stay fixed, by the design of this 
scenario.
31. Other measures of the distribution of the federal tax burden are useful as well. One is 
tax paid as a percentage of income, which is also the average tax rate; see Tables E-13 
through E-18 in Appendix E. Also, the estimates of the future distribution of tax burdens 
rely heavily on projection of the income distribution, which in turn relies on CBO long-
term projections. For estimation, the income breaks between the quintiles are as follows 
(in 2009 dollars): 20 percent, $19,429; 40 percent, $37,634; 60 percent, $65,903; and 
80 percent, $112,079. That is, the top quintile comprises people with annual incomes 
above $112,079, and the bottom quintile comprises those with incomes below $19,429. 
The top 10 percent group starts at $162,348, and the top 5 percent at $227,254.
32. The payroll tax would be affected in a variety of ways under the illustrative Social Se-
curity options of Chapter 6 (summarized in Table 8-1, above). The intermediate-2 and 
high scenarios not only increase the Social Security payroll tax, but they also move its 
relative burdens in the progressive direction. Currently, the excess of annual earnings 
above $106,800 is exempt from Social Security payroll taxation, but both options would 
impose an additional tax (at a lower rate) above the current tax cap. Moreover, the high 
scenario would raise the current tax cap so that additional upper-level earnings would be 
subject to taxation at a higher rate. Although payroll tax increases first become effective 
in 2012, they would be phased in very gradually, so that, for a given revenue level above 
“low,” the distributional differences between the current and simplified tax structure 
almost exclusively reflect the change in income tax structure.
33. For details on effects of the payroll tax over time, see note 32.
34. These results show changes in tax distributions for future projections on the basis of 
commonly used assumptions about the level and distribution of income, both total 
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income and by source. As in the recent past, economic developments—financial booms 
and busts, technological innovations—will result in differences from these projections 
in unforeseeable ways. Still, both the distributional findings for tax structures and the 
various scenarios are based on the same set of economic projections.
35. For a given scenario—such as high—the differences in the distribution of combined taxes 
between the current and simplified taxes very likely would reflect the different structures 
of the personal income tax. The differences in the distribution do	not reflect the payroll 
tax, because the current and simplified taxes for a given scenario include the same payroll 
taxes (see Table 8-1). Another point refers only to the high scenario. With the current 
tax structure only, this scenario includes a VAT that would rise from 8.1 percent in 2050 
to 14.6 percent in 2080. The rising VAT likely explains why—for the top 5 percent—the 
difference in after-tax income between the current and simplified tax structures is 7.5 
percentage points in 2050, but narrows somewhat to 5.9 percentage points in 2080.
36. Whatever the tax structure, increasing the gap between the marginal tax rates for capi-
tal gains and ordinary income expands the incentive to shelter income as capital gains. 
Such sheltering (i.e., tax avoidance) is both inequitable and inefficient. The current gap 
between the top statutory rate on ordinary income (35 percent) and the 15 percent 
rate on capital gains is 20 percentage points. Under the current tax structure for the 
intermediate-2 scenario in 2050, these percentage rates are 40.9 and 17.5 respectively, 
which increases the gap, to 23.4 percentage points. For the same scenario under a sim-
plified tax structure, rates of 22.2 and 13.3 mean a smaller gap than at present, of 8.9 
percentage points. The gap in the tax rates for ordinary income and capital gains can 
be reduced by taxing capital gains more heavily, but that risks curtailing investment and 
international competitiveness.
37. This appears in the disaggregated findings for the top quintile—not shown here—into the 
80-90, 90-95, and 95-99 percentile groups, as well as the top 1 percent and 0.l percent 
groups. Although, in absolute terms, those findings are very sensitive to the projected 
income distribution, they do show the high-end effects of tax structure, given the income 
projection.
38. Historically, lower maximum tax rates have led upper-income taxpayers to exert less ef-
fort converting their taxable incomes into nontaxable forms because there is less financial 
incentive for them to do so.
39. However, this comparison of relative tax burdens under three of the scenarios (not the 
low one) shows that taxes increase for all taxpayer groups in all years.
9Multiple Paths to Sustainability
The nation’s long-term fiscal situation requires action soon. The choices 
required are difficult. Given competing pressures for higher spending and 
lower taxes, consensus on forceful action will be difficult to achieve. A 
major objective of this report is to indicate spending and revenue policy 
choices that, in the right combinations, could put the federal government 
on a fiscally sustainable course.
This chapter shows how the policy options described in the previous 
chapters can be combined to create four illustrative spending-and-revenue 
paths, each meeting the tests of fiscal sustainability presented in Chapter 3 
(see Figure 9-1). One would sharply reduce spending growth (relative to the 
baseline) to keep revenue requirements close to the recent historical level. 
Another path—with substantially higher revenue requirements—would 
expand spending for defense and other domestic programs, allow Social 
Security spending to grow as it would under current policies, and require a 
more modest slowing in the growth of Medicare and Medicaid. Two inter-
mediate paths illustrate a possible tradeoff between new spending on public 
investments and spending for elderly oriented entitlement programs.
These four paths do not by any means exhaust the panoply of potential 
policy solutions to the fiscal challenge, but they do provide some sense of 
the lower and upper bounds of the available choices and embody a range of 
philosophical values and views on government. The paths also illustrate the 
difficulty of the decisions facing the nation: each requires decisive changes 
in federal spending, and three of the four require higher revenues. To allow 
time for a national discussion on these difficult decisions, and recognizing 
the risk of introducing major changes too early in the expected economic 
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recovery, the committee’s four scenarios are designed to begin in fiscal 2012. 
The process of making painful choices, however, must begin now.
In the study baseline, the ratio of the debt to the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) is projected to reach about 65 percent in 2011 and continue 
rising (see Chapter 1 for a description of the study baseline; see details in 
Table F-2 in Appendix F). In contrast, in all four of the committee’s paths, 
revenues are adjusted so the debt-to-GDP ratio declines to 60 percent by 
2022 and stays at that level thereafter; see Figures 9-2 and 9-3 (also see 
Tables F-3 and F-4 in Appendix F). The next four sections provide the 
substantive details of each of the four paths; technical details on their con-
struction are in Appendix F.
LOW SPENDING AND REVENUES PATH
The low path illustrates how revenue needs could be held close to their 
historic levels by adopting the low spending options for each of the three 
policy areas: see Figure 9-4 and (for the difference in spending and revenue 
levels between the low scenario and the study baseline) Figure 9-5. (For 
details; see Tables F-5 and F-6 in Appendix F.) Medicare and Medicaid 
spending growth would be allowed to exceed the economy’s growth rate 
only to accommodate the increasing number of people eligible for these pro-
grams due to changes in the age and gender composition of the population. 
Achieving this zero percent excess cost growth rate would require “strong 
medicine.” In the near term, it likely would entail direct reductions in the 
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FIGURE 9-1 Projected federal spending under the committee’s four scenarios.
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FIGURE 9-2 Projected federal debt under the committee’s four scenarios.
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FIGURE 9-3 Projected federal deficits under the committee’s four scenarios.
growth of federal health spending, although systemic reforms that improve 
incentives, information, and efficiency might allow these painful and distor-
tionary restrictions to be loosened eventually. Social Security growth would 
be reduced to a level that would allow payroll taxes to be maintained at 
current rates while putting the program on a course to solvency; benefit 
changes would be designed to have least effect on people with lowest earn-
ings. Merely to allow these health and retirement programs to grow with the 
size of eligible populations and the economy while keeping revenues near 
the current level, the proportion of the economy’s resources devoted to all 
other federal responsibilities would have to be sharply reduced.
Federal revenues could remain at approximately 18.5 percent of GDP 
through 2025, but would have to increase to 19.2 percent by 2035 and 
fluctuate around that level through 2083. (For comparison, in the study 
baseline federal revenues are projected to reach 18.3 percent of GDP in 
2019, 18.9 percent in 2035, and 21.8 percent in 2083.) On this path, the 
combined revenues of all U.S. governments—including those of the state 
and local levels at about the same proportion of federal revenues as now—
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would stay below the current average of advanced economies belonging to 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
HIGH SPENDING AND REVENUES PATH
At the other end of the spectrum, the substantial revenue increases 
assumed in the high path allow a smaller (though, in the longer term, still 
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FIGURE 9-5 Deviation from the study baseline for revenues and noninterest out-
lays under the low committee’s scenario.
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FIGURE 9-4 Federal spending and revenues under the committee’s low scenario.
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substantial) reduction in the growth of health spending, Social Security 
spending sufficient to provide currently scheduled benefits, and higher 
spending on other domestic and defense programs; see Figures 9-6 and 9-7 
(for details see Tables F-11 and Table F-12 in Appendix F). Medicare and 
Medicaid spending would increase at a decreasing rate, eventually achieving 
zero percent excess cost growth. Current benefit levels would be maintained 
for future Social Security recipients. The share of resources allocated to all 
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FIGURE 9-6 Federal spending and revenues under the committee’s high scenario.
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FIGURE 9-7 Deviation from the study baseline for revenues and noninterest out-
lays under the committee’s high scenario.
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other federal responsibilities would be slightly below the level as a percent-
age of GDP in 2008, but still a significant expansion relative to the study 
baseline.
To support the spending policies under this scenario, revenues would 
have to reach 22.4 percent of GDP in 2019, 25.9 percent in 2035, and 31.7 
percent in 2083—the last being an approximately 45 percent increase over 
the study baseline revenue share of 21.8 percent for that year. There is little 
doubt that the current tax structure could not be used to collect revenues at 
these levels, making extensive structural reforms and new revenue sources 
(such as a value-added tax) necessary. If state and local revenues grow 
proportionately, by the end of the projection period the U.S. public sector 
would account for about one-half of the U.S. economy—a share about as 
large as that in the Scandinavian countries or France today.1 Such compari-
sons are subject to the caveat that other countries may find themselves on 
a higher future spending trajectory as well, given that they are subject to 
similar pressures both from an aging population and the pressures of ex-
cess cost growth in the health care sector. The high revenues and spending 
path will appeal to those who want to preserve current program benefits 
wherever possible, and those who do not believe that it is possible to curtail 
health spending growth substantially without harm to health outcomes. 
This scenario also may appeal to those who anticipate that the nation will 
need major new public investments to maintain robust growth or to address 
international or environmental crises.
TWO INTERMEDIATE SPENDING AND REVENUES PATHS
Two intermediate scenarios illustrate ways of making tradeoffs among 
different spending priorities. The intermediate-1 path can be characterized 
as focused more on public-sector investments, while the intermediate-2 
path dedicates more resources to elderly oriented entitlement programs; see 
Figures 9-8, 9-9, 9-10, and 9-11 (for details, see Tables F-7, F-8, F-9, and 
F-10 in Appendix F). Relative to the high spending path, both scenarios 
would curtail the growth of Medicare and Medicaid through a combina-
tion of direct spending reductions and systemwide reforms. Similarly, the 
intermediate-2 path would curtail the inflation-adjusted growth of Social 
Security benefits. The intermediate-1 path would place tighter limits on 
the growth of these elderly oriented programs than the intermediate-2 
path—although not to the same extent as the low spending path. (Although 
the intermediate-1 path would reduce Social Security benefit growth for 
most, those with higher earnings would experience slight real cuts relative 
to the benefits scheduled under current law.) Compared to the baseline, 
the intermediate-1 path also expands the resources dedicated to other fed-
eral functions (though not to the same extent as the high path), while the 
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FIGURE 9-8 Federal spending and revenues under the committee’s intermediate-1 
scenario.
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FIGURE 9-9 Deviation from the study baseline for revenues and noninterest out-
lays under the committee’s intermediate-1 scenario.
intermediate-2 path cuts back on commitments in these areas (though not 
to the same extent as the low path). The intermediate-1 scenario, in other 
words, does more to constrain spending on the elderly to allow the federal 
government to take on some new responsibilities, make selective public 
investments for the future, and maintain defense spending at the baseline 
level. The intermediate-2 scenario, in contrast, gives priority to protecting 
the health and benefits of the elderly at the expense of reductions in defense 
and other domestic spending.
0 CHOOSING THE NATION’S FISCAL FUTURE
Fig9-10.eps
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
2008 2023 2038 2053 2068 2083
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
o
f
G
ro
s
s 
D
o
m
e
s
tic
 
Pr
o
du
c
t
Interest
Defense and Domestic
Social Security
Medicare and MedicaidRevenues
FIGURE 9-10 Federal spending and revenues under the committee’s intermediate-2 
scenario.
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FIGURE 9-11 Deviation from the study baseline for revenues and noninterest out-
lays under the committee’s intermediate-2 scenario.
Revenue requirements would initially be slightly higher for the 
intermediate-1 than the intermediate-2 scenario. However, as the costs of 
Social Security and (especially) Medicare and Medicaid begin to escalate, 
this gap becomes progressively smaller and disappears by 2035. Thereafter, 
the revenue requirements for the intermediate-2 path are higher than those 
for intermediate-1. Revenue levels for the intermediate-1 and intermediate-2 
scenarios are at 21 and 20.1 percent of GDP in 2019, 22.6 percent (for 
both) in 2035, and 24.2 and 26.4 percent in 2083. If state and local rev-
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enues grew at the same rate as federal revenues over the 75-year projection 
period, the share of the economy accounted for by the entire public sec-
tor in both scenarios would eventually equal or surpass the current aver-
age of the countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.2
SUMMARy OF THE PATHS
All four paths presented in this chapter would put the federal budget 
on a sustainable course. Medicare and Medicaid spending as a share of 
GDP is reduced relative to the baseline in all four; the range of variation, 
however, is quite large. Social Security spending as a share of GDP is lower 
than the baseline in three scenarios and unchanged in a fourth. Spending on 
other federal programs as a share of GDP is higher than the baseline in two 
scenarios and lower than the baseline in two others. Revenues as a share 
of GDP are higher than the baseline in three scenarios and remain near or 
slightly above their recent historical average in a fourth.
The committee recognizes that it is not wise to introduce major deficit 
reduction during a downturn or early in a recovery. Therefore, our illustra-
tive scenarios introduce the first policy changes in 2012. As one benchmark 
for assessing the realism and potential economic impacts of such changes, 
we have compared the magnitude of the changes, as percentages of GDP, 
with those that were enacted in 1993 as part of the Clinton Administration’s 
economic plan. For the paths presented in this study, savings from policy 
changes would be about twice as large in the first year as those that were 
estimated when the 1993 plan was enacted (1.1 percent and 0.5 percent, 
respectively), but much closer in magnitude by the fifth year (1.9 percent 
and 1.5 percent, respectively).3 The past is at best an imperfect guide to 
the future. Still, it is noteworthy that passage of the 1993 fiscal plan was 
followed by sustained economic growth, which most people believe was 
aided by an accommodative monetary policy. The lesson may be that a 
responsible fiscal policy can reassure financial markets and create room for 
the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates, helping to offset the contraction-
ary effect of tighter fiscal policy.
It is important to note, as mentioned in Chapter 2, that in estimating 
these scenarios we have made no effort to estimate how different mixes of 
spending and tax policies could alter future economic growth. The absence 
of clear evidence about the relationships between policy choices (even those 
that substantially change levels of spending and revenues) and economic 
growth makes it impractical to model those effects (Kobes and Rohaly, 
2002), even though some understanding of these relationships would be 
part of the ideal development of budget policy. Therefore, readers will 
need to form their own judgments about whether certain policy mixes (e.g., 
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those that include prudent public investments) will be more likely to yield 
higher future growth than others (e.g., those that promote the formation 
of private capital).
The committee’s scenarios illustrate that it is possible to construct 
any number of plausible spending and revenue paths over a wide range 
of ideological orientations and policy preferences, each consistent with 
long-term fiscal sustainability. The scenarios demonstrate that a person 
who is seeking to protect specific values and interests can find a preferred 
approach, although not one that is pain-free. The scenarios demonstrate 
that any path to sustainability will require difficult choices in most policy 
areas. For example, even the least constrained spending scenario (with high 
revenue requirements unprecedented in U.S. history) will ultimately require 
a nontrivial change in the growth trajectory for federal health spending. 
The illustrative scenarios also suggest that it may not always be easy to 
label paths to sustainability as “conservative” or “liberal.” For example, 
the intermediate-1 and intermediate-2 paths have the same revenue require-
ments in 2035, but they allocate federal resources quite differently.
Putting the federal budget on a fiscally sustainable path is not just an 
accounting exercise; distributional implications are also important. Al-
though it would be useful to estimate how the four illustrative scenarios 
vary in their impact on people at different income levels, options for 
health, defense, and other domestic programs do not lend themselves to 
distributive analysis: the Medicare and Medicaid spending trajectories are 
not tied to fixed combinations of specific reforms; defense is a public good 
whose distributive implications are all but impossible to estimate; and the 
components of the aggregate-level options for other domestic programs are 
explicitly illustrative and, by definition, incomplete. Therefore, although the 
committee estimated in Chapter 8 the effects of different revenue levels and 
tax structures by income level, it was unable to perform such an analysis on 
the spending side (with the exception of Social Security in Chapter 6)—let 
alone quantify the joint impact of revenue and spending choices. The one 
thing that can be said with certainty, however, is that by moving away 
from the unrestrained practice of borrowing to pay for current spending, 
all four scenarios leave future generations better off than they would be 
otherwise.
Consequences of Delayed Action
The committee’s analysis and projections are based on an assumed 
“starting date”—that is, the year when policy changes will begin to af-
fect spending and revenues—of 2012. Policy makers will have to judge, 
based on the condition of the economy and other factors, whether to make 
changes of the proposed magnitude beginning in 2012. They might choose, 
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for example, to postpone some of the first-year changes by a year or more. 
Delay would mean, however, that the risks of carrying a larger debt would 
be extended and the eventual cost to the budget of a policy adjustment 
would be larger. To estimate the consequences of delayed action, we have 
modeled 5- and 10-year delays (see Appendix F for additional details).
Delayed action would result in higher near-term deficits, which would 
result in a higher debt. This higher debt, in turn, would require more inter-
est to service, adding further to deficits and debt.
If action is delayed until 2017, the debt-to-GDP ratio will have risen 
to 72.1 percent by 2016, rather than 64.9 percent had remedial action 
begun in 2012. Using the intermediate-2 scenario as the basis for estimat-
ing the cost of a 5-year delay (other scenarios yield very similar results), 
revenues would peak at 22.3 percent of GDP rather than 21.2 percent (see 
Table F-13 in Appendix F; for comparison with revenues, see Table F-9 in 
Appendix F). In other words, revenues would have to be about 5 percent 
higher at their peak if budget reforms are delayed just 5 years.
The estimated consequences of a 10-year delay in addressing the fiscal 
challenge—to 2022—are more than twice as severe as those for a 5-year 
delay. Again using the intermediate-2 scenario as a basis, a 10-year delay in 
remedial action would allow debt to rise to nearly 83 percent of GDP before 
remediation begins (see Table F-14 in Appendix F; for comparison with 
revenues, see Table F-9 in Appendix F). Because of the additional revenue 
needed to reach the target debt-to-GDP ratio thereafter, revenues would 
have to be about 12 percent higher at their peak than in the intermediate-2 
scenario.
The consequences of a delay of 10 years are more than twice as severe 
as those for a delay of 5 years for two reasons. First, because of com-
pound interest on the additional debt, doubling the years of delay more 
than doubles the addition of debt. A doubled delay to attain a sustainable 
debt-to-GDP ratio would thus require more than twice as large an increase 
in revenue, even with everything else unchanged. Second, during those 10 
years the number of Social Security, Medicare, and elderly Medicaid benefi-
ciaries would have been increased by retirement of additional baby boom-
ers. Thus, such a delay would put program spending on a permanently 
higher trajectory even when the same specific policy reforms are eventually 
introduced. Although even a 5-year delay would add greatly to the difficulty 
of reaching sustainability, a 10-year delay would more than double the dif-
ficulty of putting the nation’s budget on a sustainable path.4
How delay makes it more difficult to achieve sustainability can also be 
assessed in a second way, as requiring a bigger reduction from projected 
spending (compared with the baseline), rather than as a further increase 
in revenue. To stay within the revenue bounds of the intermediate-2 sce-
nario (i.e., which assumes policy changes are introduced in 2012), a 5-
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year delay would require steeper spending reductions. For instance, Social 
Security, Medicaid, and Medicare would have to be cut to the level of the 
intermediate-1 scenario, and domestic and discretionary spending would 
have to be cut even further—to that of the low scenario (see Table F-15 
in Appendix F; for comparison with revenues, see Table F-9 in Appendix 
F). The combination of delayed—but more deeply cut—spending paths 
requires a revenue path that is close to that of the intermediate-2 scenario 
without a delay, but a delay means lower levels of public services.
However, if spending reductions were delayed by 10 years, no combi-
nation of the reduced spending paths we have modeled could be sustained 
and hold needed revenue within the bounds of the intermediate-2 scenario 
(see Table F-16 in Appendix F; for comparison with revenues, see Table F-9 
in Appendix F). Despite the lowest spending paths the committee has esti-
mated (as part of the low revenue and spending scenario), with a 10-year 
delay the revenues required are markedly higher than with the intermedi-
ate-2 scenario. In contrast, the intermediate-2 scenario without delay leads 
to lower taxes and more public services. This projected outcome is another 
indication that a 10-year delay is far worse than one of 5 years.
As noted in Chapter 6, the illustrative Social Security reforms were 
designed both to achieve a financially stable program and to contribute to 
the sustainability of the federal budget as a whole, and to do so without 
raising payroll taxes or reducing benefit growth more than required to 
ensure the program’s long-term solvency. Having already considered con-
sequences for the whole federal budget if these specific, detailed changes to 
Social Security are delayed 5 or 10 years, what is the consequence for that 
program’s solvency? As shown in Tables F-17 and F-18 (in Appendix F), 
none of the illustrative reforms if delayed comes close to achieving solvency 
(see Tables C-1 and C-2 and the accompanying text in Appendix C). Rela-
tive to reform undertaken starting in 2012 (i.e., not delayed), delayed Social 
Security reform helps the program’s finances much less for two reasons. 
First, on-time reforms affect more baby boomers than delayed reforms, 
which is important because the illustrative benefit-growth reductions are 
restricted to new retirees. Second, delaying increases in payroll taxation 
raises less revenue than needed for program solvency, particularly because 
of the slower growth of the labor force that is projected. Overall, our analy-
sis shows that to achieve budget sustainability with delay, reforms would 
have to be tougher—deeper spending reductions or higher tax increases or 
both—which would make delayed reform more politically difficult than 
more immediate reform.
Another consequence of delay cannot be modeled. That is the height-
ened risk that the nation’s creditors—especially, those abroad—will recog-
nize that the United States has no credible plan to restore fiscal stability and 
so demand higher interest rates on their loans or even broader economic 
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changes. With higher interest rates, and thus more of the budget devoted 
to debt service, the available revenues for programs would shrink, and the 
options for corrective action on the spending side would become still more 
difficult.
The Political Challenge
Given the magnitude of the fiscal challenge facing the nation and the 
costs of delay in meeting it, action would seem to be urgent. Yet the dif-
ficulty of the choices required, the nature of the U.S. political system, the 
record of most recent efforts to address the nation’s fiscal health, and con-
tinuing pressures for higher spending and lower taxes all suggest that early 
and decisive action will be difficult.
One way to increase the likelihood of appropriate and timely action 
would be to adopt budget process reforms such as those described in the 
next chapter. Budget reforms, while not sufficient in themselves to cause 
leaders to address the long-term fiscal challenge, can encourage and sup-
port those willing to make tough choices. The final chapter of the report 
addresses the kinds of actions needed by the nation’s people and leaders to 
avoid a fiscal catastrophe.
NOTES
1. If state and local revenues remained at about their current percentage of GDP rather 
than growing in line with federal revenues over the projection period, total U.S. govern-
ment revenues would be about 45 percent of GDP after 75 years. For projections of U.S. 
state and local government revenues and spending through 2050, see the Government 
Accountability Office (2007a).
2. International comparative statistics on public revenues and expenditures are available 
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2009). These es-
timates are based on National Income and Product Accounts concepts, which generally 
result in higher figures for both revenues and spending compared to U.S. federal budget 
concepts and the corresponding estimates used in this report. However, for purposes of 
the general comparisons made here, we are assuming that estimates using the National 
Income and Product Accounts and U.S. federal budget concepts remain roughly propor-
tional to one another across time and with changes in levels.
3. The 1994-1998 percentages use GDP as estimated by the Congressional Budget Office 
(1994).
4. Part of the added budget cost arises from additional health and Social Security benefits. 
However, another part arises from a delay in controlling price inflation in health care 
costs.
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Fiscal Stewardship:  
A Budget Process for the Long Term
Herbert Stein, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers under Presi-
dents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, famously said: “If something cannot 
go on forever, it will stop.” But there is a corollary—how it stops matters.
As detailed throughout this report, significant dividends would be real-
ized by addressing the fiscal challenge that faces the nation before it forces 
precipitous and hasty actions in the face of intense economic, social, and 
political pressures. If started early enough, changes in social, economic, and 
fiscal policy commitments can be phased in gradually, giving the American 
public time to make adjustments in their own retirement and savings plans 
and their expectations about the role of government in their lives. Whether 
change arrives through a gradual process of timely course corrections or 
as a rude shock from economic forces over which the United States will 
have little control may depend on whether the nation can reform the way 
it makes budget decisions.
The best-designed budgeting process cannot make the hard choices 
easier. But once those choices have been made, a well-designed process can 
support leaders who are prepared to meet the long-term fiscal challenge. 
The committee has concluded that the federal government’s current budget 
process does little to facilitate the actions needed to address the nation’s 
fiscal challenge and would do little to preserve any hard-won gains achieved 
by those actions.
Any budget is a plan for the fiscal future, but the way the federal govern-
ment currently formulates its budget is weighted toward the past. Established 
programs and tax expenditures favor the interests and needs of current gen-
erations in the competition for resources, at the possible expense of future 
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generations. The budget process needs to represent not only the interests 
and needs of the moment, but also those of the future. If the needs of today’s 
taxpayers are not properly balanced with those of tomorrow’s, future genera-
tions may suffer a loss in living standards and may have to contend with a 
severe economic crisis.
In this chapter the committee discusses a set of budget process reforms 
that would promote and sustain a new regime of more responsible budget 
stewardship. Specific reforms are proposed that would provide both policy 
makers and the public with a clear picture of the long-term implications of 
budget proposals, provide incentives for the President and Congress to act 
responsibly, and promote accountability for their actions or for their failure 
to act. Better process cannot provide political will, but it can reinforce the 
resolve of leaders who are prepared to face the long-term fiscal challenge 
and act as responsible stewards.
We offer what we believe are the essential elements of a reformed bud-
get regime that focuses attention on the long-term challenge. In the next 
section we first provide the context with a brief discussion of the political 
challenge of instituting such reforms. The rest of the chapter presents the 
elements of a proposed new budget regime, one that would add informa-
tion, set medium- and long-term fiscal goals, and enhance accountability 
by policy makers for meeting those goals.
THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE
Budgeting is always an exercise in hard choices. In any democracy, it is 
especially difficult to allocate fiscal sacrifice. The groups that benefit from 
specific tax and spending programs are almost always more organized than 
the general public that would benefit from responsible budget changes.
Tackling long-term fiscal challenges is even more daunting and politi-
cally challenging. Taking on programs that drive long-term deficits raises 
vexing challenges for the current generation of decision makers. Today’s 
voters must be convinced to make sacrifices in current consumption and 
promised government benefits in order to reduce the probability of a fu-
ture crisis and to improve the living standards of the next and future 
generations.
Rather than facing the proverbial wolf at the door, taking on the 
nation’s long-term fiscal challenge is, as once suggested by Charles Schultze 
(former chair of the Council of Economic Advisers), more akin to dealing 
with the termites in the woodwork—a problem that is not immediately 
apparent but can bring the entire house down if not dealt with proactively. 
For example, if policy makers wait until the Social Security trust fund is 
insufficient to pay benefits, the federal deficit will already have grown to 
a level that will damage economic growth and saddle the budget with 
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ever-growing interest payments. The information needed to address Social 
Security’s unsustainability is available now, but nothing in the process re-
quires that it be recognized and addressed now, when it could be dealt with 
much more easily than later.
The nature of budgeting also has changed in recent decades in ways 
that complicate the exercise of budgetary discipline and resolve. Before the 
1960s, the lion’s share of spending was provided through discretionary 
appropriations. The appropriations committees, largely controlled by mem-
bers with relatively safe seats, took a fiscally conservative and incremental 
approach to the budget, keeping spending growth from outpacing revenues. 
Since then, however, as the scope of government benefits grew to meet hu-
man needs, most spending came through open-ended entitlements, which 
are not subject to annual review or to budgetary caps. There has also been 
an increase in open-ended tax expenditures on the revenue side, which are 
also subject to neither annual review nor caps.
Leadership
Some observers believe that the political risks of tough choices are so 
high that only an economic crisis will compel leaders to change the nation’s 
fiscal course. And history suggests that political leaders rarely step forward 
to lead such an effort as long as there are no obvious and compelling eco-
nomic or political consequences today of current policies. If the historical 
pattern holds, it presents a bleak prospect for meeting the current challenge, 
because, as the committee’s analysis shows, waiting for a crisis will cause 
unprecedented economic and political harm to the nation.
Other evidence is more encouraging, however. The recent history of 
developed nations indicates that deficit reduction and major policy reform 
are not politically impossible tasks for the leaders of advanced democra-
cies. Some nations have made substantial reforms in their own pension 
and tax systems in the past 20 years (see Penner, 2007). One recent study 
of the past 40 years of fiscal history in nations of the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) found that incumbent 
governments that institute policies to reduce deficits are rewarded with 
reelection (Government Accountability Office, 1994; see also Brender and 
Drazen, 2008). Although deficit reduction is never easy, leaders who take 
decisive action can then position themselves as taking measures necessary 
to protect the nation’s economy and finances and protect the interests of 
the next generation.
The United States, too, has taken some significant steps in recent years 
to change the course of fiscal policy. In 1983, the National Commission 
on Social Security Reform (known as the Greenspan Commission, after its 
chair) formulated convincing analyses and arguments that led to political 
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consensus for reforms to Social Security. The reform, which included both 
tax increases and reductions in benefits for retirees, did not fully solve the 
program’s sustainability problems but it greatly ameliorated them.
Similarly, in 1990, the nation adopted a budget agreement that consti-
tuted significant deficit reduction, to be followed by similar action in 1993; 
see Box 10-1. That agreement, engineered by leaders of both major parties, 
helped turn the federal government from then-chronic deficits to a 4-year 
period of budget surpluses.
These examples illustrate how leaders can confront politically charged 
fiscal challenges (see Light, 1995). The 1990 example provides both a 
positive and a cautionary message. It created budget process rules that for 
almost 10 years brought discipline to budget decisions. But the rules were 
eroded when budget surpluses seemed to make budget discipline less im-
portant. Partly as the result of the abandonment of those rules, the budget 
surpluses soon disappeared.
These infrequent examples of far-sighted leadership can provide guid-
ance for how to break through long-standing gridlock to produce major 
BOX 10-1 
The 1990 Budget Agreement
	 In	1990,	 the	nation	 faced	a	budget	 crisis	brought	on	 in	part	by	a	projected	
deficit	 far	 in	excess	of	 the	 targets	established	by	 the	Gramm-Rudman-Hollings	
Balanced	Budget	 and	Emergency	Deficit	 Control	 Act	 of	 1985	 (Pub.L.	 99-177).	
That	act	had	established	annual	deficit	targets	and	required	an	automatic	cancel-
lation	of	budget	resources	for	many	programs	if	the	target	for	a	given	year	was	
exceeded.	The	projected	deficit	 for	fiscal	1991	was	so	 far	 in	excess	of	 the	 leg-
islated	target,	and	the	resulting	automatic	cuts	would	have	been	so	severe,	that	
leaders	began	bipartisan	negotiations	to	find	new	targets	and	a	new	approach	to	
budget	discipline	as	an	alternative	to	one	they	considered	unworkable.
	 Under	this	pressure,	President	George	H.W.	Bush	and	Democratic	congres-
sional	leaders	negotiated	a	set	of	tax	increases,	cuts	in	entitlements,	and	limits	on	
discretionary	appropriations.	These	policy	actions	were	supported	by	enactment	
of	procedural	reforms	incorporated	in	the	Budget	Enforcement	Act	of	1990.	The	
act	legislated	dollar	caps	on	discretionary	appropriations	spending	for	fiscal	1991-
1995	(later	extended	through	2002)	and	instituted	a	new	pay-as-you-go	(PAYGO)	
regime	that	required	any	new	tax	cuts	or	entitlement	expansions	to	be	offset	by	
other	benefit	cuts	or	tax	increases	over	the	following	5	(later	10)	years.	The	1990	
actions	were	updated	in	1993	with	another	set	of	major	cuts	and	tax	increases,	
along	with	extensions	of	the	budget	process	rules.	The	budget	rules,	constraints	
on	discretionary	programs,	and	PAYGO	offsets	were	observed	through	much	of	
the	decade,	until	the	emergence	of	budget	surpluses.	Ironically,	of	course,	those	
surpluses	were	partially	brought	about	by	these	earlier	actions.
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fiscal reforms (see Fabrizio and Mody, 2006). One interesting lesson from 
this history is how leaders can take advantage of how the public views most 
major fiscal issues. On fiscal issues, the public is not of one mind, but at 
least two. A July 2009 New York Times/CBS News poll confirmed what 
other polls and research has consistently shown: a majority of people want 
the deficit to be reduced but about the same majority do not want spend-
ing cut or taxes increased. This ambivalence provides an opportunity for 
leaders to reframe issues to appeal to the latent public support for fiscal 
restraint, and a sustainable longer-term fiscal path.
The Role of Process
Political leadership is essential to fiscal reform, but the rules and in-
stitutions of the budget process can make important contributions. They 
determine the kinds of information available and how it is used, shape 
incentives for action, and establish accountability for the results of those 
actions (Meyers, 2009). Budget processes frame the most important deci-
sions made by a political system in a given year: how much of the economy 
to devote to government through taxes and how to allocate spending of 
limited resources.
No one should expect any budget process to persuade legislators to 
endure severe political pain. But well-designed rules can nudge them in the 
right direction and can provide political “cover.” They can say that, con-
trary to their personal preferences, “The rules made me do it.”
But budget processes are produced by the same system that produced 
the problems they seek to address (see Anderson and Sheppard, 2010). 
When major budget enforcement measures were adopted in 1990, they 
were designed to lock in deficit reduction achieved through negotiated 
revenue and spending policy agreements. In other words, policy makers 
first made the difficult decision that deficit reduction was imperative. Then, 
with considerable difficulty, they negotiated an agreement to achieve it. 
The new rules were negotiated last, and they were designed primarily to 
prevent the Congress from allowing the hard-won package of deficit reduc-
tions to erode over time. A properly designed budget process can highlight 
the important consequences of different courses of action and can force 
leaders to acknowledge explicitly and take responsibility for the long-term 
consequences of their decisions. Far-sighted and strong budget rules can 
also help leaders take on both near- and long-term deficits by providing 
fiscal targets and restraints.
BUDGET REFORM FOR RESPONSIBLE STEWARDSHIP
The long-term fiscal outlook depicted in this report argues for a new 
way to use the budget to institutionalize a long-term perspective and pro-
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vide leaders with the tools needed to forestall looming fiscal crisis. Consis-
tent with the history of budget process reform, there is reason to believe 
that a more forward-looking process can help to support the initiatives of 
those leaders who are willing to make the case for fiscal responsibility.
The committee favors reforming the budget process to make it more 
focused on the long term and to establish a new system of responsible 
budget stewardship. The current budget process is focused primarily on 
the short term. It uses a 5- or 10-year time frame as the primary period for 
the baseline, and the costs of most proposals are factored into the decision 
process only for that period. While existing congressional rules enforcing 
discretionary spending ceilings and PAYGO offsets may prevent new actions 
that make deficits worse, the current regime does not prompt Congress or 
the President to go beyond current baselines to achieve deficit reduction. 
It contains nothing that requires changes in major drivers of the long-term 
fiscal outlook—Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and tax policy. More-
over, the current process sets no explicit fiscal goals or targets for long-term 
deficits or debt. Budgetary costs are largely presented on a current cash 
basis, which is misleading for programs whose present commitments imply 
future costs that are much larger than their current cash effects on the defi-
cit. As with most OECD nations, existing long-term sustainability analyses 
are not integrated into the budget process in the near term (Anderson and 
Sheppard, 2010). Given this orientation, it is not surprising that the process 
has not encouraged leaders to deal with the looming problem.
Recent actions have expanded the time horizon for budget decisions in 
certain areas, providing a possible model for broader reforms. The 2003 
Medicare prescription drug legislation instituted a funding warning that 
requires the President to propose changes when the portion of general 
revenue financing exceeds 45 percent, although Congress has undermined 
the provision by eliminating the requirement for expedited congressional 
review. The Senate has included a “four decade” rule for new mandatory 
spending that requires the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to estimate 
costs for the subsequent four decades, bolstered by a point of order that 
can be raised on the floor. Although this provision has entered into debates 
on occasion, it is still too soon to know whether it will provide significant 
institutional self-restraint.
The rest of this section discusses three major areas in which reform is 
needed to highlight the long-term implications of current programs and to 
encourage decision makers to act now to place the budget on a sustainable 
long-term path: information, goals and targets, and accountability.
Information on Long-Term Implications of Current Decisions
A first step for reform of the budget process would be better informa-
tion about the fiscal future. Such information would provide a strong foun-
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dation for other reforms. With better information, the long-term outlook 
and related analyses would be highlighted as part of the budget process. 
The President could use long-term analyses to provide an annual fall report 
on the fiscal state of the nation and to develop a budget for the following 
fiscal year. Congress could use long-term projections to develop its annual 
budget resolution, set enforceable medium- and long-term budget targets, 
and use these to guide its annual choices in appropriations and reviews of 
mandatory spending and tax policy.
More broadly, new and more prominent information about the long-
term implications of current and proposed policies—with appropriate ca-
veats about the uncertainties that surround any such projections—could 
be used by the public to assess whether a proposed budget meets the tests 
of fiscal prudence presented in this report, to assess the long-term implica-
tions of pending budget proposals, and to hold leaders accountable for the 
long-term consequences of their budget choices.
Information alone cannot be expected to change ingrained practices. 
However, like the slow effect of water dripping on stone, the gradual intro-
duction of new fiscal measures and better information can, in fact, highlight 
and elevate the long-term dimension of major policy debates.
Better information on the long-term outlook and consequences of 
today’s budget choices can also help leaders reach the right choices. The 
seriousness of the projected long-term fiscal challenge has been no secret 
to policy makers. CBO, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and 
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) all prepare annual as-
sessments of the budget outlook decades ahead.
In the past decade, a growing number of countries have independently 
adopted some version of long-term fiscal projections as part of their budget 
planning. Long-term fiscal projections provide a way to assess and discuss 
the sustainability of current public policies by quantifying the long-term 
fiscal consequences of those policies, as well as the effects of demographic 
and other changes on selected summary fiscal indicators. Their use is still 
limited to a relatively small number of industrialized countries, and it is too 
early to assess whether they have affected budget choices. (See Appendix G 
for a summary of information from 12 OECD countries on long-term fiscal 
projections.)
In the United States, the presentation and consideration of such infor-
mation is divorced from the decision-making process: it is presented sepa-
rately from and at different times than CBO’s reports on the 10-year budget 
outlook. Adding or enhancing information, developing new metrics, and 
changing how information is presented and used in developing the federal 
budget could increase the visibility of and accountability for the long-term 
consequences of budget choices.
The committee offers three proposals for more long-term information 
in the budget process: integrating treatment of long-term budget projections 
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into annual budget documents and making them prominent; expanding use 
of information on fiscal exposures in CBO and OMB budget reports; and 
increasing the use of accrual accounting.
Integration of Long-Term Budget Projections
Although OMB, CBO, and GAO all prepare long-term budget projec-
tions, these are not highly visible. OMB’s analysis appears in the Analytic 
Perspecties volume of the President’s budget. CBO’s long-term analysis 
is prepared on a different cycle than its regular budget baseline reports 
and update. GAO updates its reports throughout the year, but must wait 
for updated data from CBO and the annual Social Security and Medicare 
Trustees reports. All of the reports provide important information on the 
budget’s long-term trends, but nothing in the current annual budget process 
requires that this information be used in that process, so these reports are 
easily ignored.
As a first step, OMB and CBO could readily integrate presentation of 
their long-term fiscal outlooks with their near-term budgetary baselines by 
updating and publishing long-term projections in their initial and midyear 
budget reports. It would also be very valuable if the long-term impact of 
the President’s budget policies became a regular section of the main budget 
volume, with long-term projections included in that volume’s Summary 
Tables. In the same vein, it would be very valuable if CBO’s long-term 
outlook were updated every time the agency updates its budget baseline. 
Other countries do a better job of highlighting their long-term outlook in 
ways that are hard for policy makers and the public to ignore: Australia is 
one example; see Box 10-2.
Information on Fiscal Exposures
Some of the largest federal programs have costs that grow exponentially 
over the long term. Their longer-term cost projections are not disclosed in 
either budget authority or outlay columns in the budget. GAO has coined 
the term “fiscal exposures” to refer to such activities, which include federal 
insurance and operations and maintenance for newly acquired capital, as 
well as long-term spending estimates for the pension and health benefits 
of current employees. Some of these exposures are defined as liabilities in 
federal financial statements; but others, such as Social Security, Medicare, 
and Medicaid, are not. Yet all of them will require future expenditures that 
are not fully reflected in near-term or even 10-year projections that are 
prepared routinely by CBO and others (see Government Accountability 
Office, 2003). OMB’s Analytical Perspecties volume includes reporting 
on assets and liabilities, but it does not include the same range of commit-
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BOX 10-2 
Australia’s Experience with Long-Term Budgeting
	 Australia	is	one	of	the	leaders	in	long-term	budgeting.	The	figure	immediately	
below	shows	how	the	long-term	budget	outlook	improved	in	Australia	between	the	
first	intergenerational	report	made	in	2002	(IGR1)	and	the	second	5	years	later	
(IGR2).
Australian Intergenerational Report, 2007: Comparison of IGR1 and IGR2 
Projections of Primary Balance
NOTE:	Since	IGR1,	there	have	been	some	changes	in	projection	methodologies	
incorporating	new	data	and	modeling	approaches.
Australia’s Operation Sunlight
	 On	April	16,	2006,	the	then	Shadow	Minister	for	Finance	released	a	discussion	
paper	entitled	“Operation	Sunlight—Enhancing	Budget	Transparency”	setting	out	
recommendations	to	enhance	budget	transparency	and	accountability.	The	report,	
revised	in	2008,	proposes	that	the	Australian	government,	among	other	things:
	 •	 	Produce	an	Intergenerational	Report	every	3	years	with	greater	disaggre-
gation	of	expenditure	information	at	the	program	level;
	 •	 	Investigate	 the	 utility	 of	 a	 whole-of-government	 triple-bottom	 line	 (eco-
nomic,	environment,	and	social)	chapter	in	the	Intergenerational	Report;
	 •	 	Make	it	mandatory	for	all	new	programs	subject	to	significant	demographic	
risk	be	assessed	and	reported	over	a	40-year	horizon	consistent	with	the	
Intergenerational	Report;	and
	 •	 	Extend	the	length	of	forward	estimates	presented	together	with	the	budget	
from	3	to	6	years	(including	the	budgeted	fiscal	year)	for	programs	likely	to	
be	subject	to	demographic	pressures.
SOURCE:	Commonwealth	of	Australia	(2007).	Reproduced	by	permission.
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ments as GAO’s analyses. CBO’s budget reports do not include estimates 
for such exposures.
As an initial small step toward greater awareness of the longer-term 
dimensions of fiscal exposures, the magnitude of such commitments could 
be noted in the schedules of the President’s budget. Ideally, OMB would 
work with agencies to implement an exposure concept, by recording the 
net present value of future costs for specific program activities in the budget 
for which such information is relevant, appropriate, and feasible. Govern-
ment Accountability Office (2003) recommended that such information 
be recorded in a column alongside the more familiar outlays and budget 
authority recorded for all programs.
More broadly, both policy makers and the public would be well served 
if OMB and CBO were required to produce annual reports on fiscal expo-
sures, which would serve as counterparts to GAO’s analyses. These three 
agencies could work together to assess methodological issues in estimating 
these exposures.
Accrual Accounting
The federal budget mostly relies on cash accounting to estimate the 
amount and timing of program costs. That accounting is generally the most 
appropriate measure to capture the current-year effects of federal fiscal 
policy on the economy and on the borrowing needs of the Treasury. How-
ever, for selected programs, cash accounting provides misleading signals to 
federal policy makers about the financial costs of commitments that extend 
far beyond the current year.
Cash understates the longer-term costs of some programs that represent 
long-term contracts. For these programs, costs may arise far in advance of 
when cash is needed to satisfy obligations: for example, federal deposit and 
pension benefit guarantee insurance programs often show up as earning 
surpluses on a cash basis in the budget, even though their underlying risks 
and longer-term deficits are known to actuaries and auditors. In these cases, 
an accrual approach should be considered using the best methods available 
to estimate accruing costs.
An accrual approach would record the net present value of long-term 
contractual commitments in the year they are made, regardless of the actual 
flow of cash payments. In 1990, the federal government adopted such an 
accrual approach to replace the cash approach for loan and loan guarantee 
programs—recognizing that near-term cash flows understate the magnitude 
and risks associated with loan guarantees and overstate the commitment 
implied by direct loans. Accrued net present value better captures the 
underlying costs to the federal Treasury over the longer term and records 
these costs as outlays (and therefore as part of the deficit calculation) at 
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the time the commitment is made. Using present value accounting to move 
forward the time when the cost of long-term commitments is recognized in 
the budget improves incentives for policy makers to take timely action if it 
is needed to address their costs.
The federal government similarly could adopt accrual budgeting for 
such commitments as federal employee pension and retiree health care 
costs, which are currently recognized as liabilities on the federal financial 
balance sheet. It would also be valuable to consider adopting accrual ap-
proaches to estimating the budgetary costs of such contingent liabilities 
as insurance programs. Moving to accrual for insurance would require 
additional research and complex modeling to capture the longer-term risks 
assumed by government for uncertainties, such as natural disasters and 
other unpredictable events.
Fiscal Goals and Targets
The committee believes that establishing a set of fiscal goals and targets 
is essential to gaining control of the fiscal future. Setting fiscal goals is a 
critical first step in institutionalizing consideration of the long-term out-
look. Above all, it would force acknowledgement of the unsustainability 
of current policies.
In recent years, many nations have adopted fiscal targets and frame-
works that helped them become fiscally responsible. In New Zealand, for 
example, the adoption of overall fiscal targets, in concert with market pres-
sures, reframed policy debates; see Box 10-3. Sweden followed a similar 
approach. Fiscal targets had an impact not through formulaic cuts, but by 
providing a compelling way to frame budget debates on the basis of the 
long-run implications of current budget choices. In both countries, earlier 
fiscal and economic crises made fiscal goals important, and leaders risked 
criticism if their fiscal outcomes fell short.
In the United States, Congress last set overarching fiscal goals under the 
1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which prescribed declining deficit tar-
gets for the federal budget. However, the goals were applied in a mechanical 
fashion that proved to be politically unsustainable, as unprecedented eco-
nomic fluctuations moved the goals further away regardless of the actions 
taken by the policy makers. Chastened by this experience, policy makers 
turned to spending targets under the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 
1990, with a focus on holding themselves accountable for decisions they 
controlled, namely, the overall size of discretionary spending and new 
entitlements and tax cuts. Although this approach was more realistic and 
feasible for the United States, the BEA regime did not address the growth 
of spending or revenue losses for existing programs. That is, it prevented 
legislative acts from making things worse when in force, but contained no 
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mechanism for significantly improving the long-term outlook. Subsequently, 
the abandonment of overarching fiscal policy goals and targets has left 
Congress and the President without a framework to assess the long-term 
consequences of current policy or new proposals. Nor does it reward them 
for doing so.
The setting of long-term fiscal targets could be adapted to the current 
budget process. As explained in Chapter 3, the committee judges that a 
60 percent upper limit on the ratio of debt to the size of the economy (as 
measured by the gross domestic product, GDP) would be an appropriate 
fiscal goal for leaders to put in place over the next two decades. Formal 
adoption of such a goal now can help leaders develop fiscal policies to 
constrain the exponentially growing levels of debt implied by the nation’s 
current fiscal path.
A practical question is how to integrate such long-term fiscal goals into 
a budget process that is predominately focused on the near term. The long-
term outlook is the starting point for formulating alternative fiscal policy 
targets that would create a more sustainable fiscal future. However, no one 
would suggest that the federal government should prepare a detailed budget 
for the next 50 or 75 years. Rather, since the federal budget is prepared 
annually, long-term goals should serve as a guide for the formulation of 
policies that would lead to a sustainable debt level over the next 10 or 20 
years. In the United States, any such fiscal target would have to be renewed 
with each administration and each Congress.
BOX 10-3 
New Zealand’s Budget Principles
	 New	 Zealand,	 since	 1994,	 has	 followed	 a	 legally	 enshrined	 set	 of	 budget	
principles,	 and	 the	Government	 is	 legally	 required	 to	 assess	 its	 fiscal	 policies	
against	these.	The	principles	include:	reducing	public	debt	to	prudent	levels;	once	
these	have	been	achieved,	maintaining	them	by	ensuring	that,	over	a	reasonable	
period	of	time,	operating	expenses	do	not	exceed	operating	revenues;	sustaining	
a	net	worth	that	provides	a	buffer	against	adverse	events;	managing	fiscal	risks	
prudently;	and	pursuing	policies	 that	contribute	 to	stable,	predictable	 future	 tax	
rates.	It	is	left	to	the	government	to	interpret	terms	in	the	law	such	as	“prudent”	
and	“reasonable.”	A	government	may	depart	from	the	principles	if	it	specifies	its	
reasons	and	a	plan	to	return	to	the	principles	in	a	specified	period	of	time.	Every	
4	years	the	government	presents	a	statement	of	New	Zealand’s	“long-term	fiscal	
position,”	including	a	40-year	budget	projection	and	accompanied	by	a	“statement	
of	responsibility,	signed	by	the	Secretary	of	the	Treasury,	attesting	that	his	Depart-
ment	used	its	best	professional	judgments	about	the	risks	and	outlook	(Anderson	
and	Sheppard,	2010).
FISCAL STEWARDSHIP 
A frequent review of the fiscal targets would allow the problem to be 
addressed iteratively, in politically manageable bites. The target may need 
to be adjusted and phased in over the near term, for instance, to avoid pre-
cipitous fiscal actions that might jeopardize the economic recovery. In such 
major policy areas as health care, progress will in all likelihood proceed in 
iterative stages. Thus, although the next budget offered by the President or 
approved by Congress will likely not contain sufficient specific proposals 
to eliminate the excess growth of health costs, it could include actions to 
make progress to that end and make a commitment to continue to address 
the problem in the long run.
In the United States, assuming that inflation remains under control, 
annual deficits that average around 2 percent of GDP would be consistent 
with maintaining a debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent. As discussed in pre-
ceding chapters, simply meeting a 2 percent deficit target will become more 
fiscally ambitious over time unless actions are taken to modify the growth 
paths of the major entitlement programs or to adjust tax revenues—the key 
drivers of the long-term outlook.
Medium- and long-term fiscal targets could be established in the annual 
congressional budget resolution and then used to assess both the President’s 
budget and the congressional policy actions. The budget resolution and ac-
companying committee reports would have to explicitly address the nature 
of the policy actions that Congress will take to achieve the debt target 
over the next 10 and 20 years. CBO could be required to review this sec-
tion and provide its own estimate of the impact of these proposed policies 
on the debt target. A new congressional procedure (point of order) could 
be considered to reinforce the establishment of debt targets in the budget 
resolution.
CBO’s report also could assess the implications of these policy changes 
on the long-term outlook over the next 50 years. Although budget resolu-
tions may not provide sufficient detail to generate detailed estimates over 
the long term, a report that provided even some assessment of the budget 
resolution’s impact on the long-term target would provide useful insights. 
Such a report could, at a minimum, assess whether the budget resolution 
would make the long-term outlook better or worse.
Accountability
Fiscal targets and goals are not self-enforcing. Rather, a framework is 
necessary to hold leaders accountable for meeting targets. As difficult as 
reaching agreement on targets might be, sustaining commitment over time 
is even more difficult.
The accountability framework the committee proposes has four ele-
ments. First, it would require the President to provide an accounting of the 
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long-term fiscal outlook and the administration’s plans to address it. Sec-
ond, it suggests that longer-term fiscal goals should be reinforced through 
a budget enforcement regime that would help ensure that the goals cannot 
be ignored without consequences. Third, it would ensure a periodic review 
of the major drivers of long-term deficits on both the spending and rev-
enue sides of the budget. Fourth, it would require that beyond the 10-year 
budget projection period, the long-term fiscal effects of new proposals for 
spending or tax cuts be fully offset. Taken together, these reforms would 
establish a budget regime in which the President and Congress share po-
litical accountability for presenting and enacting budgets that take greater 
account of the implications of today’s policies for the federal government’s 
long-term fiscal outlook.
Although reforms such as providing better information and setting fis-
cal goals can increase attention to these issues, the commitment of elected 
officials will be critical to bringing about definitive actions to deal with the 
nation’s fiscal challenge. While the panel is not endorsing specific steps, 
all panel members agree that stronger public accountability for the conse-
quences of deficits both near and long term is needed.
The committee is aware that there are many other proposals for en-
forcing accountability for fiscal goals. For instance a balanced budget 
amendment to the Constitution has been prescribed by some as an in-
escapable restraint on political officials. Although almost all the states 
have such a requirement, a provision like this would not give the national 
government sufficient flexibility to take necessary actions to stabilize the 
economy, which calls for deficits at some times and surpluses at others. In 
addition, although balanced budget requirements seem to promise certain 
discipline, they have, in fact, been undermined by creative fiscal accounting 
in many states—a pattern that is very likely to be repeated in many ways 
at the national level. Moreover, for all the reasons discussed in Chapter 3, 
we believe that a budget’s projections for the debt provide a more appro-
priate indicator of its potential economic impact than whether the budget 
is balanced or not.
Presidential Accountability
In the U.S. system, presidents are uniquely held publicly accountable 
for the performance of the economy. Political scientists observe that the 
state of the economy is a critical factor in a president’s approval ratings 
and the results of subsequent elections (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008). 
Consequently, presidents often initiate policies and programs to try to en-
sure good economic outcomes in time for their own reelection campaigns, 
for their party’s midterm elections, and for their legacies. Enhancing presi-
dential ownership of the long-term fiscal challenge ultimately depends on 
FISCAL STEWARDSHIP 0
whether the public holds the president accountable for long-term fiscal 
outcomes. One way to shape those expectations is to require presidents to 
account for the nation’s future fiscal outcomes annually in a highly visible 
forum. The president could report on the long-term fiscal outlook, based on 
outcomes through the most recently completed fiscal year and the proposed 
or enacted budget for the current year. Until fiscal sustainability is assured, 
this report might take the form of an address in the fall to a joint session 
of Congress. The president’s annual statement of the nation’s fiscal outlook 
would be a reference point for everyone concerned with the sustainability 
of the federal budget. Such a fiscal accounting might come to be widely 
anticipated as a basis for assessing how well the president and Congress 
have done in delivering on the fiscal goals and targets set earlier in the year. 
It would also be a well-publicized starting point for development of the 
coming year’s budget proposals for the long run.
Reinforcing Accountability for Meeting Goals and Targets
There is considerable controversy over whether fiscal goals and targets 
would constitute an effective spur or constraint on policy makers. Both in 
the United States and other countries, experience with fiscal rules—which 
use a summary indicator of fiscal condition to bind political decisions by 
the executive or legislature—has sometimes been discouraging. In order to 
have a meaningful impact on fiscal decision making, policy makers should 
face consequences if they ignore such goals. However, designing a budget 
enforcement regime is always challenging since it requires constraining the 
subsequent choices of political officials who are free to ignore or modify 
their own constraints in a democratic system.
Nonetheless, the committee believes that any fiscal policy regime has to 
specify consequences if fiscal results fall short of targets. Although political 
leaders may choose to ignore fiscal goals in the future, they should none-
theless at least be held accountable in some public way for doing so. The 
existence of a budget enforcement regime that specifies specific sanctions 
for shortfalls may have an independent effect on the fiscal policy decisions 
of policy makers.
Reaching fiscal goals and debt targets calls for a budget process that 
will enable Congress to enact laws to reduce spending and increase rev-
enues. Fortunately, the existing budget process has features that would 
enable Congress to do so. Specifically, the current budget reconciliation 
process provides the budget committees and leadership with a vehicle to 
require the committees to develop the broad legislation that can achieve 
major budgetary savings for the near and longer term. Reconciliation bills 
have the advantage of overcoming the fragmentation of the committee pro-
cess by imposing overarching fiscal savings targets assigned to committees, 
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and with deadlines and consequences. Moreover, reconciliation bills have 
the additional advantage of being governed by special rules in the Senate 
that limit debate and are not subject to filibusters.
In addition, the fiscal goals articulated by the President and Congress 
can be reinforced as they have in the past by discretionary spending caps 
and PAYGO rules that constrain the Congress from adopting new spending 
and revenue provisions that would jeopardize its targets. PAYGO would 
require offsetting legislated changes to increase entitlement spending or 
reduce taxes that would increase the deficit or reduce the surplus with 
changes that would reduce spending or increase revenues. After 1990, 
annual caps on appropriated spending and PAYGO were successful at 
restraining spending increases and tax cuts for several years, making a 
contribution to the balanced budgets achieved for 4 years starting in 1998. 
These rules are currently enforced through congressional points of order. 
However, the underlying statutory framework that provided for fallback 
budget sequesters when the rules are breached was allowed to expire in 
2002. A good first step would be to reinstitute these caps and PAYGO 
requirements in statute, along with the potential sanction of budget cuts 
should the rules be violated.
However, PAYGO and caps will generally not by themselves be suffi-
cient to enforce debt targets. They do not control for the growth of spend-
ing or declines in revenue under existing programs, such as Medicare and 
Medicaid. Accordingly, an accountability framework must include some 
kind of look-back process where the fiscal targets can be compared with 
actual levels of deficits and debt achieved at the end of the fiscal year.
Two of many possible options for imposing accountability if results 
do not meet a target or goal are automatic fall-back actions and a soft 
constraint. Automatic cuts or revenue increases could be triggered if the 
president and Congress fail to achieve the fiscal target. Both the trigger and 
the automatic mechanism used to determine the required spending cuts or 
tax increases would have to be carefully designed, and Congress and the 
president should be able to waive the trigger during economic or national 
security crises. (As noted above, the 1985 Gramm-Rudman experiment of 
enforcing balanced budget goals with automatic cuts failed to gain support, 
partly because the fiscal goals were unworkable and unrealistic, covering a 
relatively narrow range of programs.) Automatic fall-back cuts would need 
to be applied to a broad range of both spending and revenues to have a 
strong base for savings and to promote the principle of equal sacrifice. In 
contrast to an automatic approach, a soft constraint would call on Congress 
to either take subsequent action to meet the target or to go on record that 
the target is unreachable. Such a mechanism relies on the power of shame 
to trigger action through the budget process. Although this approach does 
not involve the complexity of fall-back cuts, it is also a weaker constraint 
that can be more easily ignored.
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Periodic Review of the Drivers of the Fiscal Challenge
Given the importance of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and 
tax policy for the long-term outlook, they will require special attention to 
ensure accountability. Those three programs represent open-ended commit-
ments not only to present beneficiaries and taxpayers, but also to future 
ones. Although some entitlement programs employ trust funds that do have 
limitations, in most cases those limits only become a real constraint years 
after the programs are known to impose a net burden on the budget.1
There are many approaches to promote periodic review of the major 
drivers of the fiscal challenge, three of which are frequently mentioned: 
sunsets, benchmarks, and triggers.
• With sunsets, Congress would set legislated dates for specified 
major entitlements and tax expenditures, but excluding such pro-
grams as Social Security and federal pensions, which represent very 
long-term commitments. An approaching sunset would periodically 
provide an incentive for reexamination of a program’s costs and 
benefits. Although periodic reviews might increase prospects for 
reining in features with fast-growing costs, they do not guarantee 
that reforms will actually occur. Some people object to this ap-
proach because setting sunset dates increases uncertainty on the 
part of individuals and businesses that rely on the programs in 
planning the use of their own resources.
• Another approach to ensure that policy makers periodically ad-
dress the three major entitlement programs and tax expenditures 
would be to establish benchmarks or targets for them. If spending 
exceeded these targets or revenues fell short, the budget process 
could require the President or Congress to propose and Congress 
to vote on measures that would close the gaps as soon as they are 
identified.
• Congress could also enact provisions that automatically trigger 
actions if specified benchmarks or targets for the three major en-
titlement programs and major tax expenditures are not met. The 
use of triggers is controversial among experts. Soft triggers would 
require Congress or the President to either explicitly ignore the 
limit or take some action to address it.2 Alternatively, a hard 
trigger would automatically implement specific spending cuts or 
revenue increases (Penner and Steuerle, 2007). Other nations have 
used various triggers or “automatic balancing mechanisms” tied 
to long-run projections for some or all parts of their budgets with 
good results (Penner and Steuerle, 2007); see Box 10-4.
The committee notes that it is difficult to design fall-back mechanisms 
if targets are not both appropriate and realistic. A hard trigger, for example, 
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must accomplish two seemingly conflicting goals: to be sufficiently punitive 
and unpalatable to force Congress and the President to achieve fiscal actions 
through the regular process; and to be sufficiently realistic and feasible to be 
regarded as credible if the target is not met through the regular process.
In 2008 a bipartisan coalition of budget experts embraced hard trig-
gers for Social Security and Medicare (Brookings-Heritage Fiscal Seminar, 
2008). The coalition’s proposal sets limits on growth for these programs, 
enforced by automatic cuts in benefits and premiums when those limits are 
BOX 10-4 
Automatic Balancing Mechanisms in 
Canada, Germany, and Sweden
In Canada,	 an	 automatic	 balancing	 mechanism	 was	 introduced	 in	 1998	 and	
mandates	action	if:
	 •	 	An	 actuarial	 projection	 concludes	 that	 the	 Canada	 Pension	 Plan	 is	 not	
financially	sustainable;	and
	 •	 	An	agreement	between	the	central	government	and	the	provinces	on	nec-
essary	courses	of	action	cannot	be	achieved.
	 Financial	sustainability	 is	defined	relative	to	the	ability	to	maintain	a	specific	
level	of	contribution	over	a	period	of	75	years.	Should	the	 level	of	contributions	
exceed	a	figure	established	by	 law,	 the	automatic	balancing	mechanism	would	
affect	changes	in	both	contributions	and	pensions.	In	this	situation,	the	contribu-
tion	rate	would	be	increased	by	half	of	the	excess	of	the	steady	state	subject	to	
maximum	annual	increase.	The	remainder	would	be	covered	by	a	freeze	of	pen-
sions	payable	over	a	3-year	period.
In Sweden,	an	actuarial	income	statement	and	balance	sheet	of	the	non-financial,	
defined,	 pay-as-you-go,	 contribution	 scheme	 has	 been	made	 every	 year	 since	
2001.	 In	addition,	an	automatic	balancing	mechanism	can	temporarily	abandon	
the	 indexation	of	pension	rights	and	current	benefits	to	average	wage	growth	 if	
the	stability	of	the	scheme	is	threatened.	Stability	of	the	system	is	defined	by	a	
balance	ratio	that	relates	to	the	scheme’s	assets	and	liabilities.	A	balance	ratio	of	
less	than	1	means	that	the	scheme	is	out	of	balance	(i.e.,	 liabilities	exceed	as-
sets),	and	earned	pension	rights	and	current	benefits	are	reduced	according	to	
the	balance	ratio	rather	than	the	average	wage.	This	will	continue	as	long	as	the	
balance	ratio	is	less	than	1.
In Germany,	a	sustainability	 factor	 linked	to	the	national	dependency	ratio	that	
is	applied	to	the	rate	of	indexation	of	benefits	was	introduced	in	2005.	In	contrast	
to	 the	 triggers	 in	 Canada	 and	 Sweden,	 it	 is	 permanently	 activated—and	may	
only	 be	 deactivated	 by	 an	 act	 of	 parliament—until	 the	 social	 security	 pension	
is	 sustainable	 under	 a	 determined	 contribution	 rate.	 Since	 2008,	 the	 German	
government	must	report	every	4	years	how	to	meet	targets	for	replacement	and	
contribution	rates.
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exceeded. A coalition of opposing experts argued that this proposal was 
unbalanced in its selection of what programs should be subject to fiscal 
discipline, exaggerated the power of numerical targets to force decisions 
on how to balance spending and revenues, and would fail to address the 
growth of tax expenditures that also jeopardize the fiscal outlook (Aaron et 
al., 2008). Complex design choices would have to be faced in establishing 
any triggers, including how the triggers are activated, the resulting actions, 
how triggers can be adjusted for economic downturns, and the frequency 
of reviewing the trigger mechanism to reflect changes in the programs and 
in the overall budget outlook.2 Substantial work would be needed to de-
termine if triggers would be equally effective on the spending and revenue 
sides of the federal ledger. Revenue triggers, which could take the form 
of surtaxes or delays in indexing and other scheduled revenue-reducing 
provisions, would present novel design challenges, as none have yet been 
developed, enacted, or applied.
In the U.S. political system, it should be noted that even a hard trigger 
is not automatic—Congress cannot bind its own future actions, let alone 
those of future Congresses. The Medicare program illustrates the differ-
ential fortunes of soft and hard triggers. Premiums for Medicare Part B 
(doctors’ insurance) are automatically established each year to equal a fixed 
percentage of projected costs for the coming year, and those levels have not 
to date been overturned by Congress. In contrast, the triggers that require 
reductions of doctors’ fees under the Part B program have been routinely 
overturned.3
The concept of triggers itself has triggered significant debate, among 
committee members as well as in the broader policy community. Proponents 
argue that such provisions would not allow these fast-growing determinants 
to grow automatically: the current system places the political burden on 
those trying to slow growth in costs or benefits. In contrast, a hard trigger 
would force program advocates to act to override the triggered changes. But 
opponents argue that triggers could negatively affect beneficiaries. More-
over, some analysts object to the lack of accountability by elected officials 
that are inherent in triggers. For instance, many would argue that cuts to 
doctors’ fees for Medicare have substantive effects on the availability of 
care for the elderly that should be debated on their merits as they occur 
rather than being subject to triggers.
Consideration of the Long-Term Costs of New Policies
Meeting debt targets will require the President and Congress to more 
carefully consider the long-term cost implications of new spending and rev-
enue proposals. To bring consideration of long-term costs into the decision-
making process, policy makers need to have access to information about the 
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long-term cost (or savings) effects of a proposal when it is under consider-
ation. They also have to be able to object to long-term costs they view as 
unwarranted through a point of order or other procedural measure. Cur-
rent rules for consideration of proposed mandatory spending and tax policy 
changes generally limit estimates to a 10-year period, even if the proposed 
change has substantial implications for the budget’s long-term outlook. Yet 
a different rule is well within recent policy tradition: the Senate has already 
incorporated such a point of order in its rules, requiring policies to be 
deficit neutral in each decade over the next 40 years. Both the Senate and 
House have weak rules that attempt to restrain actions that would worsen 
the Social Security deficit. CBO does not currently provide quantitative 
estimates of costs beyond 10 years, but it does provide a qualitative judg-
ment about whether proposals would increase or decrease the deficit over 
the longer term (Elmendorf, 2009).
The 1990 PAYGO requirement that mandatory spending and revenue 
proposals not increase future deficits was enforced not only by the rules of 
the House and Senate, but also by a back-up requirement that, if congres-
sional action increased net spending over a 5- or 10-year period, covered 
entitlement programs would be cut to the extent needed to eliminate the 
increase. It may be useful to consider a comparable procedure for longer-
term costs as well. Although establishing the precise order of magnitude 
for long-term costs may be difficult, it may be possible to create formulaic 
reductions in spending or increases in revenues if proposed new legislation 
would increase the deficit beyond the 10-year period on the basis of CBO’s 
qualitative assessment. Like the 1990 act, a specified formula could provide 
greater incentives to observe long-term fiscal neutrality in considering new 
legislation.
CONCLUSION
Given the serious threat posed by long-term imbalances in the nation’s 
projected spending and revenues, simply waiting for a crisis to force lead-
ers to deal with the fiscal challenge would be irresponsible. Rather, the 
committee concludes that reforms to the budget process are needed now to 
help hold leaders accountable and to support responsible action. Just as in 
the battle to curb cigarette smoking, information, public framing, expert 
studies, and political entrepreneurs will all be important in elevating the 
priority devoted to meeting the nation’s fiscal challenge. The breadth and 
scope of the changes required will call for both budget process reforms to 
galvanize the attention of political leaders and public engagement strategies 
that mobilize the attention of broader publics at the grassroots level.
Nothing can force leaders to take on this challenge absent support 
from the public. However, once hard decisions have been made, enhanced 
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information, fiscal targets, incentives for prudent action, and procedures to 
enhance accountability could make a difference. The reforms and options 
outlined in this chapter could help.
NOTES
1. Trust funds, such as Medicare Part A (hospital insurance), become a net fiscal drain 
on the budget when they are contributing less cash from dedicated taxes than they are 
spending, which is often long before their fund runs out of Treasury securities that enable 
them to pay benefits in full. Even though the fund may be technically solvent, the budget 
incurs a net financial burden as fund-held Treasury securities are redeemed to cover cash 
deficits.
2. If the trigger concept is extended to tax expenditures, there would be particular chal-
lenges, including the several years’ lag before data on revenue losses become available 
and the large number of exogenous factors that affect tax expenditure revenue losses, 
including changes in tax rates and other tax expenditures.
3. This softer trigger, which requires expedited consideration of Medicare reforms, has been 
ignored or bypassed by the House in both years that such a review was triggered. Cur-
rently, the Medicare program has a trigger that is activated when the general revenues 
that support the program exceed 45 percent of the total program. Because the trigger was 
activated for fiscal 2009, the President included in his budget proposals to bring Medicare 
below the threshold, but Congress took no action in response.
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What Should Be Done Now?
The members of the study committee disagree about many questions of 
policy. We hold widely differing views, in some cases, about the priority to 
give different categories of spending, about who should pay for government 
and how much government they should pay for, about the proper division 
of responsibilities between federal and state and local governments, and 
even about the fundamental purposes of government.
What we firmly agree on is the need for strong action now to adjust 
the long-term relationship between federal government spending and rev-
enues—the urgent need to put the budget on a sustainable path. We also 
agree that this is going to be one of the biggest political challenges the na-
tion has ever faced.
WHy IS THIS SO HARD?
Two defining characteristics of the long-term fiscal challenge distinguish 
it from other budget or policy problems and make it difficult for people, 
including leaders, to grapple with:
• The pain of cutting spending, increasing taxes, or both, is immedi-
ate, while the gain of avoiding a fiscal train wreck—and its devas-
tating consequences—is in the future.
• Because all fiscal projections are inherently uncertain, the long-term 
benefit that will result from the short-term pain cannot be precisely 
specified.
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It is tempting, given uncertainty about the future, to discount the problem 
and hope that it will diminish, if not go away. People can use the lack of 
precision inherent in all projections to deny troubles ahead.
When faced with immediate pain and uncertain gains, the natural and 
perhaps rational reaction is to do nothing, to delay. In the case of an unsus-
tainable U.S. fiscal policy, the costs of delay are not immediately obvious. 
They are insidious, and the time in the future when remedial action becomes 
unacceptably painful or no longer possible cannot be pinpointed. Moreover, 
a potential signal of unsustainable policies—higher pricing of U.S. Depart-
ment of the Treasury borrowing to finance current spending—may have 
been masked during the recent downturn by the market’s perception that 
alternative investments are even riskier. If so, interest costs could increase 
before policy makers have had time to act. As described in Chapter 1, 
increased interest costs could lead to escalating problems: first, crowding 
out or forcing abandonment of other government functions and priorities 
as interest payments swallow greater shares of the federal budget; and 
later, decreasing wealth, slowing growth, and reducing future standards of 
living.
Even if everyone becomes convinced today of an urgent need to act, 
differences in values and perceptions of what government should do and 
how to pay for it would constrain possible agreement on what to do. Policy 
disagreements are bound to be intensified by the need to limit what govern-
ment will be able to do in the future. The likely unwillingness of many to 
consider the interests of future generations—perhaps because of profound 
disagreements regarding what those interests are or what sort of govern-
ment should be bequeathed to the future—will complicate choices.
Reaching agreements to minimize and share the inevitable pain may re-
quire a change in political culture toward less partisanship, more openness 
to compromise, and more trust and honest communication between people 
and their leaders. To the extent that compromises can be found and choices 
can be made that allow public resources to be used more productively, the 
needed policy changes can be a positive sum game. But to the extent that 
some government programs will be eliminated or scaled back, it will not 
be a net gain for everyone. To forge agreement on a plan that moves the 
budget to a sustainable path, attitudes and practices will have to change. 
Realistically, such changes will take time. The committee recognizes that at 
least some delay in fully responding to the nation’s fiscal challenge is likely, 
although we stress that delay means the challenge will only loom larger.
In sum, tackling the fiscal crisis is perhaps the toughest kind of political 
problem. Given its characteristics, quick, decisive action to put the nation’s 
budget on a sustainable course may be improbable. Yet if action is not 
taken in the near future, the nation will face a calamity, and the possible 
actions will be fewer and far more disruptive than what is now possible. 
Thus, now is the time to debate alternatives, to choose, and to act. If this 
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is done, the nation’s fiscal course can be corrected in ways that avoid the 
worst pain.
WHy IS DELAy RISKy?
Although waiting is a normal reaction to any difficult problem, in this 
case it is especially risky. Consider two possibilities and their potential 
consequences: (1) that the fiscal problem proves to be overblown or self-
correcting or (2) that the problem is as serious as the committee (and most 
analysts) argue. Even if these two outcomes were equally likely, it is prob-
able that the costs of acting too late or ineffectively would be much greater 
than the costs of acting too soon and too precipitously.1
Consider first the costs of acting to address what proves—contrary to 
all current evidence—to be an exaggerated fiscal challenge. Some people 
point to the risk of having taken large and difficult choices that raise taxes 
or reduce the government’s ability to address many urgent needs but that 
later prove to have been unnecessary. A too stringent fiscal policy could 
slow the growth of the U.S. economy or even tip the economy into another 
downturn. This would, in turn, require a corrective policy response—either 
easing fiscal policy or relaxing monetary policy or both. Yet the probability 
is high that the political system would adjust without difficulty. As at the 
end of the 1990s, the problem of projected endless surpluses tends to be 
self-correcting.
Now consider the costs of failing to act in the face of a serious fiscal 
challenge. The first risk is that of having to take bigger and much more dif-
ficult steps later to put the budget on a sustainable course. At the same time, 
the risks of a disruptive financial crisis would continue to grow. As detailed 
in earlier chapters, such a crisis could take the form of higher interest rates 
on U.S. Treasury debt that would complicate corrective action by draining 
resources for government programs; or it could take a more disruptive 
form. The risk would be compounded if, for instance, standard population 
projections underestimate growth of the elderly population.2 After a tipping 
point that is inevitable but impossible to pinpoint, there will be no simple 
fiscal strategy to bring revenues and spending into alignment. If that point 
were reached, the social and economic costs of delay would explode.
So, there are two possible ways to err. One kind of error—overreacting 
—is readily reversible; the other—underreacting—may not be. That is, the 
committee has concluded that the risks of error in dealing with the fiscal 
challenge are asymmetric. Even in the face of great uncertainty, the safer 
course is to take decisive action soon to change the nation’s fiscal course.
Despite the seriousness and scope of the budget challenges, however, 
there are a number of reasons for optimism and for believing in the efficacy 
of action:
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• If action is taken soon, the nation can preserve Social Security 
and Medicare for future generations close to their current form, 
although not without lowering the rate of growth of benefits and/or 
raising additional revenues to finance them. Even under the low 
spending and revenues scenario outlined in Chapter 9, monthly 
Social Security benefits rise in real terms for most workers. That 
is, even if benefits are sharply reduced relative to current law, most 
future Social Security benefits will still be higher, after inflation, 
than today’s benefits.
• For Medicare and Medicaid, it is more difficult to forecast future 
costs because of the many factors that drive health care spending, 
but benefits are likely to continue to cover at least the big ticket 
health care items for senior citizens. Thus, the fiscal challenges 
facing the United States by no means imply the devastation of 
these programs that have been so instrumental to the well-being of 
senior citizens and to reducing the proportion of seniors who live 
in poverty.
• Although the demographic pressures facing the United States are 
serious, they do not look overwhelming, based on standard projec-
tions of labor force participation, future retirement ages, immigra-
tion, and other relevant factors (cf., Social Security Administration, 
2009d). The U.S. challenge from this source is less formidable 
than that facing most other major industrialized nations—many of 
whom will see much greater imbalances between their working and 
nonworking populations and sooner than the United States.3
• Given its relatively low current tax levels, in comparison with other 
industrialized countries, the United States has more leeway than 
most of its peers to raise revenues, should it take that route, pro-
vided that the tax system is reformed to make revenue collection 
more efficient and to promote economic growth.
Just as an ordinary household can meet its budget challenges by tak-
ing charge, gathering information, and seeking financial advice, the people 
of the United States and the nation’s leaders should feel empowered and 
moved to action, not to despair. The nation’s problems are not insurmount-
able, but the sooner action is taken the more likely is success.
HOW CAN THIS REPORT HELP?
One product of the committee’s study is a framework for analyzing and 
addressing the long-term budget challenge, presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
We believe this framework can contribute to how people think about the 
fiscal challenge and, therefore, what solutions they will consider. Psycholo-
gists have studied the effects of framing on cognition (see, e.g., Kahneman, 
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2002). The proper framework can enable one to use structured reasoning 
in place of immediate perceptions or intuition, leading to better judgments. 
Groups who use a common framework are more likely to find areas of 
agreement. In this case, how the budget problem is presented, and in what 
context it is viewed, will affect the ability of everyone to recognize its es-
sential character and therefore the urgent need for action.
The Committee recognizes, however, that merely describing the problem 
and putting it in proper perspective is not sufficient. Therefore, this report 
uses the framework to develop illustrative budget paths to sustainability. 
These examples—combining major policy options described in Chapters 4 
through 8—show how one can apply the framework to construct a very 
broad range of plausible paths meeting the primary tests of fiscal prudence 
presented in Chapter 3, leading to budget sustainability. The committee 
hopes that these scenarios are used as a starting point for vigorous rational 
debate and early action.
WHAT CAN EVERyONE DO?
When the President proposes a budget and as Congress considers a 
budget resolution or adopts a budget, everyone should apply the six tests 
of fiscal prudence detailed in Chapter 3. Because they are central to the 
committee’s analysis, we repeat them here:
1. Does the proposed federal budget include policy actions that start 
to reduce the deficit in the near future in order to reduce short-term 
borrowing and long-term interest costs?
2. Does the proposed budget put the government on a path to reduce 
the federal debt within a decade to a sustainable percentage of 
gross domestic product (GDP)?
3. Does the proposed budget align revenues and spending closely over 
the long term?
4. Does the proposed budget restrain health care cost growth and 
introduce changes now in the major entitlement programs and in 
other spending and tax policies that will have cumulative beneficial 
fiscal effects over time?
5. Does the budget include spending and revenue policies that are 
cost-effective and promote more efficient use of resources in both 
the public and private sectors?
6. Does the federal budget reflect a realistic assessment of the fiscal 
problems facing state and local governments?
The first tests are particularly hard for nonexperts to apply by them-
selves. Therefore, the committee urges the Congressional Budget Office, the 
U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and other organizations to regu-
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larly publish projections of the long-term effects of the President’s budget 
and alternatives that can be used by anyone to assess the extent to which 
the proposals are sustainable.4
People can also use the six tests to analyze not just the entire budget 
but major policy proposals and legislation that affect the budget—to assess 
their effects on the long-term outlook. To help such assessments, we also 
urge the Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Management and Bud-
get, and other organizations to extend their analyses beyond the standard 
horizon to consider long-term effects of proposed legislation. Interested 
people and groups also can construct their own preferred budgets, using as 
a starting point the analysis of options for major spending categories and 
revenues in Chapters 4 through 8. And in looking at analyses of proposals, 
everyone should be skeptical of the estimates of budget effects provided by 
advocates of a particular proposal and search for analyses of such proposals 
prepared by those who do not have a vested interest in their enactment.
People can communicate their views on all of these matters to political 
leaders and policy makers. It is important for leaders to know that their 
constituents, armed with the facts and working with the right framework, 
can support leaders who advocate policies contributing to a sustainable 
federal budget.
Finally, constituents can reward leaders who make the difficult choices 
needed for long-term budget sustainability. The U.S. political system, with 
its frequent elections, tends to reward lawmakers who support programs 
and policies that have short-term benefits while ignoring long-term conse-
quences. By their own behavior at the ballot box and in direct communica-
tion with leaders and policy makers, people who understand the long-term 
fiscal challenge and recognize that it requires hard choices can push leaders 
to pay attention to the need to meet the long-term challenge.
WHAT SHOULD LEADERS DO?
Leaders obviously have a responsibility to lead and to present budgets 
and policy proposals consistent with a budget that is sustainable over the 
long term. Committee members are well aware of just how difficult it will 
be for leaders to gain broad popular support for any combination of poli-
cies that would put the nation on a sustainable path. The committee urges 
leaders to use the study’s framework to address the fiscal challenge in a 
manner that promotes public support for rational and creative action. It 
may be too difficult—given the nature of the fiscal challenge and the habits 
of partisanship—for leaders to develop specific policies in a single year’s 
budget sufficient to accomplish the entire, large task of aligning spending 
and revenues. However, the coming year’s budget should show a credible 
commitment to policy changes that substantially bend the curve toward 
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sustainability and an explicit commitment to the goal of aligning revenues 
and spending over the long term. The committee’s scenarios allow some 
time for debate and response and for correction of the short-term economic 
situation by assuming that policy changes take effect beginning in 2012.
Only if the process is supportive of forward-looking and prudent fis-
cal policy choices can this problem be solved. If the current federal budget 
process is found to be a hindrance rather than a help—too short-sighted 
and cumbersome—then the first step for leaders may be to change it. The 
committee’s ideas for how to establish a new budgeting regime that is 
forward-looking and provides incentives and means of accountability to 
encourage responsible, far-sighted actions, are presented in Chapter 10. 
Reforms can help leaders act as responsible stewards of the interests of 
the nation’s children and grandchildren. The committee favors reforming 
the federal budget process to use better information about the long-term 
budget outlook as a basis for setting medium- and long-term fiscal goals 
and to consider adoption of new procedures to hold leaders accountable 
for responsible fiscal stewardship.
It is not the job of a group of experts, but rather the job of leaders 
and the people, acting through the political process, to make the necessary 
choices. Those leaders who recognize the seriousness of the challenge will 
realize that all other important policy goals are hostage to first putting the 
budget on a sustainable course. Their job must be to lead a creative national 
dialogue, beginning now and pressed vigorously, to help the United States 
find a way to a sustainable fiscal future.
NOTES
1. Greater uncertainty implies the discounting of future costs and benefits at a higher rate. 
The higher the discount rate, the smaller future costs and benefits appear when compared 
to costs and benefits in the near term. Great uncertainty would therefore favor a decision 
to delay action unless the distribution of expected outcomes between the two alternatives 
were asymmetrical. For an interesting analysis of this issue applied to global warming 
policies, see Nordhaus (2008), especially Chapter 9.
2. A new set of population and life expectancy forecasts for the United States, with a focus 
on transitions that will take place by mid-century, illustrate potential budget effects of 
hypothesized accelerated advances in biomedical technology that either delay the onset 
and age progression of major fatal diseases, or slow aging itself. “Results indicate that 
current forecasts of the U.S. Social Security Administration and U.S. Census Bureau may 
underestimate the rise in life expectancy at birth for men and women combined, by 2050, 
by from 3.1 to 7.9 years. As such, there could be 164 to 419 million more person-years-
of-life lived among the population aged 65 and older by 2050 than current government 
estimates predict, and cumulative outlays for Medicare and Social Security could be 
higher by $3.2 trillion and $8.3 trillion” (Olshansky et al., 2009). If such an alternative 
forecast proves correct, the policy adjustments needed to attain budget sustainability 
would have to be much larger than portrayed in this report.
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3. The share of the U.S. population over 65 is projected to rise from 12 percent in 2000 to 
20 percent in 2050 in the United States, but in the same year it is projected to reach 25 
percent in France, 30 percent in Germany, 33 percent in Italy, and 37 percent in Japan 
(Census Bureau, 2007).
4. One difficulty in setting standards for assessing budgets over the long term concerns the 
proper horizon for projecting policy effects and assessing sustainability. A good discus-
sion is by Ulla (2006:160-162), who argues that, although “the possibility to forecast 
beyond the next 50 years may be low . . . going beyond 50 years may provide informa-
tion to help reformulate present entitlement programmes and build a strategy to deal 
with future challenges.” The Social Security and Medicare actuaries focus on a 75-year 
horizon, long enough to encompass the lifetimes of most people who are already alive.
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Appendix A
Fiscal Sustainability
DEFINITIONS AND USES
Economists typically call fiscal policy unsustainable if a country’s debt 
is growing faster than its gross domestic product (GDP) (see, e.g., Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2007). This report defines sustainability in a closely 
related manner: a budget is sustainable if over a long period: (1) it has a 
stable ratio of debt-to-GDP and (2) revenues and spending that are parallel 
and likely to remain so. For this report, we define a “long period” as 75 
years.
Others define fiscal sustainability somewhat differently (see, e.g. Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007; Schick, 2005). 
For example, some assert that fiscal sustainability requires that the present 
value of future budget surpluses exceed the present value of future budget 
deficits (Anderson and Sheppard, 2009). This is a more stringent definition 
than that used in this report. Moreover, we believe that solvency, defined as 
an excess of expected income over expected expenses, is at the same time 
an insufficient and unnecessary condition for fiscal sustainability.
The definition of sustainability does not require specifying a target 
debt-to-GDP ratio, and any target is potentially arbitrary, especially if it is 
not subject to adjustment in light of new circumstances. Large debts can 
be paid back, yet small debts may not be sustainable if future income is 
insufficient. Moreover, government debt may remain high for decades and 
experience large fluctuations over time. For example, the British debt-to-
GDP ratio has ranged between 20 and 270 percent and averaged 117 per-
cent over the past 300 years. Although the debt may have been considered 
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unsustainable on a number of occasions during that long period, the fact 
that the British government never defaulted meant that the budget was 
sustainable (Wyplosz, 2007).
Whatever debt-to-GDP ratio is chosen as a target for stabilization 
it must be low enough to inspire confidence by the investors who buy a 
nation’s debt. The target for stabilization chosen in this study, a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 60 percent, is chosen both for its near-term feasibility and 
to minimize the risk of increasing debt in the future. The forward-looking 
part of the target relates to the second part of the definition of sustainability 
used here, that revenues and spending must remain closely aligned over a 
long horizon.
The arithmetic of stabilizing the ratio is straightforward. The debt can-
not grow faster over any long period than does the economy. Arithmetically, 
the primary deficit—which is the difference between revenues and spending 
(other than for interest on the debt)—should be zero if the average inter-
est rate on the debt equals the growth rate of the economy. If the annual 
interest payment on the debt is 5 percent of GDP and the deficit equals the 
interest payment, the debt will grow 5 percent annually. If the economy is 
also growing at a rate of 5 percent, the debt-to-GDP ratio will remain con-
stant. If the interest payment on the debt as a percentage of GDP exceeds 
the growth rate of the economy, then a primary budget surplus is necessary 
to stabilize the debt.  If the interest payment is less than the rate of growth 
of the economy, then a primary budget deficit may be consistent with fiscal 
sustainability (von Furstenberg, 1991).
FISCAL GAP
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and others have calculated a 
“fiscal gap” measure of the extent to which a long-term budget outlook 
departs from sustainability (with sustainability defined as a long-term bal-
ance between expected revenues and expected spending) (Auerbach, 1994; 
Congressional Budget Office, 2009). This measure is constructed from 
projections of annual revenues and spending. The federal government’s 
expected long-term flows of revenues and spending are represented by a 
single number, which is the present value of future payments to and from 
the Treasury Department, discounted by the time value of money to make 
them comparable with payments today.
The fiscal gap is therefore a present-value measure of the nation’s fiscal 
imbalance. That imbalance reflects shortfalls of revenues relative to spend-
ing estimated over a given period. The fiscal gap can be said to represent 
the extent to which the government would need to immediately and perma-
nently raise tax revenues, cut spending, or use some mix of both to make 
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the government’s debt the same size (relative to the size of the economy) at 
the end of a given period as it was at the beginning.
An advantage of the “fiscal gap” measure is that it condenses a long-
term series of estimates into a single meaningful number that can be used 
to judge the required scale of corrective action and to compare with gap 
estimates made at different times or across budgets with different policy 
components. A disadvantage of the “fiscal gap” measure is the amount of 
mathematical sophistication required to interpret it.
Using CBO’s “current-law” baseline, Auerbach and Gale (2009) es-
timated the fiscal gap for the U.S. federal budget baseline in mid-2009 at 
around 4.4 percent of GDP for projected flows through 2085 and 6.25 
percent of GDP if flows are projected over an indefinite horizon. Under 
alternative assumptions more similar to those used in this report, their 
estimates of the gap ranged from 7.44 to 9.36 percent.
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Appendix B
Baseline Assumptions and Estimates
As explained in Chapter 1, examining the budget outlook requires a 
“baseline” set of projections. A baseline shows what would happen to fed-
eral spending and revenues if current policies remained in place indefinitely. 
It serves as a benchmark for measuring the budget effects of proposed 
policy changes. It is not intended to be a prediction or forecast.
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) produces detailed, widely 
cited, and—in the committee’s view—highly credible baseline projections. 
The committee used the CBO’s baseline estimates, with a few adjustments, 
to construct its 75-year baseline projection. This baseline is referred to here 
and in the body of the report as the “study baseline.” Specifically, the study 
baseline begins with the CBO June 2009 long-term outlook (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2009b), which incorporates CBO’s more detailed baseline 
estimates for the 10 years 2010-2019 published in March 2009 (Congres-
sional Budget Office, 2009c), as a starting point. The committee adjusted 
those estimates as discussed below to produce the study baseline projection 
used in the report and shown in Chapter 1.
CBO STANDARD BASELINE
CBO is required by law to follow certain conventions when construct-
ing its baseline projections.1 Congress uses this “standard” baseline to 
“score” the budget effects of bills as they move through the legislative 
process.
Congress has stipulated the following general rules for constructing the 
standard baseline for different categories of programs.

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• For discretionary programs—which encompass most defense spend-
ing, foreign aid, scientific and biomedical research, infrastructure, 
education, and the many other activities of government that Con-
gress funds annually through appropriation acts: Congress directs 
CBO to assume the most recent year’s appropriation, adjusted for 
inflation.
• For revenues and mandatory spending—which includes the “big 
three” entitlements (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) and 
plus many smaller entitlements, such as food stamps and unem-
ployment compensation, as well as offsetting receipts—Congress 
directs CBO to assume that current laws continue unchanged, with 
two exceptions:
   Expiring programs2 (not to be confused with expiring tax proi-
sions) are generally assumed to continue unchanged. Examples 
are the programs known as Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (the successor to the former program of Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children) and the State Children’s Health 
Insurance Program: such programs come up for periodic re-
authorization, and it would not be credible to assume their 
disappearance.
   Excise taxes dedicated to a trust fund are assumed to continue. 
An example is the aviation taxes dedicated to the airport and 
airways trust fund. Since the CBO baseline assumes that spend-
ing under such programs continues, it is reasonable to assume 
that their taxes continue as well.
• For interest costs, Congress directs use of an estimate of the average 
interest paid to holders of the levels of borrowing and debt that 
are assumed in other parts of the baseline, using CBO’s estimate of 
future interest rates.
It is important to understand several assumptions under the standard 
rules:
• the expiration of the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts and of other tempo-
rary tax breaks;
• the rapid expansion of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) that 
will apply to more than 40 million tax filers, 10 times today’s 
number;
• the omission of the likely costs of funding operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in the near term; and
• congressional agreement to allow physician payment rates in Medi-
care to fall sharply under that program’s “sustainable growth rate” 
(SGR) mechanism.
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These assumptions, as reflected in the baseline, may represent current law, 
but arguably they fail to represent current policy.
STUDy BASELINE
The study committee has adjusted the CBO baseline estimates to make 
what it considers a more credible projection of spending and revenues on 
the basis of current policies. In doing so, it has relied where possible on 
estimates provided by CBO of the effects on its standard baseline of alterna-
tive policies. This helps maintain internal consistency among the elements 
of the baseline.
The study baseline adjusts CBO’s standard baseline policy assumptions 
in seven areas:
1. extending, beyond its currently scheduled expiration at the end of 
2010, the portion of the 2001 and 2003 income tax cuts that affect 
households earning less than $250,000 a year;
2. indexing the AMT at the 2009 level;
3. extending certain other expiring tax provisions;
4. reducing defense spending to reflect a reduction of troops in Iraq 
and Afghanistan to 75,000 by 2013;
5. freezing Medicare physician payment rates, in dollar terms;
6. including the administration’s estimated cost of future disasters; 
and
7. estimating the additional debt and debt service required by the 
larger deficits that result from the above six adjustments.
These adjustments are intended to produce a more credible projection 
of current policies; they are summarized in Table B-1. For example, al-
though Congress has not yet decided whether to extend the 2001 and 2003 
tax cuts (now scheduled to expire after 2010), it is the committee’s best 
judgment that those cuts will be extended, as favored by both the Obama 
Administration and Republican leaders. Similarly, Congress has—with the 
President’s approval—routinely extended various smaller tax preferences 
every year or two, making it reasonable to assume future extensions.3 In the 
same vein, policy makers have consistently adopted temporary “patches” 
to keep more and more taxpayers from being subject to the AMT. At the 
administration’s behest, Congress has funded operations in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan chiefly through supplemental appropriations (that is, outside the 
regular annual defense bill) and it has acted to prevent cuts in physician 
fees under the Medicare SGR formula.
Deciding how to treat each of these policies in constructing a baseline 
is obviously a matter of judgment. We have made the adjustments noted for 
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 APPENDIX B
the study baseline to produce a more realistic projection of the likely budget 
effects of current policies. The panel believes that this alternative baseline 
paints a more credible picture of future budgets under current policies.4
LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS
Programs and Revenues
For its long-term projections, the study has adjusted some CBO pro-
jections. The methods used by CBO for its long-term projections vary by 
category of spending: Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, defense 
and other domestic spending, and revenues. This section discusses those 
methods and the study’s adjustments. For Social Security, the committee 
uses CBO’s “scheduled benefits” scenario, which assumes payments will be 
made on the basis of current law, regardless of the balance available in the 
trust fund. This spending projection implicitly assumes that other sources 
will be found to continue scheduled benefits, which otherwise by law would 
drop to the level of current trust fund revenues when it is exhausted, cur-
rently projected to occur in 2043. The methods used by CBO are similar 
to those used by the Social Security program’s trustees, but CBO makes 
what it terms minor adjustments to the trustees’ methods (for details, see 
Congressional Budget Office, 2009a).
For Medicare and Medicaid, the study baseline projection is the same 
as that for CBO’s “alternative fiscal scenario,” which assumes that the pro-
grams continue to operate under current law, except (as noted above) that 
the study assumes that Medicare payments will grow with inflation rather 
than being reduced under the program’s SGR mechanism.
For defense and other domestic spending, the study baseline assumes 
that discretionary program spending will grow with inflation through 2019 
and that mandatory program spending will grow on the basis of current 
law, with some exceptions. The study does not assume that the stimulus 
spending enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
will be a recurring part of the baseline for either spending or revenues. The 
same is true of the $106 billion supplemental appropriations legislation 
passed in June 2009, which included $80 billion for the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, although adjustments are made, as noted above, consistent 
with a reduction in troop levels through 2013. Other study adjustments 
affect the projection of total outlays in 2019, after which outlays for this 
broad category of programs are assumed to grow in line with GDP through 
2083.
For revenues, including Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes, the 
study baseline uses CBO’s projections, adjusted as noted above for exten-
sion of some expiring tax provisions and indexation of the AMT.
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The combined effect of the committee’s adjustments to the CBO stan-
dard baseline is to increase estimates of future deficits and debt. The cu-
mulative deficits forecast in CBO’s standard baseline over the 2010-2019 
period, for example, increase by $2.2 trillion. The study baseline extends 
to 2083; see Table B-2. Over that period:
• Total outlays, which were 21 percent of GDP in 2008 and an es-
timated 27.6 percent in 2009, first decline from 2010 to 2012 to 
22.2 percent of GDP (reflecting reduced spending associated with 
the 2008-2009 recession and the 2009 stimulus legislation) and 
then rise at an accelerating pace, reaching 60 percent of GDP in 
2083.
• Social Security spending climbs from 4.3 percent of GDP today 
to about 6 percent in 2035, and then remains roughly stable as 
a percentage of GDP, reaching 6.2 percent in 2083. Although the 
demographic challenge posed by retirement of the baby boom 
generation is the largest short-term contributor to higher Social 
Security (and Medicare) outlays, rising life expectancy is projected 
to keep the share of elderly people in the population larger than it 
is today.
• Medicare and Medicaid more than double as a share of GDP 
between now and 2035, from 4.1 percent to 9.9 percent of GDP. 
Unlike Social Security, outlays for these programs are projected 
to continue growing steeply thereafter, almost doubling again—to 
18.4 percent by 2083. Unlike Social Security, essentially a defined-
benefit pension program in which total outlays roughly grow with 
the elderly population and the average wage,5 Medicare and Med-
icaid represent the government’s pledge to pay for health care at 
prevailing usage patterns and prices. Over the past few decades, 
rapid technological change, among other factors, has driven up 
federal spending at a rate faster than GDP growth.
• All other spending—consisting of defense and nondefense discre-
tionary spending plus mandatory spending programs other than the 
“big three”—is assumed to follow the CBO baseline for the first 
10 years, with the exception of the adjustments noted above. In 
the study baseline it is held constant as a share of GDP thereafter. 
Under these assumptions, this third category of spending declines 
gradually from 10.8 percent of GDP in 2008 and a recession-driven 
peak of 16.8 percent of GDP in 2009 to 8.6 percent of GDP in 
2019, remaining at roughly that level thereafter.
• Revenues under current policies as defined in the study baseline rise 
gradually, from 17.7 percent of GDP in 2008 to 21.8 percent in 
2083, somewhat less than CBO’s “alternative” baseline. That slow 
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rise occurs chiefly because of two factors—“real bracket creep” 
(because rising real incomes push taxpayers into higher brackets) 
and growing taxable distributions from retirement accounts as 
baby boomers retire. Those two factors are just big enough to 
outweigh other sources that are flat or gently declining.
Deficits and the Debt
The baseline projection of deficits and debt is derived arithmetically 
from the above projections, except for 2009-2019. In this period, the esti-
mates of changes and debt depend partly on the issuance and repayment of 
certain debt associated with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as-
sistance to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and other financial interventions 
associated with the 2008-2009 financial crisis and economic downturn. 
The study baseline retains CBO’s estimate of outlays for TARP and some 
elements of the assistance to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: it records their 
costs as outlays in the year of intervention based on the discounted present 
value of projected cash flows resulting from each action.
Medicare and Medicaid
Projections over periods much shorter than 75 years are highly un-
reliable if viewed as forecasts. CBO and many others view Medicare and 
Medicaid as the key source of uncertainty in the long-run projections. Over 
the last few decades, annual “excess cost growth” in the two programs 
(growth in excess of GDP, adjusted for changes in the eligible populations) 
averaged 2.3 and 1.9 percent in Medicare and Medicaid, respectively. CBO 
assumes a slowdown in excess cost growth (to an annual average rate of 
1.5 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively, for Medicare and Medicaid, 
over the 2019-2083 period). Furthermore, excess cost growth in the rest 
of the health care sector—which historically has moved in tandem with 
Medicare and Medicare—is projected to diverge, falling to an average of 
0.5 percent (Congressional Budget Office, 2009c:28). Even with those as-
sumptions, health care from all sources would consume an estimated 46 
percent of GDP in 2080 (Congressional Budget Office, 2009c:30). If excess 
cost growth continued instead at about 2.5 percent annually, health care 
spending would account for an estimated 99 percent of GDP in 2082 (Con-
gressional Budget Office 2007a:27).
NOTES
1. These rules are spelled out in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act 
of 1974 and in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, as 
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amended. Although the relevant provisions of the Deficit Control Act expired at the end 
of 2006, CBO and the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) continue to fol-
low that law’s specifications when preparing their baseline projections (which are called 
“current services” projections by OMB). Although it differs from OMB’s, ours also falls 
into the “current services” category of baseline types.
2. Or provisions of programs.
3. In fact, those expiring tax preferences, such as the research and development tax credit, 
are colloquially known as the “extenders.”
4. Although they differ in some details, organizations as diverse as the Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities, the Brookings-Urban Tax Policy Center, and the Cato Institute 
have adjusted the standard CBO baseline in broadly similar ways in their analyses of the 
budget outlook.
5. It seems paradoxical that, after retirement, benefits for individual beneficiaries on the 
Social Security rolls are adjusted only for inflation, but the average benefit for the pro-
gram as a whole generally rises with wages, which ordinarily grow faster than prices. 
The key to the apparent paradox is that initial benefits are pegged to wages. Every year 
a new batch of retirees becomes eligible, with their initial benefits tied to recent wages. 
And every year other beneficiaries—typically older recipients with benefits tied to wage 
levels 20 or 25 years ago—die. Because of this constant “churning,” the average benefit 
grows about as fast as wages.
REFERENCES
Congressional Budget Office. (2009a). CBO’s Long-Term Projections for Social Security: 00 
Update. Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.
Congressional Budget Office. (2009b). The Long-Term Budget Outlook. Washington, DC: 
Congressional Budget Office.
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Appendix C
Social Security Options
This appendix provides additional details on the illustrative policy op-
tions for Social Security presented in Chapter 6, but first further considers 
three matters: (1) a variety of measures of the program’s financial condition; 
(2) the earnings replacement rate; and, very briefly, (3) the policy option of 
individual investment accounts and the Social Security program.
MEASURES OF THE PROGRAM’S FINANCIAL CONDITION
Any single measure of the Social Security program’s financial condition 
and prospects is insufficient in light of the program’s multiple goals and the 
long period of time involved. The measures discussed in this section are 
not alternatives, but instead provide multiple complementary perspectives, 
some of which are applied to the illustrative options.
Program Solvency
The Social Security Office of the Actuary (OACT) defines program 
“solvency” as any time that the (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
—OASDI) trust fund is in positive balance. In current law and under the 
intermediate projections of the Social Security trustees, the program is 
projected to become insolvent in 2037. Solvency is important in that the 
program has the legal authority to make benefit payments only as long as it 
is solvent; once the trust fund is exhausted, Social Security can pay benefits 
only from its dedicated tax revenue. A drawback of the solvency concept, 
however, is that it does not measure how healthy the system is in the long 
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run, nor does it take into account the broader budget implications of financ-
ing benefits outside the revenue streams now dedicated to the program. For 
instance, system solvency could be accomplished in a program-accounting 
sense by the federal government’s issuing new bonds to the trust funds or 
raising the interest rate on existing trust fund bonds. But from a whole-
budget perspective, this accounting approach would not generate additional 
real resources to pay benefits. For that reason, this solvency concept can be 
criticized as allowing the risk that future generations must pay for current 
Social Security benefits; that is, improving program solvency (so defined) is 
not sufficient to achieve long-run self-financing.
Positive Cash Flow
If the Social Security system has a positive cash flow in any year, it 
means that revenues dedicated to the system are at least as large as those 
required to pay scheduled benefits. If the cash flow becomes negative, it 
would require cutting benefits, raising taxes, or redeeming trust fund assets. 
Under current law, cash-flow deficits will begin in 2017 and grow continu-
ally, exceeding 6 percent of the nation’s payroll by 2075 ($1.36 trillion 
dollars in 2001 dollars).
Asking that the system have positive annual cash flows is a straightfor-
ward and easy-to-understand objective: either Social Security is taking in 
more money than it must spend, or it is not. This principle is also consistent 
with the tradition of having Social Security be self-financing, and it does 
not require an understanding of the complexities of trust fund accounting. 
A drawback is that it does not indicate how soon the program would (or 
should) attain self-financing status, nor how it could (or should) be financed 
in the meantime, nor the role of the trust fund in financing benefits. Thus, 
meeting this goal is not, by itself, sufficient to ensure the long-term solvency 
of the program.
The 75-year Actuarial Balance
Under current practice, Social Security actuaries report the actuarial 
balance of the retirement and disability programs as the net present value of 
Social Security system, that is, the present value of expected revenues minus 
the present value of scheduled expenditures over the “valuation period” of 
time that is used.1 The valuation period has historically been 75 years; re-
cently, however, an in-perpetuity accounting period also has been reported. 
The use of the 75-year valuation period led to the computation that the 
75-year shortfall in 2009 was equivalent to 2 percent of the nation’s taxable 
payroll. Although it is a useful mechanism for quantifying the magnitude 
of the financing shortfall, averaged over the valuation period, it has several 
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drawbacks. It ignores the timing of the cash outlays and cash receipts, and 
it conceals trends in shortfalls. For example, the 2 percent average actuarial 
deficit downplays the fact that today’s cash flow surpluses are more than 
offset by even larger cash flow shortfalls in 75 years, shortfalls that will 
exceed 6 percent of taxable payroll. Another drawback is that the 75-year 
time horizon ignores what happens to system finances outside the valuation 
period. Moreover, the criterion of actuarial balance can be viewed as biased 
against any reforms that advance-fund the system with investments and that 
experience paybacks beyond the 75-year window. In summary, the 75-year 
actuarial balance is a useful measure for this study, but it is only one of the 
indicators needed to assess the program’s financial condition.
System Assets at the End of the Valuation Period
Scheduled benefits under present law will, in 75 years, leave Social Se-
curity short by about $3.157 trillion or about $21,000 per current worker 
(in present value). Accordingly, one way to evaluate any Social Security 
reform proposal would be to ask how much it would reduce the size of 
this shortfall.
Amount of General Revenue Transfer Needed
Currently, Social Security would require substantial additional revenue 
to pay scheduled benefits. If changes can reduce the need for these transfers, 
this would improve the program’s financial condition by this measure.
Actuarial Balance at the End of Valuation Period
As noted, the actuarial balance measure favored by OACT does not 
exclude the possibility that system finances could deteriorate rapidly at 
some time after the end of the specified valuation period. One way to test 
for this risk is by whether the actuarial balance is moving in the positive 
direction at the end of the valuation period. A drawback of this approach 
is that actuarial projections become more uncertain in the distant future. 
Still, achieving a stable or rising trust fund ratio—the ratio of assets to 
spending—at the end of the 75-year valuation period is therefore a useful 
supplementary test of the program’s long-term financial condition.
THE EARNINGS REPLACEMENT RATE 
FOR INDIVIDUAL WORKERS
Many of this report’s graphs and tables estimate Social Security retire-
ment benefits as a percentage of individual illustrative workers’ preretire-
0 APPENDIX C
ment earnings. This definition of the “Social Security replacement rate for 
individual earnings” is widely used, not just currently by the Social Secu-
rity Administration, but by others (see, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, 
2001:20-21). However, these “replacement rate” figures may be—but aren’t 
always—markedly lower than those associated with other definitions of 
replacement rates, such as that used in most retirement planning, with the 
same or similar economic circumstances. Steuerle et al. (2000) warn against 
confusing the two definitions in policy discussions.2
Simply stated, the Social Security replacement rate as defined in this 
report compares that illustrative worker’s benefits on retirement with her 
or his preretirement earnings (below the maximum relevant for taxation 
and benefits), throughout her or his career, indexed by average earnings 
throughout the economy. In contrast, the definition of replacement rate used 
in most retirement planning compares a family’s income in retirement from 
all sources (e.g., Social Security benefits plus any labor earnings, income 
from pensions and income from private savings), to the family’s income 
from all sources, typically in the years immediately preceding retirement.
There are two basic distinctions between the two definitions of retire-
ment rates. First, the Social Security definition understandably is limited to 
Social Security benefits, which derive only from covered payroll earnings. 
The retirement definition is broader—including all sources of income.
The second distinction between the two definitions is the simplest ex-
planation of why the Social Security replacement rate often, but not always, 
is markedly lower than the measure used in retirement planning. The Social 
Security definition is for individual workers—not couples or other family 
groups—and thus excludes the Social Security benefits any spouse receives 
in retirement; it also excludes any spousal preretirement earnings. Because 
spousal Social Security benefits are often considerable, because there are 
now many two-earner couples (and likely to be in the future); because 
spouses’ labor force attachment and rewards increasingly approximate 
each other; and especially because most people enter retirement married, 
the Social Security replacement rate is generally lower than that used in 
retirement planning.3
The research on this topic calculates replacement rates from rich data 
sources, rather than solely the program’s administrative records: Lusardi 
and Mitchell (2007) and Mitchell and Phillips (2006, 2009) use data from 
the Health and Retirement Study; Biggs and Springstead (2007) use the 
modeling income in the near-term microsimulation model of the Social Se-
curity Administration, also with longitudinal microdata at both the family 
and individual levels. The last study focuses on one aspect of the question: 
the degree to which benefits and other income sources in retirement replace 
preretirement earnings, rather than replacing preretirement income from 
all sources.
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Writing in the Social Security Bulletin, Biggs and Springstead (2007:1) 
summarize their findings as showing “that replacement rates can vary 
considerably based on the definition of preretirement earnings used and 
whether replacement rates are measured on an individual or a [family] 
basis.”
INDIVIDUAL INVESTMENT ACCCOUNTS
For practical reasons, the committee did not consider options to fun-
damentally change the Social Security program as it has been structured 
from its establishment. Still, we recognize that many options exist and 
have been proposed to alter the program’s basic structure. One proposal 
has been to emphasize individual accounts by permitting wage earners to 
redirect part of their payroll tax payment to individual investment accounts 
for retirement—perhaps accounts that the wage earner would manage. This 
redirection of the payroll tax would lead to an offset—that is, a reduction—
from regular Social Security benefits. There are many arguments on both 
sides of this approach; for discussion and analyses of various forms of in-
dividual accounts, see, e.g., Brown and Apfel (2006), Cogan and Mitchell 
(2003), and Furman (2005c).
THE COMMITTEE’S ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS
Improvement in the program’s 75-year actuarial balance is one—though 
only one—yardstick for how our options would make the Social Security 
program solvent in the long term. It is used below to show how several 
reform provisions contribute to the program’s financial condition during 
that period. Tables C-1 and C-2 provide additional details for current law 
and each illustrative option.4 (See Table 6-1 for basic information on each 
option.)
Option 1: Changes in Benefits Only; No Tax Changes
This option would increase the 75-year actuarial balance by 2.02 per-
cent of the payroll under current law, bringing the finances into balance by 
this measure. (As of 2009, the program’s current balance is –2 percent.)
For individual provisions of Option 1:
• The change in the preretirement formula for monthly benefits 
would account for 1.25 percent of the improvement in actuarial 
balance. This provision’s “progressive indexing” of benefits to a 
combination of wage and price levels would generally increase the 
preretirement benefit calculation more slowly than the current in-
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dexing to wage levels alone. (By and large, wage levels rise through 
time faster than price levels.) The new provision would begin in 
2012 and its effects (relative to the current-law formula) would 
accumulate through 2049. Then the current-law adjustment would 
resume until 2070, at which time progressive indexing would 
restart.
• Consistent with discussion by the Office of the Actuary of the 
Social Security Administration (2009a:3-5), the “progressive index-
ing” of benefits to wage and price levels that we use differs from 
the “progressive price indexing” developed for Robert Pozen in 
2003, although for both, the preretirement calculation of benefits 
for most middle- and upper-earning workers would increase more 
slowly, as general wage and price levels rise, than under the cur-
rent formula. In Options 1-3, this benefit-indexing formula would 
be unchanged from current law for about the lowest-earning 30 
percent of workers and for disabled workers. For others, indexing 
would in effect be based on a mix of wage and price levels, with 
TABLE C-1 Projected Social Security Cash Flow as a Percentage of GDP, 
Selected Years, Current Law Compared with Options 1-4
Year Current Law Option 1a Option 2b Option 3c Option 4d
2010 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
2015 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
2020 –0.5 –0.3 –0.3 –0.2 –0.2
2025 –1.0 –0.6 –0.7 –0.6 –0.5
2030 –1.3 –0.8 –0.8 –0.7 –0.7
2035 –1.4 –0.8 –0.8 –0.7 –0.8
2040 –1.3 –0.6 –0.4 –0.5 –0.6
2045 –1.2 –0.4 –0.2 –0.3 –0.4
2050 –1.2 –0.2 –0.2 –0.3 –0.3
2055 –1.2 –0.1 –0.1 –0.3 –0.3
2060 –1.2 0.0 –0.1 0.0 –0.1
2065 –1.2 0.0 0.0 –0.1 –0.1
2070 –1.3 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.0
2075 –1.3 0.0 0.0 –0.1 0.0
2080 –1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2082 –1.4 –0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.1
2084 –1.5 –0.1 0.0 0.0 –0.1
NOTE: A year’s “cash flow” is its Social Security revenues minus its expenditures. When the 
cash flow is positive, the balance in the trust fund increases (see next table). When negative, 
the trust fund balance decreases.
 aChanges in benefits only.
 b2/3 benefit growth reductions; 1/3 payroll tax increases.
 c1/3 benefit growth reductions; 2/3 payroll tax increases.
 dPayroll-tax increases only.
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the price level becoming more predominant as career earnings rise, 
up to the maximum subject to the Social Security payroll tax. As a 
result, the rate of increase in the preretirement benefits would usu-
ally be greatest for the lowest earners, and decrease with earnings, 
up to the payroll tax maximum, but to no less than the rate of price 
inflation.5
• Increasing the future age for full and early retirement benefits ac-
counts for a 0.56 percent increase in the balance.
• Changing the cost-of-living adjustment to monthly benefits in re-
tirement adds 0.36 percent to the balance.6
Option  gets roughly two-thirds of its effect by reducing benefit 
growth and one-third by payroll-tax increases. It improves the 75-year 
actuarial balance by 2.07 percent of payroll.
• For the preretirement benefit formula, another form of progressive 
indexing is the only provision affecting benefits. It improves the 
TABLE C-2 Projected Social Security Trust Fund Ratio, Selected Years, 
Current Law Compared with Options 1-4
Year Current Law Option 1a Option 2b Option 3c Option 4d
2010 360 360 360 360 360
2015 359 367 365 373 375
2020 315 351 334 353 359
2025 244 311 290 319 319
2030 153 257 233 270 277
2035 50 202 178 227 229
2040 0 155 128 187 184
2045 0 121 114 167 157
2050 0 100 113 151 131
2055 0 91 112 137 117
2060 0 90 117 120 96
2065 0 95 122 123 97
2070 0 103 132 125 93
2075 0 109 142 126 99
2080 0 112 152 130 99
2082 0 113 155 132 100
2084 0 114 157 135 100
NOTE: The “trust fund ratio” is the trust fund balance at the beginning of the year, divided 
by that year’s spending.
 aChanges in benefits only.
 b2/3 benefit growth reductions; 1/3 payroll tax increases.
 c1/3 benefit growth reductions; 2/3 payroll tax increases.
 dPayroll-tax increases only.
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balance by 1.34 percent. This form of progressive indexing starts in 
2012 and accumulates through 2061, after which the current-law 
calculation is reinstated.
• While retaining the current-law cap on taxable earnings, the Social 
Security payroll tax would increase (from 12.4 percent) to 12.6 
percent in 2012, 12.9 percent in 2020, 13.1 percent in 2030, 13.9 
percent in 2040, decrease to 13.5 percent in 2050, and then finally 
decrease to 13.3 percent in 2060. Given the benefit change, this 
provision would add 0.73 percent to the 75-year balance.
Option  improves the 75-year balance by 2.05 percent—roughly one-
third by benefit-growth reduction and two-thirds by increased payroll 
taxation.
• A milder form of progressive indexing of the preretirement benefit 
formula would improve the balance by 0.63 percent. It would start 
in 2012 and accumulate only through 2021, when the current for-
mula would be reinstated. However, progressive indexing would 
restart in 2060.
• The existing rate of payroll taxation for Social Security (for earn-
ings under the current-law cap) would increase to 12.6 percent in 
2012, 12.9 percent in 2020, 13.3 percent in 2030, 13.8 percent in 
2040, 14.4 percent in 2060, and finally to 14.5 percent in 2075. 
Added to the provision above, this tax provision would add 1.02 
percent of payroll to the balance improvement.
• The other tax provision would add a second tier of taxation for 
any earnings above the current-law cap. (There would be no credit 
toward benefits.) The second-tier tax would start at 2 percent in 
2012 and rise to 3 percent in 2060. Given Option 3’s other two 
provisions, this one would add an additional 0.41 percent to the 
improved balance.
Option  achieves long-term program solvency by tax increases only, 
without changing the benefits scheduled under current law. It improves the 
75-year balance by 2 percent.
• For the existing payroll tax, the cap on taxation would be raised 
by an additional 2 percent above the current-law formula starting 
2012, until 2048 when this tax applies to 90 percent of covered 
earnings. (There would be no benefit credit for earnings above the 
current-law cap.) This provision would make a 0.69 percent im-
provement in the actuarial balance.
• Additionally, the rate of taxation under the raised cap would go up 
to 12.7 percent in 2012, 13 percent in 2025, 13.3 percent in 2040, 
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14 percent in 2060, 14.5 percent in 2070, and finally 14.7 percent 
in 2080. This provision makes a 0.83 percent improvement in the 
actuarial balance.
• Furthermore, a second-tier payroll tax would be added for any 
earnings above the raised first-tier cap, again with no credit toward 
benefits. The added second-tier tax would be 2 percent in 2012, 
3 percent in 2025, 3.5 percent in 2040, 4.5 percent in 2050, and 
finally 5.5 percent in 2060. This provision improves the balance by 
by 0.65 percent.
Table C-1 projects the program’s future cash flow, that is, its revenues 
minus its spending. After taking account of interest credited to the trust-
fund balance, in a year when a year’s cash flow is positive, the trust-fund 
balance increases; when negative, it decreases.
Table C-2 projects each option’s year-by-year effect on the balance of 
the trust fund, relative to the next year’s spending, an indicator of how each 
option’s cash flow affects the current balance in the trust fund.
The tables show the reduction and then exhaustion of the trust fund 
under current law, its “recharging” through the reform options, and its 
maintaining a balance to 2084 that the committee considers adequate for 
program finance in the long run. The options were designed not just for 
program solvency, but to avoid cutting benefits so much, or raising payroll 
taxation so high, as to raise the trust fund balance much beyond the level 
needed for long-term solvency.
Also note that, under our illustrative reforms, at times in the future 
the cash flow is slightly negative, and the trust fund ratio drops below 100 
percent—one yardstick of program finances. The ratio can drop below 100 
percent for a limited period without threatening the benefits scheduled af-
ter reform. This is because, for example, while the trust fund ratio relates 
the start-of-year balance to that year’s spending, revenues enter the trust 
fund during the year. In fact, once a durable long-term balance is attained 
between annual revenues and spending—as our reforms do—a few years’ 
dip in the trust fund ratio need not signal impending depletion of the Social 
Security reserves. What would be most serious is a sustained downward 
trend toward the end of the projection period—which does not occur.
For Option 4, from 2060 on the trust fund ratio can drop as low as 93 
percent and is never higher than 100 percent. Although this ratio avoids a 
downward trend, out of an abundance of caution it might be necessary to 
boost revenues modestly in the latter part of the century.
Tables C-3 through C-5 show real benefits, replacement rates, and 
payroll tax paid. They provide supporting and additional detail for Figures 
6-5 through 6-13.
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TABLE C-3 Projected Monthly Social Security Benefits in 2009 Dollars, 
Selected Years, for Workers Newly Retired at Age 65, Scheduled Under 
Current Law Compared with Options 1-4, and at Various Illustrative 
Earning Levels
Selected Years Current Law Option 1a Option 2b Option 3c Option 4d
Scaled Very Low Earner ($10,510 for 2009)
2000 564 NA NA NA NA
2010 638 638 638 638 638
2020 689 642 689 689 689
2035 754 714 754 754 754
2050 887 799 887 887 887
2065 1,041 903 1,041 1,041 1,041
2082 1,249 1,029 1,249 1,249 1,249
Scaled Low Earner ($18,919 for 2009)
2000 738 NA NA NA NA
2010 834 834 834 834 834
2020 901 840 901 901 901
2035 986 934 986 986 986
2050 1,161 1,045 1,161 1,161 1,161
2065 1,362 1,181 1,362 1,362 1,362
2082 1,633 1,347 1,633 1,633 1,633
Scaled Medium Earner ($42,042 for 2009)
2000 1,217 NA NA NA NA
2010 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375 1,375
2020 1,485 1,324 1,421 1,421 1,485
2035 1,625 1,359 1,435 1,523 1,625
2050 1,912 1,405 1,559 1,792 1,912
2065 2,244 1,572 1,711 2,069 2,244
2082 2,691 1,707 2,052 2,264 2,691
Scaled High Earner ($67,267 for 2009)
2000 1,582 NA NA NA NA
2010 1,822 1,822 1,822 1,822 1,822
2020 1,968 1,716 1,842 1,842 1,968
2035 2,154 1,683 1,777 1,951 2,154
2050 2,534 1,653 1,835 2,295 2,534
2065 2,974 1,836 1,917 2,627 2,974
2082 3,567 1,926 2,299 2,720 3,567
Steady Maximum Earnere ($106,800 for 2009)
2000 1,779 NA NA NA NA
2010 2,156 2,156 2,156 2,156 2,156
2020 2,396 2,062 2,213 2,213 2,396
2035 2,634 1,977 2,088 2,340 2,634
2050 3,094 1,875 2,082 2,748 3,094
2065 3,628 2,073 2,101 3,126 3,628
2082 4,350 2,122 2,520 3,128 4,350
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aBenefit changes only.
 b2/3 benefit-growth reductions; 1/3 payroll-tax increases.
 c1/3 benefit-growth reductions; 2/3 payroll-tax increases.
 dPayroll-tax increases only.
 eThat is, at the cap under the current-law Social Security payroll tax.
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TABLE C-4 Projected Social Security Worker Benefits as a Percentage 
of Past Earnings Selected Years, for Workers Newly Retired at Age 65, 
Scheduled Under Current Law Compared to Options 1-4, and at Various 
Illustrative Earning Levels
Current Law Option 1a Option 2b Option 3c Option 4d
Scaled Low Earner ($18,919 for 2009)
2010 54 54 54 54 54
2020 52 49 52 52 52
2035 49 46 49 49 49
2050 49 44 49 49 49
2065 49 43 49 49 49
2082 49 40 49 49 49
Scaled Medium Earner ($42,042 for 2009)
2010 40 40 40 40 40
2020 39 35 37 37 39
2035 36 30 32 34 36
2050 36 27 30 34 36
2065 36 25 28 34 36
2082 36 23 28 31 36
Scaled High Earner ($67,267 for 2009)
2010 33 33 33 33 33
2020 32 28 30 30 32
2035 30 24 25 27 30
2050 30 20 22 27 30
2065 30 19 19 27 30
2082 30 16 19 23 30
Steady Maximum Earnere ($106,800 for 2009)
2010 27 27 27 27 27
2020 26 22 24 24 26
2035 24 18 19 21 24
2050 24 15 16 21 24
2065 24 14 14 21 24
2082 24 12 14 17 24
 aBenefit changes only.
 b2/3 benefit-growth reductions; 1/3 payroll-tax increases.
 c1/3 benefit-growth reductions; 2/3 payroll-tax increases.
 dPayroll-tax increases only.
 eThat is, at the cap under the current-law Social Security payroll tax.
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NOTES
1. “Present value” is a way to summarize various time paths of expected future cash flows 
into and out of the trust fund with a single number. The present value of these flows 
can be calculated by discounting those that are expected to occur in future years by the 
appropriate interest rate. For revenues, for example, this present value is in simple terms 
the sum that, invested at the stated interest rate, could generate that stream of future 
revenues.
TABLE C-5 Annual Social Security Payroll Tax Projected to Be Paid, 
Selected Years Current Law and Options 1-4, Various Illustrative Earning 
Levels (in 2009 dollars except as noted)
Selected 
Years
Current 
Law Option 1a Option 2b Option 3c Option 4d
Memo: Earnings 
(Current Dollars)
Average Wage Worker (about $42,000 in 2009 dollars)
2010 5,295 5,295 5,295 5,295 5,295 42,702
2020 5,919 5,919 6,158 6,158 6,062 47,733
2035 6,923 6,923 7,314 7,426 7,258 55,832
2050 8,146 8,146 8,869 9,066 8,738 65,696
2065 9,557 9,557 10,251 11,099 10,790 77,073
2082 11,458 11,458 12,290 13,399 13,584 92,405
High-Wage Worker ($67,300 in 2009 dollars)
2010 8,481 8,481 8,481 8,481 8,481 68,391
2020 9,480 9,480 9,862 9,862 9,709 76,450
2035 11,088 11,088 11,714 11,893 11,625 89,420
2050 13,047 13,047 14,205 14,520 13,994 105,219
2065 15,307 15,307 16,418 17,775 17,282 123,440
2082 18,351 18,351 19,683 21,459 21,755 147,995
Tax Maximum Worker (max under current law, $106,800 in 2009 dollars)
2010 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 105,063
2020 14,522 14,522 15,107 15,107 14,873 117,110
2035 16,955 16,955 17,912 18,185 17,775 136,731
2050 19,960 19,960 21,730 22,213 21,408 160,964
2065 23,415 23,415 25,115 27,192 26,437 188,835
2082 28,073 28,073 30,110 32,827 33,280 226,392
Very High Wage Worker ($200,000 in 2009 dollars)
2010 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 13,028 203,343
2020 14,522 14,522 15,107 17,311 19,521 227,302
2035 16,955 16,955 17,912 20,768 29,965 265,867
2050 19,960 19,960 21,730 25,250 41,608 312,839
2065 23,415 23,415 25,115 32,538 51,382 367,015
2082 28,073 28,073 30,110 39,236 64,684 440,024
All estimates based on the intermediate assumptions of the 2009 Trustees Report.
 aBenefit changes only.
 b2/3 benefit growth reductions; 1/3 payroll tax increases.
 c1/3 benefit growth reductions; 2/3 payroll tax increases.
 dPayroll-tax increases only.
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2. The program trustee’s report now uses the Social Security definition without calling it a 
“replacement rate” (Social Security Administration, 2009b:198-199).
3. Taking the perspective of the past, however—and depending on the actual earnings his-
tory and benefit calculation—dual-earner couples may have either lowered or raised the 
whole-couple earnings replacement rate, compared to that for individual workers.
4. As said, like Chapter 6 and unlike the rest of the report, this appendix relies on the 
intermediate economic and other assumptions of the 2009 report of the Social Security 
Trustees, rather than Congressional Budget Office assumptions. In this way our detailed 
Social Security illustrations are consistent with the program’s data. A recent comparison 
of the two is in Congressional Budget Office (2009).
5. To estimate these three illustrative options, the rate of real wage inflation was taken at 1.1 
percent annually, the long-term rate used by the Social Security trustees for the current 
intermediate projections.
6. For this and other options, the sum for the individual provisions may not equal the 
option’s total (here, 2.02 percent) because of interaction among the effects of the 
provisions.
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Appendix D
Defense and Other Domestic 
Spending: Program Options
As described in Chapter 7, the committee adopted a twofold approach 
for distributing spending across the defense, domestic discretionary, and 
other mandatory categories for the four illustrative options. First, it set 
targets for other mandatory spending (which excludes Medicare, Medicaid, 
and Social Security). In Options 1 and 2, devolution-related cuts, reductions 
in commercial subsidies and “low-value” activities, and the use of a smaller 
inflation adjustment in indexed programs would bring other mandatory 
spending from 2.8 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008 
to 2 percent in 2019. The latter number can be compared with 2.1 percent 
in the study baseline for that year. In Options 3 and 4, other mandatory 
spending in this category simply follows the baseline.
Second, the committee allocated spending among the defense (nearly all 
of which is discretionary) and domestic discretionary categories. According 
to baseline projections, defense spending will stabilize at approximately 53 
percent of total discretionary spending by 2019, with domestic discretion-
ary spending constituting the remaining 47 percent. The committee decided 
that a plausible approach would be to roughly reproduce that ratio in 
Options 1, 2, and 4. Given Option 3’s emphasis upon public investments, 
however, the committee decided to allocate extra resources to the domestic 
discretionary category by having defense spending follow the study base-
line. Table D-1 presents spending details for the defense, domestic discre-
tionary, and other mandatory categories.
Once the committee determined its share-of-GDP targets for 2019, it 
created plausible spending trajectories for 2012-2019; see Tables D-2, D-3, 
and D-4.
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TABLE D-1 Defense, Domestic Discretionary, and Other Mandatory 
Spending, as a Percentage of GDP
Spending Category
2008 2019
Actual
Study 
Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
Defense 4.3 3.4 2.6 3.1 3.4 4.2
Domestic Discretionary 3.7 3.0 2.3 2.8 3.5 3.7
Other Mandatory 2.8 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1
Total 10.8 8.5 6.9 7.9 9.0 10.0
TABLE D-2 Defense Spending, 2008-2019
Year Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
In Billions of Dollars
2008a 609 NA NA NA NA
2009 671 NA NA NA NA
2010 734 NA NA NA NA
2011 755 NA NA NA NA
2012 717 692 707 717 775
2013 684 637 665 684 794
2014 670 601 643 670 812
2015 673 581 637 673 827
2016 683 566 637 683 842
2017 693 551 638 693 856
2018 705 536 639 705 869
2019 717 545 650 717 881
As a Percentage of GDP
2008a 4.3 NA NA NA NA
2009 4.8 NA NA NA NA
2010 5.1 NA NA NA NA
2011 5.0 NA NA NA NA
2012 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.9
2013 4.1 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.8
2014 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.9 4.7
2015 3.7 3.2 3.5 3.7 4.6
2016 3.7 3.0 3.4 3.7 4.5
2017 3.6 2.8 3.3 3.6 4.4
2018 3.5 2.7 3.2 3.5 4.3
2019 3.4 2.6 3.1 3.4 4.2
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aActual spending.
After 2019, total defense and domestic discretionary spending fluc-
tuates slightly as a share of GDP in the study baseline (see Table F-1 in 
Appendix F). Correspondingly, spending also fluctuates slightly for Op-
tions 1-4, with the defense, domestic discretionary, and other mandatory 
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TABLE D-3 Domestic Discretionary Spending, 2008-2019
Year Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
In Billions of Dollars
2008a 524 NA NA NA NA
2009 576 NA NA NA NA
2010 640 NA NA NA NA
2011 623 NA NA NA NA
2012 584 564 577 640 644
2013 584 544 571 657 665
2014 589 528 570 672 685
2015 596 514 571 686 704
2016 610 505 577 699 722
2017 623 494 583 711 741
2018 634 481 586 723 758
2019 635 482 587 734 776
As a Percentage of GDP
2008a 3.7 NA NA NA NA
2009 4.1 NA NA NA NA
2010 4.4 NA NA NA NA
2011 4.1 NA NA NA NA
2012 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.1
2013 3.5 3.3 3.5 4.0 4.0
2014 3.4 3.1 3.3 3.9 4.0
2015 3.3 2.9 3.2 3.8 3.9
2016 3.3 2.7 3.1 3.7 3.9
2017 3.2 2.5 3.0 3.7 3.8
2018 3.1 2.4 2.9 3.6 3.8
2019 3.0 2.3 2.8 3.5 3.7
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aActual spending.
categories; they have the same relative shares in 2020 and beyond as they 
did in 2019 (see Tables F-4, F-6, F-8, and F-10 in Appendix F).
DEVOLUTION POLICIES: OPTIONS 1 AND 2
The committee identified illustrative candidates for devolution and 
budget reduction by selecting from a list of federal grants to state and 
local governments (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). The 
committee’s candidates are in education, training, employment, and social 
services.
• Indian education: supports the efforts of local educational agencies 
and tribal schools to improve teaching and learning for the nation’s 
Native American children
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• impact aid: provides money to school districts that are financially 
burdened by the presence of tracts of land that do not pay property 
taxes (such as military bases or Indian lands)
• education for the disadvantaged: allocates funds for local programs 
that provide extra academic support to help raise the achievement 
of eligible students in high-poverty schools or, in the case of school-
wide programs, help all students in high-poverty schools to meet 
challenging state academic standards
• school improvement programs: includes funds for improving 
teacher quality, developing and implementing state assessments, 
rural education, and other activities
• innovation and improvement: funds charter school grants and 
magnet school assistance, the teaching of American history, teacher 
incentives, and other activities
TABLE D-4 Other Mandatory Spending, 2008-2019
Year Baseline Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4
In Billions of Dollars
2008a 397 NA NA NA NA
2009 1108 NA NA NA NA
2010 566 NA NA NA NA
2011 488 NA NA NA NA
2012 400 397 397 400 400
2013 414 407 407 414 414
2014 399 389 389 399 399
2015 397 384 384 397 397
2016 405 389 389 405 405
2017 404 385 385 404 404
2018 399 377 377 399 399
2019 444 419 419 444 444
As a Percentage of GDP
2008a 2.8 NA NA NA NA
2009 7.9 NA NA NA NA
2010 3.9 NA NA NA NA
2011 3.2 NA NA NA NA
2012 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
2013 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
2014 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
2015 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2
2016 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2
2017 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1
2018 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0
2019 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aActual spending.
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• safe schools and citizenship education: funds alcohol abuse reduc-
tion, mentoring, character education, elementary and secondary 
school counseling, physical education, civic education, and other 
activities
• English-language acquisition: provides formula grants to states 
to improve services for limited-English-proficient and immigrant 
students
• special education: assists state and local educational agencies to 
provide children with disabilities with access to high-quality educa-
tion, helps states provide a comprehensive system of early interven-
tion services, and links states, school systems, and families to best 
practices to improve results for infants, toddlers, and children with 
disabilities
• rehabilitation services and disability research: funds vocational re-
habilitation, assistive technology, and rehabilitation research, and 
other activities
• American Printing House for the Blind: supports the production 
and dissemination of free educational materials for students below 
the college level who are blind, research related to developing and 
improving products, and advisory services to consumer organiza-
tions on the availability and use of materials
• career, technical, and adult education: provides formula grants to 
states to help eliminate functional illiteracy among the nation’s 
adults, to assist adults in obtaining a high school diploma or its 
equivalent, to promote family literacy, and other activities
• promoting safe and stable families: funds a broad range of child 
welfare services, including family preservation and family support 
services
• children and families services programs: funds Head Start, child 
welfare services, abstinence education, and other activities
• aging services programs: provide nutrition, supportive services, and 
caregiver support services throughout the aging network
• operation of American Indian programs: provides a wide range 
of services and benefits to Native Americans in the areas of tribal 
government, human services, natural resources management, edu-
cation, public safety and justice, and community and economic 
development
• training and employment services: funds adult employment and 
training, dislocated worker employment and training, youth services, 
reintegration of ex-offenders, Job Corps, and other activities
• community service employment for older Americans: provides part-
time work experience in community service activities to unem-
ployed, low-income persons aged 55 and older
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• state unemployment insurance and employment service operations: 
provides administrative grants to state agencies that pay unemploy-
ment compensation to eligible workers, and collects state unem-
ployment taxes from employers, and funds a nationwide system 
that provides no-fee employment services
• unemployment trust fund: provides support for the financial trans-
action of the federal-state and railroad unemployment insurance 
systems
• federal unemployment benefits and allowances: funds the Trade 
Adjustment Assistance Program, which provides weekly cash ben-
efits, training, and job search and relocation allowances to certain 
workers displaced by international trade; and the Alternative Trade 
Adjustment Demonstration Program of wage insurance for older 
workers
• Corporation for National and Community Service operations: 
provides funds to foster civic engagement and responsibility by 
working with nonprofit organizations, faith-based groups, schools, 
and other civic organizations to engage Americans in community 
service
• school improvement for Washington, DC: supports efforts to im-
prove the quality of kindergarten through high school education in 
the District of Columbia
• social services block grants: funds such services as day care, pro-
tective services for children or adults, special services to per-
sons with disabilities, adoption, case management, health-related 
services, transportation, foster care, substance abuse, housing, 
home-delivered meals, independent and transitional living, and 
employment services
To generate cost savings relative to the baseline by 2019, the committee 
inflated the 2009 budget authority for these programs (taking into account 
the presumably temporary nature of some of the stimulus spending) at a 
rate of 2 percent and estimated the lagged outlay effects of cutting the pro-
grams by 50 percent starting in 2012.
COMMERCIAL SUBSIDIES AND “LOW-VALUE” 
ACTIVITIES: OPTIONS 1 AND 2
In addition to possible candidates for devolution to state and local gov-
ernments, the committee considered candidates for eliminating or reducing 
commercial subsidies (as well as raising user fees) for a range of programs 
and activities and for eliminating or reducing “low-value” activities. For 
its illustrative candidates, the committee drew on a list of potential budget 
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savings identified by the Congressional Budget Office (2009). They are 
presented here by agency.
Overseas Private Investment Corporation
• Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)—elimination: of-
fers private U.S. companies subsidized financing for foreign invest-
ment and insurance against political risks to those investments, 
including nationalization
National Science Foundation
• National Science Foundation (NSF) spending on elementary and 
secondary education—elimination: supports advanced teacher 
training and continuing education and is also used for development 
of instructional and assessment materials
Department of Homeland Security
• research and development programs in the Science and Technology 
Directorate—reduction: includes basic and applied research; devel-
opment and testing of standards, prototypes, and preproduction 
hardware; and procurement of products, systems, and equipment
Department of Energy
• applied research for fossil fuels—elimination: funds research into 
applied technologies for finding and producing petroleum, coal, 
and natural gas
• ultra-deepwater and unconventional natural gas and other petro-
leum research programs—elimination: funds applied research using 
federal revenues from old and gas leases
• nuclear energy research and development—elimination: three pro-
grams seek to develop new ways to generate and harness nuclear 
energy while reducing radioactive waste and guarding against the 
potential for nuclear proliferation
• FreedomCAR and Fuel Partnership—elimination: a joint effort of 
the federal government and private industry to promote research 
on fuel cells in energy-efficient vehicles
• applied research on energy-efficiency and renewable-energy tech-
nologies—elimination: support for the development of technology 
to increase energy conservation and efficiency in the transportation, 
building, and industrial sectors of the economy and to make greater 
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use of such renewable resources as solar, wind, and geothermal 
energy and biomass-based fuel
• grants to states for energy conservation and weatherization—
elimination: support for state and municipal efforts in energy 
conservation and building weatherization
• nuclear waste fund fee—index to inflation: funds the disposal of 
the radioactive wastes of civilian nuclear power plants through a 
fee per kilowatt-hour of electricity that they generate
• power marketing administrations—increase rates: generate electric-
ity, mainly from hydropower facilities constructed and operated 
by the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, 
with rates to customers that are much lower than those of other 
utilities
• Southeastern Power Administration (SEPA) and related power-
generating assets—sell: generate and sell electricity from hydro-
power facilities constructed and operated by the Army Corps of 
Engineers
Tennessee Valley Authority
• parts of the electric power assets—sell: now one of the largest pro-
ducers of electricity in the nation in contrast to original function 
of managing the region’s hydropower resources
Army Corps of Engineers
• permits for dredging—increase fees: needed to dredge or place fill 
material in navigable waters
• federal funding for beach replenishment projects—eliminate: op-
erations designed to counter beach erosion, typically by dredging 
sand from offshore locations and pumping it onshore to rebuild 
eroded areas
Department of the Interior
• authority to collect maintenance and location fees for hard rock 
mining on federal lands—permanently grant: mineral production 
on federal lands is less costly than on private lands unlike the ex-
traction of other minerals or fossil fuels from public lands, royalties 
are not charged on the value of hard rock minerals
• grazing fees for federal lands—use state formulas: grazing fees for 
federal lands differ from those for state-owned lands
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• Pick-Sloan Missouri Basin Program—reassign reimbursable costs 
to the beneficiaries it serves: provides subsidized service because 
customers receive benefit from but do not pay for the extra capacity 
that was built into the federal facilities that support irrigation
Environmental Protection Agency
• federal grants for wastewater and drinking water infrastructure—
eliminate: provides funds to the states to help communities build or 
replace municipal wastewater and drinking systems to meet federal 
standards
• Energy Star Program—eliminate: product-labeling and certification 
program whose goal is to help consumers and organizations save 
energy and reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by choosing products 
or management practices that are energy efficient or that rely on 
clean forms of energy
• Science to Achieve Results (STAR) Program—eliminate: provides 
grants to scientists and fellowships for graduate work in environ-
mental sciences
Department of Agriculture
• timber sales that lose money—reduce funding: management of 
federal timber sales from national forests
• Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP)—scale back: provides 
agricultural producers financial and technical help to promote the 
conservation and improvement of soil, water, air, energy, and plant 
and animal life on lands used for agricultural purposes
• Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)—limit enrollment: promotes 
soil conservation, improved water quality, and protection of wild-
life habitat by removing land from active agricultural production
• payments to producers of certain agricultural commodities—
impose limits: supports producers of various farm commodities 
(including cotton, feed grains, oilseeds, peanuts, rice, and wheat) 
through direct and countercyclical payments and loan benefits
• acreage payments—reduce by 1 percentage point: direct and coun-
tercyclical payments to agricultural producers, calculated as 85 
percent of a producer’s base acreage times an assumed yield per 
acre times a payment rate per unit of production
• reimbursement rate paid to private insurance companies in the 
Crop Insurance Program—reduce: this program protects farmers 
from losses caused by drought, flooding, pest infestation, and other 
natural disasters
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• Foreign Market Development Program—eliminate: provides part-
nerships in joint ventures with “cooperators”—such as agricultural 
trade associations and commodity groups—to develop markets for 
U.S. exports
• Market Access Program—reduce funding: provides funds to trade 
associations, commodity groups, and for-profit firms to help them 
build markets overseas for U.S. agricultural products
• export credit guarantees—limit the repayment period: protects ex-
porters and banks in the United States against default on financing 
they provide to foreign importers and banks to cover purchases of 
U.S. goods
• financing of rural water and waste disposal—create revolving fund: 
assists rural communities through a program that provides loans, 
loan guarantees, and grants for water and water-disposal projects
Department of Commerce
• trade promotion activities of the International Trade Adminis-
tration—eliminate or charge the beneficiaries: trade development 
programs that assess the competitiveness of U.S. industries and 
promote exports and U.S. and foreign commercial services, which 
counsel U.S. businesses on issues related to exporting
• Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership and the Baldrige 
National Quality Program—eliminate: improve the performance 
of U.S. businesses by providing them with technical assistance
Federal Communications Commission
• authority to auction licenses for use of the radio spectrum—
permanently extend: licenses for all circumstances in which more 
than one private applicant has sought a license (thereby increasing 
the role of competitive bidding in license assignment)
Small Business Administration
• secondary market guarantees—impose fees: guarantees for 50 to 
85 percent of the principal amount of qualifying loans to small 
businesses
Department of Transportation
• highway trust fund—reduce highway funding to maintain posi-
tive balances: provides grants to states for highways and other 
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surface transportation projects through the Federal Aid Highway 
Program
• New Starts Program—eliminate: provides funding for the construc-
tion of new rail and other “fixed-guideway” systems and for the 
expansion of existing systems
• Amtrak—reduce subsidy: provides federally subsidized rail pas-
senger service
• grants to large and medium-sized hub airports—eliminate: provides 
grants to airports to expand runways, improve safety and security, 
and make other capital investments under the Airport Improve-
ment Program
• aviation security—increase fees: covers a greater portion of the 
federal government’s costs for aviation security
• Saint Lawrence Seaway—impose fees on users: through the St. 
Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, operates and main-
tains the U.S.-controlled portion of the seaway between the Port of 
Montreal and Lake Erie
Department of Housing and Urban Development
• Community Development Block Grant Program—drop wealthier 
communities: provides annual grants to communities to help them 
aid low- and moderate-income households, eliminate slums and 
blight, or meet emergency needs by rehabilitating housing, im-
proving infrastructure, and carrying out economic development 
activities
• NeighborWorks America (Neighborhood Reinvestment Corpora-
tion)—eliminate: oversees a network of locally initiated and op-
erated groups called NeighborWorks Organizations engaged in 
activities involving housing, neighborhood revitalization, and com-
munity building
Treasury Department
• Community Development Financial Institutions Fund—eliminate: 
expands the availability of credit, investment capital, and financial 
services in distressed communities
Appalachian Regional Commission, the Denali 
Commission, and the Delta Regional Authority
• regional development agencies—eliminate: federally funded re-
gional development agencies that attempt, among other things, 
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to create jobs, improve rural education and health care, develop 
utilities and other infrastructure, and provide job training
Federal Emergency Management Agency
• flood insurance subsidy on selected older structures—eliminate or 
reduce: through the National Flood Insurance Program, charges 
premiums to insure buildings and their contents
Department of Education
• grants for safe and drug-free schools and communities—eliminate: 
support programs to discourage violence and the use of illegal 
substances—such as alcohol, cigarettes, and drugs—among young 
people in and around schools
• Even Start Program—eliminate and redirect some funds to other 
education programs: provides education and related services to 
parents who have not finished high school and to their young 
children
• Leveraging Educational Assistance Partnership Program (LEAP)—
eliminate: helps states provide grants and work-study assistance to 
financially needy
Department of Labor
• Senior Community Service Employment Program—eliminate: funds 
part-time jobs for people aged 55 and older who have low income 
and poor prospects for employment
Veterans Administration
• veterans’ disability compensation—reduce to account for Social 
Security Disability Insurance payments: disabled veterans eligible 
for Social Security disability payments receive payments from both 
programs, with no offset
Department of Justice
• grant—reduce for selected programs: provide various types of as-
sistance to nonprofit community organizations and state and local 
law enforcement agencies
The Congressional Budget Office (2009) shows the budgetary effects of 
each option over a 10-year period, from 2010 to 2019. To generate savings 
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estimates relative to the study baseline by 2019, the committee mapped 
the first 8 years (2010-2017) from the CBO report onto the first 8 years 
(2012-2019) of the spending trajectories for Options 1 and 2. Because CBO 
provided annual estimates of savings only for the first 5 years, the commit-
tee relied on CBO’s estimate for overall 10-year savings to calculate what 
the savings reasonably might be by the eighth year. These estimates adjust 
for the minor overlap with programs targeted for devolution.
HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT, RESEARCH 
AND DEVELOPMENT FUNDING, AND 
INFRASTRUCTURE: OPTIONS 3 AND 4
This section offers illustrative examples of public investments that 
would be expected to have high payoffs in the future.
• early childhood and postsecondary education and training: a num-
ber of policy experts have identified expanded early childhood 
education as a sound investment where benefits are likely to exceed 
costs over an extended time horizon. For example, an expansion 
of Head Start/Early Head Start for 3- and 4-year-olds from low-
income families has been proposed by researchers and policy ana-
lysts (see Boots et al., 2008; Isaacs, 2007). The estimated costs for 
covering 100 percent of eligible children in 2008 would have been 
around $20 billion.
• adult training and work assistance programs targeted at disadvan-
taged populations: some analysts have proposed additional spend-
ing on human capital in the neighborhood of $3-5 billion per year, 
as well as expansion of Pell grants and college assistance programs 
(see Blank, 2007; Holzer and Martinson, 2008).
• research and development in areas with long-term strategic na-
tional importance: these areas are likely to change over time as the 
nation’s needs and strategic interests shift. At present, alternative 
energy sources or green environment adaptations are often men-
tioned as areas for public research investment. Others talk about 
research on effective provision of health service and alternative care 
options that might help reduce health costs. Plausible estimates for 
additional research and development funding are about $20 billion 
a year—$15 billion for energy and $5 billion for health services 
(see Holubowich and Antos, 2008; Nemet and Kammen, 2007).
• infrastructure: CBO estimated that additional transportation infra-
structure investments by state and federal governments of about 
$164 billion per year (net of higher user fees of approximately $20 
billion per year) could be justified (Congressional Budget Office, 
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2008). Expansions in other infrastructure categories also may be 
warranted (Association of State Dam Safety Officials, 2002).
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Appendix E
Revenue Options and Their Implications
This appendix supplements Chapter 8 on revenue options. The Tax 
Policy Center (TPC) of the Urban Institute and Brookings Institution used 
specified assumptions provided by the study committee to model both the 
illustrative current tax and simplified tax structures over a nearly 75-year 
period. TPC estimated microdynamic taxpayer responses to specific tax 
changes. In addition, and also under the guidance of the study committee, 
TPC developed and applied appropriate policy specifications and behav-
ioral assumptions to estimate microdynamic responses to the change in 
the corporate income tax under the simplified tax structure to estimate the 
effects of changes in the corporation income tax. Because TPC’s is a micro-
simulation model, it took gross domestic product (GDP) as fixed; that is, 
TPC did not attempt to estimate the macroeconomic effects of tax changes, 
such as effects on investment and incomes. The results of these simulations 
are presented below. (For additional details on the analytic methods, see 
note 26 in Chapter 8.)
We use “current tax structure” as a shorthand for the current overall 
personal income tax regime of six brackets, an Alternative Minimum Tax 
(AMT), and many tax expenditures. Over time, and for the three scenarios 
with higher levels of revenues and spending than the “low” one, the various 
statutory tax rates and bracket thresholds are adjusted to raise the revenue 
needed. Because of the deemed maximum rates, the “high” current tax 
structure scenario must add a value-added tax (VAT). This analysis is sum-
marized in Table 8-1 in Chapter 8 and the discussion that follows it; details 
are presented in the tables below.
By contrast, we use “simplified tax structure” to mean two tax brackets 
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and very few tax expenditures. This analysis, too, is summarized in Table 
8-1 and the discussion that follows it. Over time and for the four scenarios, 
the rates, bracket thresholds, and standard deduction are adjusted to the 
revenue needs.
Table E-1 details the implementation of the current tax structure under 
the four scenarios and for selected years from 2012 through 2080. Because 
the low revenue scenario retains the rates and other features of the personal 
income tax under current law, the rates shown in Table E-1(A) are constant 
over time. Table E-2 similarly details the implementation of the simplified 
tax structure.
Tables E-3 through E-18 project the distributional implications of the 
revenue options for the federal tax system as a whole, by income quintiles 
and for the top 10 and 5 percent groups of the income distribution. Tables 
E-3 through E-10 pertain to the current tax structure for selected years; 
Tables E-11 through E-18 are for the simplified tax structure for the same 
years.
These tables show average combined federal tax rates, each group’s per-
centage share of the combined federal tax burden, and percentage changes 
in after-tax income (again for federal taxes combined) compared to current-
law taxation for that year. The combination of federal taxes includes the 
personal income tax (net of refundable credits); the corporate income tax 
allocated to individuals; the payroll taxes for Medicare and Social Security 
levied on both workers (and—as allocated to individuals—on employers); 
the estate tax similarly allocated; and an allocation of any VAT (Burman 
et al., 2008c; Rohaly et al., 2005). The average tax rate for the population 
or any subgroup is the average combined federal tax as a percentage of its 
average income. Comparing across groups, average tax rates are also indi-
cators of the distribution of the combined tax burden.
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TABLE E-3 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2012
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 4.6 0.8 NA
Second Quintile 10.3 4.2 NA
Third Quintile 16.3 10.9 NA
Fourth Quintile 19.1 18.3 NA
Fifth Quintile 25.0 65.7 NA
 All 20.7 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 26.1 51.6 NA
Top 5 Percent 27.0 41.2 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 5.1 0.8 –0.5
Second Quintile 11.2 4.1 –1.1
Third Quintile 17.8 10.8 –1.8
Fourth Quintile 21.0 18.2 –2.3
Fifth Quintile 27.8 66.0 –3.7
 All 22.9 100.0 –2.8
Top 10 Percent 29.0 51.9 –4.0
Top 5 Percent 30.1 41.5 –4.2
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 5.1 0.9 –0.5
Second Quintile 11.0 4.2 –0.8
Third Quintile 17.3 10.9 –1.3
Fourth Quintile 20.4 18.2 –1.6
Fifth Quintile 26.7 65.7 –2.3
 All 22.1 100.0 –1.8
Top 10 Percent 27.9 51.6 –2.4
Top 5 Percent 28.9 41.2 –2.5
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 5.2 0.8 –0.6
Second Quintile 11.4 4.1 –1.3
Third Quintile 18.1 10.7 –2.2
Fourth Quintile 21.6 18.1 –3.0
Fifth Quintile 28.7 66.2 –4.9
 All 23.6 100.0 –3.6
Top 10 Percent 30.0 52.1 –5.3
Top 5 Percent 31.2 41.7 –5.7
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
 APPENDIX E
TABLE E-4 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2020
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 4.9 0.9 NA
Second Quintile 9.9 4.0 NA
Third Quintile 16.6 10.8 NA
Fourth Quintile 19.9 19.2 NA
Fifth Quintile 24.7 65.1 NA
 All 20.8 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 25.5 50.0 NA
Top 5 Percent 26.1 38.8 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 6.2 0.9 –1.4
Second Quintile 12.0 4.0 –2.3
Third Quintile 19.9 10.7 –4.0
Fourth Quintile 24.0 19.1 –5.1
Fifth Quintile 30.1 65.3 –7.1
 All 25.3 100.0 –5.6
Top 10 Percent 31.1 50.2 –7.5
Top 5 Percent 31.8 39.0 –7.7
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 6.1 0.9 –1.3
Second Quintile 11.6 4.0 –1.8
Third Quintile 19.0 10.8 –2.9
Fourth Quintile 22.7 19.1 –3.5
Fifth Quintile 28.3 65.0 –4.7
 All 23.8 100.0 –3.8
Top 10 Percent 29.2 50.0 –4.9
Top 5 Percent 29.8 38.8 –5.1
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 6.6 0.9 –1.8
Second Quintile 12.8 3.9 –3.2
Third Quintile 21.3 10.4 –5.6
Fourth Quintile 25.9 18.8 –7.4
Fifth Quintile 33.3 66.0 –11.4
 All 27.6 100.0 –8.6
Top 10 Percent 34.6 66.0 –12.2
Top 5 Percent 35.4 39.7 –12.6
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-5 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2030
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 5.4 1.0 NA
Second Quintile 10.5 4.1 NA
Third Quintile 17.3 10.8 NA
Fourth Quintile 20.8 19.6 NA
Fifth Quintile 25.5 64.5 NA
 All 21.5 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 26.4 49.7 NA
Top 5 Percent 27.0 38.5 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 7.2 1.0 –1.9
Second Quintile 13.1 4.2 –2.9
Third Quintile 21.3 10.9 –4.8
Fourth Quintile 25.5 19.6 –5.9
Fifth Quintile 31.1 64.2 –7.5
 All 26.3 100.0 –6.1
Top 10 Percent 32.1 49.4 –7.8
Top 5 Percent 32.7 38.2 –7.9
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 7.3 1.1 –2.0
Second Quintile 13.0 4.2 –2.8
Third Quintile 21.0 10.9 –4.4
Fourth Quintile 25.0 19.6 –5.3
Fifth Quintile 30.4 64.1 –6.5
 All 25.8 100.0 –5.4
Top 10 Percent 27.7 49.3 –6.7
Top 5 Percent 28.3 38.1 –6.8
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 8.7 1.1 –3.5
Second Quintile 15.0 4.2 –5.1
Third Quintile 24.2 10.7 –8.3
Fourth Quintile 29.0 19.3 –10.3
Fifth Quintile 36.1 64.6 –14.1
 All 30.3 100.0 –11.2
Top 10 Percent 37.4 64.6 –14.9
Top 5 Percent 38.2 38.7 –15.3
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-6 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2040
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 6.0 1.0 NA
Second Quintile 11.2 4.2 NA
Third Quintile 17.8 10.5 NA
Fourth Quintile 21.8 19.5 NA
Fifth Quintile 25.2 64.7 NA
 All 21.8 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 25.8 50.3 NA
Top 5 Percent 26.1 39.0 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 7.9 1.2 –2.0
Second Quintile 13.7 4.3 –2.8
Third Quintile 21.4 10.7 –4.4
Fourth Quintile 26.1 19.7 –5.5
Fifth Quintile 29.5 64.1 –5.8
 All 25.8 100.0 –5.1
Top 10 Percent 30.1 49.5 –5.7
Top 5 Percent 30.3 38.3 –5.6
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 8.0 1.1 –2.2
Second Quintile 13.9 4.3 –3.1
Third Quintile 21.8 10.6 –4.8
Fourth Quintile 26.5 19.6 –6.1
Fifth Quintile 30.4 64.3 –6.8
 All 26.4 100.0 –5.9
Top 10 Percent 31.0 49.8 –6.9
Top 5 Percent 31.2 38.6 –6.9
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 10.0 1.2 –4.3
Second Quintile 16.5 4.3 –6.0
Third Quintile 25.7 10.5 –9.5
Fourth Quintile 31.3 19.3 –12.1
Fifth Quintile 36.5 64.7 –15.0
 All 31.5 100.0 –12.4
Top 10 Percent 37.4 50.3 –15.5
Top 5 Percent 37.7 39.0 –15.7
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-7 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2050
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 7.0 1.2 NA
Second Quintile 11.8 4.2 NA
Third Quintile 18.2 10.5 NA
Fourth Quintile 22.3 19.3 NA
Fifth Quintile 25.0 64.8 NA
 All 22.0 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 25.4 50.8 NA
Top 5 Percent 25.3 39.3 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.0 1.3 –2.2
Second Quintile 14.1 4.4 –2.6
Third Quintile 21.1 10.8 –3.5
Fourth Quintile 25.6 19.7 –4.2
Fifth Quintile 27.6 63.7 –3.5
 All 24.8 100.0 –3.5
Top 10 Percent 27.8 49.5 –3.2
Top 5 Percent 27.5 38.1 –3.0
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.1 1.3 –2.3
Second Quintile 14.5 4.3 –3.1
Third Quintile 22.0 10.6 –4.6
Fourth Quintile 26.9 19.5 –5.9
Fifth Quintile 29.7 64.3 –6.2
 All 26.3 100.0 –5.5
Top 10 Percent 30.0 50.3 –6.2
Top 5 Percent 29.8 38.8 –6.0
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 11.5 1.3 –4.8
Second Quintile 17.4 4.2 –6.3
Third Quintile 26.3 10.4 –9.8
Fourth Quintile 32.1 19.2 –12.6
Fifth Quintile 36.2 64.8 –15.0
 All 31.9 100.0 –12.7
Top 10 Percent 36.5 64.8 –16.0
Top 5 Percent 37.9 39.4 –16.2
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-8 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2060
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 7.4 1.1 NA
Second Quintile 12.8 4.3 NA
Third Quintile 19.5 11.3 NA
Fourth Quintile 23.0 19.7 NA
Fifth Quintile 25.2 63.5 NA
 All 22.5 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 25.4 49.9 NA
Top 5 Percent 26.0 38.7 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.3 1.3 –2.0
Second Quintile 15.0 4.5 –2.5
Third Quintile 22.1 11.7 –3.3
Fourth Quintile 25.8 20.1 –3.7
Fifth Quintile 27.2 62.3 –2.6
 All 24.8 100.0 –2.9
Top 10 Percent 27.8 48.5 –3.2
Top 5 Percent 28.2 37.3 –3.0
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.6 1.2 –2.4
Second Quintile 15.8 4.4 –3.4
Third Quintile 23.7 11.5 –5.2
Fourth Quintile 27.9 19.8 –6.4
Fifth Quintile 30.1 63.1 –6.6
 All 27.1 100.0 –8.6
Top 10 Percent 30.6 49.4 –7.0
Top 5 Percent 31.3 38.2 –7.2
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 12.5 1.3 –5.6
Second Quintile 19.3 4.4 –7.5
Third Quintile 28.7 11.3 –11.5
Fourth Quintile 33.8 19.6 –14.1
Fifth Quintile 37.0 63.3 –15.8
 All 33.2 100.0 –13.8
Top 10 Percent 37.8 63.3 –16.8
Top 5 Percent 39.0 38.5 –16.7
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-9 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2070
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 6.9 1.1 NA
Second Quintile 13.6 4.3 NA
Third Quintile 20.1 11.7 NA
Fourth Quintile 23.0 19.9 NA
Fifth Quintile 25.2 63.0 NA
 All 22.7 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 25.4 49.5 NA
Top 5 Percent 25.1 38.0 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 8.6 1.2 –1.8
Second Quintile 16.0 4.6 –2.7
Third Quintile 23.0 12.0 –3.6
Fourth Quintile 26.0 20.3 –3.9
Fifth Quintile 27.5 61.9 –3.0
 All 25.2 100.0 –3.2
Top 10 Percent 27.5 48.2 –2.8
Top 5 Percent 27.0 36.8 –2.5
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.1 1.1 –2.4
Second Quintile 17.2 4.4 –4.1
Third Quintile 25.1 11.8 –6.3
Fourth Quintile 28.6 20.1 –7.3
Fifth Quintile 30.8 62.5 –7.5
 All 28.0 100.0 –6.8
Top 10 Percent 31.0 48.9 –7.5
Top 5 Percent 30.5 37.5 –7.2
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 12.5 1.3 –6.0
Second Quintile 21.2 4.5 –8.9
Third Quintile 30.5 11.7 –13.0
Fourth Quintile 34.6 19.8 –15.0
Fifth Quintile 37.8 62.6 –16.8
 All 34.2 100.0 –14.9
Top 10 Percent 35.2 49.2 –17.0
Top 5 Percent 37.7 37.8 –16.7
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-10 Current Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2080
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario, Which Is Current Law
First Quintile 6.8 0.9 NA
Second Quintile 13.7 4.0 NA
Third Quintile 20.7 11.8 NA
Fourth Quintile 23.3 20.1 NA
Fifth Quintile 25.4 63.2 NA
 All 23.1 100.0 NA
Top 10 Percent 25.6 49.7 NA
Top 5 Percent 25.1 38.5 NA
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 8.5 1.0 –1.8
Second Quintile 16.2 4.3 –2.9
Third Quintile 23.8 12.1 –3.9
Fourth Quintile 26.4 20.5 –4.1
Fifth Quintile 27.7 62.0 –3.1
 All 25.6 100.0 –3.4
Top 10 Percent 27.7 48.4 –2.9
Top 5 Percent 27.0 37.2 –2.5
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.0 1.0 –2.3
Second Quintile 17.3 4.1 –4.3
Third Quintile 26.0 11.9 –6.7
Fourth Quintile 29.1 20.3 –7.6
Fifth Quintile 31.2 62.6 –7.8
 All 28.5 100.0 –7.1
Top 10 Percent 31.3 49.1 –7.7
Top 5 Percent 30.6 37.9 –7.3
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 13.3 1.2 –7.0
Second Quintile 22.2 4.2 –9.9
Third Quintile 32.1 11.8 –14.4
Fourth Quintile 35.9 20.1 –16.4
Fifth Quintile 38.8 62.6 –18.0
 All 35.6 100.0 –16.3
Top 10 Percent 39.1 49.2 –18.1
Top 5 Percent 38.3 38.1 –17.6
NOTE: NA = not applicable.
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-11 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2012
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 4.5 0.8 0.1
Second Quintile 10.2 4.2 0.1
Third Quintile 15.7 10.6 0.7
Fourth Quintile 18.6 17.9 0.7
Fifth Quintile 25.1 66.4 –0.1
 All 20.6 100.0 0.2
Top 10 Percent 26.2 52.2 –0.2
Top 5 Percent 26.9 41.2 0.2
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 5.2 0.9 –0.6
Second Quintile 11.1 4.2 –0.9
Third Quintile 17.8 11.1 –1.8
Fourth Quintile 20.9 18.7 –2.2
Fifth Quintile 26.5 65.1 –2.1
 All 22.2 100.0 –1.9
Top 10 Percent 27.2 50.2 –1.4
Top 5 Percent 27.5 39.1 –0.6
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 4.9 0.9 –0.3
Second Quintile 10.7 4.2 –0.5
Third Quintile 16.8 10.8 –0.6
Fourth Quintile 19.8 18.2 –0.8
Fifth Quintile 26.0 65.8 –1.3
 All 21.5 100.0 –1.0
Top 10 Percent 26.8 51.1 –0.9
Top 5 Percent 27.3 40.0 –0.3
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 5.4 0.9 –0.8
Second Quintile 11.5 4.2 –1.3
Third Quintile 18.6 11.3 –2.8
Fourth Quintile 21.9 19.0 –3.5
Fifth Quintile 27.0 64.4 –2.6
 All 22.8 100.0 –2.6
Top 10 Percent 27.5 49.4 –1.8
Top 5 Percent 27.7 38.3 –0.8
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-12 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2020
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 5.2 0.9 –0.3
Second Quintile 10.7 4.3 –0.8
Third Quintile 16.3 10.7 0.4
Fourth Quintile 19.6 19.1 0.4
Fifth Quintile 24.3 64.8 0.5
 All 20.6 100.0 0.3
Top 10 Percent 24.9 49.4 0.8
Top 5 Percent 25.1 37.8 1.3
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 7.2 1.1 –2.4
Second Quintile 13.3 4.4 –3.7
Third Quintile 20.9 11.4 –5.1
Fourth Quintile 24.9 20.2 –6.2
Fifth Quintile 28.4 62.8 –4.8
 All 24.7 100.0 –4.9
Top 10 Percent 28.5 47.0 –4.0
Top 5 Percent 28.4 35.5 –3.1
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 6.7 1.0 –1.9
Second Quintile 12.5 4.4 –2.9
Third Quintile 19.4 11.1 –3.3
Fourth Quintile 23.0 19.7 –3.8
Fifth Quintile 27.2 63.6 –3.3
 All 23.5 100.0 –3.3
Top 10 Percent 27.6 48.0 –2.7
Top 5 Percent 27.6 36.4 –2.0
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 7.6 1.0 –2.8
Second Quintile 14.3 4.4 –4.8
Third Quintile 22.5 11.4 –7.1
Fourth Quintile 26.9 20.3 –8.7
Fifth Quintile 30.6 62.8 –7.8
 All 26.7 100.0 –7.4
Top 10 Percent 30.8 47.0 –7.0
Top 5 Percent 30.6 35.5 –6.1
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-13 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2030.
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 6.2 1.1 –0.9
Second Quintile 11.5 4.6 –1.2
Third Quintile 17.4 11.0 –0.1
Fourth Quintile 20.8 19.9 0.0
Fifth Quintile 24.7 63.4 1.1
 All 21.2 100.0 0.4
Top 10 Percent 25.1 48.1 1.7
Top 5 Percent 25.3 36.7 2.3
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 8.8 1.3 –3.7
Second Quintile 15.1 4.9 –5.1
Third Quintile 22.6 11.8 –6.4
Fourth Quintile 26.6 20.9 –7.3
Fifth Quintile 28.8 60.9 –4.4
 All 25.7 100.0 –5.3
Top 10 Percent 28.8 45.4 –3.3
Top 5 Percent 28.6 34.2 –2.2
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.0 1.4 –3.9
Second Quintile 15.1 5.0 –5.1
Third Quintile 22.0 11.7 –5.7
Fourth Quintile 25.6 20.5 –6.1
Fifth Quintile 28.6 61.4 –4.1
 All 25.3 100.0 –4.8
Top 10 Percent 28.7 46.1 –3.2
Top 5 Percent 28.7 34.9 –2.3
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.8 1.3 –4.7
Second Quintile 17.0 5.1 –7.3
Third Quintile 24.9 11.9 –9.1
Fourth Quintile 28.8 20.8 –10.1
Fifth Quintile 31.4 60.9 –7.9
 All 28.1 100.0 –8.4
Top 10 Percent 31.6 45.6 –7.0
Top 5 Percent 31.4 34.4 –6.0
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-14 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2040
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 7.6 1.3 –1.7
Second Quintile 12.6 4.8 –1.6
Third Quintile 18.3 11.0 –0.6
Fourth Quintile 22.1 20.1 –0.4
Fifth Quintile 24.0 62.7 1.7
 All 21.4 100.0 0.5
Top 10 Percent 24.1 47.8 2.4
Top 5 Percent 24.0 36.5 2.8
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 10.2 1.5 –4.5
Second Quintile 16.4 5.3 –6.0
Third Quintile 23.3 11.9 –6.6
Fourth Quintile 27.3 21.1 –7.0
Fifth Quintile 27.1 60.1 –2.4
 All 25.2 100.0 –4.3
Top 10 Percent 26.6 45.0 –1.1
Top 5 Percent 26.2 33.9 –0.1
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 10.1 1.5 –4.4
Second Quintile 16.0 5.1 –5.5
Third Quintile 23.0 11.5 –6.3
Fourth Quintile 27.4 20.7 –7.1
Fifth Quintile 28.2 61.2 –3.9
 All 25.8 100.0 –5.1
Top 10 Percent 28.0 46.1 –2.9
Top 5 Percent 27.7 35.0 –2.1
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 11.3 1.5 –5.7
Second Quintile 18.9 5.3 –8.7
Third Quintile 26.5 11.8 –10.6
Fourth Quintile 30.9 20.8 –11.7
Fifth Quintile 31.4 60.6 –8.3
 All 29.0 100.0 –9.2
Top 10 Percent 31.2 45.7 –7.2
Top 5 Percent 30.8 34.7 –6.4
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-15 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2050
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 8.8 1.5 –2.0
Second Quintile 13.6 4.9 –2.0
Third Quintile 19.1 11.2 –1.0
Fourth Quintile 23.0 20.3 –0.8
Fifth Quintile 23.4 62.1 2.1
 All 21.6 100.0 0.6
Top 10 Percent 23.3 47.6 2.8
Top 5 Percent 23.0 36.5 3.1
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 11.5 1.7 –4.8
Second Quintile 17.4 5.6 –6.3
Third Quintile 23.3 12.2 –6.2
Fourth Quintile 26.9 21.2 –5.9
Fifth Quintile 25.1 59.2 –0.1
 All 24.2 100.0 –2.8
Top 10 Percent 24.5 44.6 1.2
Top 5 Percent 23.8 33.7 2.0
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 11.5 1.6 –4.9
Second Quintile 17.3 5.2 –6.2
Third Quintile 23.7 11.7 –6.7
Fourth Quintile 28.0 20.8 –7.2
Fifth Quintile 27.2 60.5 –2.9
 All 25.6 100.0 –4.6
Top 10 Percent 26.8 46.0 –1.8
Top 5 Percent 26.2 35.1 –1.2
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 12.7 1.6 –6.2
Second Quintile 20.3 5.5 –9.6
Third Quintile 27.2 11.9 –11.0
Fourth Quintile 31.3 20.6 –11.6
Fifth Quintile 30.6 60.4 –7.5
 All 28.9 100.0 –8.9
Top 10 Percent 30.3 46.1 –6.5
Top 5 Percent 29.8 35.2 –6.0
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-16 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2060
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.6 1.5 –2.4
Second Quintile 14.7 5.0 –2.2
Third Quintile 20.5 12.2 –1.3
Fourth Quintile 23.7 20.7 –0.9
Fifth Quintile 23.4 60.5 2.4
 All 22.0 100.0 0.7
Top 10 Percent 23.2 46.5 3.1
Top 5 Percent 22.8 35.7 3.3
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 12.1 1.7 –5.1
Second Quintile 18.4 5.7 –6.4
Third Quintile 24.3 13.2 –6.0
Fourth Quintile 27.0 21.5 –5.3
Fifth Quintile 24.6 57.8 0.8
 All 24.2 100.0 –2.1
Top 10 Percent 23.9 43.6 2.1
Top 5 Percent 23.1 33.0 2.8
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 12.4 1.6 –5.4
Second Quintile 18.7 5.3 –6.8
Third Quintile 25.5 12.6 –7.5
Fourth Quintile 28.9 20.9 –7.7
Fifth Quintile 27.9 59.6 –3.7
 All 26.6 100.0 –5.3
Top 10 Percent 27.5 45.7 –2.8
Top 5 Percent 27.0 35.0 –2.3
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 14.3 1.6 –7.5
Second Quintile 22.5 5.5 –11.1
Third Quintile 29.8 12.8 –12.8
Fourth Quintile 33.1 20.9 –13.1
Fifth Quintile 31.7 59.0 –8.6
 All 30.5 100.0 –10.2
Top 10 Percent 31.2 45.2 –7.6
Top 5 Percent 30.5 34.7 –7.1
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-17 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2070
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.3 1.5 –2.6
Second Quintile 15.5 5.1 –2.2
Third Quintile 21.4 12.7 –1.6
Fourth Quintile 23.7 21.1 –0.9
Fifth Quintile 23.3 59.6 2.6
 All 22.1 100.0 0.8
Top 10 Percent 22.9 45.7 3.4
Top 5 Percent 22.4 34.9 3.5
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 11.8 1.7 –5.3
Second Quintile 19.4 5.7 –6.7
Third Quintile 25.4 13.6 –6.6
Fourth Quintile 27.1 21.7 –5.3
Fifth Quintile 24.8 57.3 0.6
 All 24.5 100.0 –2.4
Top 10 Percent 24.0 43.2 1.9
Top 5 Percent 23.3 32.6 2.5
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 12.4 1.6 –5.9
Second Quintile 20.3 5.4 –7.7
Third Quintile 27.2 13.2 –8.9
Fourth Quintile 29.5 21.4 –8.5
Fifth Quintile 27.9 58.3 –3.6
 All 27.1 100.0 –5.7
Top 10 Percent 27.3 44.4 –2.5
Top 5 Percent 26.6 33.7 –2.0
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 13.9 1.6 –7.5
Second Quintile 23.1 5.6 –11.0
Third Quintile 30.2 13.3 –12.7
Fourth Quintile 32.3 21.2 –12.1
Fifth Quintile 30.8 58.3 –7.5
 All 29.9 100.0 –9.4
Top 10 Percent 30.3 44.6 –6.5
Top 5 Percent 29.7 34.0 –6.1
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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TABLE E-18 Simplified Tax Structure: Average Tax Rates and Tax 
Distribution for Virtually All Federal Taxes Combined, 2080
Average Tax Rate 
(percentage)
Percentage Share 
of Tax Burden
Percentage Change 
in After-Tax Incomea
Low Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 9.2 1.3 –2.6
Second Quintile 15.7 4.7 –2.3
Third Quintile 22.0 12.9 –1.7
Fourth Quintile 24.0 21.3 –1.0
Fifth Quintile 23.4 59.8 2.7
 All 22.4 100.0 0.8
Top 10 Percent 23.0 45.8 3.5
Top 5 Percent 22.4 35.3 3.6
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 11.8 1.5 –5.4
Second Quintile 19.6 5.3 –6.9
Third Quintile 26.0 13.7 –6.7
Fourth Quintile 27.5 21.9 –5.4
Fifth Quintile 25.0 57.5 0.5
 All 24.9 100.0 –2.4
Top 10 Percent 24.2 43.5 1.9
Top 5 Percent 23.2 33.0 2.5
Intermediate- Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 12.3 1.4 –5.9
Second Quintile 20.6 5.0 –8.0
Third Quintile 28.0 13.3 –9.3
Fourth Quintile 30.0 21.6 –8.8
Fifth Quintile 28.2 58.6 –3.8
 All 27.6 100.0 –5.9
Top 10 Percent 27.5 44.6 –2.6
Top 5 Percent 26.6 34.1 –2.0
High Spending and Reenues Scenario
First Quintile 15.4 1.4 –9.2
Second Quintile 26.2 5.1 –14.5
Third Quintile 35.0 13.3 –18.1
Fourth Quintile 37.2 21.4 –18.1
Fifth Quintile 35.4 58.8 –13.5
 All 34.6 100.0 –15.0
Top 10 Percent 34.8 45.1 –12.3
Top 5 Percent 33.9 34.7 –11.7
 aCompared with the after-tax income under current law. “Minus” means that after-tax 
income is reduced.
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Appendix F
Constructing Multiple Paths 
to Sustainability
The committee constructed the sustainable scenarios in three steps. 
First, unique spending trajectories for Medicare and Medicaid, Social Secu-
rity, and defense and domestic programs were specified for each of the sce-
narios. Details of the spending trajectories for Social Security and defense 
and domestic programs are discussed in Appendixes C and D, respectively. 
The health trajectories, which are by their very nature more speculative, are 
discussed in the first section below.
Second, a target debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio of 60 per-
cent was uniformly applied across the scenarios so that the target ratio was 
gradually reached by 2022. Payments of interest on the debt (an amount 
derived by multiplying the debt level in a year by the projected interest rate 
on debt in that year) are the same for all scenarios.
Third, revenue levels were adjusted annually to a level that, given the 
spending amount specified for that year, produced deficits that were arith-
metically consistent with the debt-to-GDP ratio specified for that year.
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID TRAJECTORIES
Low Spending Trajectory
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) (2009) recently laid out a zero 
percent excess cost growth (ECG) trajectory for Medicare and Medicaid 
spending in its update of the long-term budget outlook. However, it did so 
using the assumptions of the “extended-baseline scenario” for Medicare 
and Medicaid, rather than the “alternative fiscal scenario” (which abandons 
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the assumption that Medicare’s payment rates for physicians will grow with 
inflation) that is the basis of the committee’s study baseline for Medicare 
and Medicaid.
The committee adopted a simple approach to reconcile CBO’s zero 
percent ECG trajectory with the study’s baseline assumptions. In 2025, for 
example, CBO’s path puts Medicare and Medicaid spending at 7.3 percent 
of GDP and program spending at 5.9 percent of GDP—that is, 19.2 percent 
below the extended baseline. Although the study baseline puts Medicare 
and Medicaid at 7.4 percent of GDP in 2025, which is slightly higher than 
CBO’s extended baseline, the committee still assumed that the zero percent 
ECG trajectory would put Medicare and Medicaid at 19.2 percent below 
the study baseline—that is, at 6 percent of GDP; see Table F-1.
High Spending Trajectory
The high spending path uses CBO data to broadly mimic the long-
term cost-growth path of the Medicare Trustees. The formula used in the 
extrapolation does two things:
1. It causes spending in 2083 to be at the same level as that achieved 
by the 1 percent ECG path laid out by CBO in its most recent up-
date of the long-term budget outlook. The same adjustments the 
committee made to the zero percent ECG path (as described above) 
were made to the 1 percent ECG path.
2. It causes the spending curve to flatten out to zero percent ECG by 
2083.
The formula that accomplishes that is as follows:
 
MM MM
ZeroPercent ECG
ZeroPercent ECGt t
t
t
= −
−
1
1
∗ ∗( ),Xt
TABLE F-1 Basis of the Low Spending Trajectory for Medicare and 
Medicaid
2008 (Percentage of GDP) 2025 Percentages of GDP
Actual CBO
Extended-
Baseline 
Scenario
CBO: 0% 
Excess Cost 
Growth
CBO
Alternative 
Fiscal Scenario/
Study Baseline
0% Excess Cost 
Growth: For Use 
in Committee’s 
Scenarios
4.1 7.3 5.9 7.4 (5.9/7.3)*7.4 = 6.0
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where MM is Medicare and Medicaid spending, t is any year after 2018, 
Zero Percent ECG is Medicare and Medicaid spending under a zero 
percent excess cost growth assumption, and Xt is a functional form that 
captures the gradual diminishment of excess cost growth, where
 Xt
t= −1 00031 2083. ( ) .
The spending path that results fluctuates around the study baseline for 
Medicare and Medicaid until around 2050, sometimes falling slightly below 
it, sometimes slightly above it. The high spending trajectory, for the sake of 
conceptual tidiness, is constrained to never exceed the study baseline. As a 
result, the high spending trajectory follows the study baseline until 2030.
Intermediate Trajectories
For every year from 2012 to 2083, the intermediate-1 spending trajec-
tory is exactly equidistant from the low and intermediate-2 spending tra-
jectories, while the intermediate-2 spending trajectory is exactly equidistant 
from the intermediate-1 and high spending trajectories. The formulas are 
as follows:
 (intermediate-)t = lowt + ((hight – lowt)/3), and 
 (intermediate-)t = lowt + (2 ∗	(hight – smallt)/3),
where high represents Medicare and Medicaid expenditures under the high 
spending trajectory, and low represents program expenditures under the 
low spending trajectory.
SETTING THE DEBT-TO-GDP TARGET
To set the debt-to-GDP target, assume that g is the growth rate of nomi-
nal GDP and that OMF (other means for financing) represents transactions 
that affect federal borrowing but that are not included in revenues and 
outlays (and which are generally small relative to the deficit).1 Then:
 debtt/GDPt  = (debtt– + deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt 
=  (debtt–/GDPt–) ∗ (1/(1+gt)) + 
(deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt
and
 (deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt = debtt/GDPt – (debtt–/GDPt–) ∗ (1/(1+gt)).
0 APPENDIX F
If the debt-to-GDP ratio is held constant, then:
 (deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt = debtt–/GDPt– ∗ (1 – (1/(1+gt)).
If the debt-to-GDP ratio needs to be reduced—for example, by 1 percent 
a year—then:
 (deficitt + OMFt)/GDPt = debtt–/GDPt– ∗ (.99 – (1/(1+gt)).
Revenue levels can be specified once the target deficit is known:
 reenuest = outlayst – deficitt.
All four scenarios allow the federal debt to grow as a percentage of 
GDP by 0.9 percent from 2011 to 2012; roughly stabilize it from 2012 to 
2014; and then reduce it by 0.3 percent from 2014 to 2015, 0.4 percent 
from 2015 to 2016, 1 percent from 2016 to 2017, 4.3 percent from 2017 
to 2018 (a large decrease made possible by a large projected repayment of 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds in 2018, which the scenarios 
apply toward debt reduction), 0.9 percent from 2018 to 2019, 0.6 percent 
from 2019 to 2020, 0.3 percent from 2020 to 2021, 0.5 percent from 2021 
to 2022, 0.1 percent from 2022 to 2023, and maintains it at a stable level 
from then on.
The transitional decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio from 2012 to 2023 
is designed to produce a low scenario with a near-term revenue trajectory 
that is as smooth as possible and with revenue levels that are as close to the 
historical average of 18.5 percent as possible.
Table F-2 presents information about projected revenues, outlays, defi-
cits, and debt in the study baseline. Table F-3 presents information about 
projected deficits, debt, and interest payments under the committee’s four 
scenarios. Table F-4 presents information about the differences in deficits, 
debt, and interest payments between the committee’s four scenarios and the 
study baseline. Tables F-5, F-7, F-9, and F-11, respectively, present informa-
tion about revenues and outlays in the low, intermediate-1, intermediate-2, 
and high scenarios. Tables F-6, F-8, F-10, and F-12, respectively, present 
information about the differences in revenues and outlays between the low, 
intermediate-1, intermediate-2, and high scenarios and the study baseline.
DELAy SCENARIOS
General
The delay scenarios indicate, as simply as possible, the consequences 
of delaying changes. The same debt-to-GDP target is applied, and the same 
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TABLE F-3 Projected Federal Deficits, Debt, and Interest Payments 
Under the Committee’s Four Scenarios, as Percentages of GDP
Selected Years Deficit Debt Interest Payments
2008a 3.2 40.8 1.8
2009 12.1 55.0 1.2
2010 8.5 60.9 1.2
2011 6.5 64.8 1.4
2012 3.2 65.4 1.7
2013 2.9 65.4 2.1
2014 2.6 65.4 2.4
2015 2.2 65.2 2.6
2016 2.1 64.9 2.7
2017 1.7 64.2 2.8
2018 1.4 61.5 2.9
2019 1.8 61.0 2.9
2020 1.9 60.6 2.9
2021 2.0 60.4 2.8
2022 1.9 60.0 2.7
2023 2.2 60.0 2.6
2024 2.2 60.0 2.6
2025 2.2 60.0 2.5
2030 2.2 60.0 2.5
2035 2.3 60.0 2.5
2040 2.3 60.0 2.5
2045 2.2 60.0 2.5
2050 2.3 60.0 2.5
2055 2.3 60.0 2.5
2060 2.2 60.0 2.5
2065 2.3 60.0 2.6
2070 2.3 60.0 2.6
2075 2.3 60.0 2.6
2080 2.2 60.0 2.6
2083 2.3 60.0 2.6
 aActual spending.
nonbaseline trajectories are used. The difference is that the changes start 5 
or 10 years later, that is, in 2017 or 2022. The nonbaseline revenue paths 
are similarly delayed 5 or 10 years. There are two ways these elements can 
be combined; for example, for 5-year delays (also see Chapter 9):
1. the reenue path necessary to attain the debt-to-GDP target for a 
5-year delay of each spending trajectory, and
2. to stay within a given delayed revenue trajectory and attain the 
debt-to-GDP target, combinations of delayed spending paths.
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TABLE F-4 Percentage Point Differences for Deficits, Debt, and Interest 
Payments Between the Committee’s Four Scenarios and the Study 
Baseline, as Shares of GDP
Selected Years Deficit Debt Interest Payments
2008a 0.0 0.0 0.0
2009 0.0 0.0 0.0
2010 0.0 0.0 0.0
2011 0.0 0.0 0.0
2012 –1.1 –1.1 0.0
2013 –1.2 –2.2 –0.1
2014 –1.5 –3.6 –0.1
2015 –1.8 –5.3 –0.2
2016 –2.2 –7.2 –0.3
2017 –2.6 –9.5 –0.4
2018 –3.1 –12.3 –0.5
2019 –3.4 –15.2 –0.7
2020 –3.6 –18.2 –0.8
2021 –3.8 –21.3 –0.9
2022 –4.1 –24.6 –1.0
2023 –4.2 –27.9 –1.1
2024 –4.5 –31.3 –1.3
2025 –4.9 –35.0 –1.4
2030 –7.2 –57.6 –2.3
2035 –9.2 –86.5 –3.5
2040 –16.7 –120.2 –4.9
2045 –13.6 –158.2 –6.5
2050 –17.3 –199.3 –8.3
2055 –18.1 –243.8 –10.2
2060 –20.6 –291.7 –12.2
2065 –23.4 –343.4 –14.4
2070 –26.5 –400.5 –16.8
2075 –29.9 –461.5 –19.4
2080 –33.6 –530.5 –22.4
2083 –35.7 –573.9 –24.2
 aActual spending.
Delayed Medicare and Medicaid Trajectories
Low Spending Trajectory
For the low spending path, for the 5-year delay, this path follows the 
study baseline until 2017, after which it grows at the same proportional 
rate as the zero percent ECG trajectory that is implemented in 2012. For the 
10-year delay, this path follows the study baseline until 2022, after which 
it grows at the same proportional rate as the zero percent ECG spending 
trajectory.
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High Spending Trajectory
Since the high spending path that is implemented in 2012 does not 
deviate from the study baseline until 2030, 5- and 10-year delays leave it 
unaffected.
Intermediate Spending Paths
For both 5- and 10-year delays, the delayed intermediate-1 spending 
trajectories are exactly equidistant from the delayed low and delayed inter-
mediate-2 spending trajectories. Similarly, the delayed intermediate-2 spend-
ing trajectories are exactly equidistant from the delayed intermediate-1 and 
high spending trajectories.
Delayed Social Security Trajectories
A different approach is taken for the delayed Social Security trajecto-
ries, consistent with the committee’s analysis of this program (see Chapter 6 
and Appendix C). In these trajectories, the execution of each of the specific, 
detailed policies is delayed 5 or 10 years, and the fiscal consequences are 
then estimated. For example, in the 5-year delay of Option 2 (two-third 
benefit-growth reductions; one-third payroll tax increases; see Table 6-1), 
the first increase of the payroll tax would be delayed 5 years to 2017, in-
stead of occurring in 2012.
Each of the Social Security options that is implemented in 2012 achieves 
solvency for the program. However, as discussed in Chapter 9 (see also 
Tables F-17 and F-18 below), none of the delayed scenarios achieves sol-
vency for the Social Security program.2
Delayed Defense and Other Domestic Spending Trajectories
With a 5-year delay, for all four scenarios, defense and other domestic 
spending follows the baseline until 2017. Mimicking the 7-year phase-in 
(from 2012 to 2019) for the scenarios implemented in 2012, policy changes 
take effect in 2017, and by 2024 spending levels are where they would 
have been with 2012 implementation. In other words, the delayed defense 
and other domestic spending paths look different from the 2012 ones until 
2024, but are the same thereafter.
With a 10-year delay, for all four scenarios, defense and other domestic 
spending follows the baseline until 2022. Mimicking the 7-year phase-in 
(from 2012 to 2019) for the scenarios with 2012 implementation, policy 
changes take effect in 2022, and by 2029 spending levels are where they 
would have been with 2012 implementation. In other words, the delayed 
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TABLE F-13 Revenues and Outlays Under a 5-Year Delay of the 
Intermediate-2 Scenario, as Percentages of GDP
Selected 
Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma
Soc 
Secb
Def and 
Domc Interest Deficit Debt
2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4
2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6
2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0
2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4
2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1
2017 20.1 22.6 5.6 5.0 8.9 3.1 2.5 72.0
2018 20.4 22.7 5.7 5.1 8.7 3.2 2.3 69.8
2019 21.1 23.0 6.0 5.2 8.6 3.3 1.9 69.1
2020 21.5 23.1 6.2 5.3 8.4 3.2 1.6 68.1
2021 21.7 23.1 6.4 5.4 8.3 3.1 1.4 67.1
2022 21.8 22.9 6.5 5.3 8.1 3.0 1.1 65.7
2023 22.0 23.0 6.8 5.4 8.0 2.8 1.0 64.2
2024 21.9 23.0 6.9 5.4 7.8 2.8 1.1 63.0
2025 21.9 23.1 7.0 5.5 7.9 2.6 1.2 61.9
2026 21.9 23.3 7.3 5.6 7.8 2.6 1.5 61.0
2027 22.3 23.5 7.5 5.6 7.9 2.5 1.2 60.0
2028 21.6 23.8 7.7 5.7 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2029 21.8 24.0 8.0 5.7 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2030 22.0 24.2 8.0 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2031 22.2 24.4 8.3 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2032 22.3 24.6 8.4 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
2033 22.4 24.7 8.5 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
2034 22.8 25.0 8.8 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2035 22.7 25.1 8.9 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
 aMedicare and Medicaid.
 bSocial Security.
 cDefense and domestic, total.
defense and other domestic spending paths look different from the 2012 
ones until 2029, but are the same thereafter.
Tables F-13 through F-18 present details of the delay scenarios. Whole-
budget estimates appear in Tables F-13 to F-16, while financial estimates 
pertaining to the Social Security trust fund appear in Tables F-17 and 
F-18.
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TABLE F-14 Revenues and Outlays Under a 10-Year Delay of the 
Intermediate-2 Scenario, as Percentages of GDP
Selected 
Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma
Soc 
Secb
Def and 
Domc Interest Deficit Debt
2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4
2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6
2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0
2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4
2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1
2017 18.3 22.7 5.7 5.0 8.9 3.1 4.3 73.8
2018 18.3 22.8 5.7 5.1 8.7 3.4 4.5 73.8
2019 18.3 23.4 6.1 5.2 8.6 3.6 5.1 76.1
2020 18.3 23.8 6.4 5.3 8.5 3.6 5.5 78.8
2021 18.4 24.1 6.6 5.4 8.5 3.7 5.7 81.7
2022 20.9 24.1 6.7 5.4 8.4 3.6 3.2 81.8
2023 22.9 24.2 7.0 5.5 8.3 3.5 1.3 79.9
2024 23.4 24.2 7.1 5.5 8.2 3.4 0.8 77.8
2025 23.6 24.1 7.2 5.6 8.1 3.2 0.4 75.4
2026 23.8 24.2 7.5 5.7 8.0 3.1 0.5 73.0
2027 23.9 24.2 7.7 5.6 7.9 3.0 0.3 70.7
2028 23.8 24.4 7.9 5.7 7.8 2.9 0.6 68.7
2029 24.1 24.6 8.2 5.8 7.8 2.8 0.4 66.5
2030 24.2 24.7 8.2 5.9 7.8 2.8 0.5 64.6
2031 24.8 24.8 8.5 5.9 7.8 2.7 0.1 62.3
2032 24.9 24.9 8.6 5.9 7.8 2.6 0.0 60.0
2033 22.7 25.0 8.7 5.9 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
2034 23.1 25.3 9.0 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2035 23.0 25.3 9.1 5.8 7.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
 aMedicare and Medicaid.
 bSocial Security.
 cDefense and domestic, total.
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TABLE F-15 Budget Totals Resulting from 5-Year Delays of the 
Intermediate-1 (for Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security) and Low 
(for Defense and Other Domestic Spending) Scenarios, as Percentages of 
GDP
Selected 
Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma
Soc 
Secb
Def and 
Domc Interest Deficit Debt
2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4
2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6
2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0
2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4
2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1
2017 19.9 22.4 5.6 5.0 8.8 3.1 2.5 72.0
2018 20.1 22.4 5.6 5.1 8.5 3.2 2.3 69.8
2019 20.6 22.5 5.9 5.2 8.2 3.3 1.9 69.1
2020 20.8 22.4 6.1 5.3 7.9 3.2 1.6 68.1
2021 20.9 22.3 6.2 5.3 7.6 3.1 1.4 67.1
2022 20.8 21.9 6.3 5.3 7.3 3.0 1.1 65.7
2023 20.8 21.8 6.5 5.4 7.1 2.8 1.0 64.2
2024 20.5 21.6 6.6 5.4 6.8 2.8 1.1 63.0
2025 20.5 21.7 6.6 5.5 6.9 2.6 1.2 61.9
2026 20.4 21.9 6.9 5.6 6.8 2.6 1.5 61.0
2027 20.8 22.0 7.0 5.6 6.9 2.5 1.2 60.0
2028 20.0 22.2 7.2 5.6 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2029 20.1 22.4 7.4 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2030 20.3 22.5 7.4 5.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2031 20.5 22.7 7.6 5.8 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2032 20.5 22.8 7.7 5.8 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
2033 20.6 22.8 7.7 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
2034 20.8 23.0 8.0 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2035 20.7 23.1 8.0 5.7 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
 aMedicare and Medicaid.
 bSocial Security.
 cDefense and domestic, total.
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TABLE F-16 Revenues and Outlays Under a 10-Year Delay of the Low 
Scenario, as Percentages of GDP
Selected 
Years Revenues Outlays M and Ma
Soc 
Secb
Def and 
Domc Interest Deficit Debt
2012 17.9 22.2 4.9 4.7 10.8 1.7 4.3 66.4
2013 18.1 22.2 5.1 4.7 10.2 2.1 4.0 67.6
2014 18.1 22.2 5.3 4.8 9.6 2.5 4.1 69.0
2015 18.3 22.3 5.4 4.8 9.3 2.8 4.0 70.4
2016 18.3 22.6 5.6 4.9 9.1 3.0 4.3 72.1
2017 18.3 22.7 5.7 5.0 8.9 3.1 4.3 73.8
2018 18.3 22.8 5.7 5.1 8.7 3.4 4.5 73.8
2019 18.3 23.4 6.1 5.2 8.6 3.6 5.1 76.1
2020 18.3 23.8 6.4 5.3 8.5 3.6 5.5 78.8
2021 18.4 24.1 6.6 5.4 8.5 3.7 5.7 81.7
2022 20.7 23.8 6.6 5.4 8.3 3.6 3.2 81.8
2023 22.4 23.7 6.8 5.5 8.0 3.5 1.3 79.9
2024 22.7 23.5 6.9 5.4 7.8 3.4 0.8 77.8
2025 22.6 23.0 6.8 5.5 7.6 3.2 0.4 75.4
2026 22.5 22.9 7.0 5.5 7.3 3.1 0.5 73.0
2027 22.4 22.7 7.1 5.5 7.1 3.0 0.3 70.7
2028 22.0 22.6 7.2 5.5 6.9 2.9 0.6 68.7
2029 22.1 22.5 7.4 5.6 6.8 2.8 0.4 66.5
2030 22.0 22.5 7.3 5.6 6.8 2.8 0.5 64.6
2031 22.4 22.5 7.5 5.6 6.8 2.7 0.1 62.3
2032 22.4 22.5 7.5 5.6 6.8 2.6 0.0 60.0
2033 20.2 22.4 7.5 5.6 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
2034 20.4 22.6 7.7 5.6 6.8 2.5 2.2 60.0
2035 20.2 22.6 7.7 5.5 6.8 2.5 2.3 60.0
 aMedicare and Medicaid.
 bSocial Security.
 cDefense and domestic, total.
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TABLE F-17 Projected Social Security Cash Flow as Percentages of GDP: 
Current Law Compared with Four Committee Scenarios
Current Law and  
Four Scenarios 2020 2035 2050 2084
Current Law –0.5 –1.4 –1.2 –1.5
Low (Option 1) –0.3 –0.8 –0.2 –0.1
 Delayed 5 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.3 –0.1
 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –1.0 –0.5 –0.1
Intermediate-1 (Option 2) –0.3 –0.8 –0.2 0.0
 Delayed 5 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.1 –0.1
 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –1.0 –0.3 –0.1
Intermediate-2 (Option 3) –0.2 –0.7 –0.3 0.0
 Delayed 5 yrs –0.3 –0.7 –0.3 –0.1
 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.3 –0.2
High (Option 4) –0.2 –0.8 –0.3 –0.1
 Delayed 5 yrs –0.3 –0.8 –0.4 –0.2
 Delayed 10 yrs –0.5 –0.9 –0.4 –0.2
NOTE: A year’s “cash flow” is its Social Security revenues minus its expenditures. When the 
cash flow is positive, the balance in the trust fund increases (see next table). When negative, 
the trust fund balance decreases.
TABLE F-18 Projected Social Security Trust Fund Ratios: Current Law 
Compared with Four Committee Scenarios
Current Law and  
Four Scenarios 2020 2035 2050 2084
Current Law 315 50 0 0
Low (Option 1) 351 202 100 114
 Delayed 5 yrs 322 136 0 0
 Delayed 10 yrs 315 107 0 0
Intermediate-1 (Option 2) 334 178 113 157
 Delayed 5 yrs 320 126 0 0
 Delayed 10 yrs 315 91 0 0
Intermediate-2 (Option 3) 353 227 151 135
 Delayed 5 yrs 327 164 47 0
 Delayed 10 yrs 315 118 0 0
High (Option 4) 359 229 131 100
 Delayed 5 yrs 329 172 42 0
 Delayed 10 yrs 315 121 0 0
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NOTES
1. As an accounting concept, OMF provides the exact relationship between the annual 
deficit and change in the end-of-year debt. It is unusually large and positive in 2008-
2009, thus increasing the change in the debt above the deficit. The 2008-2009 OMF 
figures are largely swelled by financing for repayable advances to financial institutions, 
made to help stabilize financial markets, such as in the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). As TARP payments are repaid, they appear in the OMF accounting as negative 
entries, thus reducing federal borrowing needs, as well as reducing increases in the debt. 
CBO projects that many TARP advances will be repaid in 2010-2013 and all of them by 
2018, especially in the single years 2011, 2013, and 2018. In 2019, CBO projects OMF 
to be $18 billion, roughly the same order of magnitude as has occurred for most recent 
years.
2. Appendix C explains the indicators of program solvency. Because Tables F-17 and F-
18 are to be compared with Tables C-1 and C-2 for the “on-time” scenarios, the same 
conventions and assumptions apply. Specifically, all four tables rely on assumptions of 
the 2009 Social Security Trustees’ Report, rather than the CBO-based study assumptions 
that are applied in the report other than Chapter 6 and Appendix C.
REFERENCE
Congressional Budget Office. (2009). The Long-Term Budget Outlook. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office.
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Appendix G
International Experience with 
Long-Term Budgeting1
Long-term fiscal projections provide a basis for assessing the sustain-
ability of current public policies over an extended period (10 years or more) 
using select summary fiscal indicators.2 They do so by modeling future gov-
ernment expenditures and revenues on the basis of explicit demographic, 
macroeconomic, microeconomic, and other assumptions.
RECENT INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE
Over the past decade, fiscal projections have become increasingly com-
mon in the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD). In the mid-1990s, projections were prepared in only 
two countries, New Zealand and the United States; in 2009, 19 countries 
report that they prepare them; see Table G-1. The time horizon of fiscal pro-
jections varies among countries, from 25 years in Korea to approximately 
100 years in the Netherlands. The majority of these countries prepare fis-
cal projections on an annual basis, while six countries prepare them on a 
regular periodic basis (every 3 to 5 years), and two prepare them on an ad 
hoc basis. In parallel with these developments, attention to fiscal projections 
and fiscal sustainability has become more prominent in the monitoring and 
surveillance work of international organizations, including the European 
Commission, the International Monetary Fund, and the OECD.
This appendix focuses on the experiences of 12 OECD and other in-
dustrialized countries in using fiscal projections: Australia, Canada, Den-
mark, Germany, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For the most part, 
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these countries were selected on the basis of their responses to the 2007 
OECD Budget Practices and Procedures Survey, particularly the question on 
the frequency of their projections and the length of time covered.
Countries integrate projections with other budget practices and proce-
dures in various ways. Examples include the use of long-term projections 
when evaluating existing and new government initiatives, such as entitle-
ment spending, and linking the analysis of projections through budget 
triggers. Budget triggers are a signal for budget restraint based on indica-
tor of solvency (e.g., actuarial projections) or a sustainability factor (e.g,. 
dependency ratio). Triggers may be hard or soft. Hard triggers usually 
involve automatic cuts to program spending, changes in eligibility criteria 
or benefit formulas of mandatory spending, or tax increases. Soft triggers 
often involve result in further proposals to change the path of fiscal policy 
but are not guaranteed to produce changes (Government Accountability 
Office, 2008).
An overview of the fiscal futures reports from the 12 countries surveyed 
is presented in Table G-2.
TABLE G-1 Fiscal Projections in OECD Countriesa
Frequency fiscal 
projections are 
prepared?
How many years do fiscal projections cover?
21–30 31–40 41–50 51–60 61+ Total
Annually Belgium, Finland, 
France,* Hungary, 
Poland, Portugal, 
Sweden,* United 
Kingdom*
Czech 
Republic*
Denmark, 
United 
States
11
Regularly (every 
3-5years)
Australia, 
New 
Zealand
Germany,* 
Ireland, 
Switzerland
5
Ad hoc basis Koreab Japan,c Norway Netherlands 4
Total 1 2 13 1 3
 aAustria, Canada, Greece, Iceland, Mexico, and Turkey responded that they did not prepare 
fiscal projections of 10 years or more. Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Slovak Republic, 
and Spain responded that they prepare fiscal projections primarily for European Commission 
Stability and Convergence reporting.
 bKorea: Vision 2030 was prepared in 2030 and included projection of expenditures to meet 
the government’s proposed policy goals.
 cJapan: fiscal projections were prepared in 2007 by the Council on Economic and Fiscal 
Policy until 2025 and the Financial Systems Council within the Ministry of Finance until 
2050.
 *Countries also present fiscal projections over an infinite time horizon.
SOURCE: Anderson and Shepherd (2010).
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PROJECTIONS OF SPECIFIC FUNDS
Many countries also make long-term projections of specific budgetary 
funds, such as a public pensions and social security. A specific budgetary 
fund may be managed as a separate independent legal entity responsible 
for assets and contributions for an exclusive purpose. For example, fiscal 
projections of pension funds are undertaken in a number of OECD coun-
tries; see Box G-1.
SUMMARy OF EXPERIENCE WITH FISCAL PROJECTIONS
The experiences of the 12 countries considered can be summarized as 
follows:
• Most countries surveyed publish fiscal projections to assess the 
government’s fiscal future over a 40-50 year time horizon, and 
around half also over an infinite time horizon. Only half of all 
countries prepare their analyses annually. The practice remains 
relatively new in most countries, introduced in the past decade.
• Although many factors, such as the fiscal consequences of popula-
tion aging, global climate change, and contingent liabilities pose 
risks to fiscal sustainability, most projections focus solely on popu-
lation aging.
• A combination of projected fiscal aggregates and synthetic indica-
tors are the most common measures of fiscal sustainability; gen-
erational accounting is prepared only in a couple of the countries 
surveyed. Few countries provide an assessment of how and why 
their fiscal futures have changed since the last projection.
• Although sensitivity analyses of demographic and macroeconomic 
assumptions are common in many country’s fiscal projections, 
sensitivity analysis of the microeconomic assumptions relating to 
the cost of government services is not common. Analysis is typi-
cally used to assess a country’s fiscal future rather than to highlight 
policy options.
• Although the methodology and assumptions underlying fiscal pro-
jections are disclosed in many reports, none clearly presents how 
assumptions have changed over time and the reasons underlying 
the changes.
 APPENDIX G
BOX G-1 
Actuarial Projections of Pensions or Social Security 
Funds in Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States
The Australian Government Actuary,	 located	 within	 the	 Australian	Treasury,	
prepares	actuarial	cost	estimates	of	the	Public	Sector	Superannuation	Scheme	
(PSSS)	and	the	Commonwealth	Superannuation	Scheme	(CSS)	every	3	years,	
most	recently	in	2006.	The	report	identifies	the	projected	actual	Australian	Gov-
ernment	employer	 costs;	 the	size	of	 the	Australian	government’s	unfunded	su-
perannuation	 liability;	 and	 the	 level	 of	 the	 notional	 employer	 contribution	 rates	
required	to	cover	the	costs	of	the	schemes.
Canada’s Office of the Chief Actuary,	located	in	the	Superintendent	of	Financial	
Institutions	Canada,	undertakes	a	review	of	the	Canada	Pension	Plan	as	required	
by	 legislation.	 To	 date,	 23	 actuarial	 reports	 have	 been	 prepared	 since	 1964,	
though	 their	 frequency	 and	 time	 horizons	 have	 varied	 over	 this	 period.	 Since	
1997,	actuarial	projections	have	been	standardized	to	cover	a	75-year	period	and	
to	be	published	every	3	years.
Japan’s Chief Actuary of the Ministry of Welfare	conducts	a	mandatory	review	
of	the	financial	status	of	the	public	pension	system	at	least	once	every	five	years	
as	required	in	legislation,	most	recently	in	February	2009.	The	reports	update	the	
underlying	modeling	assumptions	and	checks	whether	the	replacement	rate	is	on	
track	to	fall	below	its	prescribed	minimum	level	in	the	future.
In Korea,	an	assessment	of	sustainability	of	the	Korean	National	Pension	Scheme	
is	required	by	legislation	every	5	years.	The	introduction	of	actuarial	projections	
as	of	2003	represents	one	of	the	major	changes	in	the	1998	amendment	to	the	
National	Pension	Act.	To	date,	two	actuarial	projections	have	been	prepared:	the	
first	in	2003,	the	second	in	2008.
The United Kingdom Government Actuary’s Department prepares	 reviews	
every	 5	 years	 of	 the	National	 Insurance	 Fund.	The	 reviews	 provide	 a	 60-year	
projection	 to	estimate	 the	contribution	rates	required	 to	be	paid	 to	 the	National	
Insurance	Fund	in	future	years	in	order	to	meet	expenditure	on	a	pay-as-you-go	
basis.	Projections,	however,	may	be	updated	more	frequently	as	necessary	to	il-
lustrate	the	financial	consequences	of	reform	proposals	and	new	draft	legislation.	
An	external	peer	review	of	the	department’s	projections	is	conducted	periodically,	
most	recently	in	2002.
In the United States,	 the	Social	Security	Act	was	amended	in	1968	to	provide	
for	the	appointment	of	an	advisory	council	every	4	years	beginning	in	1969.	The	
council	was	to	review	the	status	of	the	Social	Security	and	Medicare	trust	funds	
as	well	as	the	scope	of	coverage	and	adequacy	of	benefits	under	the	Social	Se-
curity	and	Medicare	programs.	The	statute	specifically	authorized	the	council	to	
engage	the	technical	assistance	necessary	to	carry	out	their	functions.	A	technical	
advisory	panel	also	 reviews	 the	methods	and	assumptions	used	 in	 the	annual	
projections	for	the	Social	Security	trust	funds.
APPENDIX G 
NOTES
1. This appendix is drawn from a survey of international experience with long-term projec-
tions, analysis, and related practices conducted for the committee by Barry Anderson, 
head of the budgeting and public expenditures division, public governance and territo-
rial development division, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), with the support of his colleague James Sheppard. A full report on that survey 
was presented at the June 2009 meeting of OECD senior budget officials and has now 
been published; see Anderson and Sheppard (2009).
2. What constitutes “long term” is subject to much discussion. Logically, the long term is 
anything beyond the medium term, which itself varies between countries. Long term is 
typically associated with effects across generations. In industrialized countries, an average 
generation is 30-40 years. The time period of more than 10 years has been selected here, 
noting that a number of countries prepare medium-term fiscal frameworks spanning up 
to 8 years (e.g., Denmark and Sweden).
REFERENCES
Anderson, B., and Sheppard, J. (2010). Fiscal futures, institutional budget reforms, and their 
effects: What can be learned? OECD Journal on Budgeting, 00(3).
Government Accountability Office. (2006). Budget Process: Better Transparency, Controls, 
Triggers, and Default Mechanisms Would Help to Address Our Large and Growing 
Long-term Fiscal Challenge. GAO-06-761T, May 25. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office.


Appendix H
Biographical Sketches of 
Committee Members and Staff
John L. Palmer (Cochair) is a university professor and dean emeritus of 
the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse Univer-
sity. He recently completed two presidentially appointed terms as a public 
trustee for the Medicare and Social Security programs. Previously, he has 
held positions both in and out of government, including Assistant Secretary 
for Planning and Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Urban Institute, 
and adjunct professor at Harvard University. His publications include 13 
books and numerous professional and popular articles on economic, bud-
getary, and social policy issues. He has testified before Congress on many 
occasions and been a consultant to numerous government agencies, private 
foundations, and universities. He is a fellow of the National Academy of 
Public Administration and past president of the National Academy of Social 
Insurance. He has a B.A from Williams College and a Ph.D. from Stanford 
University.
Rudolph G. Penner (Cochair) is an institute fellow at the Urban Institute, 
holding the Arjay and Frances Miller chair in public policy. Previously, 
he was a managing director of the Barents Group, a KPMG company, a 
resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and a professor of 
economics at the University of Rochester. His government posts include di-
rector of the Congressional Budget Office, Assistant Director for Economic 
Policy at the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for Economic Affairs at the U.S. Department of Housing and 
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Urban Development, and senior staff economist at the Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors. He received the Jesse Burkhead Award for the best article 
published in Public Budgeting and Finance. He is a past president of the 
National Economists Club, and he served on the board of directors of the 
National Association for Business Economics. He has a Ph.D. from Johns 
Hopkins University.
Joseph Antos is the Wilson H. Taylor scholar in health care and retirement 
policy at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a commissioner of the 
Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission and an adjunct profes-
sor at the School of Public Health of the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill. Previously, he was Assistant Director for Health and Human 
Resources at the Congressional Budget Office. His research focuses on the 
economics of health policy, including Medicare reform, health insurance 
regulation, and the uninsured. He has written and spoken extensively on 
the Medicare drug benefit and has led a team of experienced independent 
actuaries and cost estimators in a study to evaluate various proposals to 
extend health coverage to the uninsured. He has an M.A. and a Ph.D. from 
the University of Rochester.
Kenneth S. Apfel is a professor at the School of Public Policy of the Uni-
versity of Maryland. Previously, he held many senior government positions, 
including the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Associ-
ate Director for Human Resources for the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, and Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget at the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services. He also worked as legislative 
director to Senator Bill Bradley and served as committee staff for the Bud-
get Committee of the U.S. Senate. He is a fellow of the National Academy 
of Public Administration and the National Academy of Social Insurance. 
He has a B.A. from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, an M.Ed. 
from Northeastern University, and an M.P.A. from the LBJ School of Public 
Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin.
Richard C. Atkinson is president emeritus of the University of California 
and professor emeritus of cognitive science and psychology at the University 
of California at San Diego. Prior to assuming the presidency of the Uni-
versity of California system, he was chancellor of University of California 
at San Diego. He is a former director of the National Science Foundation, 
past president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, 
and was a long-term member of the faculty at Stanford University. His 
research has been concerned with problems of memory and cognition. He 
is a member of the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medi-
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cine, the National Academy of Education, and the American Philosophical 
Society. He has a Ph.B. from the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. from 
Indiana University.
Alan J. Auerbach is a Robert D. Burch professor of economics and law 
and director of the Burch Center for Tax Policy and Public Finance at the 
University of California at Berkeley. Previously, he was a member of the 
Department of Economics at Harvard University and a professor of law and 
economics at the University of Pennsylvania. He has served as a research 
associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and as the deputy 
chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation of the U.S. Congress. 
He has authored numerous articles, books, and reviews and is the past or 
present associate editor of six journals. He is a member of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has a B.A. from Yale University and a 
Ph.D. from Harvard University.
Rebecca M. Blank resigned from the committee in spring 2009 to accept the 
position of Under Secretary for Economic Affairs in the U.S. Department 
of Commerce. Before this appointment, she was the Robert V. Kerr senior 
fellow at the Brookings Institution. Previously, she was dean of the Gerald 
R. Ford School of Public Policy and professor of economics at the Univer-
sity of Michigan and codirector of the school’s National Poverty Center; 
a professor of economics at Northwestern University and director of the 
Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty 
Research; and a professor at Princeton University. She served as a member 
of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers. She has served as 
president of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, 
vice president of the American Economic Association, and president of the 
Midwest Economics Association. She is a fellow of the National Academy 
of Public Administration and a member of the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences. She has a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology.
Andrea L. Campbell is associate professor of political science at the Mas-
sachusetts Institute of Technology. She studies American politics, political 
behavior, public opinion, political inequality, and social policy, particularly 
the interplay between political institutions and the political behavior and 
attitudes of mass publics. She is currently working on a study of taxes, 
public opinion, and the American fiscal state and on an examination of the 
politics of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003. Her work has been 
published in the American Political Science Reiew, Health Affairs, Politi-
cal Behaior, Studies in American Political Deelopment, and Comparatie 
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Political Studies. She was a Robert Wood Johnson scholar in health policy 
at Yale University. She has a B.A. from Harvard University and a Ph.D. 
from the University of California at Berkeley.
Chris Edwards is the director of tax policy studies at the Cato Institute 
and manages www.downsizinggovernment.org. Previously, he was a senior 
economist on the congressional Joint Economic Committee, a tax manager 
with PricewaterhouseCoopers, and an economist with the Tax Founda-
tion. Edwards’ articles on tax and budget policies have appeared in the 
Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Inestor’s 
Business Daily, and other newspapers. He has a B.A. in economics from 
the University of Waterloo and an M.A. in economics from George Mason 
University.
Dana P. Goldman is the director of the Leonard D. Schaeffer Center for 
Health Policy and Economics and professor and Norman Topping chair 
in medicine and public policy at the University of Southern California. He 
also serves as an adjunct professor of health services and radiology at the 
University of California at Los Angeles and as a research associate at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research. His current research focuses on 
the intersection of applied microeconomics and medical issues, with a spe-
cial interest in the role that medical technology and health insurance play 
in determining health-related outcomes. He is a recipient of the National 
Institute for Health Care Management Research Foundation Award for 
Excellence in Health Policy. He has a B.A. from Cornell University and a 
Ph.D. from Stanford University.
Robert F. Hale resigned from the committee in February 2009 to accept 
the position of the Under Secretary (Comptroller) in the U.S. Department 
of Defense. Before this appointment, he was executive director of the 
American Society of Military Comptrollers, an 18,000-member associa-
tion that provides professional development activities for defense financial 
managers. During the Clinton Administration, he served as the Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force (financial management and comptroller). Prior 
to that appointment, he was head of the defense unit of the Congressional 
Budget Office. He is a former national president of the American Society 
of Military Comptrollers. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public 
Administration. He has a B.S. and an M.S. from Stanford University and 
an M.B.A. from George Washington University.
Ellen Hughes-Cromwick is a director and the chief economist for Ford Mo-
tor Company. She has major responsibility for the company’s global eco-
nomic and automotive industry forecasts used to support business strategy, 
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finance, and planning and leads a group effort on special industry studies 
and strategic issues. Previously, she was a senior economist at Mellon Bank, 
with major responsibilities that included the monthly U.S. macroeconomic 
forecast, credit markets outlook, and industry analysis. She has also held 
positions as an assistant professor of economics at Trinity College in Con-
necticut and as a staff economist on the President’s Council of Economic 
Advisers during the Reagan Administration. She currently serves as a board 
member of the National Association for Business Economics and the NABE 
Foundation. She has an M.A. and a Ph.D. from Clark University.
Malay Majmundar served as the senior program associate for this study. 
His research interests center on social policy and public administration. 
He has a Ph.D. in public policy from the University of Chicago and a J.D. 
from Yale University.
Mark David Menchik served as senior program officer for this study. Previ-
ously, he held a variety of positions at the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget, where he conducted special studies on price indexation, employ-
ment programs, and child care and performed budget, management, and 
regulatory reviews for transportation, housing, financial, retirement, and 
statistical programs. He has also held positions at the U.S. Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations, the RAND Corporation, and the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. He has an A.B. from Harvard and an 
M.A. in city and regional planning and a Ph.D. in regional economics from 
the University of Pennsylvania.
Joseph J. Minarik is the senior vice president and director of research at 
the Committee for Economic Development (CED), where he leads research 
projects on the economy and the federal budget, globalization, trade, early 
childhood education, campaign finance reform, and health care. Previ-
ously, he served as executive director of the Joint Economic Committee for 
chair Lee Hamilton and executive director for policy and chief economist 
of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives for chair Leon 
E. Panetta. During the Clinton Administration, he served as associate di-
rector for economic policy at the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. 
He is the author of Making Tax Choices (Urban Institute Press) and many 
articles on fiscal issues. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public 
Administration. He has a B.A. from Georgetown University and a Ph.D. 
from Yale University.
Olivia S. Mitchell is the International Foundation of Employee Benefit 
Plans professor and chair of insurance and risk management, executive 
director of the Pension Research Council, and director of the Boettner 
 APPENDIX H
Center on Pensions and Retirement Research, all at the Wharton School 
at the University of Pennsylvania. She is also a research associate at the 
National Bureau of Economic Research and codirector of the Financial 
Literacy Center. Her main areas of research and teaching are private and 
public insurance, risk management, public finance and labor markets, and 
compensation and pensions, both in the United States and internationally. 
She was a member of the Commission to Strengthen Social Security in the 
George W. Bush Administration. Her many speaking engagements have 
included the World Economic Forum and the International Monetary Fund, 
and she has provided testimony to committees of the U.S. Congress, the 
parliament of the United Kingdom, the Australian Parliament, and the Bra-
zilian Senate. She has a B.A. from Harvard and a Ph.D. from the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison.
Sean O’Keefe is the chief executive officer of EADS North America. Previ-
ously, he was vice president and a corporate officer of the General Electric 
Company in the technology infrastructure sector, and he led Washington 
operations for the company’s aviation business. He has been chancellor of 
Louisiana State University and has held faculty positions at Syracuse Uni-
versity and Pennsylvania State University. In the administration of George 
W. Bush he served as deputy assistant to the President, deputy director of 
the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and administrator of the U.S. 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He also served as secre-
tary of the Navy and as comptroller and chief financial officer of the U.S. 
Department of Defense in the administration of George H.W. Bush and, 
previously, as staff director of the Committee on Appropriations and the 
Defense Subcommittee of the U.S. Senate. He is a fellow of the National 
Academy of Public Administration and of the International Academy of 
Astronautics. He has a B.A. from Loyola University and an M.P.A. from 
the Maxwell School of Syracuse University.
Gilbert S. Omenn is professor of internal medicine, human genetics, bioin-
formatics, and public health at the University of Michigan. Previously, he 
served as executive vice president for medical affairs and as chief executive 
officer of the University of Michigan Health System. He also served as 
dean of the School of Public Health and professor of medicine and envi-
ronmental health at the University of Washington in Seattle. His research 
interests include cancer proteomics, chemoprevention of cancers, public 
health genetics, science-based risk analysis, and health policy. During the 
Carter Administration he was associate director in the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy and associate director of the U.S. Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. He is a former president of the American Association for 
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the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the Institute of Medicine, 
the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Association of American 
Physicians, and the American College of Physicians. He has a B.A. from 
Princeton University, an M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and a Ph.D. 
from the University of Washington.
June E. O’Neill is the Wollman professor of economics at the Zicklin School 
of Business and the director of the Center for the Study of Business and 
Government in the School of Public Affairs at Baruch College of the City 
University of New York. She is also an adjunct scholar of the American En-
terprise Institute. Her government service includes director of the Congres-
sional Budget Office, director of policy and research at the U.S. Commission 
on Civil Rights, and senior economist at the Council of Economic Advisers 
in the Reagan Administration. She has also held positions as senior research 
associate at the Urban Institute and research associate at the Brookings 
Institution. Her published research includes wage differentials by race and 
gender, health insurance, tax and budget policy, and social security. She has 
a Ph.D. from Columbia University.
Paul L. Posner is the director of the Public Administration Program at 
George Mason University. Previously, he led the budget and public finance 
work of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, developing long-term 
models of the federal budget, outlining opportunities for reform in major 
federal programs, and recommending changes to the budget process to 
provide greater visibility to long-term issues. His work on the federal bud-
get has earned him the James Blum Award from the Association of Budget 
and Program Analysis for outstanding public budgeting leadership and the 
S. Kenneth Howard Award from the Association for Budget and Financial 
Management. He has served as president of the Association for Budget and 
Financial Management and of the American Society for Public Administra-
tion. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and 
chairs the Academy’s Panel on the Federal System. He has a Ph.D. from 
Columbia University.
F. Stevens Redburn served as study director, and he is an adjunct profes-
sor in the School of Public Policy and Public Administration of George 
Washington University. He has previously directed studies for the National 
Academy of Public Administration, and he has served as chair or member 
of many of its study panels. In government he has more than 25 years of 
experience as a senior government official in the U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
He also served as senior budget adviser on the Kosovo V project of the U.S. 
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Agency for International Development, advising on a wide range of budget-
ing issues and improved budget procedures. He is a fellow of the National 
Academy of Public Administration. He has a Ph.D. in political science from 
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Robert D. Reischauer is president of the Urban Institute. Previously, he was 
a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and the senior vice president 
of the Urban Institute. His government service includes the Congressional 
Budget Office, where he served as assistant director for human resources, 
deputy director, and director. His main research foci are the federal budget, 
Medicare, and Social Security, especially the effects of entitlement programs 
on the fiscal outlook and budget process. He served on the Medicare Pay-
ment Advisory Commission and as its vice chair. He has written widely 
and testified before congressional committees on a range of economic and 
welfare issues. He is a member of the Institute of Medicine and a fellow of 
the National Academy of Public Administration. He has a master of inter-
national affairs degree and a Ph.D. from Columbia University.
Jane L. Ross, who served as senior staff officer for this study, is director 
of the Center for Economic, Governance, and International Studies at the 
National Research Council. Previously, she was the deputy commissioner 
for policy at the Social Security Administration, serving as an adviser to 
the commissioner of Social Security on policy issues, as well as the leader 
of the policy analysis and research office. Her other government service 
includes director for income security issues and senior assistant director 
for Medicare and Medicaid issues at the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office. She is a member of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and 
Management and is a founding member of the National Academy of Social 
Insurance. She has a Ph.D. in economics from American University.
Kathy A. Ruffing served as a senior program officer for this study until 
October 2008. She is a senior policy analyst at the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, specializing in federal budget issues. She spent 25 years at 
the Congressional Budget Office, where she analyzed a wide range of top-
ics including interest costs and federal debt, federal pay, immigration, and 
Social Security. She also held positions at the U.S. Department of Labor 
and the Social Security Administration. She has a B.A. in economics and 
political science from the University of Pittsburgh and an M.A. in econom-
ics from George Washington University.
Margaret C. Simms is an institute fellow at the Urban Institute and director 
of its low-income working families project, a research initiative exploring 
the challenges faced by 9 million families and their 19 million children. 
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Previously, she held many positions at the Joint Center for Political and 
Economic Studies, including vice president for governance and economic 
analysis and interim president. She has also served as a faculty member 
at Atlanta University, at Clark College (Atlanta), and at the University of 
California at Santa Cruz. She has been editor of the Reiew of Black Po-
litical Economy and chair of the board of the Institute for Women’s Policy 
Research. She has been a member of Black Enterprise magazine’s board of 
economists and president of the National Academy of Social Insurance. She 
is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. She has an 
M.A. and a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University.
William E. Spriggs resigned from the committee in spring 2009 to accept the 
position of Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Before this appointment, he was a professor and chair of the Department of 
Economics at Howard University. He was also a senior fellow for the Com-
munity Service Society of New York. He served as chair of the Independent 
Health Care Trust for United Auto Workers (UAW) Retirees of Ford Motor 
Company, and he was on the board of the Retiree Health Administration 
Corporation, which administers the health care trusts for UAW retirees of 
Ford and General Motors, and he chaired the UAW Retirees of the Dana 
Corporation Health and Welfare Trust. During the Clinton Administration 
he served as a senior adviser and an economist and special adviser in the 
U.S. Department of Commerce. He has also served as executive director of 
the National Urban League’s Institute for Opportunity and Equality. He is 
a member of the National Academy of Public Administration and the Na-
tional Academy of Social Insurance. He has a B.A. from Williams College 
and a Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Thomas C. Sutton is the retired chairman and CEO of Pacific Life Insurance 
Company. He now serves on the boards of directors of Pacific Life, Edison 
International, Southern California Edison, and the Public Policy Institute of 
California, which he previously chaired; and he previously served as chair 
and director of the American Council of Life Insurers and the Association 
of California Life and Health Insurance Companies. He has previously 
served as director or trustee for a range of organizations, including the Ir-
vine Company, the California Chamber of Commerce, the Orange County 
Performing Arts Center, the California Business Roundtable, and the South 
Coast Repertory Theatre. He has a B.S. from the University of Toronto and 
he completed the Advanced Management Program at Harvard University.
Susan Tanaka is the director of citizen education and engagement at the 
Peter G. Peterson Foundation. Previously, she was the associate director for 
communications and a senior analyst in the Budget Analysis Division of the 
 APPENDIX H
Congressional Budget Office. Other government work included the U.S. 
Office of Management and Budget, as a budget analyst and as a special as-
sistant to the Assistant Director of Administration and Legislation, working 
on agencywide personnel and administrative issues. She has also been vice 
president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, directing its 
analytic work on issues related to the federal budget, including Social Secu-
rity, health care programs, tax issues, and budget process and scorekeeping. 
She has an M.B.A. from the Yale School of Management and an M.A. from 
the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy of Tufts University.
Ruth A. Wooden is president of Public Agenda. Previously, Ms. Wooden 
was executive vice president and senior counselor at the international 
public relations firm of Porter Novelli, where she led the advertising and 
cause-related marketing practice. Other previous positions included volun-
teer president of the National Parenting Association and president of the 
Advertising Council. She currently serves as chair of the Board of Civic 
Ventures. She is also on the boards of the Family Violence Prevention Fund 
and Research!America and is a former director of CARE and the Edna 
McConnell Clark Foundation. She is a recipient of United Jewish Appeal’s 
Maxwell Dane Humanitarian Award, the Advertising Woman of the Year 
Award, the Prudential Prize in Non-Profit Leadership, and the Matrix 
Award from New York Women in Communication. She has a B.A. in sociol-
ogy and history from the University of Minnesota and an honorary Ph.D. 
from Northeastern University.
